Inside the Saudi/Londonistan Terrorist 'Suicide Factory'

by Michele Steinberg

The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the **Finsbury Park Mosque**

by Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006

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Sept. 14—Abu Hamza al-Masri, the imam of the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque in London, was convicted last May in New York City on terrorism charges dating back to the 1998 kidnapping/killing of four American and British tourists in Yemen by the al-Oaeda affiliate, Army of Aden.

Convicted in May 2014 of a terrorist conspiracy that was carried out in 1998—a gap of 16 years: That chronology should be chilling. In the intervening time, thousands have perished in terrorist attacks carried out by the "graduates" of Abu Hamza's "Suicide Factory," and as the fol-

lowing report shows, of other mosques and safehouses in London. Abu Hamza was not hiding—he was openly preaching jihad at Finsbury Park from 1998 to 2003.

Even more chilling is the story documented in *The* Suicide Fractory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, by Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, two veteran British reporters for the Times of London, which shows that the evidence of Abu Hamza's involvement in the Yemen attack was already known in 1999. The British secret services, MI6 and MI5, knew; Scotland Yard knew; conversations between Abu Hamza and Abu Hassan, the jihadi commander of the Army of Aden, had been captured by GCHQ, the British electronic spying agency, and turned over to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA and the FBI also knew about Abu Hamza's Finsbury Park recruitment center.

The trial of Abu Hamza (aka Mustafa Kamel Mus-

tafa) in New York was a farce. Not because he is not a key terrorist operative, but because he was protected. According to The Suicide Factory, he was Informant #910 for MI6. He also was used as an "asset" by Scotland Yard, the authors report, "to keep the streets of Britain safe." But he didn't keep Britain safe; and furthermore, to correct an unfortunate impression readers

> might get from the information that Abu Hamza was a British government asset and informant—being Agent #910 was not the reason he was protected. Nor did his informant status—which his defense attorneys asserted in the recent New York criminal trial—protect him from prosecution and a probable life sentence.

> Abu Hamza's freedom to operate in London stemmed from far greater strategic considerations. As EIR's authors established in a Jan. 11, 2000 Memorandum, "Put Britain on the List of States Sponsoring Terrorism," the British Empire uses terrorism (by giving safe haven and other


support to terrorists active in countries other than Britain), as surrogate warfare in its imperial designs.

If the British Empire, in its London headquarters, didn't nurture and protect radical Islamic terrorism, hundreds of terrorist attacks in the U.S., Europe, the Middle East, and even on today's nightmarish battlefields of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), might not have happened.

The names of the groups change, as one morphs into another; the foot soldiers and commanders use numerous aliases, but the footprint of the London role in the recruitment, financing, and dispatching of foot soldiers to the training centers of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries remains the same.

Case Study: 'Londonistan'

In a chapter titled "Londonistan," the authors provide details of this process, which must be put at the



forefront of every current assessment of Islamic terrorism, as well as of assessing the networks that produced al-Qaeda and the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The authors write that terror suspects living in the United Kingdom were wanted "by over a dozen friendly governments. Russia claims prominent Chechens, who helped organize bombings on civilian targets in Moscow, are sheltering in London. The Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Israeli, and Turkish authorities, together with half a dozen European allies and the U.S. government have all presented to Whitehall lists of suspects whom they want to put on trial, but those governments are still waiting. Prominent French anti-terrorist investigating magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguières described Londonistan as the safe haven for Islamic terrorists, and a place 'full of hatred.'"

The authors provide an excellent summary of some key details of how Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were openly operating in London behind the facade of a rich Saudi national, Khalid Fawwaz.

"The British authorities ignored the turgid bulletins Fawwaz would pump out, including the fatwa dictated by bin Laden in 1996 against the Americans for keeping troops in Saudi Arabia. In February 1998 ... Fawwaz published another fatwa, this time threatening all Americans, which he issued in the name of the International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders. Again this caused little stir in Whitehall."

Among the many other jihadis operating in London, the authors report on Omar Bakri Mohammed, who was both a rival and defender of Abu Hamza. Bakri became head of al-Muhajiroun, the Salafist-Wahhabi organization that financed some of Abu Hamza's operations, and whose associates have been involved in terrorist actions from Tel Aviv to India to London itself. As late as May 2013, the long-term effects of Londonistan's radical sheikhs were out in the open: British authorities arrested Michael Adebolajo for beheading British soldier Lee Rigby in London on May 22. Al-Muhajiroun co-leader, Anjem Choudary, told the *Guardian* that Adebolajo had attended meetings of the group from 2005 to 2011, and according to Bakri, had listened to his views on Islam.

Case Study: Yemen

As to Abu Hamza, one case of the West's ignoring the anti-terrorist pleas of Middle Eastern countries documented in *The Suicide Factory*, is especially important—Yemen, 1997.

In January 1997, British nationals, all radical Is-

lamist jihadis, were going on trial in Yemen, along with Yemeni extremists, for a plot to bomb multiple sites, including hotels frequented by American and British tourists and businessmen. The bomb plot was busted up by Yemeni authorities, and involved Abu Hamza's stepson, Mohsen Ghailan, as well as his 17-year-old son, Mohammed Mostafa Kamel.

Just before the trial, "the Yemeni president had written a personal letter to Tony Blair imploring him to send Abu Hamza to Aden," where he could be prosecuted for supporting, organizing, and dispatching young jihadis from London to foreign countries for training, and for carrying out suicide terrorist attacks. Not only did Blair not help the Yemenis prosecute Abu Hamza, but his Finsbury Park mosque/training center/recruiting station continued to flourish.

At the bombers' trial itself, "The prosecutor's opening sentence was: 'This offence started in London in the offices of SoS [Supporters of Sharia], which is owned by Abu Hamza and who exports terrorism to other countries." But the trial was disrupted repeatedly, and dissolved in chaos, leading to a long recess. Altogether, ten members of London's SoS were involved. Meanwhile, Abu Hamza had purchased a satellite phone and other equipment for Army of Aden leader Abu Hassan, his old friend from the mujahideen battles in Afghanistan. Abu Hassan was the leader of the terrorist kidnapping and killing in December 1998 in Yemen. In 2014, that satellite phone was one key piece of evidence in the New York trial of Abu Hamza.

"The Yemenis also handed on to the FBI their 137-page dossier on Abu Hamza [in 1997, at the time of President Salah's letter to Tony Blair], which London ignored in the early weeks of 1999. Those were the weeks during which Abu Hassan killed the kidnapped tourists."

Case Study: The Shoebomber

On Dec. 22, 2001, Richard Reid, a clumsy, hulking 28-year-old Briton, tried and failed to ignite a "shoe bomb" on an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami. Wrestled down and subdued by passengers and members of the flight crew, Reid fit the profile of a weirdo terrorist "wannabe," but *The Suicide Factory* authors show that his service to Abu Hamza and Finsbury Park was much broader.

Reid converted to Islam in prison sometime before 1996, while he was serving time for numerous smalltime burglary counts. After being released, he joined the Brixton Mosque and Islamic Cultural Center, but in

1998, finding Brixton too "passive," he "transferred his allegiance" to the Finsbury Park mosque—he had already become a follower of the radical rhetoric of Abu Hamza al-Masri, whose tentacles reached into many of Britain's mosques.

At Brixton, Reid joined the entourage of Zacarias Moussaoui—the notorious "20th hijacker," who trained to fly in the United States, but who was not on board any of the hijacked planes in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. When Reid moved over to Abu Hamza's Finsbury Park mosque, he was one of Moussaoui's "acolytes."

At Finsbury Park, Reid was personally taken under Abu Hamza's wing and tutored. He was sent to bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan, where he was judged willing to blow himself up in a suicide mission. But before that, there were other missions for al-Qaeda that the authors reveal.

"In July 2001, he was sent on a spying mission for al-Qaeda." First, he was to acquire a new British passport—which he successfully did at the consular office in Brussels, after putting his old passport with its suspicious visa and entry stamps through a washing machine. Then, "posing as a holidaymaker, Reid flew to Tel Aviv to test El Al's security." He also toured Tel



Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem, where he took notes and photos. From there he visited Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Belgium, and the Netherlands. "He has never said who funded his travels," the authors report, and since he pleaded guilty after he was arrested for attempting to blow up the trans-Atlantic jetliner, no details came out in trial. As of 2006, Reid was in the same prison in the U.S. as his old hero, Moussaoui, but the "20th hijacker" is sequestered, allowed no contact with other prisoners.

There are many other case studies of jihadis who planned and failed, or carried out terrorist attacks. In London, on July 7, 2005 (known as the 7/7 attacks), three of the suicide bombers who killed 52 passengers on trains and buses, had studied at the feet of Abu Hamza and attended Finsbury Park meetings. In May 2003, two other suicide bombers linked to Finsbury Park carried out a bomb attack in Tel Aviv. Bomb plots against targets in Dubai, Brussels, and other European capitals are covered—all linked to Finsbury Park.

In 2003, British authorities raided the Finsbury Park mosque, arrested Abu Hamza, and then released him. Eventually, he was incarcerated, after the blowback from the 9/11 attacks in the United States forced the British to take some cosmetic steps against some of the jihadi recruiters operating with impunity in the U.K.

Abu Hamza was not extradited to the U.S. until 2012. Two other terror suspects, Khaled al-Fawwaz (the former "ambassador" and fatwa-distributor for Osama bin Laden) and Adel Abdul Bary (implicated in the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa) were also extradited.

Despite these extraditions, the U.K. remains a source for, and a hotbed of, terrorism. It is estimated that some 500 Britons are fighters for the ISIS. One of those fighters may be the ghoul who beheaded one or more of the American and British prisoners held by ISIS.

The jihadi terrorists of today have a history, one which is critical to understand if the disease of this extreme, murderous ideology is to be defeated. Just as the classified 28 pages of the 2003 Congressional Report on 9/11 are still not only relevant, but critical, in investigating and stopping terrorist armies, the dossier on Finsbury Park mosque and Londonistan is vital.

The O'Neill/McGrory book has some shortcomings, but its encyclopedic look into the crucial decade when iihadi terror was nurtured and grew in Britain, is an invaluable aid to understanding the story.