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On the eve of his departure for Moscow for the annual summit meeting with the Russian leadership 15-17 December – 15th annual summit in a row – Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made an unprecedented statement in the Indian parliament that his government does not believe that China is planning to attack India and that “by and large” the Sino-Indian border has remained peaceful despite some incursions by the Chinese forces.
Nothing could have brought out more starkly that as regards one of the most crucial vectors of their respective regional and foreign policies – perhaps, the most crucial vector increasingly –Delhi and Moscow are holding different prisms. The two countries have avoided noticing it, but in the power dynamic in regional and world politics is intruding.
The single-biggest attraction of Singh’s visit will be the customary joint declaration that the two leaderships are going to issue after the Moscow summit on Friday. In diplomatic terms, the flavor of the so-called “special and privileged strategic partnership” between the two countries will be on display. Very little has been divulged by Indian officials on what the document could contain except that India and Russia have a “similarity of outlook on a host of regional and international issues” and that as far as Delhi is concerned the towering issue is terrorism, which is usually a metaphor for Pakistan.
Clearly, the challenge facing the two leaderships at the Moscow summit will be to navigate the relationship through a difficult period. The paradox is that there are no serious contradictions as such in the relationshipand yet somehow the verve keeps oozing out of it.
The best thing would be to roll up the sleeves and give more content to the relationship. After all, there is no substitute to content in a forward-looking relationship. But the prospect is dim for bilateral trade to meet the target of 20 billion dollars by 2015 – current level is 9 billion dollars.
Much depended on the cooperation in the field of nuclear energy to boost trade. But the signing of commercial contract for Koodankulam 3 and 4 nuclear reactors, which was under discussion, is a remote possibility. To be fair to the Indian government, Singh’s dream as such of creating ambitious power generation capacity through nuclear energy for ‘rising India’ is itself floundering.
Suffice to say, India has scaled down the ambitious target of 63000 MWe to be achieved from nuclear energy by 2032 to just 27480 MWe;even short-term prognosis of 20000 MWe by 2020 stands scaled down to 14850 MWe. The revised target too seems unrealistic, as India’s present capacity is at alow level of 4780 MWe and the record in meeting targets is abysmally poor.
Be that as it may, at the sites where Russian reactors are being installed or are proposed to be installed – Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu and Haripur in West Bengal – local activists have stepped up agitation over nuclear safety. There could be different interpretations – whether these agitations are instigated by Russia’s world competitors incensed over its success in the Indian market or that Fukushima has generated far greater public awareness today about nuclear safety standards.
But what is clear is that Singh’s government, which is already hobbling on many fronts, just doesn’t have the political clout to push through controversial decisions. Woven into this are other complications too – Indian economy is in doldrums with falling growth rate, an acute balance of payments situation, drastic devaluation of the Indian currency (20 percent since July) and a grave budget deficit situation and all of this necessitating drastic pruning of major investment decisions; specifically, whether Koodankulam 2 and 3 would come under India’s nuclear liability law (which would presumably drive up the cost of imported reactors); and the overall ambiguity over the state of play with regard to the scope for transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies (ENR) to India.
Thus, Indian bureaucrats have stumbled upon the good old Soviet-era recipeto boost trade with Russia –export more gems, jewellery, tobacco and tea – which, of course, is a laughable idea when Russian economy hopes to “innovate” and Indian business is raring to be overtake the Chinese dragon and become the world conqueror.
How serious are the Indian officials? The Indian foreign trade culture still remains imbued with herd mentality despite its exposure to globalization. The officials ultimately plant the signposts – and they do a good job when it comes to India’s trade with the US or Japan. Alas, the composition of the business delegation accompanying Singh to Moscow exposes that the Indian private sector is still to be persuaded that the Russian market is worth their while.
Keeping an open house
Simply put, Indian officials need to show far greater drive and commitment. Even the public sector is showing up inertia. For example, India is still reveling in the past glory of cooperation with Russia in the Sakhalin I project. But what happened to energy cooperation in the subsequent 10 years since Sakhalin I? Pious pre-summit bureaucratic homilies – “Russia is a key partner in our quest for energy security” – cannot hide the ugly truth that cooperation in energy security is going at snail’s pace despite this being a strategic area for India and notwithstanding Russia’s stature as a Colossus on the world energy scene. The high hopes that were raised 4 years ago during the visit by Vladimir Putin to Delhi remain unfulfilled.
No amount of blame game – connectivity is lacking, banking facilities are unsatisfactory, taxation problems are irritating, language barrier poses obstacle, etc. on – can detract from the home truth that a sense of urgency is lacking in Delhi with regard to the Russian market and the bleak performance stands out in comparison with the high priority that Berlin and Beijing or Seoul and Paris, for example, have attached to trade and investment with Russia.
Thus, defence cooperation remains the perennially green locomotive of the bilateral relationship. It is still very substantial (20 billion dollars or so) but how long can it chug along? Strong vested interests have grown in Delhi’s arms bazaar in the recent years. Besides, this is one area that surely catches the American eagle’s eye for giving stimulus to the US-India “defining partnership”.
In this overallsituation, the challenge facing the diplomats would be to impart a larger-than-life look to the Indian-Russian summit. To be sure, Indian diplomats are duly drawing attention away from the drab issues of trade and investment to the seamless vista of global politics as the Moscow summit’s real agenda – “The world is witnessing a profound transformation and a shift in the global balance of power. Our [India-Russia] relationship serves as an anchor of peace and stability during this transition phase.”
“Together India and Russia can help shape global responses.” Sounds great. Indeed, Russia has re-emerged on the world scene as an effective player at a formative period in the international system and its kinetic moves apropos strategic stability, the Middle East situation, etc. are impacting on world politics.
From an Indian viewpoint, Russia’s affirmation of the imperative need of a “neutral” Afghanistan can be a decisive factor in regional security. Russia’s robust “comeback” to Central Asia; its accent on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its support for India’s full membership of the body; its insistence on a diplomatic solution to the Iran problem; its repudiation of the US’s projection of the NATO as a global security organization; its emphasis on the primacy of the United Nations in conflict resolution; its abhorrence of the use of force; its insistence on adherence to international law; its opposition to the deployment of the US’s missile defence systems across Asia and Europe; its advocacy of a regional security architecture for Asia-Pacific; its consistent underscoring of BRICS as a key locus of influence on the world stage – all these are, admittedly, of immense consequence to India’s vital interests and core concerns in regional and global security and stability…
Yet, the heart of the matter is how far Delhi wishes to harmonize with these Russian initiatives, although, as Singh would see, Moscow keeps an open house for its Indian friends. The coming 48 hours should provide some answers.
The views of individual contributors do not
necessarily represent those of the Strategic Culture Foundation.
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