After a long period of total lack of dynamics in resolving N. Korea's nuclear problem, finally there seems to be some light at the end of the tunnel. The good news came from Pyongyang following the meeting between the DPRK and Russian deputy foreign ministers, at which Russia urged its partners to immediately take practical steps to reanimate the six-party talks. The suggestions were that Pyongyang declare being ready to restart the talks based on the September 19, 2005 joint statement penned by all negotiating countries, freeze nuclear arms production and testing along with ballistic missile launches, admit IAEA inspectors to N. Korea's recently built uranium enrichment and other facilities, and agree to having the “uranium dossier” on the table of the six-party talks.
It came as a major surprise that Pyongyang which tends to be allergic to attempts to limit its “sovereign” rights responded positively to the proposal. The DPRK's envoy said in the wake of the talks that the country is ready to revert to the six-party talks without preconditions and has no objections to putting Russia's list of issues on the agenda. The DPRK foreign ministry's comment as of March 15 stressed that “trilateral economic projects such as the construction of power transmission lines, gas pipelines, and railroads linking the three countries – Russia, North Korea, and South Korea – are especially promising in the light of concerns over the state of the inter-Korean relations. North Korea expressed support for Russia's initiatives and confirmed its openness to trilateral consultations centered around the above projects.
Russia's position is that resolving the Korean nuclear problem on diplomatic tracks takes a return to the six-party talks and that the DPRK Korea should with utmost urgency take convincing measures including a nuclear and ballistic testing freeze and the admission of IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon, so that its uranium enrichment program can be discussed in the framework of the six-party talks.
Pyongyangis ready to get back to the six-party talks without preconditions and does not rule out addressing the uranium enrichment as one of the issues. It indicated that other issues invoked by Moscow can be taken care of based on the parallel actions approach to the implementation of the September 19, 2005 joint statements on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The DPRK praised the recent talks for productivity and the atmosphere of mutual respect.”
An overview of the situation going back a couple of years highlights the proportions of the current breakthrough. In April, 2009, the UN Security Council condemned North Korea's long-range ballistic test, and Pyongyang responded by opting out of the six-party talks and by the re-activation of its nuclear program. In May, 2009, defiant North Korea performed a nuclear test, which was followed by a re-launch of plutonium production and new research in the sphere of isotope separation in the country. Over the past month, various media have alleged that a new nuclear test was on the way, and reconnaissance data reflected heightened activity levels including deep mine construction at North Korea's test sites.
It came as shocking news when previously unknown enrichment facilities were unveiled in Yongbyon – they were demonstrated to nuclear physicist Siegfried S. Hecker in November, 2010. His assessment was that the facilities were technologically advanced and counted up to 2,000 centrifuges of hitherto unknown origin. It may very well be that North Korea is on track to building uranium-based nuclear munitions in addition to plutonium ones.
At the same time, starting in late 2010 Pyongyang evidently took to softening its stance on the six-party talks. Messages that might be reopened under certain conditions were sent on various occasions. The preconditions included a lifting or at least a relaxation of UN sanctions, the start of negotiations over an inter-Korean peace treaty to replace the 1953 truce, and the DPRK-US summit. The West – and, in part, Russia, – rejected the scheme, and the compromise failed to materialize.
Russia's diplomacy eventually took the leading role in breaking the stalemate and accomplished what Beijing and the Washington plus Seoul tandem had been trying to for months by keeping Pyongyang under pressure from different sides. The impression is that Russiascores remarkable success whenever it comes into play without the habitually overstated regard for is partners' positions.
No doubt, Russia will have to take China's interests – and those of the US, North Korea, and Japan who actually seek to tame Russia's influence in the Korean peninsula – into account. North Korea, by all means, is not an easy partner to deal with as it expects to be rewarded for every concession squeezed out of it. A statement released by Russia's foreign ministry carried a pledge to boost food assistance to North Korea via international organizations and to look into rebuilding the humanitarian assistance process on the bilateral basis. Overall, Moscow appears to be interested in a more ambitious role in the Korean Peninsula.
So far Russia's partners in the Korean settlement are reacting to the recent developments with a chill. Beijing remained silent despite the usual proximity between China's and Russia's positions over the DPRK, while Moscow's other partners de facto brushed off Pyongyang's bid to unconditionally reopen the six-party talks. Seoul contributed a particularly hawkish view: the ROK's foreign minister Kim Sung-Hwan said Pyongyang's offer added nothing to the disposition and talks would become a possibility only provided that the five partners are convinced that appropriate conditions for the talks exist.
The position taken by the ROK and its allies is premised in the assumption that the DPRK must take steps towards denuclearization prior to the reopening of the talks and that the UN Security Council should at least formally condemn Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program. Washington is backing Seoul by demanding that Pyongyang admit being guilty of last year's incidents – the sinking of a S. Korean corvette (while it actually remains unclear how and under what circumstances it was destroyed) and the artillery fire exchange with S. Korea in the Yellow Sea border zone.
The approach is illogical considering that the purpose of the talks – to ensure the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula – should be of key importance to S. Korea. The reasons behind the lack of interest in dialog are attributable to Seoul's current euphoria over the tide of revolutions in the Arab world. Evidently, there is hope in South Korea that the domino effect will sooner or later reach North Korea. Seoul is using the territories adjacent to the demilitarized zone to drop off tons of leaflets from copters and balloons extolling the protests in the Middle East and calling the people of North Korea to follow the lead.
It is predictable that the regime change in North Korea is widely seen as a solution to all of the region's problems, the DPRK's nuclear program being just one in the lengthy list. The truth that cannot be ignored, however, is that stakes in the game are too high to let progress depend on fantasies. Russia must be credited with having done a great job to help the process in the Korean Peninsula regain momentum, and blowing the opportunities that opened up as a result would be unwise. The tragedy in Japan highlighted the fact that extreme caution should be exercised in dealing with the nuclear theme and that there is never time to waste. The lesson must be taken seriously in resolving the Korean Peninsula's nuclear problem.
