

There are two most important differences: the surviving force of "that cultural heritage of the American Revolution which was nobly affirmed by Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt;" and the fact that "world rule by the universal fascism of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, Henry Kissinger et al., is insurgent, but not yet triumphant."

Middle East foretell the tragic doom of the U.S. economic and strategic policies of the current moment.

It is their doom, but also, probably, the doom of all of us as well, as the hecatomb of Nero's rage cut open the veins and hacked off the heads of so many of the ruling elite, and others, of Rome in that time.

The point of my aside to you here, is to prompt you to compare the evident mental state of the Bush Administration with that of Rome under Nero. As I have warned you above, do not attempt an exact match between Nero's and Bush's administrations. Rather, get the flavor of the ironic similarities, the common characteristics of what are otherwise two quite different specific circumstances. The key to sorting out the similarities and differences, is your recognition that the U.S. policy under the Bush Administration today, is predominantly a strategic orientation toward establishing a universal-fascist form of English-speaking world-empire, which is an attempted parody of the ancient empire of pagan Rome.

See popular opinion in our nation's capital beltway today, as you may recognize the disgusting, tragically foolish behavior of popular opinion in Nero's time. Compare the delusions of Nero and his circles, with those in hegemonic circles of the administration, Congress, and Federal Court today. See clearly the tragic fatality lurking for the U.S. in the implications of continuing U.S.A. Afghanistan follies, and the naked support for the fascist regime of Israel's Ariel Sharon. A popular opinion which would support such policies is the mark of a self-doomed world power.

Grasp the enormity of the folly of many among you, who are still duped into the wishful delusion of a recovery which does not exist. Recognize how your credulities are digging the hole which threatens to become our national catastrophe.

With those words, I return to my part in the unfolding world drama before you.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: Then, and Now

by Sen. Eugene McCarthy

Beginning in the Johnson Administration and continuing into the administrations of President Nixon and Carter, loose ends and gaps in strategic thinking were tied up and filled out by principles of diplomatic relations and historical examples from thought principally from the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nixon and Carter chose foreign policy advisers from areas in or adjacent to the territory formerly known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Johnson chose Walt Rostow.

Nixon chose Henry Kissinger, who was born in Germany, but within 20 or 30 miles of what were once the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Henry seems more Austrian than German, although he denied considering himself a modern Metternich. On the contrary, he said he had been much more deeply influenced by Kant and Spinoza (a combination of categorical imperative and Spinozan pantheism, one would have to conclude). Nevertheless, the similarities between Kissinger and Metternich are more obvious than similarities between him and Kant and Spinoza. Metternich was Germanborn, as is Henry. Metternich was more Austrian than German in character, attitudes, and manners. The same, I believe, can be said of Kissinger.

President Carter's foreign policy adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was Polish-born. During the campaign of 1976, according to candidate Carter's issues coordinator Milton Gwirtzman, "We had to clear everything with Brzezinski that concerned foreign policy. Carter would ask: 'Has Brzezinski seen this?' So finally all staff memos on foreign policy had notes attached indicating that he had approved or seen them."

What were Brzezinski's views of himself? What was his overall view of world policy? What were his positions on foreign policy issues?

Brzezinski said that the Vietnam War was the "Waterloo of the elite" and suggested that, had the elite been firmly in control, the United States would have won the war. This elite, according to Brzezinski, was made up of the "WASP, Ivy League-trained, Wall Street-based establishment operating through such institutions as the Council on Foreign Relations, but more pervasively." Brzezinski said that he was "very much part of the WASP community," and at the same time part of the intellectual community.

Thus we start with a secure person, by his own judgment, one who said that his policy would be architectural, not acrobatic—some kind of disapproving reference to the Kissinger methods or approach to foreign policy.

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Judgments of Record

Somewhat more disturbing, and more noteworthy, than Brzezinski's broad historical judgments and projections, were his more particular judgments of record.

In speaking of the Columbia University student uprising of 1968, Brzezinski reportedly said that the authorities had not used sufficient force in putting down the uprising (certainly nothing like that used at Kent State two years later). Then he pronounced a great principle: "That the use of force must be designed not only to eliminate the surface revolutionary challenge but to make certain that the revolutionary forces cannot later rally again under the same leadership." (One can envision the burning of villages and the execution of a few relatives of the leaders.) He continues, "If that leadership cannot be physically liquidated, it can at least be expelled from the country or area in which the revolution is taking place." He later said that he was not advocating physical liquidation, but simply describing a logical alternative. (He de-

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The majority of the founding members of the LaRouche-led Labor Committees were students at Columbia University. When the Columbia strike began, at the first rumor of police intervention, the anarchist faction led by Mark Rudd literally dove out of a nearby window for safety, leaving the leadership of the strike to the Labor Committees.

As the strike took over the entire campus, the Labor Committee student leadership included on the strike committee delegates from other campuses and the surrounding ghetto neighborhoods. They began to educate those involved in the theory of the political mass strike, while organizing a broad curriculum which would keep the educational life of the university going as a program also open to the wider community.

Pictured here: Labor Committee student leaders during the Columbia strike. It was of Lyndon LaRouche's Labor Committee leadership of the Columbia strike that Brzezinski said, "The use of force must be designed not only to eliminate the surface revolutionary challenge but to make certain that the revolutionary forces cannot later rally under the same leadership."—Nina Ogden

scribed an alternative, but it was hard for me to understand why he said it was a logical one.) Presumably, he was not applying this principle of elimination to the Columbia University student uprising itself.

Before the Czech uprising in 1968, Brzezinski said that the Czechs were too placid to revolt. He added that the United States should not encourage them to revolt—not that the revolt would be futile, which it was, but because it might be difficult for the United States to deal with an independent Czechoslovakia. Zbig, presumably an expert on the history of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Thirty Years' War, should not have so downgraded the Czechs. He should have remembered that day in 1618 when the Bohemian (Czech) noblemen, refusing to accept the elevation of Ferdinand of Styria as their ruler, broke into the room where the imperial envoys were staying and hurled them out the window into the castle moat some 60 feet below—an act known in history as the "defenestration of Prague." And he should have remembered that the Czechs

took this action when Austrians and Hungarians appeared ready to accept, passively, the new ruler. So began the Thirty Years' War.

In February 1968, Brzezinski, not an expert on Asia, had these words to say about Vietnam for *US News and World Report*: "Whether we like it or not, we are involved in something very long term. . . . We must make it clear to the enemy that we have the staying power. . . . We're willing to continue for 30 years." He said: "I don't think a country like the United States can commit itself to the extent it has and 'chicken out.' The consequence of getting out would be far more costly than the expense of staying in."

In 1969 Brzezinski shortened the New Thirty Years' War by 29 years and called for a cease-fire in Vietnam, because, he said, "most of the conditions justifying our original intervention now have been changed."

In the closing moments of a television interview in January 1978, Brzezinski described the Vietnamese-Cambodian fighting as "the first case of a proxy war between China and the Soviet Union." When this judgment was challenged by other American foreign policy experts and State Department officials, Brzezinski hedged a little by observing that, "I think the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflicts have a reality of their own."

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