in large part. The economy depends, to a large degree, upon Afghan drug-trafficking! Which is still going on, full force, bigger than ever from the area! The United States bombing of Afghanistan did not decrease the drug-trafficking, it increased it! You're going to have any government you try to set up in Afghanistan, is going to be less stable, than any previous government, since the last Afghan war started. The United States will never win the war in Afghanistan! Never! It will get worse, and worse, and worse. And the effects of continuing the war will spread, into the adjoining regions. The best thing the United States could do, is get out of there. Make that kind of decision: Get out of there. We made the mess. The best thing to do, is concern ourselves with helping Pakistan to build its economy up again, so it doesn't depend upon drug-trafficking, and so the drug traffickers in Pakistan do not have control in Pakistan politics. And, to find ways, with aid of other countries, such as China, and its discussion idea, to bring about some kind of equanimity in the situation. . . .

The long-term solution is, Pakistan's economy must be rebuilt. And Pakistan is going to be an inherently unstable country, until that is done.

The issue with India, and operations which were run from outside, into India, are also dangerous. There are forces in India, which are dangerous. And, you have to think about what you are doing, when you meddle in Indian affairs. Do you want the extreme right wing turned loose in India? The people who killed Gandhi, or that type? You want them turned loose? You can have Hell on the Subcontinent. Do you want the operation that the British and others are running in Nepal? Do you want that operation? . . .

This is likely the ugly Yankee, the "Ugly American" in Laos, years ago. We are bad! Get the picture clearly: The United States around the world today, is a bad guy! The U.S. military around the United States, and U.S. policy is a bad guy! Not liked; hated, and resented, and feared—in the Balkans! Increasingly hated in Europe, in Western Europe, in France, and Germany, and elsewhere! If they had their courage, in Germany, they'd speak up, but they don't. They've been through two wars with the United States; they don't want to have a third one. The hatred of what's happened in Poland, and Eastern Europe, the same. What the United States has done to Central and South America is *hated!* We're not the good guys! What the United States has done in Africa: We're not the good guys! Yes, the British have done things, too, of the same evil type. We're bad guys!

So, instead—I may be a good guy, but my government is not a good guy, right now. You want to me to intervene? Well, unfortunately, I don't have any means. But, I'll do anything to help these guys, if they want me, to help them get some peace; to have some amity. But our government is not of that disposition. Our government is trying to find "rogues." It's trying to find bad guys to bomb! But, they're the bad guys. . . .

Brookings Demands U.S. Troops in Kashmir

by Umberto Pascali

Only days after Lyndon LaRouche's webcast warning to Western nations to stay out of the India-Pakistan crisis—largely triggered in its current form by the U.S. "war on terrorism"—two of the most notorious Washington think-tanks joined forces on June 3 to demand an immediate U.S. military deployment, both in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The Brookings Institution and the International Crisis Group (ICG), both dedicated to the annihilation of the idea of national sovereignty—threatened every sort of divine punishment if the Bush Administration listened to rational advice. Their forum was entitled "The War In Afghanistan: Is It Over? Did the U.S. Win? What's Next?"

New U.S. Military Doctrine?

The speakers' *leitmotif* was to call their forum a factional intervention in Washington, aimed at breaking the last formal resistance within the administration to a massive military operation. In particular, Brookings' Stephen Philip Cohen put all his hopes in the figure of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, pushing him, so to speak, to reveal himself.

Armitage, Cohen insisted, has a new plan and is going to make it public during his visit to India during the first week of June. Part of the ostensible Armitage plan is to make the Indians accept the deployment of foreign military monitors on their territory, considered unacceptable and insulting to Indian leaders. Cohen said, "The Indians have been putting pressure on the United States and Pakistan to change Pakistani behavior. It's the Indians who have been the judge, the jury, the accusatory, and presumably the executioners in this spirit. I think the Indians are going to have to concede some international or American or other monitoring of the Line of Control," which separates India and Pakistan in Kashmir.

Not surprisingly, Pakistan's President Gen. Pervez Musharraf was instigated to make the same suggestion in the same words on June 4 in Almaty, Kazakstan.

Cohen presented an eerily precise scenario: "As sure as we can predict that the Sun will rise, when Armitage arrives in India, there's going to be an atrocity someplace up in Kashmir. Indians will blame the Pakistanis, the Pakistanis will blame the Indians. It will probably be caused by an independent group of radicals who would like to foment a larger crisis." This will launch a new American interventionist policy in Asia, Cohen claimed: "I think there's a realization growing that we cannot go on like this—crisis, after crisis,

68 National **EIR** June 14, 2002

after crisis, with two nuclear-weapon states, indefinitely, because that's what will happen. I suspect that Rumsfeld, or Armitage in particular, is probably going to bring some new idea with him. Otherwise it makes no sense in sending him out there."

"The best thing the world can do right now is to have an American B-52 bomber fly overhead once a day," cried Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish President and ICG Chairman, in his introductory speech. Ahtisaari explained that he is no expert on Afghanistan, but he has much experience in the Balkans. How, he asked, can anybody imagine that America can withdraw from Afghanistan when Bosnia, Kosovo—not to mention the formally independent East Timor—are still protectorates of the "international community," years after a humanitarian war?

The self-styled "win-the-peace" intervention of Ahtisaari—who is also a top official in several George Soros-run foundations—was followed by an array of calls for further military intervention in the Afghan area. Brookings' Roberta Cohen began her speech with these words: "My work is in the humanitarian area, but one cannot discuss humanitarian or human rights and development issues in Afghanistan independently of the war." Conclusion: an expanded role for the international security forces is required. "The Pentagon has rejected an expanded role, but this refusal ignores and contributes to the absence of security."

Gathering the New Legions

Michael O'Hanlon, another Brookings' Senior Fellow specialized in military issues, approved of the use of the B-52s as stressed by Ahtisaari, and mentioned other possible ways to achieve the goal: "For example, the recent attempt to assassinate the warlord [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar—which I fully approve of, by the way, because he had allied himself with the Taliban." O'Hanlon also presented a plan for the deployment of about 30,000 troops in Afghanistan, which is "more than simple peacekeeping or simple monitoring." He admitted: "That's a tough force in and of itself to come up with. The United States would have a hard time generating the contribution. . . . I would propose one specific idea: that we contribute some of the forces, some of the Marines that are now at Okinawa, Japan."

O'Hanlon called for what LaRouche has been denouncing regularly, as the transformation of professional national armies into international mercenaries on the model of the Roman legions. He urged participation of Japanese, South Korean, and European militaries "that are not presently engaged as heavily in Afghanistan"; and beyond that, to go around "looking for countries who can give some soldiers. The best potentials appear to be within the future NATO aspirants." The Brookings plan seems to be to demand a pound of military flesh from all those countries who are deluding themselves they will find stability and economic survival once they are in the NATO club.

FDR Embodied American Intellectual Tradition

Among the questions during Lyndon LaRouche's May 28 webcast, was a question put together by several former members of the Clinton Administration, which was read by moderator Debra Hanania Freeman.

Q: Mr. LaRouche, there's no doubt that the challenge of the moment poses a question of courage. But, it also poses a question of what will work, and what is effective. And, since none of us is inclined to sacrifice ourselves for the mere sake of it, it's useful, when there is an historic precedent to lean on. You spoke often of the example of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and his actions that brought us out of the Great Depression. What, in your mind, is key, from FDR's '33-'45 recovery strategy, for us to look to today?"

LaRouche: I don't think there's anything in particular you should look to. I think everything should be looked at. Because, we've done this report ["Economics: The End of a Delusion," issued by the campaign committee "LaRouche in 2004"], which Richard Freeman has pulled together, in large part, on what the lessons are of the recovery programs of Franklin Roosevelt, particularly during the 1930s. And, we've also done earlier studies, which we've published on the same matter, of what the effect was, the relationship between the economic potential, which was developed in the United States under the recovery program, which made possible the mobilization for strategic victory in World War II, in the way it was done.

We emerged from World War II as the *only world power*. And, we could have done a lot of good, if Roosevelt had lived. So, you have to look at the whole man, and his knowledge, to see what the precedent is.

Now we have, you know—like Harold Ickes, each of them did their part. Each of them did a mission for Roosevelt. They were good people. They did an excellent job. But, there's something behind it: Look for the driving force, not just for the detail. Don't try to get the package. You get the image, of Roosevelt's way of thinking, applied to the problems as they presented themselves to him, concretely, at the time. That's what we have to do, now.

Now, Roosevelt's thinking—what is it? And, people know it, especially of my generation, and earlier—they know it. I represent, though a different individual, as Franklin Roosevelt represented, and Abraham Lincoln represented before me, and John Quincy Adams represented before him—I represent an embodiment of the American Intellectual Tradition, which I referred to at the beginning of my remarks today:

EIR June 14, 2002 National 69