

Pacific Theatre

Part 7

“Guadalcanal: a piñata of lies”

By Lestrade aka Unpopular Opinion

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There's no freedom of speech in the UK but I'll say my opinion anyway



Caption: “U.S. soldiers stationed in Guadalcanal hold an animal contest with American Red Cross volunteer Patricia O'Neill.” - original [here](#). Absolute meat grinder, life and death situation, but still time to answer the important questions like: “Who has the best pet cat?”.

Hello again. Yes, there was a gap in releases. Newborn babies are time consuming. Plus your patience is rewarded: this is a big boy.

If I said something outrageous like “the entire Guadalcanal campaign is fictional” then the popular response would be to boo and throw pint glasses at my head. There's no way this entire section of WW2 could be a propaganda exercise, right? Buckle up.

The TL;DR for Zoomers: There was a bit in the Pacific Campaign of World War 2 where the Elite wanted to do a couple of things at the same time. These were:

- A) Justify the existence of the Marine Corps.
- B) Have an extended holiday in the tropics, with opportunity for war gaming exercises, to create propaganda footage for the audiences back home and of course justify military budgets in general.
- C) Get Australia involved in the nonsense to pad out the plot of World War 2 and justify shenanigans by the Australian government on the Australian people.

D) Justify the “defeat” of Japan (in reality defeated as a nation since the Boshin War) by creating a meat grinder plot line where large numbers of Japanese troops get battered and the Allies “gain ground”.

We therefore had a fake military invasion of [the Solomon Islands](#) that mostly took place in Fiji; a ghost airfield; three major fake land battles; a completely pointless air force bombing campaign dropping a couple million quids worth of incendiaries on orangutangs and fake naval skirmishes with vanishing ships. Not to mention a fanciful adventure involving JFK and the entire population of Australia being scared with Scooby Doo-tier ghost stories (but we will get to that). So much to cover. Luckily for you, dear reader, I am a consummate professional and can relate this in a digestible and hopefully entertaining manner.




Rare photograph of Lestrade being trained by Miles Mathis (seated on right with his teaching stick) at his secret dojo in the mountains of California, on techniques of logical deduction and correct observation of faked documents, circa 1982. He insisted on playing “Eye of the Tiger” on a loop on his stereo the entire time but I got used to it.

Wow, Lestrade was quite a babe 40 years ago. I tend to forget that in my elevation. I also note that Lestrade has now lost all respect for the “history” (s)he is analyzing. Which is just as it should be.

Let’s get into it: Here we have the South Pacific. We can see our good friend Australia. North east of Australia you have the Coral Sea and a small island chain called the Solomon Islands, which are east of Papua New Guinea.




The Japanese have a base here, at a small tropical fishing village called [Rabaul](#).



They allegedly have 110,000 troops living here full time, with kilometres of underground tunnels, multiple aerodromes, barracks, gun turrets and secret bunkers to hide from observation. They mostly sit around listening to early J-Pop and trimming the branches of very small trees while cackling evilly, that sort of thing.

South east of Rabaul, in the Solomon Islands, you have this island called Guadalcanal. The Japanese are in the process of building an airfield to launch planes from.




Allegedly they also have “seaplane bases” to the north on tiny islands called Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo, which are so small you can’t even see them on the above map (despite how much we’ve already zoomed in). Let me zoom in even more, it’s that small bit on the underbelly of the Nggella island chain to the north:



All this is serious business because if the Japanese get the ability to launch planes from Guadalcanal, this will allow them to cut off the area from the American military... and threaten Australia... or something.

The Americans claim if this runway becomes operational they will no longer be able to sail ships like this:



That's why the Americans develop a plan (initially Operation Watchtower and Cactus, later "[Operation Cartwheel](#)" by mid-1943) to invade the Solomon's, steal the airfield from the Japanese and push north to keep Australia & New Zealand safe. Because the Solomon Islands are that important.

They tell us this took over six months and involved roughly 100,000 men, with around 35,000 casualties.

Strength	
60,000+ men (ground forces) ^[4]	36,200 men (ground forces) ^[5]
Casualties and losses	
7,100 dead ^[6]	Army: 19,200 dead, of whom 8,500 were killed in combat ^[9]
7,789+ wounded ^[7]	
4 captured	
29 ships lost including 2 fleet carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 17 destroyers.	
615 aircraft lost ^[8]	
	1,000 captured
	38 ships lost including 1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 11 destroyers.
	683 aircraft lost ^{[10][11]}
	10,652 evacuated

(Americans always on the left, Japanese on the right. Note the immediate dodgy numbers of “19,200 dead, of whom 8,500 were killed in combat”)

Now, I include the maps because I want to clearly highlight how dumb this is as a concept. You’re not meant to question this, but I will: the Japanese having an air field on Guadalcanal is irrelevant. It does not warrant a military campaign, it does not warrant either side throwing that many men at it. In a sane world it should have been only known as “That time we did a bombing run on some island near Papua New Guinea and left a couple of craters in an airbase they were setting up”.

Compare to the way they staged a large part of the fighting in the European theater to North Africa, for no logical reason except to hide the (lack of) action from firstworld reporters and locals, and to spare the European countryside from fake bombing/strafing. The Pacific campaign was more of the same, in spades, since the Solomon Islands were the most remote place on Earth. The idea the Japanese would have an important base there is ludicrous on the face of it. They might as well have staged this crap in the Antarctic.

Apparently I am supposed to forget the Americans have these things called aircraft carriers. If you have a particularly annoying airfield being used to attack convoys you can tell the carrier to sail nearby and bomb it to pieces (also the hangers, fuel tanks, repair shops, warehouses, barracks etc. that are connected to that airfield). You can then sail on to more useful targets, for example Singapore, or Hong Kong, or (gasp) perhaps even attack Tokyo directly.

The [Guadalcanal Campaign](#) kicks off on August 7th of 1942.

As per Wikipedia:

*“The Allies chose the Solomon Islands (a protectorate of the United Kingdom), specifically the southern Solomon Islands of **Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Florida Island**, as the first target, designated Task One (codenamed Pestilence), with three specific objectives. Originally, the objectives were the occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands (codenamed Huddle), Tulagi (codenamed Watchtower), and “adjacent positions”. **Guadalcanal (code name Cactus), which eventually became the focus of the operation, was not even mentioned in the early directive and only later took on the operation-name Watchtower.** Tiny **Tulagi** had a large natural harbour perfect for a float-plane base and small Florida had to be taken as it dominated Tulagi. Large Guadalcanal,*

*south across the soon-to-be-named Iron Bottom Sound was added **when it was discovered the Japanese were building an airbase there.***

Referring to Tulagi as a large location is a bit of a stretch, as we will see. Note that floatplanes are not the same thing as long-range heavy bombers. Also note that Guadalcanal wasn't the priority, it was Tulagi. To save a lot of time and confusion for the reader, this is because the majority of the Marine force land on Guadalcanal (the main island) and a much smaller force are used to "clear" Gavutu-Tanamaboko and Tulagi (which I believe were empty of Japanese). They flip it later and make out the fierce fighting is on these smaller locations away from the main force, this is your classic "isolated location" protocol, makes it easier to fool large numbers of squaddies, easier to control the narrative, etc.

"The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had occupied Tulagi in May and had constructed a seaplane base nearby. Allied concern grew when, in early July, the IJN began constructing a large airfield at Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal – from such a base Japanese long-range bombers would threaten the sea lines of communication from the West Coast of the Americas to the populous East Coast of Australia. By August, the Japanese had about 900 naval troops on Tulagi and nearby islands and 2,800 personnel (2,200 being Korean forced labourers and trustees as well as Japanese construction specialists) on Guadalcanal. These bases would protect Japan's major base at Rabaul, threaten Allied supply and communication lines and establish a staging area for a planned offensive against Fiji, New Caledonia and Samoa (Operation FS). The Japanese planned to deploy 45 fighters and 60 bombers to Guadalcanal. In the overall strategy for 1942 these aircraft would provide air cover for Japanese naval forces advancing farther into the South Pacific."

Got to pad those numbers. So 900 on Tulagi and "nearby islands". What, throughout the Solomons? On Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanamaboko (which you can think of as one site, because it's two very small atolls right next to each other connected by a bridge) specifically? Nice and vague. So what, split it in half, 450 soldiers on each? Later we will see they admit a chunk of the 900 are actually Korean labourers... who fight anyway despite being slaves who hate the Japanese. Hmm. We have 2,800 people on Guadalcanal which sounds like a lot but this is actually only 600 troops keeping control of 2,200 Korean slaves. That must have been a hell of a job, preventing rebellion! See how quickly we're getting into "funny numbers" territory.

"The Allied plan to invade the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral Ernest **King**, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. **He proposed the offensive to deny the use of the islands by the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the United States and Australia and to use them as starting points.** With U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's tacit consent, King also advocated the invasion of Guadalcanal."

King is a major Peerage name (over 1,200 names listed [on the Peerage with multiple adjacent ones](#) – this is reminding me of Martin Luther King or former Governor of the Bank of England Sir Mervyn King, Baron of Lothbury). Please note that the Japanese ([according to none other than Tojo himself](#)) never intended to invade Australia (or New Zealand) as they (allegedly) did not have the manpower.

As per the above wiki link we quote Prime Minister Tojo:

"We never had enough troops to [invade Australia]. We had already far out-stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over-strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New

Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion – no, at no time.”

It's funny because you're not meant to keep reading and notice how the Japanese Army estimates were that 125,000-250,000 men would be needed to properly invade Australia, which was too big an ask, but they had no problem dumping 110,000 men to sit in Rabaul. Do you see what I mean? Briefly double the numbers for the Rabaul posting and you can take/destroy the Australian east coast and permanently disable the American supply lines to the south Pacific. Or hey, why not just take out New Zealand instead? If Australia takes 250,000 men, what do you need to capture Auckland? What damage would 100,000 soldiers with carrier support do to the Kiwi's capital? Take New Zealand and you've got a great location to run interference between Australia and America.

If you query this you get the usual guff online from people saying “Well ACTUALLY they couldn't invade Australia because it's SO BIG” – this is amusing to me. Do they think you need troops stationed every square metre of a country to occupy it properly or you somehow lose automatically? Australia is big, yes, but it's mostly empty and inhospitable. The majority of the population are on the eastern seaboard. The vast majority in the south-east, in Sydney / Melbourne / Canberra and surrounding areas. The Japanese would not need to occupy the whole country, this is mid-wit thinking. If they captured the major cities that would do the job. Before I get people shouting “But muh guerilla warfare pushback” yes I know that could happen, but there's a big difference between groups of militia trying to chip away at a force that holds the cities and a functioning country that has operational airports and ports and so on.

Besides, Australia was almost as worthless in the World War as the Solomons. The entire continent didn't even have the population of London. The Australian army and navy was of no import. The Japanese were allegedly at war with the US here, and taking Australia would not help them in that war. It would only draw off money and troops, so it was completely counterproductive. It would be like the US attacking Sri Lanka in order to vex the Japanese.

As we can read [here](#):

“The Imperial Japanese Navy demonstrated the vulnerability of New Zealand when submarine-launched Japanese floatplanes overflew Wellington and Auckland in 1942. In March a Glen floatplane from I-25 overflew Wellington on 8 March and Auckland on 13 March, then Suva, Fiji on 17 March. The submarine was not seen by the Wellington-Nelson ferry when navigating Cook Strait on the surface on a full-moon night. In May a floatplane from I-21 overflew Suva on 19 May and then Auckland on 24 May. Lost in heavy fog the pilot (Matsumora) was helped by airport staff who heard a plane apparently in trouble and turned on the runway lights so allowing the pilot to find his bearings. During one March or May 1942 overflight a Tiger Moth apparently gave chase ineffectually.”

They launched a floatplane from a submarine that we couldn't spot despite it being a full moon night (best time for a submarine to surface guys well done) and the Auckland airport staff flipped on the runway lights to help the Japanese plane navigate. Nothing was bombed or shot at. I will translate this: the NZ Air Force launched a plane and flew over Auckland and pretended this was a Japanese plane launched from a submarine. Or, more likely, nothing was launched at all and there was no plane and they just invented the entire story to remind the Kiwi's they were at war and in peril.

Anyway the point is that they definitely had enough men to attack Australia/New Zealand and properly knock them out of the game. Imagine the morale loss to the Allies! As usual, the Japanese

pull their punches and don't do the killing blow, like we've seen every time (e.g. at Pearl Harbour not sending in a 3rd wave or never using the Unit 731 bioweapons). This is without factoring in the German naval support that (allegedly) assaults Australian ships in their waters throughout the war and the tens of thousands of troops shipped in during the Guadalcanal campaign. They had the numbers.

So on the one hand you have the Americans saying the Japanese are going to use Guadalcanal's airfield to advance further into the south Pacific but on the other hand the Japanese Prime Minister is saying "nah mate, we just wanted to hold defensive at Rabaul". Which is it? Nobody cares and it's decades later and I'm the first to ask apparently.

Skipping ahead a bit, what ultimately happens to Rabaul?

As you can read about [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#), the Allies never take Rabaul. You might have expected some big battle where they conquer the port, amphibious landings, raise the flag etc. but... nope. They "encircle" it and move on with the war, leaving 110,000 Japanese troops sitting around playing cards (and another 25,000-odd at Bougainville nearby) until the end of the war.



"Photo taken from US Marine SBD dive bomber on 2 August 1944, during an air raid on Rabaul. The aircraft are attacking Rabaul's defences and a previously sunken cargo ship"- original [here](#).

A base supporting 110,000 men? Where? I like how they admit the ship is a previously sunken cargo ship. My theory: the military are war-gaming around the area and using old, disposable vessels as target practice, like with the USS Utah at Pearl Harbour.

From [Wikipedia](#):

*"After its capture by the South Sea Force in January 1942, Rabaul was developed into a major fleet base by the Japanese, eventually becoming **the most heavily defended Japanese position in the South Pacific**. Rabaul's strategic location, multiple airfields and large natural harbour made it the ideal staging base for ships, aircraft, troops and supplies during the New Guinea and*

Guadalcanal campaigns. *The Japanese army dug many kilometres of tunnels as shelter from Allied air attacks. They also expanded the facilities by constructing army barracks and support structures. By 1943 there were about 110,000 Japanese troops based in Rabaul.*”

And:

*“The capture of Bougainville and Buka brought Rabaul within range of land-based US Navy and Marine Corps tactical bombers, setting the stage for the pacification campaign to follow. **Rather than attempt to capture the heavily fortified position, the Allies determined to neutralize Rabaul by isolating it and eliminating its air-power.**”*

So... you just drop some bombs... and ignore them? Wouldn't they be able to go on the offensive in other ways? Or protect the planes using the defensive facilities?

We read on:

*“The first air attack in the pacification campaign was planned for 17 December 1943. It would be based out of Torokina Airfield on Bougainville, and consisted of thirty-one Marine F4U Corsairs, twenty-three RNZAF P-40 fighters, twenty-two US Navy F6F Hellcats, and a slightly smaller number of Army Air Forces B-24 bombers. **The attack did not receive a large response from the Japanese, so only seven Japanese fighters were lost.** Three RNZAF P-40s were lost, two with their pilots. A similar attack took place on 19 December, **which cost the Japanese four aircraft**, two credited to Marine fighters. The first **"large scale"** strike took place on 23 December. Different from previous strikes, the Army Air Forces bombers went in first, and the fighters followed afterwards. Forty Japanese fighters responded this time, with thirty **claimed** to be destroyed by Allied fighters, **though Japanese records do not match the Allied claims.**”*

You can see where I'm going with this. Photo evidence please! From [this](#) article:



“An aerial photograph of bombing raids on Japanese shipping in Simpson harbour”


Ah yes, bombing raids. Over a small lake far away from the actual harbour, visible in the top left. Bombing raids with no planes or anti-air fire, no visible military facilities and the “bombing” consisting of... what... some sort of smoke cloud? Is that from a large smoke grenade going off? Some kind of flare?



“Allied air forces striking Japanese shipping in the harbour at Rabaul”

Pretty sure that plane in the foreground is cropped in. We seem to have a size and perspective malfunction. Also the whited out dumb-bell shape in the foreground centre is suspect. Also the general quality of the image. There are more photos [here](#).

Here are some choice ones I like:



“Japanese freighter exploding after being hit by a bomb, Rabaul, New Britain, Nov 1943”

No comment needed, fake as a Kardashian.



“USAAF 3rd Bomb Group aircraft attacking Haguro and other ships in Simpson Harbor, Rabaul”

Ships... possibly US Naval ships... detonating depth charges? No planes in the sky (for a bombing run) no obvious damage to anyone. Why is it such a giant cloud of white smoke coming off the tiny ship in the top right? Wouldn't it be a fuel-burning fire, so would it be black?



“Parafrag bombs falling in Simpson Harbor, Rabaul”

Parafrag bombs – when saying “bombs” is not military enough. It’s a fragmentation bomb on a parachute I assume... not that any are visible. Or planes. Or parachutes. Or ships being damaged. Or anything to indicate this is a Japanese super base (e.g. no bunkers, barracks, barb wire, gun emplacements, etc. etc.).

So yeah, have a look for yourself – aside from multiple paste-up/bleached out images that have been doctored you have shots of a tropical harbour – which may or may not be Rabaul – a possible wargaming drill involving US ships (as we have no way of knowing which ships these are, they may be Japanese but there is no way to tell) and no evidence of any kind of military facilities.

What about video footage? Well we’re in luck, if you [follow this link](#) you can watch a copy of the entire 1943 “documentary” called “Mission to Rabaul”. It’s a bit of mind-blower. Please keep asking yourself “The Japanese are where?” as we watch this.

At the 8 minute mark you see a bombing run on Wewak, allegedly a Japanese facility. As you can see they are bombing empty tropical coastline, [as per the photograph on the wikipedia page for this topic](#). At the 9 minute mark you get to see the US pilots firing machine guns at tropical forest. The narrator reassures me this is actually the destruction of 120-odd Japanese warplanes. I must have missed that by blinking at the wrong moment. At 10:30 we have 1,000 pound bombs being dropped on Salamaua, allegedly another Japanese facility. We have nice shots of forest and tropical coastline. Truly the Japanese are masters of camouflage. Bizarrely, the camera footage then cuts at 10:50 to the anti-air response... of the Japanese... which is being filmed on the ground... by the Americans... during their own bombing run!?

The Americans then proceed to bomb rainforest for several minutes and claim this is wiping out large numbers of hidden Japanese. We must take their word for this. Footage on the ground at the 12 minute mark shows how utterly wild this place is – native tribesmen being paid to act as logistics support as the American trek around the hills and jungles. No real roads from the look of it – the odd rope bridge if you’re lucky.

Obvious question: if the Japanese have all these elite military bases in the jungle, how did THEY get into position... and maintain their own health with necessary supplies? If there is no infrastructure set up (e.g. proper roads), then how do hundreds of thousands of troops operate and stay fed, clean and watered?

Notice also that the Japanese never do anything as pre-emptive defence. For example you never have the Americans talking about “well we tried to do an amphibious landing but it turned out they had put sea mines in the area so we lost a bunch of landing craft” or “we landed but then we found the beach was saturated with land mines and pit traps so a whole company was wiped out” or “they had machine gun nests in the tree line so we lost X number of men trying to land at this location”. It’s always “we sailed in, we landed, we unpacked our kit and went for a walk” or “we flew over the area, dropped our bombs and flew away”.


At 12:45 we look at Hansa Bay, more empty tropical coastline, more jungle being blown up by bombers. I feel sorry for all the animals the USAF killed. At 13:18 some fields are flown over. A sugar plantation? A coconut farm? The ocean is then bombed to kill some fish for good measure. More footage of jungle being bombed. More coastal jungle being shot at.

At 21 minutes the Americans ambush a “Japanese” cargo ship – sailing by itself, no escort, no defences, just pootling along somewhere in a lagoon. The Americans strafe it. No flag, no ship

identification. A target dummy used in wargaming exercises perhaps? At 21:32 they shoot... what... a landing craft? Parked up on the beach?

At 29:38 we have an actual Japanese attack. Except this is not captured on film. No planes in the sky, nobody hurt. The narrator explains that although this forward airbase has no fighter planes to fight back with (!?) the Japanese are “timid” and run away. They “only do one pass, missing the runway entirely” and instead start a small fire in the nearby grassy field which harms no-one. Those silly Japanese. Again, are we dealing with psycho fanatic sword wielding cannibals or are we dealing with a timid people who can’t fly a plane?

At 31:30 we actually get a glimpse of some kind of facility:



I guess that could be some kind of military base. Or it could be a small native settlement and those are houses and dirt roads. If it is a base why are there trees growing between the buildings in the middle? Wouldn't the grounds be cleared? Why would the buildings be so spread out? Wouldn't there be some kind of defensive perimeter around the place? Why can we see this base but all the others are invisible from the air due to “camouflage”?

At 32:12 we see what is supposed to be wreckage of a destroyed base and some planes. Why is the foliage around the planes so deep? They weren't going to take off like this were they?



Or this:



These are just pre-busted planes dumped in a tropical meadow aren't they?

At the 36:30 they buzz a Japanese air base. I counted two or three planes, all are parked up and there are no signs of life – just a deserted runway in the forest and a couple of planes to the side. Where are the troops? Where are the enemy fighters? Or buildings?

We are then told this film is footage covering six weeks worth of fighting and the destruction of over a thousand Japanese aircraft at multiple sites. I have seen no evidence of any Japanese. Remarkable. At 37:42 we start approaching Rabaul. The narrator goofs by saying there are 60,000 troops at Rabaul (not 110,000). I believe this is because later on they wanted to increase the death toll (and justify the campaign / not taking Rabaul by force) so they upped the numbers.

At 50:30 we finally see Rabaul. Disappointingly, this is more of the same – shooting/bombing tropical jungle. There is a clear sign of an airfield at the 51 minute mark, so that’s interesting. No way to know this isn’t just Guadalcanal airfield of course.



Elite Japanese base with 110,000 troops, allegedly. I suppose they live underground in the tunnels.



Another screenshot, again this is an empty field with nothing in it. The narrator then claims massive success and huge destruction of Japanese property. He informs us that the Americans have been able to repeatedly and systemically smash the Japanese positions because they “use surprise”, which seems to boil down to “fly the bombers in at low altitude, around 100 feet, so you go under the radar and be radio silent”. OK, but this doesn’t explain how the Japanese never HEAR or SEE the planes coming. You have lookouts, right? Scouts? Your own aircraft? You also have the problem

that on a tropical island in the middle of nowhere it's quiet. So if a fleet of planes are coming your way you will hear them from quite a long way off.

At the very end, (the 54 minute mark) the narrator interestingly recounts how – to the bomber pilots – they are always seeing their bombs fall on what appears to be empty jungle and coconut farms, but they understand that this is just camouflage that the Japanese use. So we see the method of how the pilots were led to do their part in this.

Anyway, that video was worth looking at closely because it demonstrates that there were no Japanese at any of the facilities listed, including Rabaul. Also Weewak, Salamaua, Hansa Bay, etc. They couldn't even get their story straight with the troop numbers at Rabaul. This undermines the entire point of south Pacific campaign – the main HQ's are Rabaul and Truuk lagoon, but we'll look at that other one later.

I get that the Air Force have all these expensive toys and want to test them out and justify getting billions of dollars every year. They get to fly around an empty tropical archipelago and drop bombs and film it and then get out and high five each other afterwards. Great job guys. Except for, you know, it all being a massive waste of time and resources and jungle wildlife.

Anyway, let us jump back to Guadalcanal proper:



“The airfield at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal under construction by Japanese and conscripted Korean laborers in July 1942” – original [here](#).

So the problem here is that this isn't an airstrip. This is a photograph of a plantation (as per lower right corner) and you've got a shining white rectangle drawn in. This is like someone using TipEx (“Wite-Out” for our American readers) on the photograph to create a white rectangle and saying “Hi this is an airstrip”. You can see the original road/path crossing over the middle of the airfield, still visible. Note the diagonal end of the runway in the lower left. Also note how there are no support buildings, no construction material, no people.

From [Wikipedia](#):

*“**Bad weather** allowed the Allied expeditionary force to arrive **unseen** by the Japanese on the night of 6 August and the following morning, **taking the defenders by surprise**. This is sometimes called the “Midnight Raid on Guadalcanal”. A Japanese patrol aircraft from Tulagi had searched the*

general area the Allied invasion fleet was moving through, but missed seeing the Allied ships due to **severe storms and heavy clouds**. The landing force split into two groups, with one group assaulting Guadalcanal, and the other Tulagi, Florida, and nearby islands.”

It's always bad weather, or fog or something, isn't it?



“Tulagi and two nearby small islands, Gavutu and Tanambogo, were assaulted by 3,000 U.S. Marines, under the command of Brigadier General William Rupertus. The 886 IJN personnel manning the naval and seaplane bases on the three islands fiercely resisted the Marine attacks. With some difficulty, the Marines secured all three islands: Tulagi on 8 August, and Gavutu and Tanambogo by 9 August. The Japanese defenders were killed almost to the last man, and the Marines lost 122 men.”

Whereas on Guadalcanal proper:

“In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance. At 09:10 on 7 August, Vandegrift and 11,000 U.S. Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered little resistance and secured the airfield by 16:00 on 8 August. The Japanese naval construction units and combat troops, under the command of Captain Kanae Monzen, panicked by the warship bombardment and aerial bombing, had abandoned the airfield area and fled about 3 miles (5 km) west to the Matanikau River and Point Cruz area, leaving behind food, supplies, intact construction equipment and vehicles, and 13 dead.”

This is gloriously stupid. The Japanese just ran away! They are good enough to leave behind all the useful kit (supplies, construction equipment, etc.) and we have of course 13 dead. The Marines thought there were roughly 7,000 Japanese guarding the airfield! What about the 2,000-odd Korean slaves? Did they pack up and walk away as well? Are they then sat quietly in the swamp with the Japanese?

So that's your glorious capture of Guadalcanal: the Marines walk up the beach and onto an empty airbase full of food.



This is supposed to be them landing on Guadalcanal. Nice and easy, right? A cynic might add this doesn't exactly look like 11,000 men but hey hard to get them all in frame.



Again, seems like a small scale thing.



“U.S. Marines debark from LCP(L)s onto Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942.”

It’s interesting how they already have the camera crews set up on the beach to film the Marines coming in – there is no fear whatsoever of a Japanese attack. Absolute brass balls on the film crew sailing in ahead and standing around on the beach getting a white balance and the tripods set up!

This next one I got from Pinterest and seems to be watermarked from Life Magazine, tagged for Guadalcanal. I assume this is from the Marine landings at Guadalcanal, apologies if someone knows this is from a different landing. If it is Guadalcanal, we can see this is clearly NOT 11,000 men:



Love the ship in the distance painted in, conveniently right on the horizon.

And again, another photo showing how small scale this is:




Note how in all these photographs roughly the same number of men and landing craft are visible. This would indicate to me that a) the photos are genuine as they show the same thing from different angles and b) all are taken in one staged “photo shoot” and c) this disproves the size of the landing

force claimed (as logically the Marines are not dropping off waves of 100 men at a time if they have 11,000 men to deploy).

[Here's a link](#) to the YouTube hosted episode of WW2 documentary series **Battlefield**, that did a whole episode on Guadalcanal. If you jump to 28:11 they look at the actual landing operation. Note how some of the battleships are firing their cannon, but as we know there are no Japanese ships defending the island shoreline, or troops and no shoreline facilities to hit, so logically they are literally firing at nothing. This is for show. The narrator explains how nobody knew what they were doing, supplies and men were being dropped off on the beach and there was lots of confusion.

Here's a screenshot from 28:29 which is supposed to be the Marines landing:



This is a significantly larger force than anything shown in your normal “Marines land at Guadalcanal” photographs found online. Weird, right? Compare the two for yourself. This is a whole can of worms. Did you know that the Guadalcanal landings were rehearsed? The rehearsal was known as **Operation Dovetail**. You can read about that [here](#). Simple question: is this footage of Dovetail or the “real” invasion?

I also like this quote from the article linked above:

*“Although at the time a rehearsal was considered vital before the U.S. Navy launched its initial seaborne attack of World War II, **information about the four-day operation off the coast of Koro in the Fijis at the end of July 1942, just 10 days before the actual invasion of Guadalcanal, is strangely absent from the literature of the Pacific War.** Neither the official Navy and Marine Corps histories nor other authoritative accounts more than briefly acknowledge its existence. **Even high-profile participants in the Guadalcanal operation barely mention it in their postwar accounts.**”*

And:

*“The four-day pre-invasion exercise, extending from July 28 to July 31, was to be carried out by Turner’s Task Force 62, which included **19,000** ground troops of the 1st Marine Division in 22 transports, two fire support groups comprising cruisers and destroyers, and three fleet aircraft carriers with their complement of fighter, dive, and torpedo bomber aircraft. **The naval component of the exercise totalled 72 ships.**”*

How strange this massive exercise doesn’t get talked about more. The next time you see one of those veteran interviews talking about Guadalcanal, see if they mention the four day rehearsal in Fiji. Am I outrageous to suggest that when the Battlefield documentary is giving us that lovely panning shot of a massive amphibious landing force backed up by warships (28:28 – 28:40) we are in fact seeing footage of Dovetail? Which would neatly explain the huge shift of scale between that footage and the photographs of the landing? If you read the entire article there is a lot of information about how the Marine operation was completely incompetent. If they were actually pitted against a defending shoreline force they would have been massacred. Not something you’re meant to know.

Fortunately on the day of the landings none of the Marines were harmed by the Japanese so it was a good time for all. The real action was to be found on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo.



Check out how the Battlefield documentary at 30:06 has a map which is presenting the entire Nggela Island cluster as being Gavutu-Tanambogo! I think this is to give the impression of them being really big islands (equivalent to Guadalcanal) for the Marines to fight through. This is because they’re trying to sell you the idea it took two days to take them. See for yourself on google map – or on page 4 where I’ve put my map screenshots – for how crazy that map scale is.

Note also, back at 3:40, that the Marines as of June 1942 were not combat ready despite completing their training and the Marines commander was advised that nothing was to be expected of them until 1943 at the earliest! So these highly trained Marines were considered not just raw but completely unsuitable for combat. Interesting. This ties in with the article on Dovetail.

We are then told there is a lot of back-and-forth battling where the Americans sit on the runway at Henderson Field (the renamed Japanese air strip) and the Japanese try and take it back. The Americans were so scared of the Japanese that:

*“[Admiral Frank Jack] Fletcher was concerned about the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships' fuel levels. **Fletcher withdrew from the Solomon Islands area with his carrier task forces on the evening of 8 August.** As a result of the loss of carrier-based air cover, **Turner decided to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal, even though less than half of the supplies and heavy equipment needed by the troops ashore had been unloaded.**”*

Another classic example of “leave no man behind”. The Navy runs away and leaves the Marines with only a small chunk of their supplies. It was supposed to take 4 or 5 days to offload everything, not two! I don't understand how Fletcher and Turner got away with that. Even if you truly believed the Japanese were about to strike surely you'd notice after an hour or so that it was peaceful and return? I'm not sure what the correct military terminology would be but abandoning the plan and leaving your buddies without supplies thus setting them up to be killed is a total dick move in my book.

From Wikipedia:

*“By **18 August** the airfield was ready for operation. **Five days' worth of food had been landed from the transports,** which, along with captured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days' supply of food. To conserve supplies, the troops were limited to two meals per day.*

***Allied troops encountered a severe strain of dysentery soon after the landings, with one in five Marines afflicted by mid-August.** Although some of the Korean construction workers surrendered to the Marines, most of the remaining Japanese and **Korean personnel** gathered just west of the Lunga perimeter on the west bank of the Matanikau River **and subsisted mainly on coconuts.** A Japanese naval outpost was also located at Taivu Point, about 35 kilometers (22 mi) east of the Lunga perimeter. On **8 August,** a Japanese destroyer from Rabaul delivered **113** naval reinforcement troops to the Matanikau position.”*

Again the Marines are disorganised and not prepared for this. Presumably drinkable water had to be shipped in and rationed heavily. Then it's a bunch of white guys in oppressive tropical heat so they're going to be exhausted and dehydrated anyway. Thank God the Japanese kindly left them ample supplies to survive until the Navy returned! I like how the Korean slaves are now described as “personnel”, to make them sound more like regular troops (and not essentially POWs who would want to stab their captors and escape at the first opportunity).

If you've been keeping notes so far you'll notice that we have yet to see any evidence of Japanese in the Solomon Islands - just a load of Americans swanning around.

Next let's look at the three major battles that constitute the Guadalcanal campaign. There are other skirmishes and fights on the island (allegedly) but I'm going to show you the main three. These are the Battles of Alligator Creek, Bloody Ridge and Henderson Field. First up: Alligator Creek.

From [Wikipedia](#):

*“**The Battle of the Tenaru,** sometimes called the Battle of the Ilu River or the **Battle of Alligator Creek,** was a land battle between the Imperial Japanese Army and Allied ground forces that took place on **August 21, 1942** on the island of Guadalcanal during the Pacific campaign of World War II. The battle was **the first major Japanese land offensive** during the Guadalcanal campaign.”*

And:

*“In the battle, U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, repulsed an assault by the **"First Element" of the "Ichiki" Regiment, under the command of Japanese Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.** The Marines were defending the Lunga perimeter, which guarded Henderson Field, which had been captured by the Allies in landings on Guadalcanal on August 7. **Ichiki's unit was sent to Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings with the mission of recapturing the airfield and driving the Allied forces off the island.***

*Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, which at the time numbered about **11,000** personnel, Ichiki's unit conducted a nighttime frontal assault on Marine positions at Alligator Creek on the east side of the Lunga perimeter. **Jacob Vouza, a Coastwatcher scout, warned the Americans of the impending attack minutes before Ichiki's assault.** The Japanese were defeated with heavy losses. The Marines counterattacked Ichiki's surviving troops after daybreak, killing many more. **All but 128 of the original 917 of the Ichiki Regiment's First Element died.**”*

What was that about a warning before the assault? Let me tell you about Jacob.

From [Wikipedia](#):

*“**Sir Jacob Charles Vouza**, KBE, GM, KPM (c. 1892 – 15 March 1984) was a native police officer of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, who served with the United States Marine Corps in the Guadalcanal campaign during World War II.”*

This next bit is glorious:

*“In mid-1942, Japanese forces invaded Guadalcanal. Vouza returned to active duty with the British forces and volunteered to work with the Coastwatchers... On 20 August, while scouting for suspected Japanese outposts, Vouza was captured by men of the Ichiki Detachment, a battalion-strength force of the Japanese 28th Infantry Regiment. **Having found a small American flag in Vouza's loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a tree and tortured him** for information about Allied forces. **Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He was then bayoneted in both of his arms, throat, shoulder, face, and stomach, and left to die.***

*After his captors departed, **he freed himself by chewing through the ropes with his teeth, and made his way through the miles of jungle to American lines.** Before accepting medical attention from Lt. Col. Stanley Radzynski MD, **he gasped a warning** to Martin **Clemens** and Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. **Pollock**, whose 2nd Battalion 1st Marines held the defences at the Ilu River mouth. Vouza told him that an estimated 250 to 500 Japanese soldiers were coming to attack his position in any minute. **This warning gave the Marines the brief but precious time of about 10 minutes to prepare their defences along the Ilu river.** The subsequent Battle of the Tenaru was a clear victory for the Marines.*

*After spending 12 days in the hospital **and receiving 16 US pints (7.6 l) of blood,** Vouza returned to duty as the chief scout for the Marines.”*

I can't even. Just... wow.



"Vouza on Guadalcanal in August 1942, soon after the Allied landings." - original [here](#).



Here he is in a more recent photo. You wouldn't think he'd been bayoneted in the face, right? - original [here](#).

So anyway, you have this strike force of Japanese dropped off on Guadalcanal. From Wikipedia we [read](#):

"An aerial reconnaissance of the U.S. Marine positions on Guadalcanal on August 12 by one of the senior Japanese staff officers from Rabaul sighted few U.S. troops in the open and no large ships in the waters nearby, convincing Imperial Headquarters that the Allies had withdrawn the majority of their troops. In fact, none of the Allied troops had been withdrawn. Hyakutake issued

*orders for an advance unit of **900 troops** from Ichiki's regiment to be landed on Guadalcanal by fast warship to **immediately attack the Allied position and reoccupy the airfield area at Lunga Point**. The remaining personnel in Ichiki's regiment would be delivered to Guadalcanal by slower transport later. At the major Japanese naval base at Truk, which was the staging point for delivery of Ichiki's regiment to Guadalcanal, **Colonel Ichiki was briefed that 2,000–10,000 U.S. troops were holding the Guadalcanal beachhead and that he should, "avoid frontal attacks".**"*

Make sense of that if you will. The Marines had 11,000 men at the airfield but the Japanese couldn't see them. The Japanese were able to fly scout planes over the airfield without getting shot down or pursued by US fighter planes. The Japanese command (despite not seeing any Americans at the site) believed that there were 2,000-10,000 troops there, but only sent 900 men to fight them. They wanted Colonel Ichiki to retake the airfield with at best being outnumbered 2 to 1, possibly 10 to 1. This is obviously a suicide mission. They had 110,000 men at Rabaul nearby but didn't deploy them. They also believed the 10 to 1 odds were dug in around the airfield and told him to avoid frontal attacks... but to somehow take the airfield entirely and hold it.

I mean at this point nothing is making any sense but I will press on:

*"Ichiki, together with **917 of his regiment's 2,300 troops**, designated the "First Element" and carrying **seven days' supply of food**, were delivered to Taivu Point, about 35 kilometers (22 miles) east of Lunga Point, by six destroyers at 01:00 on August 19. **Ichiki was ordered to scout the American positions and wait for the remainder of his force to arrive**. Known as the Ichiki Butai (Ichiki Detachment), they were **an elite and battle-seasoned force but as was about to be discovered, they were heavily stricken with "victory disease" – overconfidence due to previous success**. Ichiki was so confident in the superiority of his men that he decided to destroy the American defenders before the remaining majority of his force arrived, even writing in his journal "18 August, landing; 20 August, march by night and battle; 21 August, enjoyment of the fruit of victory". He concocted a brazenly simple plan: **march straight down the beach and through the American defences. Leaving about 100 personnel behind as a rear guard, Ichiki marched west with the remaining **800 men** of his unit and made camp before dawn about 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) east of the Lunga perimeter**. The U.S. Marines at Lunga Point received intelligence that a Japanese landing had occurred and took steps to find out exactly what was happening."*

So this is an elite unit... that disobeys orders to wait for his other men to arrive... and plans to simply walk onto the airfield and capture it in a day. Insert your own "One Does Not Simply Walk Into Mordor" meme. Of course he leaves behind a rear guard so it can be a nice round 800 men.

To cut it short the Japanese end up arriving at Alligator Creek on the east bank at midnight of the 21st and find themselves staring down the barrel(s) of the Marines, who are all set up and prepared thanks to top boy Vouza. The Japanese then decide to attack in nice manageable waves of 100-200 men at a time, with a gap of an hour or two between each wave. This was extremely kind of the Japanese and must have allowed the Americans to rehydrate and grab a smoke between rounds. By dawn the Marines counterattack and kill more Japanese, but somehow this whole nonsense takes until 5pm the following day(!) to be resolved. I have no idea how, you would think this would be wrapped up by 2am the same night. The Japanese are chased into a coconut grove and then a bunch of US tanks roll over them and everyone not already shot is crushed to death. Lovely.

*"By 17:00 on August 21, Japanese resistance had ended. **Colonel Ichiki was either killed during the final stages of the battle, or performed ritual suicide (seppuku) shortly thereafter, depending on the account**. As curious Marines began to walk around looking at the battlefield, some wounded Japanese troops shot at them, killing or wounding several Marines. **Thereafter, Marines shot***

and/or bayoneted any Japanese soldier lying on the ground that moved, although about 15 injured and unconscious Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner. About 30 of the Japanese troops escaped to rejoin their regiment's rear echelon at Taivu Point."

It's silly they don't know how Ichiki died: if you gut yourself on a samurai sword while kneeling in a quiet corner then that doesn't look the same as being shot with a rifle. If the Japanese have been machine gunned (let alone run over with tanks) it seems unlikely they can lie perfectly still and quiet to spring an ambush.

But of course Ichiki probably buried himself or was buried by his soldiers in some undiscoverable grave, so there was no body.

"The battle set another precedent that would continue throughout the war in the Pacific, which was the reluctance of defeated Japanese soldiers to surrender and their efforts to continue killing Allied soldiers, even as the Japanese soldiers lay dying on the battlefield. On this subject Vandegrift remarked, "I have never heard or read of this kind of fighting. These people refuse to surrender. The wounded wait until men come up to examine them... and blow themselves and the other fellow to pieces with a hand grenade." Robert Leckie, a Guadalcanal veteran, recalls the aftermath of the battle in his book *Helmet For My Pillow*: "Our regiment had killed something like nine hundred of them. Most lay in clusters or heaps before the gun pits commanding sandspit, as though they had not died singly but in groups."

So the usual then: inhuman fanatics who just don't stop until you put a bullet in their forehead, like zombies or vampires or something. The trick with the hand grenades is cute. Funny how that isn't indicated in the photos.

Ah yes: the photos. You've read the above and know it's 3,000 vs. 800 on a beach, seventeen hours of heavy machine guns, mortars, tanks – it must be an absolute bloodbath, right? With the grenade traps as well – we must have a beach caked in blood and gore. OK, deep breath, cover your eyes grandma, men pour yourselves a stiff scotch. Here we go:



“Japanese soldiers, killed while assaulting US Marine positions, lie dead on the sandbar at the mouth of Alligator Creek, Guadalcanal after the battle on August 21, 1942” – original [here](#).

What am I looking at, a dozen bodies? With no blood or visible injury? Click on the link to get the really high resolution photo of this and zoom in, see what I mean. It's cute how most of the bodies aren't even carrying a weapon. Or anything to indicate they are Japanese. Or any visible faces. This is crazy. Another photo, please.

\

And remember, they had color film in 1942, and the Army could definitely afford it. But of course then you could see blood, or lack of it.



“Dead soldiers from Ichiki's forces lie partially buried on the sandbar of Alligator creek after the battle.” - original [here](#).

Buried? How? Was there a sandstorm? At least we have two faces clearly visible now. I assume those are Japanese and not Filipino or Thai. The two guys spooning each other look Thai. How are they dead? Are the bullet wounds all tucked away under the sand? Why are they so clean? Also uninjured? Even the sand is clean!

This is rubbish. I want more gore. What about the Coconut Grove of Doom? The one with the tanks crushing heaps of bodies so the treads “looked like a meat-grinder”?



“Japanese soldiers, killed while assaulting U.S. Marine Corps positions, lie dead in a coconut grove on Guadalcanal after the Battle of the Tenaru on August 21, 1942. Two U.S. Marine Corps M3 Stuart tanks of A Company, 1st Tank Battalion, participating in the battle in late afternoon are visible in the background.” - original [here](#).

Hmm... not what I expected. Conspicuous lack of bodies, let alone steamrollered ones. Death toll?

Strength	
3,000 ^[1]	917 ^[2]
Casualties and losses	
41–44 killed ^{[3][4]}	774–777 killed, 15 captured ^{[5][6]}

Lucky 7's. We know that 100 men were left behind as a rear guard so that's 800 participating in the battle. They captured 15? Really? I thought these guys wouldn't surrender? Who were the captives? No idea. No information. Nobody cares. 770-odd dead they say. Well, not based on the photos it wasn't. This story doesn't hold together and I think nothing happened at Alligator Creek. Just a few guys lying down on the sand for a photo op.

What about the [Battle of Bloody Ridge](#)? From Wikipedia:

*“**The Battle of Edson's Ridge, also known as the Battle of the Bloody Ridge, Battle of Raiders Ridge, and Battle of the Ridge, was a land battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II between Imperial Japanese Army and Allied (mainly United States Marine Corps) ground forces. It took place from 12–14 September 1942, on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, and was **the second of three separate major Japanese ground offensives** during the Guadalcanal campaign.***

*In the battle, U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, repulsed an attack by the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade, under the command of **Japanese Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi**. The Marines were defending the Lunga perimeter*

that guarded Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, which was captured from the Japanese by the Allies in landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942. **Kawaguchi's unit was sent to Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings with the mission of recapturing the airfield and driving the Allied forces from the island.**

Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal – about 12,000 – Kawaguchi's 6,000 soldiers conducted several nighttime frontal assaults on the U.S. defences. The main Japanese assault occurred around Lunga ridge south of Henderson Field, manned by troops from several U.S. Marine Corps units, primarily troops from the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions under U.S. Marine Corps **Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson**. Although the Marine defenses were almost overrun, Kawaguchi's attack was ultimately defeated, with heavy losses for the Japanese.”


The simplest way to break this is to look at the troop numbers.

Strength	
12,500 ^[1]	6,217 ^[2]
Casualties and losses	
59 killed or missing	700–850 killed ^[3]
204 wounded	~500 wounded

The idea is that the US already has 11,000 men on Guadalcanal. They get an additional 1,500 dropped off to help reinforce the airfield. Somehow, they find it difficult to form a proper defensive perimeter (despite having nearly 13,000 troops not to mention the artillery, barbed wire, tanks, fighter planes, etc.). The Japanese send in just over 6,000 men to retake the airfield.

“Kawaguchi set the date for his attack on the Lunga perimeter for 12 September and began marching his forces west from Taivu towards Lunga Point on 5 September. He radioed 17th Army and requested that it carry out air strikes on Henderson Field beginning on 9 September, and that naval warships be stationed off Lunga Point on 12 September to "destroy any Americans who attempted to flee from the island." On 7 September, Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to "rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield." Kawaguchi's plan called for his forces to split into three, approach the Lunga perimeter inland, and launch a surprise night attack. Oka's force would attack the perimeter from the west while Ichiki's Second Echelon – renamed the Kuma Battalion – would attack from the east. The main attack would be by Kawaguchi's "Center Body", numbering 3,000 men in three battalions, from the south of the Lunga perimeter. By 7 September, most of Kawaguchi's troops had started marching from Taivu towards Lunga Point along the coastline. About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard the brigade's supply base at Taivu.”

It's weird how Kawaguchi decides the first strike will be on the 12th of September, i.e. that he plans it to take 7 days of marching from their Taivu Point drop off to reach Lunga where Henderson Field is – about 32 kilometres (20 miles) away. I appreciate it's jungle but still – 7 days to march 32km? For Japanese infantry? Really?



Also, how are there Japanese warships “stationed off Lunga point”? What? The Americans control the seas – at least during the day, so the combat narrative goes. Later on we are told:

*“Kawaguchi's Center Body of troops was planning to attack the Lunga perimeter at the ridge, which they called "the centipede" (mukade gata) because of its shape. On 9 September, Kawaguchi's troops left the coast at Koli Point. Split into four columns, they marched into the jungle towards their predesignated attack points south and south-east of the airfield. **Lack of good maps, at least one faulty compass, and thick, almost impenetrable jungle caused the Japanese columns to proceed slowly and zigzag, costing a lot of time.**”*

Ah yes, the classic “we came to assault this very specific place but didn’t bring proper maps and only had one compass that was busted” excuse. This is dog ate my homework level of nonsense.

*“Meanwhile, native island scouts – directed by British government official and officer in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force, Martin Clemens – **told the Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu**, near the village of Tasimboko, about 17 mi (27 km) east of Lunga. Edson launched a raid against the Japanese troops at Taivu. **Destroyer transports USS McKean and Manley and two patrol boats took 813 of Edson's men to Taivu in two trips.** Edson and his first wave of 501 troops landed at Taivu at 05:20 (local time) on 8 September. Supported by aircraft from Henderson Field and gunfire from the destroyer transports, Edson's men advanced towards Tasimboko village but were slowed by Japanese resistance. At 11:00, the rest of Edson's men landed. With this reinforcement and more support from the Henderson Field aircraft, Edson's force pushed into the village. **The Japanese defenders, believing a major landing was underway after observing the concurrent approach of an Allied supply ship convoy heading towards Lunga Point, retreated into the jungle, leaving behind 27 dead. Two Marines were killed.**”*

***In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered the supply base for Kawaguchi's forces, including large stockpiles of food, ammunition and medical supplies, and a shortwave radio. The Marines seized documents, equipment and food supplies, destroyed the rest, and returned to the Lunga perimeter at 17:30. The quantities of supplies and intelligence from the captured documents revealed that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island and apparently planning an attack.**”*

So this is funny – in the time it takes for the Japanese to walk to the south side of Henderson Field and prep for an assault the Marines learn of their landing, arrive at Taivu, seize all their supplies and

return to base! Why on earth didn't the Japanese just land their 6,000 men directly north of the airfield and march south? How could the native scouts spot and advise the Marines so quickly? How come the documents seized talked about 3,000 troops, not the 6,000-plus that had been landed?

*“Edson and Colonel Gerald Thomas, Vandegrift's operations officer, believed that the Japanese attack would come at the Lunga Ridge, a narrow, grassy, 1,000 m (1,100 yd) long, coral ridge parallel to the Lunga River just south of Henderson Field. **The ridge offered a natural avenue of approach to the airfield, commanded the surrounding area and was almost undefended.** Edson and Thomas tried to persuade Vandegrift to move forces to defend the ridge, but **Vandegrift refused, believing that the Japanese were more likely to attack along the coast.** Finally, Thomas convinced Vandegrift that the ridge **was a good location for Edson's Raiders to "rest"** from their actions of the preceding month. On **11 September**, the 840 men of Edson's unit—including the 1st Raiders and the Paramarines – deployed onto and around the ridge and prepared to defend it.”*

Two points:

1. You didn't defend the south side of the airfield? What? Why was it undefended? You only have three directions the Japanese soldiers can attack from!
2. The Marines have over 11,000 men at this base – how on earth do they not have the manpower to sufficiently barricade it from all angles?

So this nonsense goes on and we hear about how the bumbling Japanese were confused and didn't attack properly – the first night of attack is an absolute shambles:

*“At 21:30 on 12 September, **the Japanese cruiser Sendai and three destroyers shelled the Lunga perimeter for 20 minutes and illuminated the ridge with a searchlight.** Japanese artillery began shelling the Marine lines, **but did little damage.** At the same time, **scattered groups** of Kawaguchi's troops began skirmishing with Marines around the ridge. Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion—led by Major Yukichi Kokusho—attacked the Raider's "C" company between the lagoon and the Lunga River, overrunning at least one platoon and forcing the Marine company to fall back to the ridge. Kokusho's unit **became entangled** with troops from Kawaguchi's 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Kusukichi Watanabe, **who were still struggling to reach their attack positions, and the resulting confusion effectively stopped the Japanese attack on the ridge that night.** Kawaguchi, **who was having trouble locating where he was in relation to the U.S. Marine lines as well as coordinating his troops' attacks, later complained, "Due to the devilish jungle, the brigade was scattered all over and was completely beyond my control. In my whole life I have never felt so disappointed and helpless."** Twelve U.S. Marines were killed; Japanese casualties are **unknown** but perhaps somewhat greater. **Although both Oka in the west and the Kuma unit in the east tried to attack the Marine lines that night, they failed to make contact and halted near the Marine lines at dawn.**”*

So you've got an artillery bombardment that does nothing, the main commander can't organise his men into a co-ordinated attack and the other assault teams (Oka and Kuma) can't even locate where the battle is let alone assist. We read on for more nonsense regarding the second night of the battle:

*“Around and behind Hill 123 he placed five companies. Any Japanese attackers surmounting Hill **80** would have to advance over 400 yd (370 m) of open terrain to close with the Marine positions at Hill 123. **With only a few hours to prepare, the Marines were able to construct only rudimentary and shallow fortifications. They were low on ammunition, with one or two grenades for each Marine.** Vandegrift ordered a reserve force consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (2/5) to move into a position just to the rear of Edson's troops. In addition, a battery of four 105*

mm howitzers from the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel James J. Keating moved to a location from where it could provide direct fire onto the ridge, and a forward artillery observer was placed with Edson's front line units. **Late in the afternoon, Edson stepped onto a grenade box and addressed his exhausted troops**, saying: "You men have done a great job, and I have just one more thing to ask of you. **Hold out just one more night. I know we've been without sleep a long time. But we expect another attack from them tonight and they may come through here. I have every reason to believe that we will have reliefs here for all of us in the morning.**" Edson's speech "raised the spirits" of the Raiders and helped them prepare mentally for the night ahead."

I think I'm supposed to forget already that this battle is located a short distance away from the airstrip with 11,000 other Marines fully equipped for battle. How are they low on ammunition? How are they not being resupplied / having men rotated if they are exhausted/wounded? There's literally a giant encampment just north of them but somehow the whole thing rests on Edson's men.

*"As the sun set on 13 September, **Kawaguchi faced Edson's 830 Marines with 3,000 troops of his brigade**, plus an assortment of light artillery. The night was pitch black, with no moon. At 21:00, seven Japanese destroyers briefly bombarded the ridge. Kawaguchi's attack began just after nightfall, with Kokusho's battalion assaulting Raider Company B on the Marine right flank, just to the west of the ridge. The force of the assault caused Company B to fall back to Hill 123. Under Marine artillery fire, Kokusho reassembled his men and continued his attack. Without pausing to try to "roll-up" the other nearby Marine units, whose flanks were now unprotected, **Kokusho's unit surged forward through the swampy lowlands between the ridge and the Lunga River, heading for the airfield.** Kokusho's men came upon a pile of Marine supplies and rations. **Not having eaten adequately for a couple of days, they paused to "gorge themselves" on the "C" and "K" rations.** Kokusho ordered his men to continue the attack. At about 03:00, he led them against the Marine units around the northern portion of the ridge, just short of the airfield, as well as Hill 123. In the heavy fighting that followed, Kokusho and around 100 of his men were killed, ending that attack."*

I forgot to mock how the Japanese destroyers are firing... directly north of Lunga... shooting over the airfield... hitting a ridge south of the airfield (let alone "illuminating the ridge with a searchlight"). What? How? Are the Japanese sending them co-ordinates? Can they even fire that far? Why did the Marines not immediately sink them? Then we have the nonsense of the Japanese acting like wild bears or raccoons, discovering a "pile" of rations and stopping mid battle to feast! This is complete gibberish.

*"Major Bailey, took ammunition and grenades under fire to the Marines around Hill 123, who were **running critically low**. Said Marine participant Captain William J. McKennan, "The Japanese attack was almost constant, **like a rain that subsides for a moment and then pours the harder...** When one wave was mowed down—and I mean mowed down—another followed it into death."*

Bear that quote in mind for later. Then we get some great PR for this Edson fellow:

*"Edson remained standing about 20 yd (**18 m**) behind the Marine firing line on Hill 123, exhorting his troops and directing their defensive efforts. **Marine Captain Tex Smith, who was in position to observe Edson for most of the night, said: "I can say that if there is such a thing as one man holding a battalion together, Edson did it that night. He stood just behind the front lines—stood, when most of us hugged the ground."***

And:

“As the sun rose on 14 September, pockets of Japanese soldiers remained scattered along both sides of the ridge. But with Tamura's battalion shattered after losing three-quarters of its officers and men, and with heavy casualties to his other attacking units as well, Kawaguchi's assault on the ridge had effectively ended. About 100 Japanese soldiers still remained in the open on the south slope of Hill 80, perhaps preparing for one more charge on Hill 123. At first light, three U.S. Army P-400 Airacobra fighters from the 67th Fighter Squadron at Henderson Field, acting on a request personally delivered by Bailey, strafed the Japanese near Hill 80 and killed most of them, with the few survivors retreating back into the jungle.”

We then learn how the Japanese – in the aftermath – manage to nearly starve to death and throw away their weapons having run out of food 10 days after arriving on Guadalcanal:

“At 13:05 on 14 September, Kawaguchi led the survivors of his shattered brigade away from the ridge and deeper into the jungle, where they rested and tended to their wounded all the next day. Kawaguchi's units were then ordered to withdraw west to the Matanikau River valley to join with Oka's unit, a 6 mi (9.7 km) march over difficult terrain. Kawaguchi's troops began the march on the morning of 16 September. Almost every soldier able to walk had to help carry the wounded. As the march progressed, the exhausted and hungry soldiers, who had eaten their last rations on the morning before their withdrawal, began to discard their heavy equipment and then their rifles. By the time most of them reached Oka's positions at Kokumbona five days later, only half still carried their weapons. The Kuma battalion's survivors, attempting to follow Kawaguchi's Center Body forces, became lost, wandered for three weeks in the jungle, and almost starved to death before finally reaching Kawaguchi's camp.”

Ah yes, we ran out of all supplies and abandoned our rifles, thus rendering us useless as a fighting force and sitting ducks to the enemy. Also hilarious is the idea it took the Japanese five days – or weeks – to reach Kokumbona, which is only 13 km (8 miles) away:



Corpse Math time. It's called the Battle of Blood Ridge and we heard all about those Japanese being mowed down by machine guns and bombed by fighter jets and so on. This must be an absolute slaughterhouse, right? Edson's plucky 830 men vs. 3,000 oriental fanatics?

“In total, Kawaguchi's forces lost about 830 killed in the attack, including 350 in Tamura's battalion, 200 in Kokusho's battalion, 120 in Oka's force, 100 in the Kuma battalion, and 60 in Watanabe's battalion. An unknown number of wounded also died during the withdrawal march to the Matanikau. On and around the ridge, the Marines counted 500 Japanese dead, including 200 on the slopes of Hill 123. The Marines suffered 80 killed between 12 and 14 September.”

I am confused, reader. 830 killed? The exact same number of Japanese dead as Edson had under his command? Weird. Also... what... we have 6,000+ Japanese infantry dropped off to fight, they assault in three divisions (east / west / south side assault)... but only 3,000 are talked about involved in the actual battle... so you would expect roughly 1,000 men to each assault... but only 100 or so die in the Oka and Kuma battalions... and only 500 at the south ridge? Where did the Japanese all go? It's like 5,000 men just evaporated into mist. It's not exactly "like heavy rain" is it? How did the Marines only lose 80 men?

Wikipedia footnote 54 reads:

*"Christ, p. 281; Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 144; and Smith, Bloody Ridge, pp. 184–185. Only 86 Paramarines, out of the 240 originally deployed, walked off of the ridge the morning after the battle; the rest were all killed or seriously wounded. Christ states that 53 Marines were killed on the ridge and 237 seriously wounded, and that **the Japanese suffered 1,133 killed or wounded. The Americans buried the Japanese bodies in mass graves or burned them.**"*

Aha, the classic unmarked mass grave / cremation route. So no idea how many actual dead then.

"On 15 September, General Hyakutake at Rabaul learned of Kawaguchi's defeat, the Imperial Japanese Army's first defeat involving a unit of this size in the war. The general forwarded the news to the Imperial General Headquarters in Japan. In an emergency session, the top Japanese army and navy command staffs concluded that, "Guadalcanal might develop into the decisive battle of the war." The results of the battle began to have a telling strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of the Pacific. Hyakutake realized that, in order to send sufficient troops and materiel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal, he could no longer support the major Japanese offensive on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea. Hyakutake – with the concurrence of the General Headquarters – ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within 30 mi (48 km) of their objective of Port Moresby – to withdraw until the Guadalcanal matter was resolved. The Japanese were never able to restart their drive towards Port Moresby; the defeat at Edson's Ridge contributed not only to Japan's defeat in the Guadalcanal campaign, but also to Japan's ultimate defeat throughout the South Pacific."

So we see that this battle is also important because it's the excuse given for why the Japanese lose at Moresby / the New Guinea campaign as well. Again, there are still supposed to be 110,000 men at Rabaul, twiddling their thumbs and playing cards.

Photos please!



“An American Marine stands near some of the fighting positions on Hill 123 on "Edson's" Ridge after the battle. Edson's command post during the battle was located just to the right of where the Marine is standing” - original [here](#).

The perspective there is way off, since those are supposed to be tiny people on the road center of photo. So either they are two inches tall or our Marine is about 100 feet tall.

Command post? I thought Edson was just standing 18 metres behind the front line shouting encouragement? Note the complete lack of any fortifications. Or artillery impact craters. Or corpses.



“Japanese troops from the "Aoba" Regiment march along the shore of Guadalcanal shortly after landing during the first week of September 1942.” - original [here](#).

So the sneaky strike force... had a camera crew? And they only took one photograph?

You can see how that is pasted up, with band-aid lines on the photo. Plus, what it was it printed on, burlap?



“Dead Japanese soldiers lie on the ridge near Hill 123 after the battle” – original [here](#).

Again, nothing to distinguish them as Japanese either by uniform insignia or being able to see faces. No visible wounds. No blood on uniform. No uniform damage. No blood on the ground.

That, shockingly, is actually it in terms of photographic evidence of the battle. We do get a painting though, so that’s something:



“A painting by a Marine officer present during the Guadalcanal campaign depicts Marines defending Hill 123 during the battle.” - original [here](#).

Yeah, so 4 bodies on the ground, a Marine looking at the horizon and a fanfiction drawing is all you’re getting. Otherwise it’s believing the Combat Narrative which is absurd in and of itself.

“At Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, enlisted recruits finish their training with the 54-hour final exam called "The Crucible". In the final stage, recruits scale a 700-foot mountain dubbed The Reaper. At the peak, Edson's Medal of Honor citation is displayed. The recruits read and are addressed about it. They are then awarded their Eagle, Globe and Anchor emblems by their senior drill instructors, signifying them as full-fledged Marines. For perspective, the end of training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island is a hike to the steel scale replica of the Marine Corps War Memorial and a lecture on Raising the flag on Iwo Jima.”

Ah, it’s a shame, isn’t it? The Marine lads do a proper workout and climb a mountain and then they get lied to about a stupid Ridge fight fairytale. I’ve already covered how Iwo Jima was fictional on my Bitchute channel, so both examples they get are invented. They deserve better.

[The Battle for Henderson Field](#) is the third major land battle of Guadalcanal. First I’m going to show this:

Strength	
23,088 ^[2]	20,000 ^[3]
Casualties and losses	
61–86 killed, 1 tugboat, 1 patrol boat sunk, 3 aircraft destroyed ^{[4][5]}	2,200–3,000 killed, 1 cruiser sunk, 14 aircraft destroyed ^[6]

Ridiculous numbers. 20,000 Japanese attack 23,088 men and the Americans lose “61-86” men? What? Are the Americans walking around in Iron Man style robot suits? Nope, we know that

actually the Marines were (for some reason) walking around in [those jumpsuits mechanics at your local garage wear](#) along with farmers hats like Van Gogh. Were the Japanese using paintball or BB guns perhaps? How are the Japanese defeated when (if we go on 2,200-3,000 killed as accurate) that would mean 80-90% of their forces are still alive when they give up?

Or what about this:

*“On **13 October**, in order to help protect the transit of an important supply convoy to Guadalcanal that consisted of six slower cargo ships, the Japanese Combined Fleet commander Isoroku Yamamoto sent a naval force from Truk—commanded by **Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita**—to bombard Henderson Field. Kurita's force—consisting of the battleships Kongō and Haruna, escorted by one light cruiser and nine destroyers—**approached Guadalcanal unopposed** and opened fire on Henderson Field **at 01:33** on 14 October. Over the next **83 minutes**, they fired 973 14 in (360 mm) shells into the Lunga perimeter, most of them falling in and around the **2,200 m² (24,000 sq ft)** area of the airfield. The bombardment heavily damaged the airfield's two runways, burned almost all of the available aviation fuel, destroyed 48 of the CAF's 90 aircraft, and killed 41 men, including six CAF aircrew. **Despite the heavy damage, Henderson personnel were able to restore one of the runways to operational condition within a few hours.**”*

How are the Japanese able to sail right up near Lunga point? What about the fighter planes/bombers the Marines had? Or the US Navy in the area? Note how they admit the airfield is 24,000 sq feet in size. That's half an acre. For reference, an American football field is 57,600 square feet, or the equivalent of 1.32 acres. So the area that 11,000 (or by the time of the 3rd battle, 23,000) Marines are camped out in is about a third of a football field. But remember they had an awful time trying to defend the perimeter, they just didn't have the manpower.

What evidence do we get for this climactic battle?



Dead soldiers from the Japanese 16th and 29th Infantry Regiments cover the battlefield after the failed assaults on 25–26 October. - original [here](#).

OK, so a bit more dramatic compared to what we've seen so far. This is still a photo of only 30 or so corpses(?) heaped up close together with the brightness turned down so it's really dark and gives the impression they're burned. As usual nothing identifies the dead. We do have the appearance of a broken Japanese flag in the upper centre, the white of which is pure white and unblemished. Seems legit. Note the misty(?) or semi-transparent line of Marines standing on the horizon, spread out watching the scene.

It's another garbage paste-up, from the days before computers, with no resolution. You can see the horizontal seam down the middle, where the photo goes from black to gray. And of course the Japanese flag pasted in dead center. Clunk.

DuckDuckGo also gives me this:



So again with the pattern of no blood / no gore / clean sand / no impact craters / no Japanese insignia / no dropped rifles. A couple of lads lying down on the sand for a quick photo. Despite mortars / artillery / grenades being involved we only ever see intact corpses.

Actually, beyond the first guy, we can't tell what we are looking at, and even with him we can't identify a head. Only a helmet.

Or this:



This is supposed to be from Edson's Ridge, so again a ridiculous photo, all clumped up and lying down neatly. I can only assume the Marines are gathering up the bodies and arranging them in a loose cluster (not even stacking them in a heap, just next to each other) after the battle. But that isn't the idea of the photo, it's supposed to be a candid shot of the enormous casualties. Again though, no blood / gore / injury / insignia / weaponry.

Not enough resolution to tell what we are looking at. Could be a pile of dummies. Could be corpses borrowed from the morgue. Could be cut/paste/paint.

Now let's go down a rabbit hole. This photo is interesting – it's supposed to be an aerial shot of Henderson Field aka Lunga Point taken in August of 1942:



So two months before the final battle. At this point there are over 11,000 Marines based here, allegedly. Do you see facilities for that? What, those three or four buildings on the right are packed like clown cars? Do you see any barracks? Storage facilities? Vehicles? Any planes? Any munitions dumps? Rations dumps? Any men? Radar? Radio antennae? Any defensive fortifications at all?

Or what about this one, from [here](#), dated to September of 1942? This is only a month before the big battle:



Or if we follow the link to [this page](#), we can see photos like this one which is marked as August of 1942. Original hi res image [here](#).



Again, do you see an airbase and protective encampment of over 10,000 men? Zoom in! Have a look! Here's the "field headquarters" building of the Marines, from December of 1942. Original [here](#).



Does this look sturdy enough to be a headquarters to you? A wooden hut? Some good old boys sitting around on benches outside in the shade? We actually have to go all the way to August of 1944 to get [this photograph](#), which shows the essentially complete airfield with tents / housing visible in the bottom left corner of the shot, which is across the Lunga River:



What we've seen on Guadalcanal is, essentially, no evidence of a Japanese presence – also no real American presence given the airbase visibly isn't built until the end of the war! The Americans are said to have abandoned the site at the close of WW2 and it's now used as the airport for the islanders – here's a helpful comparison photo found online taken by a tourist in 2008:



Note how close Edson's Ridge (upper right) is from the runway. Or how close it all was to the island's northern coast where the Japanese could have landed en masse and immediately attacked instead of hiking through jungle for days getting lost. You can see Alligator Creek in the top left as well.

I would feel remiss if I didn't touch on the Tulagi / Gavutu-Tanambogo invasion, so we will look at this next.

From the official US [Combat Narrative](#) (pdf page 19 of 110):

*"The decision to make Tulagi our principal objective in the Solomons was reached in April. Tulagi had been the seat of the resident commissioner of the British Solomon Islands. In addition to his residence, **it contained several public buildings, including a hospital and prison, and was also the location of a radio station, a golf course, and several other accessories of western civilization. The nearby island of Gavutu served as the headquarters of Lever Pacific Plantations, Ltd., which had extensive coconut groves throughout the islands. On Gavutu were the company's offices and stores and also machine shops for the repair and upkeep of its small fleet of schooners and motorboats.** The Japanese overran Tulagi and its environs early in April and soon put its various facilities to use."*

OK, so how many Japanese are there actually on these islands though?

*"Intelligence received up to July 30th indicated that **the enemy had 1,850 men in the Tulagi area.** These consisted of 1 battalion reinforced (750 men), 1 anti-aircraft battalion reinforced (600 men), and naval and air personnel (500 men). **The bulk of these forces was concentrated in the islands of Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, Makambo and along the southern shore of Florida Island.** Installations were believed to consist of a radio station on Makambo, a seaplane base at Gavutu, and fuel dumps on several of the islands. There were evidences of heavy anti-aircraft gun emplacements on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, and also 2 to 4 coast defence guns on Tulagi and one each on Gavutu and on Bungana. Dugouts were reported on the southeast coast of Tulagi and on Tanambogo. **On Guadalcanal the enemy was believed to have 5,275 troops** divided as follows: 1 regiment reinforced (2,300 men), 1 anti-aircraft regiment (500 men), 1 heavy machine-gun battalion (325 men), 2 engineer units (1,050 men), air personnel and service squadrons (200 men), and a labor unit (900). The major part of these troops was believed to be concentrated between Kukum, just west of Lunga Point, and the mouth of the Tenaru River, with a small garrison at Tetera and other small detachments elsewhere. Installations consisted of docks at Kukum and Lunga Point, and stores, motor transport, and a radio station at Lunga. The airfield south-east of Lunga was believed to have been completed, with another at Tetera and possibly a third at Tenaru under construction. Artillery was believed to be confined to 8 heavy anti-aircraft guns between Kukum and the Lunga River, 4 on the hill in the rear of Kukum, and a few light guns at other points."*

You see, this is what they do – they give you a number (of course 1850) and then muddy it by saying they are spread over various islands, seaplane bases, etc. A simple question like "How many Japanese on Tulagi" suddenly becomes a cats cradle of different figures. Can they not simply ask the Japanese how many men were stationed there? It's weird how, even after winning the war and decades later, we're having to go on estimates of troop strengths.

[Wikipedia](#) tells us the US forces threw 7,500 men at Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo:

Strength	
7,500 ^[2]	1,500 ^[3]
Casualties and losses	
248 dead ^[4]	1,500 dead ^[5] 23 captured ^[6]

Again, those invincible Yanks, with bulletproof skin! It then puts the Japanese forces at around 1,500. So Navy Intel (Combat Narrative is determined by Naval Intelligence) says 1,850 Japanese are spread across the Florida Islands area (the small archipelago north of Guadalcanal island) and roughly 5,200 on Guadalcanal itself. The Combat Narrative on page 77 says:

“We had put about 7,500 men ashore in that area at a cost of 248 casualties. Japanese casualties, however, were virtually 100 percent, or about 1,500. At Guadalcanal we had about 11,000 men ashore, with a fairly firm hold on the northern shore from Kukum to Koli Point.”

Whereas on Wikipedia we have this breakdown:

“Tulagi and two nearby small islands, Gavutu and Tanambogo, were assaulted by 3,000 U.S. Marines, under the command of Brigadier General William Rupertus. The 886 IJN personnel manning the naval and seaplane bases on the three islands fiercely resisted the Marine attacks. With some difficulty, the Marines secured all three islands: Tulagi on 8 August, and Gavutu and Tanambogo by 9 August. The Japanese defenders were killed almost to the last man, and the Marines lost 122 men.”

So now it's 886 men, split across three islands. Not 1500. It gets more confusing – from the [main article](#) on the Guadalcanal campaign on Wikipedia we then get these numbers:

“The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had occupied Tulagi in May and had constructed a seaplane base nearby. Allied concern grew when, in early July, the IJN began constructing a large airfield at Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal – from such a base Japanese long-range bombers would threaten the sea lines of communication from the West Coast of the Americas to the populous East Coast of Australia. By August, the Japanese had about 900 naval troops on Tulagi and nearby islands and 2,800 personnel (2,200 being Korean forced laborers and trustees as well as Japanese construction specialists) on Guadalcanal. These bases would protect Japan's major base at Rabaul.”



Lestrade attempting to make sense of all this.

So it might be only 900 odd soldiers spread across the three nearby islands... and about 600 Japanese engineers... along with 2,200 Korean slaves. That's across the whole area (Guadalcanal, Tulagi and the Gavutu-Tanambogo atolls). So 900 troops and 600 engineers who may or may not be any good at defending themselves from the Marines. How were the Japanese soldiers divided up? 300 men on each island? Then you attacked them with 7,500 men? But maybe this is wrong and actually it's 1,500 on Tulagi alone?

Let me check again – [how many landed on Tulagi](#)? Two battalions of Marines. OK, how big is a battalion? Between 500-1200 men. Quite a range. So maybe 1,000 men, up to 2,400. So why is the Combat Narrative saying 7,500?

If your head is getting spun I'm not trying to confuse you, I'm highlighting how (deliberately) baffling they have made this. The numbers don't make any sense. They are not consistent and the US troop deployment numbers are not proportionate to counter them.


If we read [this article](#), we learn:

“The Japanese garrison on Tulagi consisted of a 350-man detachment of the 3rd Kure SNLF under Commander Masaaki Suzuki, 536 naval members of the Yokohama Air Group, and some Japanese and Korean civilians from the 14th Construction Unit. About 900 soldiers under the supervision of Captain Shigetoshi Miyazaki, commander of the seaplane-equipped Yokohama Air Group, were in residence on Gavutu and Tanambogo. Making good on their promise, the Japanese on Tulagi did fight almost to the last man while exacting a heavy price on their American opponents.”

OK so now it's 886 men on Tulagi (and an unspecified number of construction unit personnel) and 900 men on Gavutu/Tanambogo.

The story goes that the Americans land and everyone fights them to the death.

Photo # NH 97764 Tulagi Island, prior to Allied invasion



You can see how small Tulagi is.

The Japanese are supposed to be all clustered up in the bottom third of the island and there's basically nobody in the upper half. The Marines land at Blue Beach and then form a line of men who walk south-east until they hit the Japanese fortifications.



It's 1.9 miles if you walk from end to end. They're not doing that, they're walking from Blue Beach so that's like a mile. As usual the Marines can land amphibiously and walk up the beach with no issues whatsoever:

Photo # 80-G-16485 Marines land on Tulagi Island, August 1942



Original [here](#). Who were these brave men wading ashore you might ask? From [this article](#) we learn: *“At 8 am, **Edson’s 1st Raider Battalion** grounded on an undetected coral reef 100 yards from Tulagi’s shoreline, forcing them to wade that distance to reach the beach. No enemy resistance was met at first since the Japanese garrison on the island believed that the naval bombardment and air attacks only signaled a hit-and-run raid and took shelter in caves. A solid defence was not mounted until later on the afternoon of the 7th.”*

Ah, Edson and his Marines. Interesting he pops up again. We read about how initially they sweep the north-west of the island and detect no Japanese. They then push [to the east](#).

There’s a nice selection of US military photographs of the Tulagi operation [here](#).

Photo # NH 97742 Japanese positions on Tulagi afire during Allied invasion, 7 August 1942



“Fires burn near the Tulagi Cricket Grounds, after bombing by U.S. carrier aircraft on 7 August 1942”

Photo # NH 97743 Fires burning on Tulagi during Allied invasion, 7 August 1942



Can you spot a Seaplane base? Or a dock? Remember this is supposed to be a fearsome Japanese base, the main thrust of the whole invasion prior to Lunga airfield being known about.


*“Close to dusk, as the Raiders attempted to move beyond Phase Line A, Company C ran into heavy Japanese machine-gun fire near Hill 208. Commander Suzuki had formed his forward tripwire line on the hill’s steep slopes, which ran down to a ravine on its western edge. Farther to the east, **he had set up his main line of resistance running from Hill 281 on the north-east coast of Tulagi through flat land that had been used as a cricket field in peaceful times to the south-east tip of the island.***

***Cunningly constructed dugouts and tunnels carved into the hill’s limestone cliffs and covered by machine-gun pits protected by sandbags made up this strong and well-concealed Japanese defensive position.** The Japanese subsequently employed tactics that became hallmarks of their savage defence of Pacific island strongholds, including ambushes, the plentiful use of snipers, savage nocturnal counterattacks, and stealthy infiltration of American lines by small groups of Japanese soldiers.”*

Ah those pesky Japanese turning cricket grounds into sniper posts and so on.

How about in [this one](#):

Photo # NH 97744 Tulagi structures afire during the Allied invasion, 7 August 1942



*“A large building and other structures burn **near the Tulagi Cricket Grounds**, after bombing by U.S. carrier aircraft on 7 August 1942, the day U.S. Marines landed to capture the island. Photographed from a Navy plane, this view looks toward the WNW. Note houses in lower left, with Red Cross markings on their roofs.”*

So that would be the cricket grounds warped by Commander Suzuki’s tactical acumen into a military bastion. I can’t see much in the way of limestone cliffs with secret tunnels. Interesting the Red Cross is hanging out with the Japanese. What about the whole “total war” thing? Wouldn’t the Japanese have killed/captured them? Who are they caring for?

*“During the afternoon and evening, Marines rooted out stubborn Japanese defenders with small arms and hand grenades. **The Americans at this point in the war did not possess flamethrowers or purpose-built explosive devices, so they had to improvise, and that took time and cost lives.** After disposing of the enemy’s forward defence line, Companies C and A moved a little farther to the east. **The gathering darkness precluded a Marine attempt to clear the apparently strong and unidentified enemy positions of the main defensive line, so the Raiders dug in for the night.**”*

Ah yes, in 1942 the Americans had not yet discovered flamethrowers or explosives. TNT, artillery and flamethrowers, as used in World War 1, were not supplied to the Marines, nor were they able to operate at night. This is well known and consistent with warfare in that time period. Ask any soldier and they will attest “when it gets dark, we have to go to bed and stop fighting”.

Or this one:

Photo # NH 97741 Town of Tulagi during Allied invasion, 7 August 1942



Can you spot any Japanese? Any flags of the rising sun? Any military technology? Ships? Seaplanes? Radar installation? Defensive fortifications? No? Me neither.

“About 10 pm , the Japanese mounted a fierce counterattack, driving a wedge between Company C and Company A, almost isolating the former from the rest of the battalion. Savage assaults against Company A’s exposed flank were were fended off. A second banzai attack, which might have successfully exploited the initial thrust, fell on the front of Company A and was bloodily repulsed.

*The Japanese reverted to using infiltration tactics. **Throughout the remainder of the night they slipped individuals and small groups into the rear of the American lines.** They attacked the aid station and the command post of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines on Blue Beach. In addition, during the early hours of the 8th, Japanese infiltrators made five separate attacks on and near Raider battalion headquarters at the governor’s residence. **The attackers were wiped out in hand to hand fighting.** During the desperate fighting near the battalion command post, **Colonel Edson tried to summon reinforcements, but his radio communications were out.**”*

I love the idea of the Marines being ambushed on an island the size of a postage stamp. Also, note how the Raiders are operating out of “the governor’s residence”. Wouldn’t that be... y’know... in the main village... in the south-east of the island... where the Japanese are? Also the mystery of the Marines not having a functioning radio. Did they only bring one? Do the Japanese suddenly have electronic warfare capabilities?

“Later that morning, reinforced by Company’s E and F, 5th Marines, which landed on the north shore above Hill 281, and by 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, which reinforced the main U.S. line moving east along Tulagi, the leathernecks surrounded Hill 281 and the ravine sheltering their foe. After delivering lengthy barrages of 60mm and 81mm mortar fire, they used improvised TNT explosive devices to eliminate the numerous Japanese positions.


*By 3 pm, the **tenacious and often suicidal Japanese resistance** on Tulagi was broken. The battle had cost the Marines **45 dead and 76 wounded**. The Japanese suffered **347 killed and just three captured**. Japanese **prisoners** reported that **about 40 to 70 Japanese soldiers had escaped Tulagi by swimming to Florida Island**. Over the next two months, they were hunted down by Marines and native patrols.”*

Now we are told the Marine’s suddenly have access to explosives and mortars. Can the ONI please keep its story straight? The battle concludes with 347 Japanese killed, 3 captives and about 50 guys allegedly swimming to safety. OK. So that would mean there were only about 400 men on Tulagi. What about the Korean labourers? No idea.

*“Colonel Edson established his reputation for courage by spending most of his time on the front lines, where **he contemptuously exposed himself to the enemy’s heaviest fire**. More importantly, he aggressively employed his command in battle, taking the fight to his adversary and steadfastly defending his positions when attacked.”*

Of course he did.

What about Gavutu-Tanambogo? This is even more ridiculously small by the way:




Wikipedia [tells us](#):

*“At 12:00 on 7 August, Gavutu was assaulted by the U.S. Marine 1st Parachute Battalion consisting of 397 men. The assault was scheduled for noon **because there were not enough aircraft to provide air cover for the Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Gavutu landings at the same time.**”*

What? Not enough aircraft? They had carriers, the regular fleet and air support from Australia. Also the military photos seen above literally talk about bombing done by carriers. These islands are right next to each other. Why only 397 men? Why send less than a single battalion? How many Japanese on Gavutu-Tanambogo?

*“The nearby islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo housed the Japanese seaplane base as well as **536** Japanese naval personnel from the Yokohama Air Group and 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force and Korean and Japanese civilian technicians and labourers from the 14th Construction Unit.”*

OK so Gavutu and Tanambogo combined have 536 men on them. For once the Americans are evenly matched for a fight. This is another tiny location - two small coral mounds sticking out of the ocean with hardly any cover.



Some photos taken mid-battle:



“Most of the 240 Japanese defenders on Tanambogo were aircrew and maintenance personnel from the Yokohama Air Group. Many of these were aircraft maintenance personnel and construction units not equipped for combat. One of the few Japanese soldiers captured recounts fighting armed with only hand sickles and poles.”

You would think this would be over within a few hours but no. Somehow they fight all night (the invasion starts at midday on August 7th, they fight all day... and all night...) then on the 8th the Marines get reinforcements (to deal with a Japanese mechanic wielding a sickle):

“The 3rd Battalion began landing on Gavutu at 10:00 on 8 August and assisted in destroying the remaining Japanese defences on that islet, which was completed by 12:00. Then the 3rd Battalion prepared to assault Tanambogo. The Marines on Gavutu provided covering fire for the attack. In preparation for the assault, U.S. carrier-based dive bombers and naval gunfire bombardment were requested. After the carrier aircraft twice accidentally dropped bombs on the U.S. Marines on Gavutu, killing four of them, further carrier aircraft support was cancelled. San Juan, however, placed its shells on the correct island and shelled Tanambogo for 30 minutes.”

So the Marines take Gavutu after receiving another battalion of men... then wait from noon to after 4pm to actually do anything (presumably while being shot at by the Japanese the entire time).

“The Marine assault began at 16:15, both by landing craft and from across the causeway, and, with assistance from two Marine Stuart light tanks, began making headway against the Japanese defences. One of the tanks got stuck on a stump. Isolated from its infantry support, it was surrounded by a group of about 50 Japanese airmen. The Japanese set fire to the tank, killing two of its crew and severely beat the other two crewmembers before most of them were killed by Marine rifle fire. The Marines later counted 42 Japanese bodies around the burned-out hulk of the tank, including the corpses of the Yokohama executive officer and several of the seaplane pilots. One of the Japanese survivors of the attack on the tank reported, “I recall seeing my officer, Lieutenant Commander Saburo Katsuta of the Yokohama Air Group, on top of the tank. This was the last time I saw him”. The overall commander of troops on Tanambogo was Captain (naval rank) Miyazaki-san who blew himself up inside his dugout on the late afternoon of 8 August.”



“After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn of their foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support hitting the enemy emplacements, Japanese opposition from caves proved to be serious obstacles for attacking Marines. Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231” – original [here](#).

Ah yes, the caves. Always caves. Any photos of the caves? Nope.



Not exactly mountainous. See it from ground level [here](#).

*“Throughout the day, the Marines methodically dynamited the caves, destroying most of them by 21:00. The few surviving Japanese conducted isolated attacks throughout the night, with hand to hand engagements occurring. **By noon on 9 August, all Japanese resistance on Tanambogo ended. In the battle for Gavutu and Tanambogo, 476 Japanese defenders and 70 U.S. Marines or naval personnel died. Of the 20 Japanese prisoners taken during the battle, most were not actually Japanese combatants but Korean labourers belonging to the Japanese construction unit.**”*

You have the usual mix of fist fighting and TNT tossing to clear out warrens of Japanese lurking underground. At least the Korean slaves are mentioned, they usually get forgotten about completely.



“Photographed on August 8, 1942, the day after the U.S. landings in the Solomons commenced, Japanese installations on the island of Tanambogo lie in ruins.” - original [here](#).

Behold the epic base everyone was terrified of. I mean, the main base was actually supposed to be on Tulagi, this was the lesser facility, but we saw that Tulagi just had a small town and some Red Cross buildings (for some reason). Now we see that Tanambogo had two piers for fishing boats and a couple of huts. So the fabled seaplane base didn't really exist. Or Guadalcanal proper, which was just a coconut farm and a small field until the Americans built an airport around 1944.

You may be wondering what happened to the alleged 1,500 Japanese corpses. No idea. Mass grave? Cremation? Possibly. What about the tunnels they hid in? Can we visit nowadays as tourists? Nope, they are filled in. What about the Korean slaves – did they get taken to safety as refugees in, say, Australia or America or something, to wait out the war in freedom? No idea, nobody cares to ask or tell.

Now we've established the battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo were nonsense, let's have a brief look at the Japanese commanders playing opposition during the Guadalcanal campaign. What happened to them?

[Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa](#)

Retires from active duty in 1945, “After the war, Admiral Mikawa lived a long and rather quiet life in Japan, dying in 1981 at the age of 92”. No prison, no problems.

[Admiral Hiroake Abe](#)

Retires from the IJN in March of 1943, is never arrested for involvement in the war let alone any prison time. “Dies” in 1949 at the age of 59 which is quite young for a Japanese guy. Is he related to Shinzo Abe, who was allegedly just assassinated? Yes, since Shinzo's grandfather Kishi was

“economic king” of occupied China and served as Tojo's Vice Minister of Munitions. He was captured after the war as a class A war criminal, but immediately released. We are supposed to believe Shinzo's paternal grandfather was Kan Abe, no more than a representative and pacifist. But even if that is true it doesn't mean Hiroake wasn't his uncle or cousin. I would assume he was. Remember, Abe is probably short for Abraham, meaning these people were half-Jewish, which would explain Kishi being an “economic king”. Shinzo came out of USC's School of Public Policy and by his mid-20s was working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His father was Foreign Minister at the time.

Admiral Nobutake Kondō

No mention of arrest or trial. Dies in 1953 at the age of 66, which is still quite young for an east Asian.

Admiral Nishizō Tsukahara

No mention of arrest or trial, dies in 1966.

Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita

Following the Japanese surrender, Kurita retired and found work as a scrivener and masseur, living quietly with his daughter and her family. Kurita died in 1977 at age 88.

Admiral Jinichi Kusaka

Surrenders at Rabaul (?) which makes no sense given that place was ignored and contained (allegedly) and the Allies then move past it towards the Philippines. No mention of arrest / imprisonment. Dies in 1972 (aged 83).

Admiral Shōji Nishimura

Went down with the Battleship Yamashiro. In the battle the battleship was bombarded for... drum roll... 18 minutes and: *“Yamashiro increased speed to 15 knots in an attempt to escape the trap, but she had already been hit by two to four torpedoes, and after two more torpedo hits near the starboard engine room, she was listing 45 degrees to port. Shinoda gave the command to abandon ship, but neither he nor Nishimura made any attempt to leave the conning tower as the ship capsized **within five minutes and quickly sank, stern first, vanishing from radar between 04:19 and 04:21. Only 10 crewmembers of the estimated 1,636 officers and crew on board survived**”.* *Of course his body was never found.*

Sank within 5 minutes, really? Also: only 10 men lived to tell the tale... really? Who were the survivors? Any anecdotes? Nope. The Yamashiro was, of course, later to be found by Paul Allen's crew of the Petrel:

*“**John Bennett** claimed to have discovered Yamashiro's wreck in April 2001, but confirmation of the wreck's identity could not be made. On 25 November 2017, **Paul Allen and his crew aboard the research ship RV Petrel**, discovered the wreck of Yamashiro and confirmed her identity. The ship was found upside down and mostly intact, with the bow folded back over the hull.”*

Amazing how all of these ships from the Pacific campaign are all found like 60 years + later by the same sources: usually Allen's *Petrel* crew. The only think Allen hasn't yet found is Jimmy Hoffa's coffin in the Mariana Trench. In this case, we interestingly have another player on the scene, diver John Bennett – who of course **vanished without a trace** after making the dive and claiming to find the ship. [See here](#). Wonder if he is related to JonBenet's father?

Rear Admiral Raizō Tanaka

Was absolutely fine, no arrest or trial. Tanaka retired from the navy on 26 June 1946 and died on 9 July 1969 at 77 years of age.

General Hitoshi Imamura

I quote this in full, it's glorious:

"Imamura was promoted to full General in 1943. Along with the naval commander at Rabaul, Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, Imamura surrendered the Japanese forces in New Guinea and the southern Pacific Islands to Australian forces, representing the Allies, in September 1945. Imamura was detained at Rabaul by the Australian Army, as he and troops under his command were accused of war crimes, including the execution of Allied prisoners of war. One infamous example highlighted how the prisoners captured in eastern Java were locked up in bamboo cattle cages and thrown overboard into shark-infested waters. In April 1946, Imamura wrote to the Australian commander at Rabaul, requesting that his own trial for war crimes be expedited in order to speed the prosecution of war criminals under his command. Imamura was charged with 'unlawfully [disregarding and failing] to discharge his duty... to control the members of his command, whereby they committed brutal atrocities and other high crimes...'. He was tried by an Australian military court at Rabaul on 1–16 May 1947; he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. Imamura served his imprisonment at Sugamo Prison, in Tokyo, until he was released in 1954. As he found that his imprisonment was too light with respect to his responsibility for the crimes of his subordinates, he had a copy of the prison built in his garden and stayed there until his death."

I love it. Absolutely love it.

General Harukichi Hyakutake

"He and his forces were trapped on Bougainville when the Allies established a heavily fortified perimeter at Cape Torokina, and Hyakutake was cut off from reinforcements and re-supply. His attacks on the perimeter failed, and his army was forced to live off the land, hiding in jungle caves for most of the rest of the war. Hyakutake suffered a debilitating stroke and was relieved of his duties in February 1945 by General Masatane Kanda. There was no way to evacuate him to Japan for medical treatment until February 1946, after the surrender of Japan. He died on 10 March 1947."

He would have been 58 at the time of his death, again dying very young for a Japanese person.

General Kiyotake Kawaguchi

"After the war, Kawaguchi was arrested by the SCAP occupation authorities, and was tried and convicted of war crimes, including complicity in the execution of Philippines Supreme Court Chief Justice José Abad Santos. He was imprisoned at Sugamo Prison from 1946 until 1953"

So 7 years... for being a General involved in war crimes..? Really?

Officer Kiyonao Ichiki

The guy leading the Japanese at Alligator Creek, *"Accounts differ as to how Ichiki died. At least one account claims that Ichiki was killed in action during the heat of battle; others state that he committed ritual suicide due to the humiliation of his defeat in the battle. Despite the failure of his attack, Ichiki was promoted posthumously to major general."*


So we can see, from that brief tour, that the Japanese higher-ups do very well out of the campaign. Almost nobody suffers any kind of real penalty and you'll forgive me for suspecting that anything involving super-fast shipwrecks, Sugamo Prison or "I sat for the rest of my life in a birdcage in my garden" are all fanciful.

What about all the ships sunk at Ironbottom Sound? There's supposed to be dozens and dozens of wrecks, from all the various naval battles there, hence the name.

I direct you to [this article](#) which helpfully summarises:

“Microsoft founder and philanthropist Paul Allen is a history buff on the events of WWII, and he has a keen interest in the Battle of Guadalcanal. Though Dr. Bob Ballard, with support of U.S. Navy assets, searched Iron Bottom Sound in the 1990s, he found only 13 of the estimated 50 ships sunk during the battles. Mr. Allen felt it would be a fitting tribute to those lost in the battles to definitively locate and map as many of the sunken ships as possible and to precisely position and document the resting place of the lost ships using the latest state-of-the-art underwater survey technology. A plan to map Iron Bottom Sound was outlined, and the project timetable was set in motion. A subsea operations team from Mr. Allen's company, VULCAN Inc., would manage the AUV sonar mapping and ROV operations from the expedition yacht Octopus. The VULCAN subsea operations team, managed by Robert Kraft, was mobilized and met on 16 January 2015 in Honiara on Guadalcanal to meet the soon arriving Octopus.”

That's right, only in the 1990s did anyone bother to locate some of these wrecked battleships and even then they only found... 13. So then we get Allen and the crew of the Petrel coming along to scan the ocean floor. It gave us images like this:



Which are definitely not just computer generated images, this is a legit shot of the ocean floor. There is nothing but flat sand on the seabed as we all know. You have a couple of ripples of sand in the top right, what more do you want? Why does the wreck on the left have a shadow like a sundial? This is supposed to be somewhere between 600 and 1,350 feet below the waves. Maybe it was a really sunny day. It's a sonar shadow, I came across the same question in my Titanic paper, but this still looks fake.


We learn:

“The sonar mapping produced a total of 29 wreck locations, 7 wreck debris fields, and several possible plane locations, one being confirmed. Of the 29 wrecks located, 6 were positively

identified: USS Astoria, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Northampton, HMAS Canberra, and the USS Atlanta. Eleven of the wrecks were tentatively identified using the analysed sonar imagery with vessel measurements and location information from historical records: USS Walke, IJN Ayanami, USS Dehaven, IJN Yudachi, IJN Fubuki, USS Laffey, USS Monssen, USS Barton, USS Cushing, USS Little, and the USS Preston. The remaining 12 wreck locations were not identified and require further investigation to classify them. The 7 wreck debris fields did not provide enough information in the sonar data to classify them with any certainty beyond a debris classification.

OK so look you guys they only actually identified 6 ships. So we've got less confirmation than what Dr. Ballard was claiming with his 13.


Here's a shot of the Astoria that they found:



Cool, solid proof of a wreck at last. Lestrade BTFO. Pretty sweet how the US Navy had this raised lettering on the hull of their ships. Not seen that before, it's normally just painted on. I mean... of course... a bit awkward for me to even mention it but... we have photographs of the Astoria and this ain't the front or the back of the ship.

As per [this site](#): [Front](#) / [Back](#) / [Alternate](#)

Not the Astoria. CGI Fake? CGI Fake. Whoopsie. We have the usual nonsense as well with, for example, the USS Quincy:



"Quincy caught in Japanese searchlights, moments before sinking off Savo Island with great loss of life, on 9 August 1942." - original [here](#).

Another obvious paste-up. The wreck was found by Robert Ballard, obviously.

You have the [USS Vincennes](#), found by Paul Allen – 332 dead on that so they say. You have the [USS Juneau](#), found by Paul Allen, from which we learned [the dreadful fate of the five famous Sullivan Brothers](#), which was totally a real thing and not US Navy propaganda bit for working class Irish back home. You have the [IJN Kirishima](#), which listed 18 degrees before sinking, found by both Allen and Ballard. Or the [IJN Haruna](#) which we can see here was being attacked by the US Navy... wait let me wipe my glasses... yep sorry, the Haruna which [was a model ship in a model village](#). It goes on and on.

Anyway... I should probably leave it there. I think I've made my point. I know some people will criticise this for not being thorough enough and not doing bits on the Battle of Mount Austen or the various other sections of this campaign. A lot happened (or rather, was said to happen) in this area, I know I didn't cover every single thing. I don't want to bore the reader.

If you've made it this far: thank you, I hope you found it interesting and it gave you some food for thought. An island hopping military campaign involving 100,000 people would seem a bit much to fake... but yeah... it's a fake from front to back. Realise now that we've gone all the way from Pearl Harbour to the Aleutians to the South Pacific (with Midway and Wake Island along the way) and we've still not come across an actual real encounter between the US and the Japanese. This blows my mind.

More to come.

[Tropical Outro Music](#)

