The two-day visit of Afghan president Hamid Karzai to India starting from 4 October 2011 will play a key role in moulding power alignments in South Asia. His visit is taking place amidst tumultuous atmosphere aftermath of the Pak-US spat over the Haqqani network and the Chinese assurance of support with the visit of Vice Premier Meng Jianzhu to Islamabad last week…Reportedly, India and Afghanistan will give concrete shape to strategic partnership envisaged during visit of India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Kabul in May 2011…

Karzai’s speech to state TV prior to his India visit emerges as a clincher as to how Afghanistan has viewed its neighbour Pakistan with increasing suspicion. Karzai said, “The government of Pakistan does not support our efforts to bring peace and security in Afghanistan, which is very unfortunate news for us.” He further added that “After all the destruction and misery, the double-game towards Afghanistan and the use of terrorism as an excuse still continues.” The killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was Chairman of High Peace Council by a Pakistani citizen, as claimed by Karzai’s office, and the increasing estrangement between Karzai and Pak administration particularly over the issue of engagement with hardliners have appeared to have impacted the approach of Afghan leadership. However, it may be difficult for India to play a balancer in this complicated politics, as India, which is not geographically linked to the region, has its own set of problems particularly with other crucial players like Pakistan and China. Pakistan has often viewed India’s involvement with suspicion. To quote Pak diplomat Maleeha Lodi, “Pakistan won’t object to any Indian role in helping the development” in Afghanistan, but “any military or intelligence role for India will not be tolerable for Pakistan.”

Perhaps, in contrast to Pakistan’s objectives, the strategic partnership document to be signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan during Karzai visit will have significant defence cooperation in its ambit. Under the agreement, India will likely get the offer to train Afghanistan’s armed forces, and cooperate with Kabul on anti-terrorism front. In recent years, India has emerged as the largest regional donor in Afghanistan with commitment of about $2billion. While Indian policy makers and strategic analysts view increasing estrangement between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a leeway to further Indian involvement in the war-torn country, Pakistan will certainly view these developments as detrimental to its core objectives in a region which it considers its strategic backyard. The rivalry between these two countries are historic: while India accuses that Pakistan gives shelters to dangerous anti-India elements, Pakistan accuses India of acting against its interests whether in Afghanistan or on the Kashmir issue. There is fear in certain circles in Pakistan that increasing partnership between India and Afghanistan will likely develop a ‘strategic encirclement’ of Pakistan and hamper its objectives. Hence, a greater involvement of India may further lead to hardening of positions in some quarters of policy making in Pakistan, thus further impacting India-Pakistan relations as well as prospects of stability in Afghanistan with bearing on other conflict spots like Kashmir.

The Chinese and the US roles in the region add further complexities in properly evaluating the developments. The recent spat between American and Pakistan diplomats, generals and political leaders over hard line elements particularly Haqqani network , which is allegedly involved in many attacks in Kabul in recent months, has added the element of uncertainty in US-Pakistan relations. Admiral Mike Mullen’s labeling of Haqqani network as a ‘veritable arm’ of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI and subsequent rebuff by Pakistan’s leadership led to the worsening scenario of relations between the two countries. Mullen argued, “The link between the Pakistan military and specifically the ISI, their intelligence agency, is very well-known. And I have argued for the need to sever this link. That also has to do with getting control of that safe haven. That's not a new discussion. It's not a new issue. It's long lasting.” Mullen was later rebuffed by Pakistan establishment. During a public address on 3 October 2011, Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani asserted that Pakistan’s political parties are unanimous in resisting the US accusation, and ultimately “It is the victory of Pakistani nation, political parties as well as the government's policy of reconciliation.”

While the Pak-Afghanistan, Pak-US estrangement may drive Karzai to the arms of India, the Pak-China axis may emerge another crucial balancer in the region. But such alignments may not likely emerge in a straightforward black and white fashion, as there will be many grey areas in these emerging partnerships. It is difficult for Karzai to totally ignore Pakistan in its policy making. With Pakistan, Afghanistan shares about 25000 km border, and there are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in is Afghanistan, in which this community forms the majority. The major groups like Taliban and Haqqani network which impact the ongoing peace process have their major bases in Pakistan. For Taliban, it is Quetta in Pakistan and for Haqqani network it is North Waziristan. Hence, the shifting alignments will also have to take into account these realities. However, for sure, the current mood in the air is the increasing estrangement between Pakistan and Afghanistan and with pressure of the US in Karzai, Pakistan’s crucial role in Afghan pace process may likely be dented in coming months.

The Chinese involvement in Afghan affairs can not to be likened to that of the US involvement at least in the present stage. The Chinese too are wary of radical elements like Taliban and Haqqani, and with its situation in Xinjiang, the Chinese may prefer more of a supportive role rather than direct involvement in the ongoing turmoil. China will be more interested to boost relations in the areas of trade and commerce. China has fully backed Pakistan in the recent spat between Pakistan and US over Haqqani network, with China’s Vice Premier stating that Pakistan has its genuine concerns over its territorial integrity and sovereignty. He said during his recent visit to Pakistan, “We are celebrating 2011 as a year of friendship following the completion of 60 years of friendship between China and Pakistan. I have come to Pakistan to further improve ties.” But China is not enthusiastic to replace US in Afghanistan. Perhaps China will be interested to play the role of balancer, and maintaining its relations with Pakistan, without at least overtly antagonizing India. At present China-India trade stands at more than 60 billion, while with Pakistan it is about 8 billion. China may soft pedal its relations with Pakistan, while expressing support to it while at the same time playing a role of balancer without directly antagonizing other powers. Hence, while Pakistan Prime Minister Gilani called Pakistan and China ‘true friends’ and ‘we count on each other,’ the hyped defence pact to be signed during Chinese Vice Premier’s visit could not materialize.

However, the current flux in Afghanistan reveals three things clearly. First, the US-Pak relations are not as sustainable as it was during cold war, or even aftermath during ‘global war against terror.’ The developments of the past few years have revealed increasing cankers in bilateral relationship, thus opening spaces for other players. Second, China has increasingly been showing its prowess in the region, albeit cautiously. At present it is perhaps more interested to maintain strategic stability in the region, without affecting its relations with other powers in the region. The coming months will likely reveal how far this policy of strategic stability pans out. Third, the ongoing India-Afghanistan deliberations indicate the significance attached by Manmohan Singh and Hamid Karzai to relationship towards further deepening bilateral engagement. Karzai appears moving closer to other players in the region particularly India, which impinges on his equations with Pakistan. He also aims to nudge Pakistan to consider his concerns as well as concerns of the US particularly in the context of radical elements. While his decision to move closer to India has been viewed with suspicion by Islamabad, Indian strategists and policy makers view it as vindication of India’s stand point and increasing recognition of its role as a responsible balancer. In these power alignments, the interesting part will be their shifting nature and how the players’ overt declarations of peace and stability in Afghanistan are impacted by covert intentions.