Prize for general nonfiction, for *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, which became a number-one best-seller and was made into an eight-hour PBS/BBC television series. He is a member of both the New York Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House).

• U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson gave the concluding speech.

CSIS Energy and National Security Program

The conference was the culmination (except for a book that is to follow) of CSIS's Strategic Energy Initiative. This initiative is one of four programs that have been run at CSIS under the umbrella of the Energy and National Security Program (ENSP).

ENSP Director Robert Ebel has held positions in the CIA, the Department of the Interior, and the Federal Energy Agency. He was a member of the first U.S. government oil delegation to the Soviet Union in 1960, and in 1970 he returned to Russia to inspect the new oil fields in western Siberia. In 1994, he was named by the International Energy Agency to a team of experts examining Russia's long-term energy strategy, and in November 1997, he led a team to examine the oil and gas sectors of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. He is the author of numerous books on Russian, Transcaucasian, Caspian Sea basin, and Central Asian oil and natural gas.

The programs for which he provides overall coordination, apart from the Strategic Energy Initiative, include:

- 1. "Global Nuclear Materials Management." This initiative was to study a post-Cold War strategy for secure nuclear energy operations in the next century. On Dec. 4, 1998, CSIS's Sam Nunn hosted a conference to discuss nuclear policy and its future.
- 2. "Nuclear Regulatory Process Review." This initiative was focussed on a review of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulatory process for commercial nuclear reactors and its internal efforts to improve this process. It produced a final report under CSIS auspices, *Regulatory Process for Nuclear Power Reactors: A Review*.
- 3. "Caspian Sea Oil Study Group." The ENSP report on this study group states: "After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea basin held great promise to foreign investors for its potential oil and natural gas reserves. Since then, deals have been struck, millions of dollars invested, but very little oil has been exported. This ongoing group focuses on foreign investor developments in oil production and export in the Caspian Sea states, taking into consideration current political and economic climates. Since the beginning in April 1994, the group has hosted the Prime Minister of Armenia, the Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan, and the President and Vice-President for Exports of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC)."

Lunatic Brzezinski's 'New Carter Doctrine'

by Scott Thompson

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), especially through its counsellor, Carter National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, has been one of the key centers advocating what high-level European sources have called a "New Carter Doctrine," and with it the threat of an escalation of regional crises toward World War III.

According to this "doctrine," the Caucasus-Central Asia region is defined, in effect, as the Persian Gulf of the twenty-first century, whose raw materials deposits are of vital importance for the West. While Russia is in what the CSIS calls a "meltdown," Brzezinski describes Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea basin as part of a "Zone of Instability" which includes the infamous "Arc of Crisis," of which he spoke before and during the time he infested the Carter administration.

At least since the 1997 publication of his book *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books), Brzezinski has advocated a new version of the historic "Great Game," by which Britain, France, and the failing Ottoman Empire sought to wrest Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Caspian basin, with its significant raw materials, away from any re-assertion of Russian dominance. Brzezinski's colleagues at CSIS, through its Strategic Energy Initiative, argue that such moves today ought not cause a Russian backlash, because Russia receives most of its oil and natural gas from the Urals-Volga region and Siberia. Thus, a plot has been hatched by British asset Brzezinski and his Anglo-American oligarchical faction, to grab this region, while Russia remains enmired in a "time of troubles."

Brzezinski on U.S. supremacy

In *The Grand Chessboard*, Brzezinski asserts that the United States is today the supreme superpower, on a scale

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^{1.} For more on Brzezinski's geopolitical lunacy see Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Mad Brzezinski's Chessboard," *EIR*, April 2, 1999; Scott Thompson, "A Lexicon of 'Brzezinskisms': Brzezinski Testifies Against Himself," *EIR*, April 9, 1999; Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Brzezinski's Role in the Nuclear-War Potential," *EIR*, Sept. 10, 1999; and, Scott Thompson, "An Oily Family: The Brzezinskis and the 'Great Game' in Transcaucasus," *EIR*, Sept. 10, 1999.

unmatched by even the Roman and British empires.

"Hegemony is as old as mankind," he writes. "But America's current global supremacy is distinctive in the rapidity of its emergence, in its global scope, and in the manner of its exercise. In the course of a single century, America has transformed itself—and has also been transformed by international dynamics—from a country relatively isolated in the Western Hemisphere into a power of unprecedented worldwide reach and grasp....

"In brief, America stands supreme in the four decisive domains of global power: militarily, it has an unmatched global reach; economically, it remains the main locomotive of global growth . . .; technologically, it retains the over-all cutting edge areas of innovation; and culturally . . . it enjoys an appeal that is unrivalled . . . all of which gives the United States a political clout that no other state comes close to matching. It is the combination of all four that makes America the only comprehensive global superpower. . . .


"For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia. For half a millennium, world affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers and peoples who fought with one another for regional domination and reached out for global power. Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia—and America's global primacy is directly dependent upon how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained."

This geopolitical view draws upon the earlier "geography as religion" idiocy of Britain's Halford Mackinder and Germany's Karl Haushofer, which provided the figleaf for British geopolitical manipulations that triggered World War I and World War II, in order to halt Eurasian integration. For Brzezinski, control of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Caspian basin is the spoils of American superpower hegemony.

'The Eurasian Balkans'

This belief, that the Transcaucasus-Central Asian region is up for grabs, is already goading the Russian bear into a murderous rage, Brzezinski fumes:

"The emergence of the independent Central Asian states meant that in some places, Russia's southeastern frontier had been pushed back northward more than 1,000 miles. The new states now controlled vast mineral and energy deposits that were bound to attract foreign interests. . . . Supported from the outside by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the Central Asian states have not been inclined to trade their new political sovereignty even for the sake of beneficial economic integration with Russia, as many Russians continued to hope they would. . . . For the Russians, the specter of a potential conflict with the Islamic states along Russia's entire southern flank (which, adding Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, account for more than 300 million people) has to be a source of serious concern."



Zbigniew Brzezinski's policy toward Russia is blunt and brutal: "We should ostracize them."

Speaking of this "Zone of Instability," Brzezinski writes: "The Eurasian Balkans are truly reminiscent of the older, more familiar Balkans of southeastern Europe: not only are its political entities unstable, but they tempt and invite the intrusion of powerful neighbors, each of whom is determined to oppose the region's dominance by another. It is this familiar combination of power vacuum and power suction that justifies the appellation, 'Eurasian Balkans'....The Eurasian Balkans... are infinitely more important as a potential economic prize: an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves is located in the region, in addition to important raw materials, including gold."

'Ostracize Russia!'

Since writing this lunatic recipe for World War III, Brzezinski has been frequently warning that the subsequent war in Chechnya is merely the harbinger for a "domino effect" by which Russian "neo-colonists," who are motivated by "revenge, paranoia, and nostalgia for empire," may seek to reassert hegemony over Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea basin. Not only did Brzezinski's advocacy of this domino theory dominate his keynote address to the CSIS conference (see accompanying article), but he has written a number of commentaries on the subject that have been printed

worldwide. One such is a Nov. 10 piece, "Why the West Should Care About Chechnya." In it, he writes:

"More broadly, the conflict could destabilize the Southern Caucasus. The Northern Caucasus is already a mess, but the flow of refugees and the associated instability is likely to spread to Georgia. A military success in Chechnya is likely to tempt Moscow hard-liners either to subdue or to eliminate Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, thereby also subordinating his nation. The fear of such an outcome was palpable when I visited Tbilisi [the capital of Georgia] last month.

"This would be bad news for the U.S.A. A subordinated Georgia would give Russia access to Armenia, already Moscow's dependency, thereby cutting off Azerbaijan (as well as Central Asia) from the West while giving Moscow political control over the Baku-Supsa [Georgia] pipeline."

(It is worth noting that, at least until the 1998 British Petroleum takeover of Amoco, Brzezinski had been a consultant on Caspian Sea oil to Amoco, for a fee that he will not disclose. He helped convince both the Azeri leadership and the Azerbaijan International Operating Company to pursue a very expensive pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, Turkey, thereby cutting off Russia.)

Brzezinski expanded upon his favorite theme on C-SPAN TV's "Morning Journal" on Dec. 12:

Q: "In this map, this relatively small area is Chechnya. Why should Americans care about what's happening there?"

Brzezinski: "You know, that's a very good question. It was asked about Kosovo. It was asked about East Timor. It was asked about Rwanda. Why should we care? . . . Geopolitically, why should we care? Well, I will make two arguments.

"One, if the Caucasus is destabilized, then any hope of integrating that large, new, more independent area involving the Caspian Sea, involving Central Asia, where there is a fair amount of energy, is going to be lost. It's going to become a zone of conflict. And, secondly, in Russia itself, as the papers today made quite clear, this war is unleashing chauvinistic, nationalistic, imperialistic attitudes, which are setting back the process of transforming Russia.

"In the case of Russia, we have to be realistic. Russia is a major regional power. It has a nuclear arsenal, so we can't use force against them. But, this doesn't mean that we have to do nothing....

"This is why I think we ought to be adopting a position of economic sanctions against Russians, so they would not have the finances to wage this war, which could be done directly, but we continue to give them credits like the IMF has done. We should ostracize them. We should kick them out of the G-8, which allegedly is a club of the good, decent, advanced, democratic countries: Make them feel there is a price for this. Maybe they will acquiesce. Maybe they will not. But, at least we will have tried, and we'll have more or less drawn a line so that they are not inclined to do this again."

Many of Brzezinski's colleagues at CSIS share his desire

for such a raw materials grab in the region, but they differ on the timetable for doing so. One Feb. 11, 1999 background paper for CSIS's Strategic Energy Initiative, "The Geopolitics of Energy in the Former Soviet Union," states that this sort of grab may remain a possibility until well into the twenty-first century.

"At best," according to the report, "a slow recovery can be expected [with the Russian economy], with none of their outputs regaining their 1989 levels before the year 2010 at the earliest."

The report notes that conditions have worsened even more in Russia "in the wake of the August 1998 political, economic, and financial meltdown."

The authors of this report state that this is true throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), especially for Russia, Belarus, and Tajikistan, which are "basket cases": "All of the CIS member-states have experienced substantial drops in GDP, industrial output, and real incomes since 1989, owing to the disintegration of the highly integrated economy of the former U.S.S.R. and the severance of the trading link with Comecon [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], together with the disruption of civil wars, armed hostilities, and mass movement of refugees in, inter alia, Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Tajikistan."

A window of opportunity

This provides a window of opportunity for the "victors" of the Cold War, according to the authors: "The producing potential of the Caspian Sea basin has caught the eye of the major international oil companies for several reasons. First, once unavailable, it is open to the foreign investor; second, the Caspian producing potential is world class; third, this potential and the anticipated income cannot be realized within an acceptable time frame without outside participation; and fourth, given that local demand is minimal and likely to stay that way, most of the oil will be available for export."

What is ironic, is that Russia itself is currently the thirdlargest producer of oil and natural gas in the world. Other CSIS reports admit that even if the oil in Transcaucasia, the Caspian Sea basin, and Central Asia were developed and pipelines built, it would still only contribute 3% to known potential oil reserves.

If CSIS were truly interested in the "enlightened selfinterest" of the United States, rather than the lunatic geopolitical theories of Brzezinski, it would behoove CSIS to advocate joint development of Russia's oil and natural gas capacity, which presently is dropping due to the lack of new capital inputs, exploration, and technology. (China, for example, is investigating the possibility of natural gas pipelines both to Turkmenistan and to Siberia.) It would seem that those like Brzezinski, with his "New Carter Doctrine," are more interested in reviving the Cold War, and with it the potential for World War III.