It did not evade watchers during the Russia-Korea summit how cautious both sides were about the Moscow-Seoul strategic partnership which featured prominently on the agenda of Lee Myung-bak's September, 2008 visit to Russia. Progress in the relations between Russia and Korea will largely depend on the countries' ability to realize what they expect from each other, how realistic the expectations are, and what reasons they have to regard each other as uniquely important partners.
Obviously, Korea pursues its own interests engaging with Russia. First, Seoul hopes that Moscow will help it to deal with the DPRK and employ whatever leverage over the country to influence Pyongyang's conduct accordingly. Pushing Moscow to condemn Pyongyang, Seoul makes it clear that Russia's position will be the litmus test as far as the potential Russia-Korea partnership is concerned. Recently Seoul made a series of attempts to secure Moscow's support in the conflict with Pyongyang, but they met with limited success. Moscow did not side with Korea over the sinking of the Cheonan corvette which Seoul blamed entirely on Pyongyang. Similarly, Russia did not back Seoul in the incident triggered by the recent shelling of Korea's island in the Yellow Sea. Instead, the statement released by Russia's Foreign Ministry called both Koreas to exercise restraint and to avoid escalation. Obviously, Russia intends to steer a balanced course and will not be expressing solidarity with Lee Myung-bak's policies which are aimed at bringing North Korea to its knees. No doubt, Pyongyang's escapades are somewhat of a pain to Moscow but Russia is fully aware how much it stands to lose if North Korea is reduced to the status of the world's enemy. Seoul makes no secret of its dissatisfaction over Moscow's stance but the impression is that the summit did not further the understanding between Russia and Korea on treating Pyongyang. In stark contrast to the 2008 communique, the concluding document produced by the recent Seoul summit contained only one phrase on the inter-Korean relations which essentially reflected Russia's support for the dialog on the Korean Peninsula but in no way – Korea's views on the issue.
Secondly, Seoul's priority in the relations with Moscow is to gain maximal access to Russia's natural resources. At the moment the South Korean administration sees Russia mostly from this perspective and takes practical steps in line with the approach. Korean leaders are known to have said that the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan benefits Korea by preventing Tokyo from eating into Siberia's mineral riches. Due to Russia's inability to suggest a viable alternative, the trade between Russia and Korea sustains an imbalanced structure with 80% of Russia's export being minerals and commodities while import – mostly industrial products such as cars, electric appliances, and machinery.
While ambitious plans for South Korea's involvement in the modernization of the Russian economy and for the Russian-Korean cooperation in high-tech were formulated as a result of the recent talks, much room is left for skepticism.
Firstly, how serious is Russia about its own commitments in the above sphere and is there a risk that the process will run into roadblocks put by Russia's notorious bureaucratic inaptness?
Secondly, given that Korea's priorities are linked to the access to Russia's natural resources, does the country actually want to see a modernized and industrialized Russia which might grow into Korea's competitor? Besides, the Korean business community is deeply convinced that in Russia the economy is chronically mismanaged and the investment climate leaves much to be desired. Predictably, Russia's Korean partners are eager to simply take advantage of the situation. For decades Moscow has been telling Seoul that Russia's potential in basic research and Korea's experience in technology commercialization are complimentary and that in this light working together should be a win-win type of arrangement. While no objections are audible, Korea clearly prefers to benefit from Russia's brain drain. According to official estimates, some 200 Russian researchers are currently employed in Korea, but the real figure is sure to be much higher. If Russia expects to truly get Korea to cooperate in high-tech, due attention should be paid to the legal dimension of the process.
Serious questions also arise in connection with the possibility of Russian-Korean cooperation in the security sphere. The ROK's obligations to the US are known to impose considerable constraints on Seoul's independence. For South Korea, consensus with the US is a prerequisite for any measures. While the ROK's two former presidents at least tried to ensure greater freedom of maneuver, the incumbent Lee Myung-bak managed to ruin the relations with North Korea irreversibly and, permanently taken over by the anticipation of Pyongyang's hostile acts, he feels totally dependent on Washington. Seoul may be lauding Moscow's initiatives to create various security mechanisms for the Korean Peninsula or the whole Asia Pacific but has to regard them as background issues. For Lee Myung-bak and his conservative supporters the US with its nuclear umbrella is the main or even the sole guarantor of South Korea's security and hermetic military-political alliances like the reviving Washington-Tokyo-Seoul one are much more attractive than the inclusive security frameworks proposed by Moscow.
In the early 1990ies, Moscow's approach to the cooperation with the ROK was loaded with unrealistic expectations. The country routinely portrayed as the stronghold of a puppet dictatorship and a de facto occupied territory in the Soviet era was suddenly seen as an exemplary democracy and a prosperous market economy capable to contribute a lot to Russia's development. Hopes were running high that the engagement with Korea would boost the economic development of Russia's Far East if not that of the entire country. Some thought naively that South Korea would be generously sharing its original recipes of breakneck economic growth. Nothing of the kind materialized, at least in the desired proportions. The mistake was to overlook the fact that Korea had interests of its own which did not necessarily coincide with those of Russia.
By the way, in that epoch the above set of ideas led Russia to distance itself from the DPRK. The overall result was an erosion of Russia's positions on the Korean Peninsula.
Currently Seoul rather than Moscow is defining the character of the Russian-Korean relations. South Korea knows exactly what it wants from Russia and has no difficulty casting its vision into practical steps.
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Russiashould formulate a far-sighted strategy that would help it to set its own rules of the game. For that, Moscow has to realize that the Korean Peninsula is not a relatively peripheral zone to be looked upon occasionally but a key political crossing where Russia faces serious challenges but can as well secure sizable benefits. Moscow's ability to interact with Korea is contingent on the functioning of the Russian Far East, a region which Russia remains unable to revitalize. The economically and militarily weak Far East which is, on top of that, geographically isolated from Russia's decision-making centers cannot serve as a step stone for advancing Russian interests in Korea.
