On January 12, the Tajik parliament's lower chamber ratified the border demarcation treaty with China, by which Tajikistan is to cede to China 1,112 square kilometers of its territory in the Eastern Pamir Mountains.The agreement was sold as a serious diplomatic achievement by the Tajik administration but otherwise drew mixed coverage.
The Tajik administration traced the territorial dispute with China back to the second half of the XIX century, the epoch when the Russian Empire was making inroads into Turkestan and cutting territorial deals with China in the process. The documents signed at the time afforded an ambiguous interpretation concerning the location of the Russian-Chinese border. As a result, shortly after the end of World War II China staked a claim to a 28,500 square kilometers chunk of the Soviet Union's territory which is currently owned by Tajikistan. Considering that the total area of Tajikistan is 143,000 square kilometers and therefore China, a player immensely more powerful economically, politically, and militarily than Tajikistan, was pressing a claim for 19.9% of the republic's territory, Dushanbe's assertion that the treaty with Beijing was a diplomatic achievement seems fairly logical. Suhrob Sharipov, director of the Center for Strategic Studies Under the President of Tajikistan remarks that, under a scenario unfavorable from Tajikistan's standpoint, China could easily deploy troops to Tajikistan's eastern regions and advance all the way to Khorugh already during the 1992-1997 civil war in the republic.
In fact, every post-Soviet republic sharing a border with China shed some of its territory in China's favor. Russia passed to China several islands in the rivers of the Far East – initially, Damansky Island and later Tarabarov Island and a half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island. In 1997, Kazakhstan ceded to China 407 square kilometers in the border zone and, on Beijing's request, agreed to destroy the Soviet era fortifications originally built to par the Chinese threat. Kyrgyzstan settled its territorial dispute with China completely by August, 1999 at the cost of some 1,100 square kilometers of the Kyrgyz territory (the deal earned the former Kyrgyz leader A. Akayev charges of betraying the republic's national interests).
In 1999, Beijing and Dushanbe signed an agreement to settle their border zone disputes. Tajikistan handed over to China some 200 square kilometers of territory near the Markansu River but retained control over a piece of land in the proximity of the Karzak pass to which China was also staking a claim. In May, 2002, an additional border demarcation agreement was signed, by which Tajikistan was to lose some 1,000 square kilometers of its territory in Gorno-Badakhshan (this treaty recently ratified by the Tajik parliament).
Strange as it may seem, nobody in Dushanbe is sure which part of Gorno-Badakhshan China is getting. The Tajik administration says it is a relatively useless uninhabited territory in the Murghab region at the altitude of 5,000 m above mean sea level. In contrast, academician R. Masov holds that the territory stretching south of UZ-Bel pass now given to China contains deposits of uranium, gold, nickel, and mercury, in which China is keenly interested. Geologist Zumakhmad Erov who led explorations in the Pamir region in the Soviet era stressed that if China is to get the territory in the Markansu River valley or in the proximity of Rangkul Lake it should be taken into account that the region has open deposits of gold and other precious metals.
The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP) opposed the ratification of the deal to settle territorial disputes with China. According to its leader Muhiddin Kabiri, the ratification is incompatible with Article 7 of Tajikistan's constitution which states that the republic's territory is indivisible. The view is shared by the leader of the unregistered Socialist Party of Tajikistan Mirhuseyn Narziev. On the other hand, the Tajik communists expressed support for the ratification on the grounds that at least it closed irreversibly the theme of territorial disputes with China.
There is a broad consensus that Tajikistan ratified the treaty in the hope to be rewarded economically for the move. China's economic activity in Tajikistan intensified visibly over the past several years. For example, in June, 2009 – at the peak of the crisis – China offered to pour over $1b into the republic's critical energy sector. On top of that, China plans to invest $560m in the construction of Nurobod hydroelectric plant-1 on the Khinghob River, $400 m – in the construction of a coal-burning co-generation plan in Dushanbe, $61m – in the construction of two modern electric power transmission lines, and $51m – in rebuilding the Dushanbe–Danghara expressway.
Chinaalso cooperates with Tajikistan in the transit sector. When Uzbekistan imposed a railroad transit blockade on Tajikistan in an attempt to impede the construction of the controversial Roghun hydroelectric plant, Tajikistan had to face a de facto isolation which led Dushanbe to probe into creating alternative supply avenues. Preference was given to the eastern and southern directions, and, again, China emerged as Tajikistan's key partner. It was announced in late 2010 that Dushanbe would join the project to build the Kashgar-Herat transcontinental railroad which is to link the East and Central Asia with the Persian Gulf. Tajikistan will host a 392-km segment of the 2,000-km railroad. If the project materializes, Tajikistan will gain an outlet to China and the Middle East that Uzbekistan will be unable to obstruct.
