

The United States Is Losing the Iraq War

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

The shooting down of an American CH-47 helicopter in Fallujah on Nov. 2 by a surface-to-air missile—one of four lethal encounters for American personnel that day—continued the steady escalation and coordination of guerrilla military operations by the Iraqi resistance. That resistance has now, on several occasions, been able to select high-value occupation targets and to hit those targets at dramatic times, as well as to coordinate its actions with anti-occupation demonstrations. Military-operations coordination—not Paul Wolfowitz’ “sporadic attacks by bitter-enders”—is also indicated by the dramatic increase in the number of daily attacks, now averaging over 30, twice the number of two months ago.

Reviewing the situation on Nov. 2, U.S. Presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche pointed to the events around April 9, when Baghdad fell. Then, faced with the vast destructive force of American air power, “the Iraqi military ‘disappeared.’ It didn’t vanish to nowhere—it still existed. What you’re now seeing: A decision was made. Since they could not defeat the strategic arsenal being deployed against them by the United States, they would take a lesson from Korea and Vietnam. And the Iraqis would say, ‘We can’t beat their weapons, but when we’re close up to them, next to them, walking the same streets, in the same neighborhoods, and they have to deal with us man-to-man; if we’re willing to take the brunt of that, we can win that war.’ And, the Iraqi military is in the process, now, of winning the war. . . . This is not a mismanagement problem: The United States is losing the war! And, it’s losing that war in the same degree that it lost the war in Indo-China.”

LaRouche’s view has been corroborated by several regional experts. One European strategic analyst emphasized to *EIR* that the resistance, now largely focussed in Sunni-dominated central Iraq, could rapidly be extended nationally, when and if the Shi’ite leadership were to give the order. Currently, the Shi’ite majority is waiting to assume power through the political process of elections. If its majority position is not accepted—as U.S. authorities have indicated it will not be—then Shi’ite forces would be mobilized in the resistance.

Although the Shi’ite community has maintained its low profile thus far, certain developments indicate a possible, slow shift. The mayor of Najaf, one of the two holiest Shi’ite cities, called a strike on Nov. 5 to protest the utter lack of security, after the assassination of a judge investigating crimes of the Saddam Hussein regime. The occupying forces, by interna-

tional law responsible for maintaining security, are preoccupied with protecting themselves.

An Arab strategic specialist in Kuwait told *EIR* on Nov. 3, that an informed Arab view is that the Nov. 1-2 attacks, one week after the audacious missile attacks against the U.S. occupation headquarters at the Rashid Hotel on Oct. 24, while Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz was there, signalled a watershed, a qualitative escalation. Iraq’s geographic size, in the heart of the Middle East, presents a situation which the Americans did not envisage; its extensive border is almost impossible to seal to prevent infiltration by pro-resistance forces. As this expert emphasized, American complaints about “foreign terrorists” ignore the fact that not only pro-Saddam Hussein elements are joining the resistance. Furthermore, given the history and character of the Iraqi people, they would never allow outside elements to dominate or lead any such struggle for liberation; foreign elements must be subordinating themselves to Iraqi leadership. And these foreigners could not function without receiving the support of the population: lodging, food, weapons.

This source reported that sentiment in favor of Saddam Hussein is being openly broadcast on Arab TV outlets, which show jubilating crowds of Iraqis after every major attack. In sum, the Arab perspective is that the Iraqi resistance will grow, and will, in the end, prevail, no matter how long it takes. The Iraqi resistance, initially, had encountered problems in its intelligence, which, according to experts, have since been solved. They have a good map of the U.S. deployments, methods, procedures, manpower, etc., and are therefore able to attack with precision, in a coordinated, deadly fashion. The general view is that about three-four months before the 2004 elections, the Bush Administration will be forced to withdraw. Although there is no indication that the Administration is *planning* such a course, the steadily-growing pressure against the Cheney faction, generated by LaRouche’s now year-long mobilization to force Cheney out of office, is now felt and discussed throughout Washington. This—given the Iraq situation on the ground as LaRouche characterized it—is what makes such a withdrawal a very strong possibility.

On Nov. 5, Gen. Peter Pace of the Marine Corps, and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee that thousands of active duty and part-time National Guard and Reserve troops would go to Iraq early in 2004. He said the troops would be part of a rotation plan for the next year, and that the current troop strength of 132,000, could be reduced to 100,000 by May. The European strategic analyst cited above, spoke about a “conspiracy of incompetence” vis-a-vis Iraq on the side of the neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration. “And the U.S. Army on the ground has to pay the price for this arrogant incompetence.” Now, when American military and intelligence officials talk to their non-American counterparts, there is no more hiding the “growing rage within the Army and the intelligence community” against the neo-conservatives, notably Dick Cheney, for what they have done in Iraq.