Is Obama pledge really ironclad?
While referring to the ‘pivot’ strategy in Asia, Gen. John Paxton, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps posed a key question during a recent speech, «Do we [US] have enough people and enough ships to do it?» He lamented, «We are on our way… to a less than a 300 ship navy. We are on our way to a 175,000 man Marine Corps». According to Gen. Paxton, the Marine Corps needs 54 amphibious ships to do its job, while current plans call for only 38 and that too is likely to shrink to 33. He asked, «With the dollars we have, and the ships we have and the aircraft we have, and the people we have, are we going to be ready to do what we need to do?»
In political terms, there is lingering uneasiness among the US’ allies about the depth of Washington’s resolve, notwithstanding the remarks by the US President Barack Obama’s hosts during his Asia tour that they were reassured by his words. To quote Narushige Michishita, a Japanese expert on security policy, «The wording of his [Obama’s] statements was O.K., but if you look at his demeanor and tone, he was very nuanced and trying not to get entangled in disputes with China».
This ‘nuanced’ approach suits China fine, because it always took pains to maintain that its interests in the East China Sea are unrelated to those in the South China Sea, and vice versa. While not a mere naval strategy, China’s two-fold objective is to make good its territorial claims while at the same time ensuring unimpeded strategic breakout beyond the constraints of the so-called First Island Chain that could be deemed to run from Northeast China through Japan and the Ryukyu archipelago, the Philippines and down to the Strait of Malacca.
The Southeast Asian capitals are staying on the sidelines when it comes to tensions in the East China Sea, and they prefer to adopt a less direct and non-confrontational approach to China and keep tensions in check in the South China Sea. The South Asian capitals have by and large kept a studied silence over the tensions between China and Japan. Simply put, they aren’t interested in pushing the envelope in the East China Sea and would opt for a differentiated approach that serves the interests of maritime relations in the South China Sea.
Obama offered a clue to his own thinking on the ‘pivot’ strategy at his press conference in Manila at the fag-end of his Asia tour when he gave «the general takeaway» from his regional tour: «Our alliances in the Asia Pacific have never been stronger. Our relationship with ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia has never been stronger. I don't think that’s subject to dispute».
But what followed was something quite extraordinary – the core tenets of what can probably be called by now the ‘Obama Doctrine’. Obama held forth at some length to dispel the criticism in America regarding his foreign policy. Its application to the ‘pivot’ strategy has stunning implications, and the important thing is that Obama articulated these thoughts during his Asia tour. The bottom line, he said, is that he is being criticized at the failure to use military force, which is uncharitable because military force is something that needs to be deployed only as a last resort and it ought to be deployed wisely. Besides, he said that the American people have no interest in policies that «go headlong into a bunch of military adventures» that would have no bearing on the US’s core security interests.
Obama elaborated, «there are disasters and difficulties and challenges around the world, and not all of those are going to be immediately solvable by us [US]». Therefore, the prudent thing to do is to «look at what is it that is going to advance our security interests over the long term, to keep out military in reserve for where we absolutely need it». Obama went on to stress that military force is only one of «the tools we’ve got in the toolkit» and if there are occasions where «targeted, clear actions can be taken that would make a difference, then we should take them». But otherwise, it is the diplomatic track that ought to be given priority.
Obama claimed that this foreign-policy approach is paying off and «it is fair to say that our alliances are stronger, our partnerships are stronger, and in the Asia Pacific region, just to take one example, we are much better positioned to work with the peoples here on a whole range of issues of mutual interest». He concluded that the focus, therefore, ought to be on «steadily» advancing the interests of the American people and the US’ partnerships. The stress was on an incremental approach.
It is extraordinary that Obama spoke in this vein at the concluding lap of his Asia tour, which was being widely perceived locally for signs of a robust confirmation that America-led bilateral security relationships remained the backbone of peace and stability in the region and that was what the ‘pivot’ primarily aimed at. In a nutshell, Obama underscored that he eschewed military adventures abroad in countries engaged in messy conflicts, and wanted instead to focus more on diplomacy and trade.
This is perfectly understandable because Obama hopes to spend more time on domestic issues at a time when the economy is barely recovering and when social disparities are growing. Call it the vagaries of history, or the decline of a superpower, but Obama hopes to pay attention only on foreign-policy issues that affect the US’s core interests.
Indeed, Syria has been a glaring example of how the ‘Obama Doctrine’ is at work. We know that he nixed the proposal for arming and organizing vetted moderate Syrian opposition commanders – something that was collectively proposed by the then secretaries of state and defence Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey and the then CIA Director David Petraeus. Later, he chose the path to work with Russia on eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons rather than embark on a military strike.
Of course, the detractors are galore – be it on Obama’s approach toward the Syrian conflict or on relations with Russia and the ‘pivot’ strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As an American columnist Trudy Rubin wrote, «sending the Ukrainian army MREs – yes, more of them – just makes us look foolish. People are asking whether, as was the case with those sent to the Syrian rebels, their sell-by date is about to expire… In Manila, Obama seemed not to recognize that China is watching. So are America’s Asian allies, who have to judge whether Washington will support them if Beijing makes aggressive moves… That kind of approach will convince Moscow, Beijing and Tehran that Obama can be ignored, which will create new foreign-policy headaches. It signals a president who isn’t really interested in the foreign-policy game».
Unsurprisingly, an opinion piece in the Philippine Daily Inquirer framed the big question as the US president headed home: «Is Obama pledge really ironclad?» The fact of the matter is that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement [EDCA] signed during Obama’s visit to Manila defines a new mode of security relationship between the two countries and revises the framework of the expanded presence of US forces in Philippine military bases. It is perceived by many as a counterweight to Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea as well as to meet the Chinese challenge to the US hegemony in Asia-Pacific.
The EDCA emanates out of a US commitment to defend the Philippines, which, in Obama’s words, is «ironclad… because allies never stand alone». But how much ironclad is Obama’s commitment? In a symbolic speech to Filipino and American soldiers at Fort Bonifacio last Tuesday before his departure after the overnight stop in Manila, Obama quoted from the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty [MDT] and said the two countries had pledged to defend each other «against external attacks, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone». He added that the «deepening of our alliance is part of our broader vision for the Asia-Pacific».
On the other hand, Obama didn’t give a categorical answer when asked after the signing of the EDCA whether the 1951 MDT would apply in case the Philippines’ territorial dispute with China escalated into an armed confrontation. He sidestepped neatly and said China had an «interest in abiding by international law» and that «larger countries have a greater responsibility» doing so. Obama added, «Our goal is not counter China. Our goal is not to contain China».
