The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that he looks forward to working «with the new administration [in Egypt] based on the peace accords with us», which eh described as «a cornerstone of stability in the region and of vital interest to both countries.» But it is not as simple as that. Israel’s biggest worry will be that even taking at face value Morsi’s public assurance in his first speech after the election victory assurances – «We came to the world with a message of peace. We will maintain international charters and conventions and the commitments and agreements Egypt has signed with the world» – even then, how far will the Egyptian security establishment continue to cooperate with regard to sharing intelligence or undertaking joint operations? Without the genuine cooperation at the working operational level that was forthcoming from the Mubarak regime on a daily basis in real time, the security challenges are such that Israel will have to allocate huge budgets to ensure the safety of its borders with Egypt. Again, without annulling the peace treaty as such, Egypt can demand changes in the terms of the accord, especially as regards redeployment in Sinai, which the peace treaty stipulates as a demilitarized zone. Morsi, in fact, has hinted at such a demand to revise the peace treaty with Israel.
Thus, gnawing worries have begun appearing in the Israeli mind as to whether the MB will allow the Egyptian military to cooperate with Israel at all as time passes and how the Brothers will choose to maintain their relationship with Hamas. Israel is heavily counting on the US to modulate Egyptian policies and to ensure that the military restrains Morsi when it comes to Israel. The early signs are that Morsi prefers to form a national unity government and to negotiate the president’s powers with the military. Israel would regard them as helpful signs. But it is a somewhat thin hope, given the limits to US influence in Egyptian politics and also taking into account the fact that it was the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] in Cairo that after all began violating all the existing deals with Israel, including the gas agreement. It was under the SCAF’s watch that the Israeli embassy in Cairo came under attack and Egypt stopped issuing visas for Israelis and decreased the number of flights between the two countries – aside permitting for the first time in history Iranian warships to cross the Suez canal twice in the past year, ignoring virulent Israeli (and US) protests. The Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot neatly summed up the security paradigm that Netanyahu needs to grapple with: «Egypt will not turn overnight into an enemy state that threatens Israel’s borders, but the Israeli intelligence and military institutions should deal with that country as an old friend who needs to be reassessed, and they should prepare accordingly.»
No more a ‘sub-cultural’ status
The underlying question here – as also in Egypt’s relationship with the US and the West in general – is how far or whether Egypt will accept a «subcultural status», to cite an expression from an editorial comment in the Chinese communist party newspaper The Global Times. The daily analyzed that the revolution in Egypt has brought out and amplified «fundamental cultural and political factors» and it is a moot point whether Morsi «becomes more secular.»
Indeed, what will perennially worry Israel is that Morsi mirrors the MB’s strategy of couching a hardline doctrine with short-term pragmatism. The Brotherhood is over 85 years old and it is a pan-Arabic movement that consistently espoused the creation of a Muslim state encompassing the entire Middle East – and, it has never given up that goal despite its pragmatic willingness today, perhaps, to accept the existence of Israel. Of course, Egypt as a country would have a lot to lose if it cancelled the peace treaty with Israel, including billions of dollars of western investment, and last but not the least, Egyptian military is still the ultimate power in Egypt and jettisoning it from that position will take much time and effort on the part of the MB. All the same, as the Chinese daily pointed out, something has fundamentally changed in a broader, regional, civilizational context. The Global Times adds,
«The process of democratization is releasing the cultural and political character of the Arab world. When Arabs have the choice, it seems the first thing they d is to find their identity. Earlier, Palestine churned out the Hamas regime. The Egyptian elections will no doubt encourage the Brotherhood in other countries, impacting US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.»
The above observation made earlier in the week in the flush of Morsi’s victory was so prescient that hardly a day later, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood drew inspiration from the happenings in Cairo and threatened to boycott the forthcoming local elections if Amman didn’t deliver on the promised democratic reforms. The MB spokesman said on Tuesday that King Abdullah of Jordan should fulfill his pledge that cabinet ministers will be elected by the parliament and will no longer be his appointees. «We also want greater powers given to the Parliament,» the MB spokesman told Associated Press news agency. He said:
«All the moves we have seen so far [in Jordan] are cosmetic. We want to see actual moves and serious intentions for real reforms, or we will suspend our participation in the municipal elections.»
Reviving Egypt’s identity
Jordan’s MB has also demanded that King Abdullah should remove Marouf Al Bakhit, a tough ex-army general, from his post as prime minister, who they believe is an unlikely man to steer Jordan’s reform program. Quite obviously, things are coming to a pass in Jordan since the parliamentary elections are slated for early next year and although King Abdullah said it might take «at least two or three years» to put in place an elected government, the political impetus drawn from the developments in next-door Egypt may dictate otherwise. The Jordanians have staged dozens of demonstrations across the country this year to press for democratic freedom and reforms.
Again, demonstrators estimated to number 4000 staged a protest in Kuwait on Tuesday against a court ruling on June 20 scrapping the parliamentary election results in February (in which the opposition won 34 seats in the 50-member parliament). On Monday, Kuwaiti cabinet submitted its resignation following the standoff with the opposition.
To be sure, Morsi’s election will resonate throughout the Middle East region and it has the potential to redraw the relationship between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world – Saudi Arabia and Qatar in particular. The last two countries have surged to the forefront in regional politics sidelining Egypt in the recent years but Egypt is bound to reclaim its leadership position. Morsi told the Iranian media in an exclusive interview just hours before his election victory was formally announced:
«[My plan] is to establish relations with all countries of the region to revive Egypt’s identity in the region through economic cooperation among the Arab countries and making certain reforms in the Arab league to activate its role on the international arena – and, besides that, supporting the Palestinian nation in its legitimate campaign for realizing its rights.»
Significantly, Morsi also underscored his enthusiasm for expanding Egypt’s ties with Iran and said the relations between the two countries will «create a strategic balance in the region. It is part of my agenda.»
Iran’s reaction to the election of Morsi has been most effusive. Within hours of the announcement of the election result in Cairo, Iranian foreign ministry conveyed its felicitations to the Egyptian people and government. This was followed by a message from President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Interestingly, a message from the general staff of the Iranian armed forces also felicitated the «Egyptian nation» and «urged» Egypt’s armed forces to accept the election results. In a separate statement the chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces criticized the Egyptian military’s supreme council for its «illegal measures» and called it an «illegal» body. The Iranian commentaries have counseled the Muslim Brotherhood to confront the military with the backing of the agitators on Tahrir Square and cautioned that any undue delay in settling the equations between the elected leadership and the military may work to the detriment of the democratic forces since the entrenched military would only be inclined to dig in.
Tehran had made repeated overtures to Cairo in the period since the overthrow of the Mubarak regime for resumption of diplomatic relations but had to accept that the Egyptian side needed more time. To what extent Tehran’s enthusiasm for the MB is genuine is hard to say and there could be a contrived spin to it. But Iran is taking a long term view that the rise of Islamism in Egypt will ultimately work in its favor. (This is its public stance vis-à-vis Libya and Tunis as well.) For the present, Tehran draws satisfaction that Morsi will not be party to any US-led containment strategy toward Iran.
Tehran insistently claims an Islamic affinity with the MB and it probably estimates that the feeling is reciprocated. The MB is faction-ridden and it is conceivable that Iran holds influence with some of its factions. The MB’s links with Hamas, its support of the Palestinian problem and its hostility toward Israel are trends that are in harmony with the overall Iranian regional strategy. But most important of all, Iran will keenly watch how the ambivalent relationship between the MB and the Persian Gulf oil states – Saudi Arabia and Qatar in particular – will evolve in the coming period. Iran’s worst case scenario will be that the Saudi and Qatari financial prowess might cast a spell on Egypt’s brothers. Its best hope is that the MB feels and overarching Islamic affinity with Shi’ite Iran and does not fall for the Saudi agenda of rallying sectarian Sunni feelings in the Middle East.
Revolution in revolution
The MB’s equations with Saudi Arabia promises to be a fascinating template of regional politics in the coming period and it would have significant ramifications in the situations such as Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, etc. On the one hand, Egypt needs financial help and would know that the Persian Gulf countries have deep pockets. But on the other hand, the petrodollar monarchies have shown reluctance to give any large-scale assistance to Egypt unless there are commensurate political guarantees that their vital interests aren’t going to be put into jeopardy. The autocratic regimes in the Persian Gulf are extremely wary of a successful revolution in Egypt as it might become a role model for the Arab peoples and the revolutionary fervor may spread in the region posing threat to the monarchies. Morsi has tried to allay the fears of the Persian Gulf regimes by assuring that Egypt will not export its revolution. But in his victory speech on Monday, he also spelt out a conditional, nuanced approach: «We will not allow ourselves to interfere in the internal affairs of any country in the same way that we will not allow any interference in our affairs.» On the face of it, this may seem a logical and balanced stance that goodwill must be reciprocated but the rub lies in that the MB has had a troubled relationship with Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
The MB resents the clandestine funding and promotion of the Egyptian Salafists by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which aims at challenging the stature of the MB as the fountainhead of Islamism in Egypt and in the region. Equally, the MB is well aware that Saudis and Qataris had close ties with Mubarak and tried all through for a very long time to stop the empowerment of the Islamists in Egypt, fearing that it might change the political map of the region and end up drawing attention to the lack of legitimacy of their own autocratic regimes.
The Saudis were very nervous about the MB coming into power in Egypt because they have their own struggle with the Brotherhood in their own backyard. There is also a whole backlog of violent history between the Saudi establishment and the Brothers (whom the late Crown Prince Nayef violently confronted), which the two sides need to come to terms with. The seething mutual suspicions and antipathies erupted recently when Saudi Arabia threatened to expel all Egyptian expatriates and the Saudi embassy in Cairo came under attack, which forced Riyadh to recall its ambassador. (Interestingly, Morsi felt called upon to publicly disavow the media reports that his first visit as president could be to Saudi Arabia.)
Having said that, Morsi’s election victory has been possible, partly at least, only due to the Salafist blocs that voted for him. Given the nature of the «split» verdict, Morsi has hastened to pledge that his endeavor will be to act as the president of «all Egyptians». Coupled with that, his priority for the immediate future will be on domestic issues and not on foreign policy. But even without the MB switching into a proactive regional policy, its rise in Egypt as such promises to restructure the politics of the Middle East. The US’s exclusive influence over Egypt (and the Arab world) is not going to be possible to re-establish. Other players are poised to enter the arena – especially China, which is well-placed to commit resources and is not haunted by past history of entanglement with the Mubarak era. The historic significance of the Muslim Brothers’ rise in Egypt lies in that henceforth no single outside power can completely take the region under its wings and turn it into a «sub-cultural area».
