known to be forged and that the campaign was used successfully to frighten our elected representatives in Congress into voting for war is clear from the bitter protestations of Rep. Henry Waxman and others. The politically aware recognize that the same information was used, also successfully, in the campaign leading up to the mid-term elections—a reality that breeds a cynicism highly corrosive to our political process.

The fact that the forgery also crept into your state-of-theunion address pales in significance in comparison with how it was used to deceive Congress into voting on October 11 to authorize you to make war on Iraq.

It was a deep insult to the integrity of the intelligence process that, after the Vice President declared on August 26, 2002 that "we know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons," the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced during the critical month of September featured a fraudulent conclusion that "most analysts" agreed with Cheney's assertion. This may help explain the anomaly of Cheney's unprecedented "multiple visits" to CIA headquarters at the time, as well as the many reports that CIA and other intelligence analysts were feeling extraordinarily great pressure, accompanied by all manner of intimidation tactics, to concur in that conclusion. As a coda to his nuclear argument, Cheney told NBC's Meet the Press three days before US/UK forces invaded Iraq: "we believe he [Saddam Hussein] has reconstituted nuclear weapons."

Mr. Russert: ... the International Atomic Energy Agency said he does not have a nuclear program; we disagree?

Vice President Cheney: I disagree, yes. And you'll find the CIA, for example, and other key parts of the intelligence community disagree ... we know he has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. ElBaradei [Director of the IAEA] frankly is wrong.

Contrary to what Cheney and the NIE said, the most knowledgeable analysts—those who know Iraq and nuclear weapons—judged that the evidence did not support that conclusion. They now have been proven right.

Adding insult to injury, those chairing the NIE succumbed to the pressure to adduce the known forgery as evidence to support the Cheney line, and relegated the strong dissent of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (and the nuclear engineers in the Department of Energy) to an inconspicuous footnote.

It is a curious turn of events. The drafters of the offending sentence on the forgery in the president's state-of-the-union speech say they were working from the NIE. In ordinary circumstances an NIE would be the preeminently authoritative source to rely upon; but in this case the NIE itself had already been cooked to the recipe of high policy.

Joseph Wilson, the former US ambassador who visited Niger at Cheney's request, enjoys wide respect (including, like several VIPS members, warm encomia from your father). He is the consummate diplomat. So highly disturbed is he, however, at the chicanery he has witnessed that he allowed himself a very undiplomatic comment to a reporter last week, wondering aloud "what else they are lying about." Clearly, Wilson has concluded that the time for diplomatic language has passed. It is clear that lies were told. Sad to say, it is equally clear that your vice president led this campaign of deceit.

This was no case of petty corruption of the kind that forced Vice President Spiro Agnew's resignation. This was a matter of war and peace. Thousands have died. There is no end in sight.

Recommendation #1

We recommend that you call an abrupt halt to attempts to prove Vice President Cheney "not guilty." His role has been so transparent that such attempts will only erode further your own credibility. Equally pernicious, from our perspective, is the likelihood that intelligence analysts will conclude that the way to success is to acquiesce in the cooking of their judgments, since those above them will not be held accountable. We strongly recommend that you ask for Cheney's immediate resignation. . . .

/s/

Ray Close, Princeton, NJ
David MacMichael, Linden, VA
Raymond McGovern, Arlington, VA
Steering Committee, Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity

Congress Marks 'Last Days' of Richard Cheney

The U.S. Congress, under massive pressure from the international community, and increasing pressure from the American population, led by the political movement of Democratic Presidential pre-candidate Lyndon LaRouche, is beginning to move in the direction that LaRouche specified—taking on Vice President Dick Cheney. The following selection is excerpted from the Congressional Record and from official letters from Members of the House and Senate.

Levin: Bush Mis-Statement 'Not a Mistake,' But Was 'Calculated'

In a statement on the Senate floor, on July 15, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said, "Last week, CIA Director George Tenet accepted responsibility for having gone along with the African uranium statement in the President's State of the Union address. . . . But his explanation of the CIA's acquiescence in allowing the use of a clearly misleading statement

64 National EIR July 25, 2003



Some members of a large picket line of the LaRouche Youth Movement which met visiting (or, from the British view, escaping) Prime Minister Blair outside Congress on July 17.

raises more questions than it answers, and statements by other Administration officials, particularly National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, compound the problem."

Levin rebutted Rice's denials that the Administration "never said that we thought he [Saddam] had nuclear weapons," pointing out: "But Vice President Cheney said on March 16, 'we believe he [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons'....

"The President's statement that Iraq was attempting to acquire African uranium was not a 'mistake.' It was not inadvertent. It was not a slip. It was negotiated between the CIA and the NSC [National Security Council]. It was calculated. It was misleading. And what compounds its misleading nature is that the CIA not only 'differed with the British dossier on the reliability of the uranium reporting' to use Director Tenet's words, but the CIA had also 'expressed reservations,' again using Director Tenet's words, to the British in September 2002, nearly five months before the State of Union address. Furthermore, the CIA pressed the White House to remove a similar reference from the President's speech on Oct. 7, 2002, and the White House did so nearly four months before the State of the Union address."

Levin listed the following other attempts "made, apparently by the NSC and concurred in by the CIA, to create a false impression":

Aluminum Tubes: "In a speech before the UN General Asembly on Sept. 12, 2002, President Bush said, 'Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.' The Interna-

tional Atomic Energy Agency, after conducting an inquiry into the aluminum tubes issue, concluded they were not for uranium enrichment."

Iraq/al-Qaeda connection: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed a "bullet-proof case" demonstrating " 'that there are in fact al-Qaeda in Iraq.'... It was certainly never a 'bullet-proof' case."

Nuclear reconstitution: "Last Sunday, Ms. Rice said, 'We have never said that we thought he [Saddam] had nuclear weapons.' But Vice President Cheney said on March 16, 'We believe he [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.' "

Certainty that Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons: "On Aug. 26, 2002, Vice President Cheney said, 'Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.'... The fruitless search to date for Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction during and after our entry into Iraq suggests that our intelligence was either way off the mark, or seriously stretched."

Mobile biological warfare labs: The CIA claimed that two trailers found in Iraq were for producing biological warfare agents, even through other experts and intelligence community members do not agree.

White House website photos: "The White House placed three sets of satellite photos on its website on Oct. 8, 2002, with the headline 'Construction at Three Iraqi Nuclear Weapons-Related Facilities.' Although one of the facilities was not

EIR July 25, 2003 National 65

nuclear-related, the captions gave the impression that Iraq was proceeding with work on weapons of mass destruction at these facilities, although UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections at these facilities found no prohibited activities or weapons."

Levin concludes with some major questions raised by Condoleezza Rice's continuing to justify letting the uranium statement be used in the President's State of the Union Address. These include:

"Who in the Administration was pressing the CIA to concur in a statement that the CIA did not believe was true. . . ?

"Who in the White House was involved in removing a similar reference from the President's speech on Oct. 7, nearly four months before the State of the Union speech? . . .

"What role did the Office of the Vice President have in bringing about an inquiry into Iraq's pur-

ported efforts to obtain uranium from Africa? Was the Vice President's staff briefed on the results of Ambassador Wilson's trip to Africa."

Immediate Hearings Needed by House Intelligence Committee

"Some press accounts indicate the [forged Niger] documents were first given to Vice President Cheney's office by the British "via the Italians' in early 2002," wrote Rep. Henry Waxman (Calif.), the ranking Democrat on the Committee on Government Reform, in a July 15 letter to Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and to its ranking Democrat, Jane Harman (D-Calif.). ranking Democratic. Waxman is also a member of the Intelligence Committee.

Waxman's 12-page letter challenges all of the contradictions in the explanations given by the White House on the use of forged intelligence in Bush's State of the Union address, and also details that "The President's statement in the State of the Union address was by no means the only use of the Niger evidence by Administration officials."

Waxman asks, "Who was responsible for the repeated attempts by Administration officials to use the bogus evidence? . . . [T]here was a concerted effort spanning many months and involving multiple Administration officials to promote the claim that Iraq was seeking to import uranium from Africa. . . . And we know that these efforts occurred despite repeated attempts by intelligence officials at the CIA



LaRouche organizers chant and march outside Blair's speech. Despite his medal from Congress, both practitioners of the "ignoble lie," Blair and Cheney, are under mounting pressure to resign.

and the State Department to discredit the evidence. Yet we still do not know who was behind this repeated effort to promote the phony evidence."

Waxman argues in his letter, "Under these circumstances there is no longer any reasonable justification for considering this matter in closed proceedings. Nor . . . for further delay. Public hearings in the Intelligence Committee to examine the handling of the Niger evidence should commence before the upcoming August recess." The Congressman dismisses the White House attempt to pin the error on Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, noting that Tenet was the person who had "urged restraint" about citing the information.

Instead of accepting this excuse, Waxman says that "all relevant agencies" must be scrutinized, including "the CIA, the State Department, and the Defense Department, as well as the Vice President's office and the White House." He takes particular note of press reports, that the citation of the Niger forged documents had been included in "the first draft" of Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the UN General Assembly "written by Cheney's staff and the National Security Council.'"

Representative Waxman has been investigating the story of the forged Niger documents since March 2003, after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) disclosed on March 7, 2003 that the documents had been forged—*before* the Iraq War began.

On June 26, Waxman and 20 fellow House members—

66 National EIR July 25, 2003



who had *supported* the resolution to use force in Iraq, House Joint Resolution 114, in October 2002—have now introduced a bill, HR 2625, to establish an Independent Commission on Intelligence About Iraq. However, since such a commission would "take months to enact," Waxman urges, "It is essential that the Intelligence Committee hold immediate public hearings on the Niger evidence."

Did Congress Vote for War, Based on 'False Intelligence'?

On July 11, Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) issued a press release, "Congressional Democrats Demand the Truth: 16 Democrats Supportive of Iraqi War Resolution Sign Markey Letter to Bush on False Intelligence." The release says that Representative Markey, the "co-chair of the Bipartisan Taskforce on Non-Proliferation, and Senior Member of the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Select Committee on Homeland Security, sent a letter [dated July 10] to President Bush questioning the erroneous information provided to Congress by the Administration to convince Members to vote in favor of House Joint Resolution 114 authorizing military force in Iraq." Markey stated: "President Bush has many questions to answer about the use and misuse of intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The American people were given erroneous information . . . [and] the credibility of this Administration rests on the answers to the questions we have asked."

The signers, all Democrats who voted to give the President authorization for the use of force in Iraq are: Edward Markey (Mass.); Patrick Kennedy (R.I.); Martin Meehan (Mass); Sanford Bishop (Ga.); Anthony Weiner (N.Y.); Bill

Pascrell (Calif.); Ellen Tauscher (Calif.); Lyn Woolsey (Calif); Robert Wexler (Fla.); Marion Berry (Ark.); Steven Rothman, (N.J.); Gene Taylor (Miss.); Baron Hill (Ind.); Steve Israel (N.Y.); Shelley Berkley (Nev.); and Gary Ackerman (N.Y.).

The letter gives Bush a detailed list of questions:

- "1. Exactly how did the claim regarding Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa get into your State of the Union speech, in light of the evidence in the possession of the Executive Branch that this claim was based on forged documents?
- "2. Who within the Exeuctive Branch reviewed and approved the inclusion of this statement in your speech?
- "3. Did anyone raise concerns about its inclusion? If not, why? If so, why were such concerns apparently disregarded?
- "4. Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who was dispatched to Niger to investgate the intelligence reports about a putative Iraq-Niger uranium connection, stated in an interview on NBC, that his doubts about the purported Iraq-Niger connection reached the highest levels of government, including Vice President Dick Cheney's office. . . . What input did the Vice President have into your State of the Union speech? Did the Vice President's office receive one or more drafts of the speech prior to its delivery, and if so, when?"

The last of the six questions, includes the direct challenge to Bush, on three areas, "During your State of the Union address you stated. . ." and then asking about the President's assertions:

- "(a) Where are the 500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent you discussed? Was the intelligence information upon which this statement was based erroneous?
- "(b) Where are the remaining 29,984 chemical weaponscapable munitions? Was the intelligence information upon which this statement was based also erroneous?
- "(c) Where are the several mobile weapons labs? We are aware of press reports of the discovery of one vehicle that some within the Administration claimed to represent one such lab, but we are also aware from press reports that some within the intelligence community do not believe the evidence supports such a conclusion."

It concludes with concern, that "there is a danger that nations around the world may lose confidence that they can rely on the United States for straight information on the growing risk of nonproliferation."

EIR July 25, 2003 National 67