As a result, the incumbent can afford to mix some amount of healthy irony into his comments on the clumsy foreign-policy statements like the top-notorious one – that Russia is America's number 1 geopolitical foe – which Obama's Republican rival Mitt Romney and his associate, vice-presidential hopeful Paul Ryan bestow upon the constituency. “My opponent and his running mate are new to foreign policy. But from all that we've seen and heard, they want to take us back to an era of blustering and blundering that cost America so dearly. After all, you don't call Russia our number one enemy — not al-Qaeda, Russia — unless you're still stuck in a Cold War mind warp”, responds Obama.
Considering that, at the moment, the Democratic candidate is the frontrunner, there appear to be grounds for optimism concerning the future state of the interactions between Washington and Moscow, but glossing over the existing and potential contentious issues may prove unwise and, in any case, "the devil is in the detail". “The reset with Russia is based on the belief that we can cooperate with them on areas of common interest, understanding that we still have some differences,” said Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes.
While Romney's team armed its candidate with a whole ad hoc program -“AN AMERICAN CENTURY — A Strategy to Secure America’s Enduring Interests and Ideals” – as he entered the race, Obama, in dealing with the foreign-policy theme as the re-election contender, naturally draws from the National Security Strategy he signed back in 2010. It leaves a fairly dovish impression compared to Romney's fiery rhetoric but, upon careful reading, is still found to contain passages which should echo with reasonable concern in Moscow[1].
The 2010 strategic blueprint urged the US “to pursue a policy of engagement with Russian President Medvedev, the Russian government, and the Russian society that focused on achieving concrete results in areas of mutual interest”, adding that the US is interested in a strong and prosperous Russia which respects international norms. Suspicion creeps in at this point that, at least prior to 2010, the authors of the document felt Russia's respect for the norms was somehow missing. Similarly, the pledge written into the Strategy that Washington would protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors implies that Moscow poses a threat to them, and the declared intent that the US would promote the primacy of law, universal values, and government accountability in Russia sounds fairly intrusive though still moderate against Romney's ambitions.
The New Start arms control deal, which prescribed the 1,550 warhead ceiling for the US and Russian nuclear arsenals, and the U.S.-Russian Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, known as the 123 Agreement, are cited as the top benefit produced by Obama's reset policy. The White House also credits to itself a role in Russia's integration into the WTO as the US backed the bid submitted by Moscow, but it must be noted that the net gains the WTO membership promises to Russia are questionable and there would have been no logic in shutting Russia out of the group anyhow. Certainly, the Obama Administration put a checkmark on its wishlist when Moscow finally gave consent to diluted sanctions against Iran. Washington's key foreign-policy achievement – the one that should, more than any other, factor into the US domestic polemics over the reset invented by Obama – was that Russia agreed to host a supply route which NATO used to sustain the campaign waged by the Western coalition in Afghanistan.
Otherwise, the coalition would have been left with no external feed apart from the fluctuating route traversing Pakistan and could be suffering critical jams all along. While the US armed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980ies to derail the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow could – but did not – pay in kind just by saying 'No' in a phone conversation. US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James N. Miller admitted that, absent the northern supply route, the difficulties confronting the NATO contingent at the moments when Pakistan became uncooperative could be enormous.
Talk that the 1974 Jackson–Vanik amendment imposed on the USSR for impeding immigration is obsolete has been going on in Washington and elsewhere for years, and the overdue solution started to loom on the horizon under the Obama Administration. However, while the procedure to erase the Jackson–Vanik amendment finally took off, the controversial Magnitsky bill with a scope that can expand indefinitely starting from an isolated precedent jumped to the US-Russian agenda. It is clear that in this case Obama's domestic regards – the fear of being seen as a president overly gentle with Moscow – prevent him from listening to what Russia has to say on the matter[2].
The reality to be faced is that, seeking another term in office, Obama may plan to enrich the menu of “nonstandard” measures meant to influence Russia rather than to make things easier for Moscow. In various epochs, the items from the menu used to belong to the spheres of psychological operations or public diplomacy, and these days are denoted by the bracket term “soft power”.
Obama, for example, holds on to the entrenched tradition of replaying every July the so-called Captive Nations Week declared by a congressional resolution and signed into law (US Public Law 86-90) back in 1959. The piece of legislation says that “submerged nations look to the United States, as the citadel of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their liberation and independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious freedoms, and of their individual liberties”[3].
The corresponding list of victimized peoples used to be quite lengthy but, up to date, slimmed to include only a couple of East-Europe and post-Soviet space nations – Idel-Ural and Cossackia thought to be waiting for justice somewhere in Russia's Volga region and North Caucasus respectively. The whole thing is a caricature, but it nevertheless sends a disquieting message of disrespect for Russia's territorial integrity.
The Obama Administration actually has on record a few innovations pertinent to Russia, one of them being to employ – as a follow-up to the above law, perhaps – the religious factor in public policy. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a group based in Obama's home city and formerly chaired by Michelle Obama, issued a set of recommendations in February, 2010, calling the US Administration to put together a strategy of advancing the US interests based on religion. The report – “Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy” – was promptly absorbed by the US Department of State[4]. “Religion, properly understood, can become the "smartest" power of all in international affairs” said Professor of Theology at Chicago Theological Seminary Susan Brooks in a comment on the document. Somewhat earlier, in 2009, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) placed Russia, along with Belarus, on the watch list of countries where the religious freedom supposedly falls short of the West's requirements, diplomatic steps to be taken by the US Department of State or international organizations being among the punishment options. In practice, the purpose behind the above is to slam countries under the pretexts of the lack of religious freedoms or the dominance of religion, whichever appears expedient under current circumstances. Russia was blacklisted in 2010 over allegations that its religious freedom situation was worsening. In April, 2012, US Ambassador to Russia Michael Anthony McFaul met Russian Patriarch Kirill for a thorough discussion, and Russia's religious leader suggested that the coverage of the religious affairs in the country could be more objective, but Russia was blacklisted again in the 2011 report. The ado around Pussy Riot showed how much can be accomplished in a low-cost game played around a bunch of discourteous ladies in masks packed into a female punk band.
At first glance, the incumbent appears to be a preferable partner from Russia's perspective, but that is not necessarily correct. Romney's statements are blunt and his steps – predictable. In a changing world, the Republican candidate will sooner or later discover that his nostalgia for the epoch when the US might went uncontested is pointless and will adopt a more realistic stance. For that, Moscow will have to be firm with Mr. Romney, that is clear. Obama is a completely different type of character. He does his best to look pragmatic and readily dives into realpolitik but has already developed a taste for applying the US soft power internationally. The US Administration indicated recently that it would find ways to support its partners in Russia despite the coming closure of USAID offices in the country. By the way, the Jihad networks operate Hawala, an informal value transfer network – Moscow should be ready to par intrusive initiatives even if they employ approaches as exotic as that.
[1] http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.
[2] http://www.americanthinker.com/
[3] Public Law 86-90, 73 Stat. 212/ U.S. Code.
[4] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2010.
