The NPT: A Faustian Bargain

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), stands on three principles that apply to the five nuclear weapons states (NWS), and the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).

The Treaty states: "Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war," NNWS will not undertake to receive or develop nuclear explosive devices, and will accept safeguards and standards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA will have the authority to inspect installations that have been declared as nuclear sites by each nation, and track all fissionable material.

In return, "all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate . . . in the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes," and that "nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all of the Partiesto the Treaty to develop research, production, and use

of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity" with the non-proliferation statues of the Treaty.

Third, the five NWS declare "their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament."

The Bush Administration proposes to change the Treaty, to hold access to peaceful nuclear technology hostage to the agreement of NNWS to the highly intrusive, recently formulated Additional Protocol.

The Administration proposes that NNWS are *not* entitled to access to uranium enrichment and spent fuel-reprocessing technologies, no matter what non-proliferation regime they agree to, but should instead rely on an international consortium to provide these services. This is a challenge to national sovereignty, and violates the Treaty.

And rather than engage with the other NWS toward disarmament, the Administration is proposing the development of new classes of nuclear weapons.

The following day, Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. Kamal Kharrazi stated his nation's position: "The inalienable right of the States to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes emanates from the universally accepted proposition that scientific and technological achievements are the common heritage of mankind. . . . It is unacceptable that some tend to limit the access to peaceful nuclear technology to an exclusive club of technologically advanced States under the pretext of non-proliferation."

"Let me be absolutely clear," he continued, "that arbitrary and self-serving criteria and thresholds regarding proliferation-proof and proliferation-prone technologies and countries, can and will only undermine the Treaty. Iran, for its part, is determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology, including enrichment, exclusively for peaceful purposes, and has been eager to offer assurances and guarantees." More effective than negotiating "objective guarantees," he stated, is for Iran to continue its legal pursuit of technologies, "under the fullest and most intrusive IAEA supervision." On May 8, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi confirmed that Iran is preparing a bill to submit to Parliament to ratify the Additional Protocol.

Kharrazi zeroed in on the "one non-party to the NPT" in the Middle East which has been given "unrestricted access, at least by acquiescence," to nuclear technology and equipment. "Israel has continuously rejected calls by the international community" to accede to the NPT. Instead, it has developed one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, "which has endangered regional global peace and security," he said.

The U.S. Threat

When the NPT was formulated, it promised that in return for foregoing the development of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons states would have full access to civilian technology, that the five declared weapons states would work toward disarmament, and that non-nuclear states would be given "Negative Security Assurance" that they would not be subject to attack by the nuclear weapons states. Now, the United States proposes to renege on that agreement.

Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs Syed Hamid Albar, representing the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that it is the nuclear-weapons states that threaten international peace and security, and that the "doctrine of nuclear deterrence" must be "rejected." The Non-Aligned states "reaffirm the inalienable rights of [parties to the NPT] to engage in research, production, and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting this right."

Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg from Brazil countered the U.S. proposal that signing the Additional Protocol be prerequisite to nuclear technology access. He stated that the NPT "does not qualify, restrict, or reinterpret" the "inalienable right to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful ends." Sardenberg also stressed that it is "the introduction of new weapon types and the announcement of strategic doctrines that tend to lower the threshold for the utilization of nuclear weapons," not the peaceful use by developing countries. Brazil has been in a tussle with the IAEA for the past

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