

Behind the Hoax About Russian Hacking

From an interview with Ray McGovern

The following article consists of excerpts from a lengthy [interview](#) with Ray McGovern. Mr. McGovern was a high-ranking CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990, and in the 1980s chaired National Intelligence Estimates and prepared the President's Daily Brief. In 2003, he co-founded Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. We at Executive Intelligence Review have the highest regard for Mr. McGovern and his ongoing efforts to get out the truth in regard to the current activities and functioning of the intelligence community and how this impacts U.S. policy making. At the same time, EIR is not in a position to make any final judgement as to the technical details of U.S. intelligence gathering.

Jason Ross: It's January 10, 2017; I'm Jason Ross here at LaRouche PAC. We are very happy to have Ray McGovern in the studio today, multi-decade veteran of the CIA and the co-founder in 2003 of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. Thanks very much for coming today, Ray.

Ray McGovern: You're most welcome; I'm glad to be with you.

Ross: So, let's jump right into one of the big issues that we're hearing about so much in the media today—the issue of purported Russian hacking of the U.S. elections. Now your group, the Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, released a press statement on December 12th, saying that all evidence pointed toward



Ray McGovern

LPAC

a leak rather than a hack. Since then, two reports have come out; one from the the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and one primarily authored by the ODNI, the Director of National Intelligence, saying here's the proof; we know Russia did it. The report was of questionable usefulness. Then just a few days ago, you co-authored an op-ed in the *Baltimore Sun* with William Binney, where you restated your position; all evidence points toward this being a leak rather than a hack, and in any case, evidence of a hack has not been presented.

Why do you take that position?

McGovern: Well, I need to tell you something about Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity first. We established ourselves when we saw that our colleagues—the colleagues with whom we had worked—had let themselves be suborned into creating, into fabricating intelligence for the express purpose of deceiving our elected representatives out of their Constitutional prerogatives to declare or otherwise authorize war. That was before Iraq; and that's as bad as it gets.

Bush, Cheney, and the others all said, "Oh, it was a terrible mistake." It was not a mistake; it was out and out fraud. When we saw that happening, we formed a little group—there were five of us in the beginning—and we started publishing. We published three memoranda before the war, warning the President. Our first one was on the day of Colin Powell's speech—the 5th of February, 2003—and we gave him a C-minus for

content. And we warned the President, “The intelligence is being manipulated and you really should widen the circle of your advisors,” we said at the end, “beyond those who are clearly bent on a war for which we see no compelling reason, and from which, we believe, the unintended consequences are likely to be catastrophic.” We take no delight in the fact that we happened to be right on that; there were a couple of other people saying that, but nobody got into the mainstream media.

When this business about Russian hacking went viral, it was the most natural thing for me to say to my colleague Bill Binney, who had been the technical director at NSA before he left shortly after 9/11, “Hey, Bill. We need a memo from you; we need you to do a draft because you designed most of these systems, and you know what Ed Snowden has revealed. Those slides? They look really interesting to us, but we need somebody to take us through them.” So, he said, “Sure.” So, he gave us a draft, and what we typically do is, we circulate it around the five or six or seven people who have special interests in that, or special experience; and we got it right together. We were one of the first ones off the block saying “Yeah, this is a crock! Why? For technical reasons.” There were plenty of other reasons, but some people—and I think it’s to their credit—want to know, “Is this possible? Could the Russians have done this?” Well, the answer is “Yes, but NSA would know about it.”

Now, it boggles the mind, Jason, it boggles the mind. But NSA traces *all emails on this planet*. If they (the emails) go abroad, they have cooperating agencies and cooperating governments. If they go through the United States, they get them; if they come from outside, they get them all. And they can trace them; they have these little trace mechanisms at various points in the network. So, they know where each and every email originates and where it ends up.

So, let’s say the Russians hack, and they got it to Julian Assange, they got it to one of his associates. “Well, OK, Russians are really bad people,” people say; “show us the messages.” “Oh, we can’t; we don’t have the messages. But we’ll look at it.” Now, they got the President, before he went on vacation to Hawaii, to impose sanctions based on this elusive evidence that they can’t show us. Now, add to that the ironclad coverage they have of the Ecuadoran embassy in London, where Julian is; and I’m sure that they monitor his colleagues as well, wherever they happen to be.

My first reaction was to laugh at them, but this a very sad thing to see what the intelligence community has become; very, very sad. Because this is an important issue.

So, what did the President do? He slapped on sanctions; threw out thirty-five diplomats. All on whose say-so? John Brennan’s. Now, how did the *New York Times* get all this information? John Brennan. We know that because the *Wall Street Journal* was a little ticked off about it, and they said, “Yeah, it’s Brennan that’s talking to these other guys; he’s not talking to the *Wall Street Journal*.” So, what do we have here? We have the President going out on a limb, causing even more danger, more tensions, more flak in our relationship with Russia. On the basis of what? Well, let me just say this; maybe I’ll put it this way: I was looking at some YouTube clips, and I happened on one of Christiane Amanpour, broadcasting from London. She’s interviewing Lukyanov, one of the Russian gurus. She says, “Mr. Lukyanov, [imitating Amanpour’s voice] you say there’s zero evidence, you say zero. Well, if there’s *zero* evidence, why is it that the President of the United States has slapped sanctions on Russia?”

Ross: Hah! That’s good.

McGovern: [Earlier], I remember being asked that question about weapons of mass destruction. [Again imitating Amanpour’s voice] “Mr. McGovern, if you say there’s no evidence of weapons of mass destruction, why did Bush and Cheney start a war on Iraq?” Well, same answer; same answer! It’s a really bad flashback, because what they need to do, is come up with the evidence. My strong view is that they’re not going to do that; not because of sources and methods, but because there isn’t any.

Ross: Because that’s just not what happened.

McGovern: Well, one has to be careful in distinguishing these things. Do the Russians hack? Of course they hack! Chinese hackers—the Chinese got twenty million records from OPM, right? Everybody hacks. I’m sure the Russians have hacked; but the question is, who gave these records, these emails from the DNC—the Democratic National Committee—and from Podesta’s email, to Julian Assange or his people to put out in that very overt form. Now Julian, of course, says it wasn’t the Russians. John Brennan says it was the Russians. I like to believe government officials; I spent twenty-seven years in the CIA. I would really like to

believe the Director of the CIA. But you know, experience with his record—and Clapper’s record, Clapper having lied under oath to the Senate. And then after he was shown to have lied, he said, “Oh! What I said was clearly erroneous.”—His words. And the Senate said, “Oh, tut, tut! Don’t worry; no problem.” That was four years ago; four *years* ago.

So, if you want to believe Clapper, you want to believe Brennan, that’s your prerogative. I know Julian Assange; I had dinner with him right before the election, four days before the election. He looks awful. Stay inside for four years, plus; you look awful. He’s got no color; he’s pale. But he was enlivened; he had just done that interview with John Pilger. He was enlivened; and I know the feeling, because we’re in the same business. We’re trying to spread some truth around, OK? He had done that successfully. What he had, he ordered in a cogent way, made it eminently searchable; and when he put it out—and this is the real story—when he put out the DNC emails and the Hillary Clinton emails, he put them out very deliberately. He evinced this right before the Democrat National Convention—two days before. So, this caused quite a stir. What happened? Well, people forget, the first thing that happened, the top five officials—starting with that woman ...

Ross: Debbie Wasserman Schultz.

McGovern: Debbie Wasserman Schultz. They quit! What does that tell you? The next thing, I can see them sitting around the table—the Brain Trust; and Hillary comes in and says, “How are we going to do this? Right before the convention! Anybody talking to Bernie?” Why did I say Bernie? These emails, the contents showed that she stole the nomination from Bernie Sanders; by every which way she did that.

Ross: Talk about an assault on democracy!

McGovern: Or interfering in the election! Yeah, it was interfering, but it was Hillary that did it. So, that’s what they showed, OK? So, what do you do? Somebody says, “I know! We’ll blame it on the Russians!” “But it wasn’t the Russians, it was Julian Assange.” “That’s OK. He’s probably working for the Russians; we’ll say he’s working for the Russians. There’s a two-fer; we’ll get the Russians, and we’ll get Julian Assange, too.” “That sounds great, but what’s the rationale?” “Oh, c’mon! We’ll say the Russians want Trump to win.”

Sources and Methods

Ross: It seems bizarre sometimes to see the extent of the anti-Russia coverage in the media, from the administration... some of the recent coverage like the claim that Russia had hacked a Vermont power utility and was going to take over all of our power plants now. The evidence is not being put forward for this; it’s covered up by saying we don’t want to reveal our sources and methods, even when this is something that is being called by some senators “an act of war,” when Obama is taking actions against Russia in response to it, increasing sanctions, you might think that this is the sort of time where it might be worth revealing what your sources and methods are, given the importance of the political changes it’s provoking.

McGovern: I’m really glad you mention that, because I’ve been through this kind of thing. David Ignatius in the *Washington Post* today says, “our sources and methods”—they can’t reveal their sources and methods, and the *New York Times* when they had that banner headline: “Putin Directed Attack...,” even there, Scott Shane was sensible enough to say, “Well, there isn’t any real evidence here and that’s probably because of the sources and methods.”

Ross: Right. Right.

McGovern: On the technical side, Bill Binney, as I said before, was the technical director at NSA, and he’s open. He’s very open in saying, “Look, what I know, I used to be unable to say. But when Ed Snowden came out with all these slides and all these diagrams, not only can I say ‘Hey! Wow!’ The systems that I put in place are still being used, but my God, they’re not only being used abroad, they’re being used in our country and this is how they do it.” Ray, you see this? These are the trace mechanisms they put in the network. They’re about 500 right here in Europe, and so he takes me through the whole thing. I said, “Well, is that secret?” He says, “Hellooo? No! The slides say ‘Top Secret,’ code word, but they’re all revealed now. So, I can tell you Ray, and I can tell everybody that I’m 99 percent sure that if there are emails, if there are hacks, then we would have them.” So is it sensitive sources and methods?

Interestingly, in the thing that the head of the National Intelligence put out, CIA and FBI are “highly confidential,” and the NSA—now if there is real evidence—unless we have a source in the Kremlin, which



NSA

National Security Agency headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland.

I really don't think we do—if there's real evidence, NSA would have it, right? They only have “moderate confidence....” So that's the technical side.

Ross: Let me just read a quote for our viewers. This is from the report that came out of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on January 6. It said, “We also assessed Putin and the Russian government aspired to help President-elect Trump's election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton”—as though she didn't do that herself—“and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. The CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment. The NSA [who might have any of the evidence] has moderate confidence.”

McGovern: Let me just finish on the sources and methods because it's really interesting. I think I can contribute something from my own experience. In 1986, there was a discotheque in Berlin that U.S. GIs frequented. I think it was in April, it was blown up by a big bomb. Two GIs were killed, several were

wounded. About 100 Germans were wounded and a lot of U.S. civilians as well. A big blast, OK? Who did it?

We knew who did it. I'm not revealing any secrets right now, but we had an intercepted, encrypted Libyan message showing that the Libyan intelligence service did that. They were congratulating each other. Mission accomplished. We told President Reagan. President Reagan didn't waste a day, flew some bombers out of England and blew the hell out of the palace in Tripoli, killed one of Qaddafi's young daughters and made a real mess of things—so much so that there was a lot of consternation in the world at large. What's this U.S. President doing? How does he know it was the—? My God, why would the Libyans blow up a disco in Berlin? Come on! It got pretty tense, it got pretty bad, and Reagan was getting a real black eye throughout the world.

So he comes to us and says, “Where's that message?” So we showed him the message. “We got to give this to the press.” Oh no, no, you don't understand Mr.

President—“sources and methods.” The Libyans don’t know that we’re intercepting their messages, and even if they suspect we are, they don’t know we can decode them—this encrypted stuff. So if you go ahead and do that [release the intercept], we won’t be able to see what they’re doing from this source [in future]. Reagan looked and he said, “I thought I told you to release that.” We said, “Oh yes sir” and we released it, immediately. The world got the real deal. Did we blow the source? Yeah, we blew the source, but there are some junctures at which the national interest is far better served by blowing a source—you’re national interest is better served by coming out, showing where the beef is, where the evidence is and sacrificing other sources. That worked. It worked like clockwork. That’s a good example of what is necessary now—assuming—now, this is a big assumption [that they have such sources]. I think I told you before, I’m 90 percent certain they don’t have any sources, and if you read this drivel, God, it’s embarrassing.

Let’s say they did have an NSA source, one question is why are they only “moderate”? Let’s say they have an NSA source, don’t you think they should release that now? What makes them reluctant to do that? It’s a canard. Particularly when the McCainiacs and others are saying this is an act of war. “Mr. Director, don’t you think this is an act of war?” And the Director of National Intelligence starts to say, “Well, this is beyond my pay grade to tell you it’s an act of war, but I think...” Anyhow, If it is an act of war, then we ought to really see what the evidence is.

Bill Binney and the rest of our group in Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, of which there are about fifty now—there isn’t one who has said, “Hey, you know, maybe they do have something that they just can’t possibly—maybe they have a guy sitting next to Putin, or maybe that beautiful woman is a ‘hot off the press’ spokesman. She does a great job for Lavrov, but maybe she’s really working...” Come on!

So, the “sources and methods” is the only thing they have now, and it was interesting in today’s *Washington Post* that David Ignatius, who is well plugged into all this says, “well obviously it is the sources and methods thing. It would be so great if they could reveal these things.” In the Bronx where I come from, we call that a “crock.”

The Corruption of U.S. Intelligence

Now the other thing of course is much more serious.

People don’t realize that not only did Clapper lie to the Senate Intelligence Committee about NSA’s coverage. You remember that wonderful picture where Wyden asks him, “Are you collecting information on millions or many millions of Americans?” And he’s like he’s looking for some hair, he says, “No. No sir.” Then he thinks, “Oh my God.” “Not advertently or inadvertently, or yeah, inadvertently we might—”

Ross: Not wittingly.

McGovern: You got it. Okay. “Not wittingly but inadvertently maybe we did.” So then of course, that was March 12, 2013. So in June, Ed Snowden comes out and you could hear from the director of National Intelligence office all the way down to Virginia where I live, you know, he goes “Oops!” So, he writes a letter. It doesn’t even go to the Senators. He writes a letter and he says “You know, what I said was clearly erroneous,” that kind of thing.

Ross: I’d like to amend my testimony here.

McGovern: But what I wanted to tell you is that he’s actually—all kidding aside—he’s guilty of heinous malfeasance, not misfeasance, but malfeasance in office.

When Rumsfeld came in with George Bush and wanted to do a war in Iraq, he needed to gin up some evidence. It was easy to lean on George Tenet, the head of the CIA—he’s a guy from Queens, I’m a guy from the Bronx. He got to play with the big boys, you know. If you get to play with the big boys, you got to know who the big boys are. So, Rumsfeld says, “Look, we’re having a cabinet meeting. Show some pictures of some of those suspected chemical weapon facilities. So, Tenet says, “OK.” The first cabinet meeting, Condoleezza Rice says, “George has some photos,” and we know this because Paul O’Neill, Secretary of the Treasury at the time, was there. Okay? And he says, “I could hardly see anything at all, and I said what is this?” Tenet says those are suspected chemical weapon facilities. “Where?” So, Tenet pointed to a cloud or something. Tenet was easy.

Now how do you get the people who analyze satellite photography—now, realize, most people know this, but maybe not—when we put those satellites up for billions and billions of dollars, they take imagery. Not only photos, but infrared, radar, multispectral—this is fancy stuff. So they’re going around here like this, and they’re collecting all this stuff and of course they are

fixated on Iraq because people say they have weapons of mass destruction.

Now Rumsfeld is a little bit worried about who he put in charge of imagery analysis, and so he picked a guy named James Clapper. The point of the background here is very sorrowful. Up until 1996, imagery analysis was done in a nonpartisan objective way, by folks whose expertise wouldn't quit. It was called the National Photographic Interpretation Center. It was the people who found the missiles in Cuba, it was the people that told not only Reagan but Nixon, "Look you conclude these arms control agreements, we can verify—you can trust." These are real professionals. Their average experience was about twenty-five years.

In 1996, the head of the CIA, John Deutch, who made it clear when he came to the CIA that this was just a stopping point, before he'd take the place of his old friend, Bill Perry, as Secretary of Defense. Right? All of a sudden, it was decided not to give this to Deutch; but before that was decided, Deutch said, "Well, how do I ingratiate myself with the Pentagon?" He had been Deputy there. So, he said, "I know what I'll do. I'll give our imagery analysis capability to the Pentagon. The Pentagon has a big role in collecting this stuff, they pretty much run the satellites, so why don't we give them the analysis function, as well?"

Now that's a no-no. That's for the CIA. That's for people who have no axes to grind. Those are people who can't be under a military regime. They have to act as civilians in the way that they did when they were verifying arms control agreements.

So that went, kit and caboodle; all 800 of these specialists in 1996 went to the Defense Department. There they are in something called the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Now these are the people who might find the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, or they might not find them—because they might not be there. So, Rumsfeld has this challenge. He says, "Jim" (James Clapper was an Air Force General), "look, you take charge of the NGA. You know the drill."

Put yourself in the position of somebody working for James Clapper. All through 2000, 2001, 2002, you have this steady stream of Iraqi émigrés—Ahmed Chalabi and his crew—and they're saying we know there's a chemical weapons facility at these coordinates right near Baghdad; or we know that there's a biological depot right here. So they give the coordinates to the NGA and the sergeant or the major who is looking at the

imagery says "that's a chicken coop" or that's a "gym for a high school." [laughter] Put yourself in the position of somebody who knows that James Clapper is going to get really, really mad if you pour cold water on these émigrés. If you say "Ahmed Chalabi doesn't know what the hell he's talking about or maybe he's fabricating; some of these Iraqis are really clever, they do fabricate stuff." Well, you wouldn't let any of that stuff through. *So the prime source for weapons of mass destruction was stifled*, by a guy named James Clapper.

Nobody knows that story, or maybe they do, but they just don't want to tell it. There he was! In the position of either verifying that there were weapons of mass destruction—the primary source—or saying no, there weren't any. And there weren't any—but nobody could say that.

So what happens? They find out there aren't any weapons of mass destruction. What does Jim Clapper say? "Oh! I think they moved them to Syria." [laughter] I mean, he had no evidence to support that, but that's what he said, "They moved them Syria"! So you see what I mean about not being the sharpest knife in the drawer? I mean, hallo-oo! And he got away with it, because the press—I haven't made this point yet, but I always try to make it: I've been in Washington for fifty-three years now; that's a long time. I've seen a lot of change, you see a lot of change in fifty-three years, but there's one change that dwarfs all the other changes. It's a sad change, and it's simply that we no longer have, in any real sense, a free media. That's big. The fourth estate is dead. I watched it die over Iraq. You could see it now, in this incredible drumbeat over Russians hacking, without any evidence, and so that's the bad news. Now, there is good news, and that is, that the young people I talk to, they don't buy that! [laughter] They don't even look at it on the Web! If they're smart enough, they can find what's going on, on what I call the fifth estate, which is on the Web.

So this past weekend, I had this terrible flashback, where I'm reading all this stuff, about the Russian hacking, the Russian hacking, the Russian hacking. On Saturday, the whole front page of the *New York Times* had a banner headline, like all eight columns, "Putin Behind Hacking of blah, blah, blah, Report Says." Now, my God! They're talking about this thing here.

You know, it's sad. Because I gave twenty-seven years to that. I used to chair National Intelligence Estimates, I used to brief Presidents with the President's Daily Brief. We took great pride in our work. It became

corrupted under Bill Casey and Bobby Gates. When Ronald Reagan came in, Bill Casey was the director of the CIA under Reagan; and Bobby Gates—he's known as Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, but he worked for me. [laughs] Interesting thought—he worked for me in the 1970s. I was chief of the Soviet foreign policy branch and I had him working on the Soviet policy in the Middle East. He was a bright guy, but he was so ambitious! He'd curry favor with my boss and his boss, and the first day he was there he asked how long it took my boss to get to where he is and all that stuff. So, he was a disruptive influence in the branch.

Ten years later Gates is in charge of *all* the analysis, under Bill Casey! Now, Bill Casey was the kind of guy, he was a really good spy guy for World War II, but he wasn't real sophisticated. He thought, for example, down in Nicaragua, that there was a Russian under every rock. You know, you turn over the rock, and this is a metaphor here, but Bobby Gates thought, you know, "Mr. Casey? You see that Russian? I see three Russians under this rock." That's an exaggeration, but just a little bit.

So Gates gets appointed by Casey to be the head of analysis. What happens? This is important, because only the people who would see two or three Russians under every rock, got a dance. And so who became head of the Soviet analysis part of the whole analysis? Somebody who didn't know anything about the Soviet Union but was a malleable manager. So, if Bobby Gates said, as he did, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will never, ever give up power without a big struggle; and this Gorbachov fellow, he's just a Commie, man! He's just a Commie, he's just a more clever Commie, making all these noises. Don't trust them, they'll never give up power."

So we've got all these people coming in, and they're more interested in advancing their careers than they are in telling the truth, and they get advanced up. Now, what do we make out of all of this? Well, because it takes about a generation to corrupt an institution. So that was 1981, when Bobby Gates came in and Bill Casey.

Fast forward to 2002: Bush wants to make a war in Iraq. He's got a malleable manager in George Tenet who's the head of the CIA at the time, and Tenet knows that there aren't any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and so Tenet's solution for that, was to keep his head way down, and not let anybody write about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. If you'd been through

that time, you realize what a big *cause célèbre* this was.

Anyhow, Bush and Cheney say, we're going to get the Congress to approve our going into Iraq. And so they do; they ask the Congress to move this legislation forward, and Bob Graham [D-FL] who was head of the Senate Intelligence Committee says, well, what about these, do we have a National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass destruction? And George Tenet says, no we don't. "Why not?"

"Well, we're really busy!" So, these guys don't have much spine: Graham was going to say, "Oh, you're too busy," but Dick Durbin [D-IL] was by his side, and he said, "Bob! They want us to vote on a war, and they're not going to do an estimate? Tell him he's got to do an estimate!" Graham called him back; he says, "Uh, George, if you don't do an estimate we're not going support this legislation." Hang up.

Now, I wasn't there, but I know how these things happen: Tenet says, "Oh, damn." Goes to the White House, says, "we've successfully escaped the need to write an estimate, but now the jig is up; they won't move the legislation unless we do an estimate." White House tells them, "No problem! Just two conditions: One is, the estimate has to come out exactly as Dick Cheney said the situation was on the 26th of August." That was just three weeks before, in the big speech he made at the Veterans of Foreign Wars, saying Saddam Hussein was about to get a nuclear weapon and all that kind of stuff. "And it's got to be done in 10 days, because they want to get it out and up before we force Congress to vote on whether I should be permitted to make war in Iraq."

Long story short: George Tenet goes back to the Director's conference room, where I spent many hours during my career, and he's got his top managers around the table, but they're not the same kind of managers that existed in my day—they're careerists. They're people that Bobby Gates has put in these positions because they will say there's a Russian under every rock. And Tenet says: "Well, we have to do a National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass destruction. And there are two conditions, one is that it has to be done in 10 days; and the other is, the conclusions have to be what Cheney said in Nashville on Aug. 26th."

Now, if that had happened in my day, we would have said "Ha-ha-ha! You want...! [laughs] George, you're kidding, right?" And if he said he wasn't kidding, we would be out of that door. There might be a sucker or so who'd stay around, but he'd know that

he'd had an insurrection. We don't do that kind of stuff, right?

But now, this is a generation later, right? He's got all these malleable managers around, "Yessir, ten days? We can do that!"—and out of that came the worst, the very worst estimate on record from the CIA or any U.S. intelligence agency, saying there were all manner of weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological, they're just about to get a nuclear... It was just really awful!

This Iraq estimate was dishonest, it was fraud. And you don't have to take my word for it. After a five-year investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee, Jay Rockefeller presenting their final report, which was bipartisan, Chuck Hagel, Olympia Snowe; so, in introducing the report, Rockefeller said: The evidence or the intelligence that was concocted before the war in Iraq was fraudulent; that some of it was nonexistent. Now, I want to ask you: What does nonexistent intelligence look like? Well, it looks like forgeries and stuff like that.

So, that's a long story, but I'm afraid that these guys are not only dishonest, and that's the word I would use, I think Julian Assange is quite right in saying this is dishonest; but they're not even literate. I mean this stuff about hacking and stuff—as if this is evidence!

Reforms

Ross: Let me ask you this: What kind of reforms do you think are in order? How do we get the intelligence community, the intelligence agencies back in shape? What's required?

McGovern: Character matters. You need some characters with character: You need a director who realizes what the job is, and the job has evolved in a way that Truman, who created the CIA never intended... If you want to reform the intelligence community, you have to have somebody with integrity; you have to have somebody who will fulfill the function that Truman created the Agency for—namely, to have an analysis outfit that reports directly to the President! Now that was the legislation in 1947-48. The CIA was not going to be under the Pentagon; the Pentagon always made the Russians out to be ten feet tall. It wasn't going to be under the State Department, because they're always justifying their policy; it was going to be somebody reporting directly to the President, somebody, ideally that would have an In Box full of everything that he or she needed.

We need somebody in charge of the CIA who realizes what its main mission is, to give the President unvarnished truth about things. I don't think anybody's doing that now. Matter of fact, many of the analysts have become little more than targeters. What do they do? They collect stuff from cell phones in Afghanistan, from neighbors who want to get rid of the neighbor they don't like; put it together, and "OK, drone operators, these guys are suspected terrorists." And it was Brennan who was at Obama's side during all this, and would meet with him on Tuesday mornings and go through this list.

Here's the President, you know, and I could imagine him also having also a legal pad because he's a lawyer, and Brennan gives him this list, and he says, "Oh, which ones are we going whack this week?" "Well, there's three—now, John, didn't you tell me that this Ahmad, that he had three little kids and a wife?"

"Yes, Mr. President, but we saw him having lunch with the daughter-in-law of a suspected terrorist."

"Look, John, I don't feel good about Ahmad, so let's put #3 down, and #6 we'll talk about it next week, and we'll move the others up. So, we'll still get five, but let's not whack Ahmad. And excuse me, John, but now I have to go have lunch with Michelle."

Some of these people are American citizens! I mean, there is a Fifth Amendment: "No one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process"! And here's our President saying, "well, let's ask the Attorney General about that." And so, Holder goes to a pretty reputable law school, Northwestern in Chicago, and he says, "well, I'm going to tell you why it is we're entitled to whack American citizens: You see the Fifth Amendment does say 'no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process,' but it doesn't say '*judicial* process.' It only says, 'due process,' and so, we 'do do doo-doo process,' right here in the White House, thank you, very much."

It's *always* meant judicial process! And the Germans do have in their Constitution, that it has to involve the courts, and the Germans are doing our bidding by letting us do that stuff from Ramstein [air-base].

So these are things that are a profound disappointment to me, and I just hope, against hope perhaps, that things will get better after the 20th of January.

Ross: Ray McGovern, thank you very much.

McGovern: You're most welcome, Jason.