* * *

Probably those who were most looking forward to Ahmadinejad leaving were the Iranian clergy, among whom the former president, who was supported by the military elite in Iran, including the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, was never fully accepted. 

Rouhani's victory returned control of executive power in the country to the hands of the Shiite clerics. And since there was a demand among certain parts of the Iranian electorate for a «liberal politician» or a «reformer», Rouhani was also immediately made a «reformer». Voters were offered not a candidate, but an image of a desirable president. This political image turned out to be fairly attractive to Iranians and, having received 50.7% of the votes, Rouhani became the next president of the IRI to represent the country's higher clergy, who almost unanimously acknowledged his victory. Naturally the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, was aware of the plans for Rouhani's candidacy. 

As early as the second half of the 1960s Rouhani had begun to participate in revolutionary activities against the shah. In 1977 he left Iran due to persecution from the authorities and joined Imam Khomeini. From 1980 to 2000 he was a member of parliament, where from 1992 to 2000 he was the vice chairman. In the years of the Iran-Iraq war Rouhani was part of the Supreme Defense Council, commanded the Iran Air Defense Force and was the deputy commander of the armed forces. In 1989 he was appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and held this post until Ahmadinejad became president. Starting in 2005 Rouhani was the representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, in the Supreme National Security Council; the council's secretary Jalili played the role of chief nuclear negotiator. For over twenty years, starting in 1991, Rouhani was a member of the Expediency Council and headed the Center for Strategic Research. 

Such a political career hardly justifies calling the new Iranian president a liberal. The doctorate he received at Glasgow Caledonian University in the 1990s and the heightened expectations of the «reformist» members of his new government change little in this respect. The Iranian majlis is usually considered conservative, but 15 out of the 18 ministers presented by President Rouhani for approval received a vote of confidence from the parliament. That means that no confrontations between the new cabinet of ministers and the parliament are expected in the near future; common pragmatism prevails. As Rouhani himself says, the time for slogans has passed; in the situation in which Iran now finds itself, the time has come to act, which he is urging his new ministers to do.

* * *

The core of the new government of Iran is made up of career officials with an average age of 57. Politicians who served in the governments of Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami are substantially represented in the new cabinet, but no obvious representatives of the reformist wing of the Iranian elite, as were seen in 2009, made it into the government. More precisely, Rouhani did not even nominate any for confirmation by the parliament. 

To give one example, the absolute leader (96.47% of the votes of parliament members) in the parliamentary voting to confirm the new Iranian cabinet was Ali Tayebnia, the secretary of the economic commission under Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, who took the post of minister of economy and finance. Other members of the governments of that time who became part of the new cabinet of ministers include the ministers of petroleum; defense and armed forces logistics; agriculture; cooperatives, labor and social welfare; industries and business; and transportation and housing. This has caused some to say that in the near future the economy of Iran (but only the economy, not the country as a whole) will be governed by three presidents. The last word in President Rouhani's selection of candidates for key political posts in the cabinet – the ministers of foreign affairs, intelligence, justice, interior, and culture and Islamic guidance – went to Ayatollah Khamenei. 

* * *

Rouhani indicates that the main goals of the new government will be to rehabilitate the economy, which is experiencing growing pressure from sanctions; to normalize relations with the West; and to bring Iran out of international isolation. It will be necessary to rein in American power, which has become an obstacle to Iran's economic progress. «That does not mean», emphasizes Rouhani, «abandoning our principles, but a change of methods is needed.» The task is a difficult one; it is one thing to abandon his predecessor Ahmadinejad's bellicose rhetoric toward the U.S. and Israel, and quite another to normalize relations with the West without making radical changes in the state's foreign policy. To believe in Washington's peaceable intentions toward Tehran would be absurd.

It is for this complex task that the new Iranian minister of foreign affairs, whose career is not typical for an Iranian politician, was selected. 53-year-old Mohammad Javad Zarif is a graduate of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (USA). He received a PhD at San Francisco State University. In 1992-2002 he held the post of deputy minister of foreign affairs, and then he was the head of the Iranian delegation to the UN for five years. Iranian experts note his closeness to President Khatami, as well as Zarif's long experience in conducting informal negotiations with Washington. The new head of the foreign policy department, as envisioned by the Iranian leadership, should become the face of Tehran's new diplomacy, first and foremost in contacts with the United States and the European Union. Let us also note that Iran's foreign policy, in accordance with the legislation of the IRI, is determined by the country's supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, who approved Zarif's appointment.

* * *

Rouhani speaks openly of Iran's difficult socio-economic situation, which has resulted from pressure on the Iranian economy from sanctions imposed by the West. The new president emphasizes that «the West is depriving Iranians of the means to meet elementary needs». In 2012 Iran entered a recession for the first time in 20 years, and in the first quarter of 2013 only 45% of the budget of the Islamic Republic was implemented. The country's new leadership intends to develop and implement a six-month plan to restore stability to the economy, while realizing that planning while under sanctions is becoming more and more difficult. 

According to the estimate of the U.S. Department of Energy, sanctions against Iran have led to a decrease in the country's oil exports to the lowest level since 1986. In 2012 exports of Iranian oil to other countries decreased to 1.5 million barrels a day (in 2011 that figure was 2.5 million barrels). Iran's revenue from oil exports decreased over 2012 from 95 billion dollars to 69 billion dollars. Iran's losses are connected not only with the cessation of oil exports to Europe. There has also been a reduction in exports to Asian countries upon which Washington has, to a greater or lesser extent, forced its anti-Iranian course. For example, over the 2012-2013 fiscal year ending March 31, India reduced the volume of its imports of oil from Iran by 26.5%. 

In the U.S. a new law has been passed according to which the main «punitive measure» applied to Iran is the successive cutting back of oil exports by one million barrels a day over the course of a year, which in the end, as envisioned by the Americans, should lead to the cessation of Iranian oil exports to world markets in 2015. Iran has nothing with which to compensate for the losses from oil exports. As shown in statistical data from the customs administration, over the first four months of this year the volume of exports of Iranian petrochemical products dropped by 12.5%, while that of gas condensate dropped by 15%. The remainder of exports (besides oil and gas) dropped by 5% compared with the same period for last year. The situation with imports, for which the goods nomenclature was seriously cut back by the Iranian government last year, is no better: it has decreased by almost one third. 

During the Ahmadinejad administration Iran chose the wise strategy of developing production of petroleum refinery products with high added value in order to export petrochemical products rather than raw materials. Currently in Iran 70 petrochemical industry facilities are under construction; the degree of completion varies from 5% to 95%. In order to complete all the projects, Tehran needs 30-35 billion dollars. Finding that much money, considering that Iran is under comprehensive sanctions, will be exceedingly complicated. 

In any case, Rouhani cannot but sense that he has too little time to justify the confidence of the country's population. The first things that the president will be taking care of in these conditions are socio-economic problems and, as a prerequisite to solving them, the relaxation of sanctions. One must also consider the fact that with the beginning of Rouhani's presidency, new opportunities in the Islamic Republic's relations with the West have appeared which may include, in particular, the beginning of direct bilateral negotiations between Tehran and Washington. The leading countries of the European Union are anxiously looking forward to this, as they are losing billions of euros by leaving the Iranian market. 

The Syrian crisis has metastasized to Iraq. The part of the country which remains after the de facto separation of Iraqi Kurdistan is on the brink of civil war. Its result is completely predictable: division into Sunnite and Shiite areas, blood, chaos, instability and «wild lands» in which extremists will «frolic».

The statement made by Martin Dempsey in early July just added fuel to the fire. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the U.S. is prepared to increase the amount of military assistance (and the number of advisors) to Lebanon and Iraq. It is worth noting that this readiness is motivated by «the return of al-Qaeda». Baghdad, to the surprise and dismay of Tehran, was very well-disposed to this initiative; the media advisor to the prime minister, Ali al-Mussawi, stated practically the next day that Iraq «will welcome an increase in the amount of military assistance from the U.S».

Incidentally, either of the two possibilities, civil war or the expansion of American military presence in Iraq, will be unacceptable for Tehran. In either of these possibilities it loses its «corridor» to Syria, which in turn will give the anti-Syrian coalition, which is currently experiencing hard times that look more like death throes, its second wind.

The strategic partnership which arose between Baghdad and Tehran in 2008 was Ahmadinejad's accomplishment. That is why it is completely logical that it is he who flew to Baghdad at Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's critical moment; during Ahmadinejad's presidential term Iran spent a considerable amount of political and financial resources on supporting him.

Ahmadinejad's visit to Baghdad in 2008 was justly assessed by many experts as a serious diplomatic victory of the Islamic Republic. During the visit of the Iranian party they were able to convince Baghdad that collaboration with Tehran would give it a guarantee of security and stable development, which was completely fair considering the influence Iran had on a great number of Shiite organizations. Incidentally, not all Iraqi Shiites approved of the rapprochement with Iran, and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani even refused to meet with Ahmadinejad, as he was unable to forget the support the Iranian president gave his «competitor», Muktada al-Sadr. But such «trivial matters» didn't bother Iranian leadership too much when they placed their bets on al-Maliki and openly pressured pro-Iranian organizations (for example, the supporters of al-Sadr) when al-Maliki needed support.

The importance of the strategic partnership with Iraq required certain sacrifices, and not only financial ones. Iran's financial expenses paid off in spades; trade volume between the two countries showed astounding growth (according to various figures the trade volume was between 7 and 12 billion dollars). In conditions of a constant «sanctions war», , Iraq became a real «breathing hole» for Iran; the Iranian goods supplied to Iraq were then sold throughout the Middle East, providing Iran's economy with an influx of finances and Iraqi traders with stable profits from their intermediary services.

With the help of Iraqi business, Iran was even able to tap into the international financial system, which infuriated U.S. financial intelligence agents. For example, in October 2010 American experts established that the purpose of opening two private Iranian banks in Iraq was to service international financial transaction from Iran. And one of these financial institutions turned out to be connected with the state bank Melli, which was under the strictest of sanctions. In addition, various companies in Iraq and Turkey served as loopholes in the sanction regime through which Iran obtained technologies for the needs of its own economy.

From a financial and economic point of view, the partnership was more than profitable for both parties; in the political sphere, however, negative feelings started to build up. It is difficult to say whether Tehran understood that al-Maliki was not at all pro-Iranian. Most likely they recognized this circumstance perfectly well. There was no secret about it. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad (the first Muslim to have a successful career in a U.S. diplomatic agency), who exerted himself greatly to support the political career of the current Iraqi leader, accurately described al-Maliki as a person who is «not dependent on Iran and positions himself as an Arab nationalist. His collaboration with Iran was always dictated first and foremost by the political interests of part of the Iraqi elite, and only then by some kind of «ideas».

But such a system suited Tehran perfectly, as al-Maliki professed the principle of «equidistance» with regard to the U.S. as well, stating during a visit to Washington: «I consider myself a friend of the U.S., but I am not America's man in Iraq». Furthermore, as the leader of the Dawa party, he was the image of the representative of a Shiite Islamic party, which fit in well with the concept of «Islamic awakening in the Shiite crescent proclaimed by Tehran. The only thing Iranian officials allowed themselves to do is restrain al-Maliki from responding with massive repressions to any protests against his party or him personally.

Thanks to his own political talent and astounding political self-preservation instinct, al-Maliki managed to be seen as «one of ours» both in Tehran and in Washington.

However, it proved impossible to maintain such a balance after the beginning of the Syrian conflict. Tehran's economic interest in the partnership with Baghdad was further increased by the fact that Iraq was a corridor for delivering Iranian equipment to Syria; it was an important channel via which Tehran shows support to Bashar al-Asad and the Syrian Arab Republic which was fending off the aggression of Salafi jihadists. Furthermore, since the end of last year Iraqi Shiite volunteers have begun to take fairly active part in military actions in Syria on the side of the government forces.

The situation was further complicated by the link between former members of the overthrown Ba'ath Party with Sunnite radicals in Iraq. And soon Saudi Arabia, which has been part of all violence in the Greater Middle East since the days of the USSR's Afghan campaign, got actively involved in stirring up internal conflict in Iraq.

It must be said that the Saudis' activities in Iraq had a quite understandable explanation. In the opinion of King Abdullah expressed in 2009, Maliki is an «Iranian agent» and his governance «opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq». Considering Saudi «Iranophobia», this statement was tantamount to declaring al-Maliki persona non grata. And while no direct proof has been found, in expert circles there exists the belief that the Saudis, mediated by the representatives of the U.S. Republican Party, paid off a long-term contract with the company Barbour, Griffith and Rogers in August 2007 for conducting an informational war against al-Maliki and his party.

By this summer a situation had formed where the interests of the anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian coalitions (while outwardly similar, there are still differences in their configurations, so it makes sense to speak of them as different groups) interlock on Iraq. The Sunnite opposition in Iraq, besides having joined with the Ba'athists – , also received armed reinforcements from Islamists who were broken in in fighting in Syria and dream of settling accounts with the Shiites on Iraqi territory as well. Behind protests in the regions where Sunnite Arabs live stands “al-Qaeda in Iraq». Basically, a certain part of the Iraqi Sunnite opposition is already under the control of Islamist extremists, and the demands of this opposition are becoming tougher and more unachievable every day. The plan of this coalition, in which Salafis, Ba'athists and outright terrorists have come together like a nest of serpents, is also becoming clear – either to remove al-Maliki (and all Shiites) from power, which is not realistic, or civil war and the division of Iraq into Sunnite and Shiite parts in a state of permanent war among themselves.

In the face of such a powerful coalition, al-Maliki has seriously begun to think about the possibility of Iran giving him serious support. Naturally, neither the removal of the current government nor the division of Iraq could please Tehran; either of these cases would be a strategic defeat, and the outcome of the Syrian conflict would once again be hanging by a thread. But at the same time, Tehran, tied up with the conflict in Syria (and Ahmadinejad has been criticized many times in the Islamic Republic for getting too involved in this conflict )and, to put it mildly, limited in its capabilities due to the difficult economic situation, is unlikely to be able to hold the «Iraqi front» as well.

An indirect confirmation of this is the constant calls from Iranian officials for al-Maliki and other Iraqi Shiite leaders, to show restraint and try to resolve the crisis using political methods.

It is worth noting that during a visit to Iraq in early April of this year, the Iranian Minister of Intelligence, met with Nouri al-Maliki and other high-ranking state leaders and offered Baghdad complete and comprehensive collaboration in the field of security. Judging by the fact that this offer did not meet with much understanding from the Iraqi leadership and was clearly let drop, one can assume that al-Maliki's team is inclined to place its hope for maintaining security in Washington. 

In connection with this, the exchange of statements during Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Baghdad is very much worth noting. «We are filled with determination to use all available methods to develop brotherly relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not see any limitations for the further expansion of our ties with Iraq,» stated the Iranian president, and received the following noncommittal answer: «Today Iraq has an open door policy, and we advocate the expansion of collaboration and relations with friendly countries with common historical and cultural traditions.»

Such restraint is very alarming for Tehran; it indicates the appearance of a real and very serious threat. And Ahmadinejad's visit to Baghdad two weeks before the end of his presidential term is a sign of the Iranian leadership's serious concern about the situation which has arisen literally over the past few months. And here individuals are not important, nor is division into «Rouhani's team» and «Ahmadinejad's team», the «former» and the «future». This is a challenge to the entire Islamic Republic of Iran, and in such situations the Iranian elite knows how to work around political differences.

To avoid the repetition of mass street protests during the 2009 elections, Ali Khamenei reduced tension by disqualifying the most problematic presidential hopefuls and thus getting them out of the race. They are former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, the leader of reformist movement, who enjoyed the support of incumbent President Ali Khamenei, and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s Chief of Staff and son-in-law. But the interest is still strong. (1) The remaining candidates stick to the basic foundations of the existing power structure (Velayat-e faqih), but their views significantly differ when it comes to details and tactics. 

There are two front runners at present – Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a moderate conservative, and Saeed Jalili, Islamic radical, who is the Iran's chief nuclear negotiator as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. The last one is believed to enjoy the support of ayatollah Khamenei and is viewed as the favorite. For instance, Reza Hojat-Shamami, a member of board, Tehran Eurasia Research Center, predicted a close race between two real heavyweights of Iranian politics. (2) At that, the Supreme Leader was on the fence. According to him, no matter what foreign media said, he had no preference, the winner should be the one who is able to be more effective in tackling the problems of the country. (3)

Unexpectedly the polls indicate the Tehran mayor is leading with 24%. He is the person who enjoys the reputation of being able to effectively tackle the problems of everyday life. Jalili is lagging behind with 20%. Moreover, Ghalibaf is predicted to win in the run-off election with 56% against 27. 5% going to the opponent. Running against Velayati, the capital’s mayor is to win 47% against 28%. In case his opponent is Hoddad Adel, he is to get 55% against 18%. The polls say he will have a major lead running against all other hopefuls. 120 majlis members have already given their support to Ghalibaf. It is worth to know more about him. (4)

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was born 23 August 1961. He is a professor and a former military and police commander. He holds a Ph.D. in political geography graduating from Tarbiat Modares University. Ghalibaf had also completed his Airbus pilot training on the following year and began his military career during Iran-Iraq war in 1980. He became chief commander of Imam Redha troops in 1982 and was chief commander of Nasr Troops from 1983 to 1984. After the end of the war, he became Managing-Director of Khatam al-Anbia, an engineering firm controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and was appointed as commander of Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force in 1996 by Ali Khamenei. Four years later, he became chief of the Iranian Police Forces after previous commander was dismissed after 1999 student protests. He was also appointed as Representative of President Mohammad Khatami at campaign to combat smuggling in 2002. He ran for presidency in 2005 presidential election and lost. It was kind of a consolation when two months later he was elected as Tehran's Mayor by City Council of Tehran. Let me note, Ahmadinejad had occupied this position before him. He is also a professor at University of Tehran. The mayor’s position makes him a public figure giving him an advantage to be aptly used. Ghalibaf has managed to become popular with the city dwellers implementing many programs to make the city’s life better. Well-planned and cohesive strategy has made Tehran, the city with the population of 10 million, become more modern and comfortable than the cities of comparable size like Cairo and Istanbul, for instance, or, in some respects, even Moscow, especially talking about auto bans. In 2008 he was added to the nomination list of ‘best world mayor» hopefuls. (5)

A faithful Muslim, but not a radical, he ably finds a balance between state structures and the people eager for reforms. He stands for introduction of innovations and high technology to modernize economy. It’s not an occasion that he is the candidate of Political party called Islamic Society of Engineers. He says he doesn’t believe in populism and fooling people while giving priority to logical, systematic and science based approach. At that, he stands for strong government and staunchly defends the basic pillars of Islamic Republic’s state structure. He is a modern businessman and manager driving his motorcycle to get to the office, quite often he even steers a plane. Talking about the nuclear program talks, he promises to get ahead and achieve progress. As to him, Iran can hold talks with the United States because getting at the round table with the Americans has never been a red line for Iran. . (6) 

He calls for reasonable balance between state and private sectors. It can be surmised that his election will speed up privatization. Some estimates make him the best orator among the hopefuls. (7) 

As one can see, he can rely on the support of Revolutionary Guards, police, armed forces, national minorities, and the intelligencia living in the capital, as well as emerging middle class. He keeps abreast of times making the image of nationwide politician. Along with fellow runner Ali Akbar Velayati he enjoys the support of the so called Coalition for Progress. The support rendered by Velayati, the third runner, in the run-off election may be decisive. 

Liberal Israelis believe if elected Ghalibaf may normalize the bilateral relations because he criticized Ahmadinejad for refusing to acknowledge holocaust. On Ahmadinejad’s statements regarding the Holocaust, Ghalibaf asked, «for instance, where did the case of the Holocaust take us?» He continued, «We were never against Judaism; it’s a religion. What we opposed was Zionism. We’ve been the major supporters of Palestine for 30 years, but with the intelligence of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei, no one could accuse us of being anti-Semitic. But suddenly without consideration for the results and implications, the issue of the Holocaust was raised. How did his benefit the revolution or the Palestinians?» (8)

At the same time the apprehension is prevalent among politicians that Ahmadinejad leaving the political scene is bad for Israel because it can to large extent set back the global opposition to the nuclear threat. The world may not want to exert strong pressure on a new President of Iran testing his flexibility in the talks with the West. They think there is no significant difference between the reformers and conservatives related to the nuclear issue. (9)

The same views are prevalent in the West. Iran is not backward. To the contrary, the rigid norms supported by ayatollahs don’t stand in the way of boosting the development of modern and diversified economy. It’s not only the adherence to the nuclear program for «peaceful» purposes. Step by step the country makes progress building a diversified economy, including minerals, materials, technologically enhanced production, like cars, aviation, ships, heavy weapons systems, including missiles. Oil refineries are built to substitute exporting raw minerals with oil products. Gradually the country is becoming the absolute regional leader (producing 100 million oil products a year or 40% of overall production). The construction of railways leading to Central Asia and the Transcaucasia is on the way to provide for the shortest possibly access to the sea undermining the expediency of the Great Silk Road project sponsored by the West. The next endeavor to be undertaken is the construction of Mashhad-Great-Dushanbe strategic railway linking Tehran with China across Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the countries with Persian speaking population. The overall transit cargo going through Iran is to increase from the current 10 million to 50 million tons. The development of South Pars, the largest gas condensate field, is on with gas pipelines going to Europe through Iraq and Syria and to India and Pakistan. No doubt the Western sanctions damage the economy to some extent spurring the Tehran’s shift to its neighbors and the Far East and meeting the long-term interests of the West after all. 

Whoever wins the election, the policy aimed at Iran becoming an independent and important regional and world politics actor is irreversible. Sometimes Ahmadinejad appeared to be satisfied with the role of troublemaker. Still a new Iranian leader will not be a better interlocutor for the West. Moreover, bringing more authority to the Iranian leadership will only hamper the policy of keeping Iran isolated on the world scene. Having that in mind, the United States rushed to announce the would-be election «undemocratic». But there is no doubt; the White House will have to start a dialogue with the new host of the Tehran’s presidential palace. Iran’s international clout is on the rise. 

The meeting of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Egyptian counterpart Mohamed Morsi, the first ever meet between the highest officials of the two countries after a gap of 34 years, was one of the major focus of national and international media. Morsi gave a red carpet welcome to Ahmadinejad, and as the two leaders deliberated on various issues, the prospects of an emerging Islamic cordiality between Egypt and Iran appeared in sight. Morsi agreed with his Iranian counterpart that Syrian crisis can not continue unabated, and a peaceful solution must be sought at the right earnest. It may not appear a surprise if Morsi and Ahmadinejad jointly develop a solution format, commonly agreeable to Syrian government and the opposition. The leaders of Egypt, Iran and Turkey met on the sidelines of the summit and deliberated on the Syrian issue. While the states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey may not hesitate to adopt military means to topple the Assad regime, and states like Iran, Iraq and Lebanon may prefer a solution tilting in favour of the current regime, the OIC emerged as a balancer, advocating for peaceful engagement between the parties to the conflict. 

Another positive development worth noting is the appeal of the OIC to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to expedite the resolution process of the conflict. The summit urged the powerful international body to «assume its responsibilities to end the violence and bloodshed». The UNSC has so far failed to evolve a consensus on Syria. Russia and China have opposed any sanctions or military intervention in the country. They have vetoed three such proposals in this international body. The positive development is that Russian and the US diplomats and political leaders have met on many occasions at Geneva, Dublin and other places to evolve a common position. The United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has expressed keen interest for an expeditious resolution of the crisis. The UN and Arab envoys like Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi too played key roles in defusing tensions in Syria. Ban observed, «The Organization of Islamic Cooperation and United Nations have an important responsibility to address people’s aspirations, particularly by promoting democratization, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights, as well as socio-economic progress». He further stated, «I am encouraged that cooperation between our two organizations has significantly increased in the socio-economic and political fields, particularly in the area of conflict prevention and resolution». 

The offer of the Syrian National Council (SNC) leader, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib to Syrian Vice President, Faruq al-Sharaa may not be ruled out as a sham. Any proposal for dialogue needs to be welcomed in the present context. Reportedly, few days back the meeting of SNC with representatives of Russia and Iran in Germany led to the change of course of the opposition. Though the offer is with condition that the Syrian government must release prisoners, it can be considered as a move, howsoever fragile, by the opposition to talk to the Assad regime. Such a prospect was infeasible few months back. The Syrian government has not responded to this offer so far, but it can explore this opportunity or other avenues to engage the opposition by various peaceful means. The conflict is propitious for neither of the parties; hence an indigenous people-centric solution is an urgent task both for the Syrian government and the opposition. 

The call for dialogue and negotiation by the OIC summit will have also another positive byproduct. This call will discourage the extremist groups in Syria, supported by Al Qaeda, and strengthen the constituency of peace. The extremist groups camouflage as the indigenous people and foment religious extremism and terrorism in Syria. The OIC distancing itself from violence may weaken their ideological sustenance. As reports suggest, religious extremists from various parts of the world have gathered in Syria and join the rebel ranks to fight the Assad regime by exploiting sectarian fault lines. It is not to argue here that there is no popular frustration against the Assad regime, but the joining of these extremist elements in the ranks of rebels have not only changed the character of the movement but also contributed to violence and consequent loss of lives. The killing of Tunisian opposition leader, Shokri Belaid considered to be secularist, supposedly by the extremists on the eve of the summit indicates that the Arab Spring might have empowered people, but it has also contributed to extremism at least in some parts of the Arab world. 

The OIC has sent a clear message that the conflict in Syria can not continue for long. Now the question arises: how to deal with this conflict, which has been made complicated with passing months. The OIC may play an active role to distance the conflict from any ethnic or sectarian tangle, and mediate between the conflicting parties as an honest broker for peace, stability and development in the Arab world. 

On December 8, the Univision Spanish-language channel bestowed on its audiences revelations about alleged Iranian and Venezuelan plans for a massive cyber-attack against the United States from Mexico in a documentary titled “The Iranian Threat”. According to the authors of the piece, the list of targets comprised the White House, the Pentagon, and the FBI, and the consequences could surpass in severity those of the September 11 terrorist acts. The documentary placed Venezuela’s consul general in Miami Livia Acosta Noguera at the center of the conspiracy – supposedly, she had regular conversations with student hackers from Mexico's National Autonomous University, probing into their ability to steal confidential materials, and the kids offered their services to Cuban and Iranian diplomats. Diplomats do know very well that the National Autonomous University tends to be the scene of strenuous CIA recruiting activity, and the US intelligence community had to scrap the whole operation when one of the hackers was unmasked during a trip to Iran. 

Acosta took the position in Miami in March, 2011 to be declared non grata in ten months without being confronted with any formal charges. Simply, Washington urgently needed a sensation to counter the success scored by Ahmadinejad during the Latin American tour, and the scandal over alleged cyber-attacks which culminated in the deportation of Acosta was all the US could come up with absent anything real. In the aftermath, Chavez remarked ironically that the sheer number of charges leveled at Acosta undermined the credibility of the case, but also said that in fact the accusations came from the Miami-based ultra-right and taking her back to Caracas became expedient for the woman's safety. 

Andrés Oppenheimer, an Argentinian-born politics watcher based in the US, is a serial manufacturer of publications targeting Ahmadinejad whom he ordinarily refers to as a fascist dictator and a bloody tyrant. The definitions suit Oppenheimer's arch-conservative audience. In his January paper in ABS Digital, he stresses that the US Department of State considers two answers to the question about Ahmadinejad's Latin American agenda. The first one is that the “terrorist” regime boldly attempted to demonstrate its might in the proximity of the US, cooperates with Venezuela (and, possibly, with Ecuador) in mining Uranium to feed its nuclear program, and is cultivating a network of agents in the region to be ready to launch an attack against the US in case Washington and Tel Aviv do take to hammering Iran's nuclear facilities. The second one is that Ahmadinejad's visit to Latin America actually signaled the weakness of the increasingly isolated Iranian regime and that Ahmadinejad meant to convince his countrymen that he still has an iconic status in some parts of the world as a champion of resistance to the Empire. De facto relaying the position of the US Department of State and warning Latin American governments against welcoming Ahmadinejad, Oppenheimer argued that the Iranian leader brings to the region the conflicts in which its nations have no stake and invoked the blasts that shattered Jewish facilities in Argentine in the 1990ies. In conclusion, Oppenheimer quoted a US Department of State source as saying that the Iranian threat to the US national security in Latin America exists in a latent form. At least that must be true – throughout the tour, Ahmadinejad and his partners talked about the economy, politics, energy, etc. with no military planners in sight. 

So far Chavez avoided commenting on the West's likely oil embargo against Iran, but his past projections that the cost of crude would jump to $250 per barrel if developments around Iran take an abnormal turn hardly sank into oblivion.  Perhaps, what he meant was the situation where the US and Israel unleash a war against Iran and it mines the Hormuz Strait in response. The Iranian navy's recent maneuvers in the area showed that Tehran remains immune to threats, and the traffic via one of the world's key oil supply avenues will surely be blocked if a war breaks out. On the other hand, Chavez does not seem to believe in the reality of the scenario judging by the fact that he pledged to visit Tehran late in 2012, that is, after winning the presidential race in Venezuela. 

It did not evade watchers that both Ahmadinejad and those who received him in the ALBA bloc's capitals, including Havana, refrained from strongly worded anti-American statements. Summarizing his talks with the Castro brothers, Ahmadiejad said Iran and its Latin American friends had a common front in the struggle for the rights of peoples, shared views and positions, and will always stay together. Greeting the Iranian leader in Managua, D. Ortega whose second presidential term began a couple of days ago expressed support for Iran's right to nuclear energy and called nuclear-armed countries, Israel among them, to get rid of their arsenals. In Ecuador, R. Correa stressed that nobody would be allowed to tell his sovereign country whom to be friends with – Ecuador would at all times be strengthening ties with the countries open to cooperation with it based on the principles of national dignity and mutual respect. 

While the US domestic anti-Iranian sensations evoke little trust if any, the efficiency of the struggle waged by Iran's security forces against the agents of the CIA, Mossad, and other Western intelligence agencies appears to be steadily growing. Under the current circumstances, Tehran simply has no choice but to focus on counter-espionage as Iranian nuclear scientists and military officers routinely get killed by magnetic bombs or sniper shots, the country's air space is invaded by drones spotting targets for future missile attacks, and, by all indications, an imperialist aggression is drawing closer. Reports of enemy agents' networks being discovered are released in Iran on a regular basis, with at least 30 CIA agents apprehended in 2011. US citizen Amir Mirza Hekmati, 28, was the last in the list – he returned to his homeland with the stated goal of seeing his relatives but was taken into custody after it transpired he was collecting data on the Iranian armed forces. As the investigation was unfolding, Hekmati admitted to spying for the CIA and to having been trained at the US Air Force base in Bagram (Afghanistan) and is sentenced to death by the Iranian court. 

The propaganda onslaught on Iran is gaining momentum. The country's Islamic regime is being demonized by the pro-US media and the Zionist influencers who, it must be noted, are in the position of dominance in the post-Soviet space. Consequently, the progressive analysts are right when they hold that, by launching the Latin American tour, Ahmadinejad broke the US diplomatic blockade and dealt a heavy blow to the Zionist smear campaign.