The visit by President Vladimir Putin to Pakistan next Tuesday is undoubtedly an historic event insofar as no Russian head of state has ever visited that country since its creation over six decades ago. Of course, the visit will generate keen interest in the region and in the international community as a whole for a variety of reasons at a juncture when the regional security situation is touching unprecedented criticality.
Moscow has studiously underplayed the event for reasons of its own. But Islamabad obviously made up for the Russian reticence and in the process has displayed its eagerness – again, for compelling reasons of its own. It stands to reason that Putin being a purposive and far-sighted statesman, much preparation has gone into the forthcoming event. He is not the sort of leader who likes to measure life in a coffee spoon. Yet, the Pakistani side tried to impart a sense of aroma at one point by hinting at a likely preparatory mission by the powerful army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to Moscow ahead of Putin’s arrival in Islamabad (which of course didn’t materialize).
There has always been a cogent body of opinion within the Russian strategic community through the Soviet era, which never missed an opportunity to argue that Moscow’s regional policies and perhaps even its then superpower relationship with the United States would significantly stand to gain if only the ties with Islamabad were somehow repaired. But then, objective realities and contradictions – aside the inevitable considerations of realpolitik – kept barging in like a cold blast blighting the scope for dalliance. That body of opinion in Moscow stands vindicated today, although the regional mileu has changed, the Cold War has ended and indeed Russia is not aspiring to be the former Soviet Union in the emergent world order.
The last is a crucial point to begin with, since Russia is no more content with the Soviet Union’s search for a peaceful co-existence with the United States but on the contrary is tirelessly seeking habitation and a name in the common European home to which Russia indeed belongs culturally, historically and politically. So, what could be the range of Russian considerations in taking an initiative toward Pakistan at this juncture? Afghanistan situation readily comes to mind. The Russian angst over the post-2014 regional scenario following the NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan is apparent in the numerous statements from Moscow in the recent weeks. Unsurprisingly, the strategic ambiguity in the US posturing casts doubts in the Russian mind about Washington’s long-term intentions in the region, especially as negotiations are slated to start in 3 weeks from now for the conclusion of an Afghan-American agreement providing for open-ended US military presence. Moscow’s concerns over the deployment of US missile defence system on Russia’s periphery are quite pronounced.
Moscow will be justified in sensing that amongst the regional powers – Iran excluded – it is only Pakistan that shares a similar angst about the US’ intentions. At the same time, what also brings together Russia and Pakistan is that these two countries think they control the US’ vital transit routes for supplying the troops in Afghanistan and, therefore, they could have a big say in modulating the US regional strategies if the crunch time comes if only they could “coordinate” their approaches.
A tough call to make
Equally, Moscow shares the widespread perception that the US can work out an enduring settlement in Afghanistan only with Pakistan’s cooperation. The natural corollary is that it is in the Russian interest to augment Pakistan’s strategic autonomy. The prevailing opinion among the Russian experts seems to be that Pakistan is no more willing to subserve the western regional policies and, simply put, Russian interests lie in strengthening these nascent tendencies that are also in consonance with Moscow’s global strategy of promoting a multipolar, democratized world order.
Quite obviously, if Pakistan is weaned away from its “unipolar predicament”, the South and Central Asian region and the Greater Middle East as a whole, would no more be the same again in strategic terms. Pakistan is a nuclear power; it is a major Sunni Muslim country; its economy is potentially promising; the market it offers could be rewarding; and, most important, its geographical location is of profound consequence to the geopolitics of the Eurasian heartland. In any whichever way one looks at it, a strong strategic understanding with Pakistan could give yet another underpinning to the Russian regional strategies.
Thus, Russia’s overture to Pakistan was couched carefully in a quadripartite format that also includes Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Putin’s visit to Pakistan, in fact, was originally conceived as an occasion to participate in a summit meeting of the quadripartite forum in Islamabad. Moscow also has lately taken some major initiatives to bring much-needed dynamism into Russia’s ties with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. All in all, it is possible to see the Russian overture to Pakistan as Moscow’s counter to the US’s celebrated New Silk Road Initiative.
The raison d’etre of the emergent Russian strategy toward Pakistan is apparent. However, the contradictions cannot be overlooked, either. First and foremost, what is the “additionality” that Moscow can offer to Pakistan? Russia is not a major donor country and it instinctively abhors a return to the Soviet-era habit of underwriting other countries’ failing economies. Obviously, Duma cannot offer the kind of 5 billion dollar aid package bearing the name of Senator John Kerry that the US Congress put together at one time not too long ago for Pakistan.
Again, if the experience of China is any indicator, there are “systemic” difficulties that outsiders come across in making serious investments in the Pakistani economy. Where even China chooses to be reticent, it is highly likely that Russia will be circumspect and will tread softly. Then, there is the big “if” – military cooperation. Russian experts would know that the military leadership in Pakistan takes all major decisions and most minor decision on the key areas of foreign and security policies. Yet, it will be a major decision for Russia to robustly push for military cooperation with Pakistan and it is hard to see why Moscow would be foolhardy to tread on Indian sensitivities. The South Asian panorama presents a qualitatively different challenge to the Russian diplomacy and regional policy than what it may come across in the Asia-pacific while developing military ties with both China and Vietnam.
The Russian experts may wonder why Moscow cannot have military cooperation with both India and Pakistan, when New Delhi is doing splendidly well with Moscow while at the same time rapidly developing the “mil-to-mil” with the US. There is some pragmatic merit in seeing things simplistically that way, but it is a call Russia would have to make ultimately.
Unfulfilled expectations
But the main contradictions are of a geopolitical character. First, Russia has come a long way to “normalize” its ties with Afghanistan in the recent years but it still remains a complex relationship that carries heavy burdens of history. The point is, Kabul continues to “celebrate” annually the Mujahideen victory in Afghanistan, which invariably becomes an occasion to refresh painful memories. Besides, Afghan-Pakistan relations remain on roller coaster and at present they are actually passing through a very tense phase. Come to think of it, Moscow will be called upon to take a stance if Kabul presses ahead with its idea of lodging a protest in the UN Security Council regarding alleged Pakistan shelling of Afghan territory.
An easing of tensions in the Afghan-Pakistan relations is not likely to happen in a near term unless Pakistan completely jettisons its power projection into Afghanistan, which is improbable as things stand. Similarly, Russia’s ties with Tajikistan are in some difficulty at present. Arguably, a consolidation of Russia’s standing in the Central Asian region as a whole is very much a work in progress. This, in turn, makes it highly problematic for Moscow at this juncture to develop the ties with Pakistan in a broader regional context of the geopolitics of Central Asia. That is to say, small countries like Afghanistan, Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan would still have their own perceptions and opinions regarding Pakistan as a reliable partner in the struggle against terrorism and religious militancy, no matter Moscow’s efforts to harmonise the intra-regional tensions.
However, at the end of the day, what is going to count most is the Russian assessment regarding Pakistan’s relations with the US. True, US-Pakistan relations are passing through a difficult period. Pakistan even tried to rope in China as a counterweight to the US pressures on it – although Beijing wouldn’t allow itself to be drawn in. But it is not an adversarial relationship, either. The heart of the matter is that Pakistan and the US have their respective competing narratives. From the Pakistani viewpoint, as the former American ambassador in Islamabad Cameron Munter stressed in a remarkable speech at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington earlier this week, the US has treated it as a “one-night stand” without offering it the conjugal bliss of a roaring, full-throated “marriage”, which it deserves, after having loyally served as a handmaiden for decades altogether in a most special way.
Munter recapped that a series of mishaps through 2011 blighted the US’ efforts to create enduring trust in the relationship – Raymond Davis affair, Osama bin Laden’s killing, Salala massacre, etc. – which has forced the civilian and military leadership in Pakistan to “abdicate from a consistent position of being pro-American” and as a result the expectations from both sides have become “very measured, more modest” and a realization has since dawned that Washington’s attempt to build a strategic partnership during the halcyon period of 2008-2010 was probably not the “right way to have gone about it.” The result is that the competing narratives have been strengthened – regarding perceived US opportunism (as Pakistan would see it) and of Pakistani perfidy (as seen from Washington).
However, Munter also made it clear that this is not the end of the story and the saga will resume in new directions once the US presidential election is over in November. Interestingly, an engrossing template of Munter’s projection of future US policies toward Pakistan consisted in taking them out of their quintessential bilateral track so far and situating them in a broader regional context, especially by developing synergy with the Pakistan-India track which has been running remarkably well in the most recent years.
In sum, on the eve of Putin’s historic visit to Islamabad on Tuesday, the big question is whether the western-oriented Pakistani elites – civilian and military – are really on the lookout for the sort of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis that Russia can help it develop. Frankly, the jury is still out. Therefore, with its enormous experience in managing the relationship with Pakistan, Washington has little reason to feel perturbed about a Russian thrust toward Pakistan. As for India, the success of Putin’s visit will largely be measured in terms of his success in moderating the Pakistani policies.
To be sure, Putin’s visit to Pakistan has a sense of high drama about it, which is only to be expected. But it is reminiscent of a similar Russian thrust toward Iran in October 2007, which also raised huge (unfulfilled) expectations of a tectonic shift in the geopolitics of the region. Indeed, Putin’s visit to Tehran was the first by a Russian leader since Josef Stalin’s in 1943. Moscow has done well not to raise hype this time around.
