Today the three dominant groups – Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds – have failed to reach agreements which would establish peace in Iraq and let it remain one state. 

On June 28, 2004 the interim coalition administration transferred the power to the national government formed with the participation of the three major ethnic and religious groups. In the fall of 2006 the Iraqi parliament approved the bill on federal structure of the country making legal the establishment of autonomous regions. The autonomous Kurdistan region is the story of success. It sets the example for the Shiites who demand the autonomy status for the regions with predominant Shiite population in the south of Iraq with the parliaments enjoying independence from the central legislative body, their own self-rule executive bodies and power agencies. The Sunnis oppose the federation which may put an end to their control over the oil revenues and the larger part of national economy. 

Thus, the choice was made in favor of proportional representation in the government structures along ethnic – religious lines like it is done in Lebanon. The pattern has failed. The ongoing aggravation of the situation is the direct result of the policy the Iraqi government has pursued during the last three years. As soon as the US troops left in 2011, Nouri al-Maliki launched purges in the government squeezing Sunnis out. Now Shiites dominate power agencies, while the Sunnis are discriminated against and even repressed. The refusal to adhere to the principle of equal ethnic representation has brought the country to the brink of civil war provoking the Sunnis into joining the terrorist underground. Regional and outside forces’ interference into Iraqi internal affairs pours fuel on the country’s destabilization process. 

The United States intervened in 2003. According to its plans, the country was to become an obstacle on the way of spreading the Iran’s influence in the Arab world or even, if need be, a springboard for attacking Iran. At that, the control over the territory failed to become the control over the country as a whole, Iran used the US foreign policy blunders to its advantage. Today Tehran and Bagdad manage to find a common language leaving the existing contradictions behind. Led by the Shiite community, Iraq orients its foreign policy on Iran. Its stand on Syria is a good example. 

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have traditionally treated Shiites as their enemies. The both try to do their best to create chaos in Iraq. The interests of international terrorism under the banner of Islam and local Sunni leaders, the yesterday’s opponents of Saddam Hussein, coincide; the money flows from Saudi Arabia made thousands of young Sunnis join the fight under the liberation slogans. As a result, a huge region has plunged into violence while Iraq has been becoming more like a battlefield for Saudi Arabia fighting Iran. Foreign jihadists flew into Syria, Lebanon is on the verge of collapse, Iraq is on the brink of civil war, the Taliban is opposing the Iran’s influence in Afghanistan, while anti-Shiite actions have become routine in Pakistan with the death toll of 600 Shiites in 2013. The Sunni jihadists go on a rampage everywhere the Shiites are a minority, be it Kuwait, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. Iraq is not the only country threatened by Islam religious strife. The conflict between Sunnis and Shiites is a strategic absurd – the war without winners. The United States is responsible for inciting the conflict. Its interventions in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq, tipped the delicate balance of forces and provoked the regional competition between Riyadh and Tehran, which strives for dominance in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has nothing but sand and oil, it imports foodstuffs and water, its chances to win in the fight against Iran are negligibly small… The only thing Iran lacks is Saudi style of Wahhabism, which has provoked a wave of anti-Shiite sentiments in the Middle East and created a global net of multiple Islamic groups united under the Al Qaeda’s brand. 

Washington has never stood in the way of Saudi Arabia; it shows no haste to prevent the civil war in Iraq. US State Secretary John Kerry emphasized that the Unites States would not aid Iraq. 

Iran offers support to Iraq in its fight against Al Qaeda. Iran's deputy chief of staff General Mohammad Hejazi has said the Islamic Republic was prepared to provide military equipment and advice to Iraq to help it battle Al-Qaeda. «If the Iraqis ask, we will supply them with equipment and advice, but they have no need of manpower». He said there had not been any request from Iraq to «carry out joint operations against the terrorists». As yet Iraq has not approached Tehran with a request to launch a joint operation against jihadists; the contacts have been limited by logistical support and consultations. Iran realizes that bringing Iranian troops into Iraq would inevitably lead to a new escalation of tension in the Middle East. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, believes the hostility between the two major branches of Islam – the Sunni and Shia – poses a major threat to global security. He has a reason. Assuming the G8 presidency in 2014 Russia offers to put the fight against terrorism and radical Islam at the top of the G8 agenda being worked out for this year. 

As the US Marine Corps announced a ceasefire and withdrew in May 2004, mosques proclaimed the victory of insurgents and Fallujah’s transformation began as a sort of Islamic mini-state with Sharia law. So, in the fall of that year, in late October, the US military returned with another major offensive with aerial attacks and precision-guided missiles followed by a full-blooded assault by the Marines backed by artillery and armor in early November – Operation Phantom Fury. 

This is how CNN’s Karl Penhaul reported on November 9: «The sky over Fallujah seems to explode as U.S. Marines launch their much-trumpeted ground assault. War planes drop cluster bombs on insurgent positions and artillery batteries fire smoke rounds to conceal a Marine advance». According to Washington Post, white phosphorous grenades and artillery shells were used to create «walls of fire» in the city. Doctors later reported seeing melted corpses. No one knows the casualty figures; as of November 18 US military claimed 1200 ‘insurgents’ had been killed and 1000 captured… 

A Guardian report said over 70 percent of the city’s homes were destroyed along with sixty schools and sixty-five mosques and shrines. There has been anecdotal evidence of large increases in cancer, infant mortality, etc. among the survivors, triggering speculation that there was use of depleted uranium leading to environmental contamination. 

It is extremely important to recollect the horrendous living memory of Fallujah to understand what happened last week when the centre of the city fell into the hands of fighters from the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State in Iraq and Levant [ISIL]. Fallujah, along with the capital of Anbar province, Ramadi, was a stronghold of Sunni insurgents during the US occupation of Iraq and al-Qaeda militants largely took over both cities last week. Hundreds of ISIL fighters have entered Fallujah. 

Pundits have begun analyzing the factors behind. The dominant narrative is that the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki failed to reach out to the Sunnis and alienating them during the period since the US troops pulled out in 2011. Indeed, the latest flare-up happened after Maliki dispatched troops last week to break up an year-old Sunni protest in Ramadi to voice their grievances of political exclusion. Almost all Sunnis have turned against the government and are opposed to the Iraqi security forces, although not all have aligned themselves with the ISIL. 

Meanwhile, the turmoil in Syria in which ISIL is playing a lead role has compounded the security situation in Iraq. The ISIL has been targeting Shi’ites, which at once gives the conflict in Anbar a sectarian overtone. Also, Iraq is heading for parliamentary poll in April and there are conspiracy theories that Maliki is calibrating a confrontation with Sunnis and raising the spectre of the al-Qaeda threat that might help him rally the Shi’ite opinion to support his re-election. 

However, Maliki’s decisions are also prompted by the real fear that his Shi’ite-led government is besieged and faces the threat of being overrun Sunnis. To say he contrived the al-Qaeda takeover in Fallujah stretches credulity. The ISIL comprises hardened fighters coming in from Syria where the US’ regional allies in the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, have been inducting foreign fighters and supporting them financially and with weapons. Also to be factored in is the so-called Sahwa, the Awakening, which the US created as surrogate force to fight the al-Qaeda and was abandoned when the American troops withdrew in 2011. Most of its leaders have been assassinated. 

Suffice to say, in terms of political morality or strategy, the Barack Obama administration cannot wash its hands off the emergent situation in Fallujah. The blame for the Iraq’s unraveling as a nation should lie with the George W. Bush presidency. Bush’s forecast of ‘mission accomplished’ in Iraq and Gen. David Petraeus’ brag about the Awakening sound hollow today. 

To be sure, how Obama responds to the situation in Fallujah has wider implications for the US’ regional strategies. Secretary of State John Kerry said, «We’re not contemplating putting boots on the ground. This is their [Iraqis’] fight, but we’re going to help them in their fight». 

The White House spokesman Jay Carney said Washington is «accelerating» its deliveries of military equipment to Iraq and «looking to provide an additional shipment of Hellfire missiles» in the coming months as well as ten surveillance drones in the coming weeks and another 48 later this year. Carney added that Washington is «working closely with the Iraqis to develop a holistic strategy to isolate the al-Qaeda-affiliated groups», but ultimately Iraq must handle the conflict itself. 

The point is, US fought ferociously in 2004 to keep al-Qaeda out of Fallujah and now they’ve returned and may create a base there and this is every bit the US’ fight and Maliki government is a quasi-ally of Washington. The US’ interests in the region will be seriously hurt if al-Qaeda establishes another foothold in the region. And, of course, the whole region is watching Washington’s grit to take on al-Qaeda. 

The Republican hawks like Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham blame Obama for the situation insofar as he didn’t try hard enough to reach an agreement with Maliki to keep US troops in Iraq beyond 2011. However, the criticism won’t gain traction as the domestic attitudes in the US favor the idea that despite the upheaval in the Middle East, the US will do well to seek a diplomatic and political engagement with the region rather than a military settlement. 

The choices that lie ahead for Obama can be viewed from three perspectives. First, the Fallujah situation sails into view at an awkward time – when the Obama administration proposes to maintain anywhere around ten to twelve thousand US troops in Afghanistan. That plan lacks support within the US and the Fallujah situation is a timely warning about the dangers of maintaining a large residual force in Afghanistan. 

Second, Fallujah highlights that the wars in Syria and Iraq and the dangerous slide in Lebanon have morphed. At the same time, Fallujah is not an al-Qaeda problem alone. It is a city that became irreconcilably alienated in the brutal violence of US occupation and it no longer feels it’s a part of Iraq. Thus, Fallujah calls attention to a far more fundamental question regarding the future of Iraq itself. This, again, holds some stark lessons for Afghanistan where too the US occupation hastened the fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines. A response to the crisis by accelerating weapons deliveries to the Iraqi government will not solve the problem and may even make it worse. 

A third stunning aspect is that the Fallujah situation finds the US and Iran on the same side. Their respective interests in Iraq vary but they share the profound concern that an international movement of Sunni fighters fired by Wahhabi ideology is raising the black flag of al-Qaeda along sectarian fault lines. Neither is willing to intervene and Tehran too promises military aid but shows reluctance to put ‘boots on the ground’. 

The Obama administration could be edging close to acknowledging Iran’s influence on regional issues – Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen – and this hastens regional realignments. Saudi Arabia accuses the Obama administration of strengthening Iran’s regional at the expense of Washington’s traditional allies and also alleges that Tehran is pursuing a clever strategy to undermine the US-Saudi alliance. 

Indeed, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said at a meeting with a visiting delegation of Italian lawmakers on Sunday in Tehran that the spread of radicalism in the Middle East would pose unpredictable threats to other parts of the world as well unless countered through effective international cooperation. The Intelligence Minister Seyed Mahmoud Alavi claimed that the western powers realize that international cooperation is needed to counter the «threat of terrorism by Takfiri groups». 

Significantly, a bipartisan a group of influential figures in the US foreign policy establishment addressed a letter to the US Senate on Monday urging that no new sanctions be passed against Iran, warning that it would potentially move the US closer to war. Ryan Crocker who was a former ambassador to Iraq, led the initiative.

In late 2011, when the last American combat troops left Iraq and the 7-year occupation ended, Baghdad many times declared its readiness to take over the administration of the country and ensure its forward development. In practice, Prime Minister al-Maliki began by quickly and energetically concentrating all power in his own hands and essentially deciding who to punish and who to pardon at his sole discretion. The head of the cabinet of ministers began purging undesirables and those who simply disagreed from the state machinery, without any particular concern for whether there was any basis for it and without scruples over his choice of means. The opposition (and others as well) had many grounds for accusing the head of the cabinet of dictatorial ambitions. 

Following the example of the representatives of the Western coalition, which declared anyone who opposed the occupation a criminal and a terrorist, al-Maliki started accusing everyone who disagreed with his actions of terrorism and collusion with al-Qaeda. The law on fighting terrorism gave intelligence and law enforcement agencies broad powers, including the right to arrest people and hold them in detention without trial solely on suspicion of «antigovernment activities» or, for example, in connection with longtime membership in the now-banned Ba'ath party (although the former ruling party had members from all levels and confessions of Iraqi society). On the basis of this law the courts hand down death sentences, which are then carried out; for example, on August 19, 2013 the most recent batch of 17 «enemies of the people» were executed, including two women… 

In December 2011 the highest-ranking Sunni at the time, vice president Tariq al-Hashimi, was accused of serious crimes (terrorism, complicity in murder, etc.) and was forced to flee first to Iraqi Kurdistan, then abroad. He was tried in absentia and sentenced to death by hanging on September 9, 2012. But it seemed that was not enough, and on November 1 the criminal court in Baghdad pronounced a second in absentia death sentence against al-Hashimi…

The highest official, the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, was first deprived of many powers which usually belong to a head of state; suffice it to say that the Commander in Chief of the country's armed forces is the prime minister. However, President Talabani tried to take a stand, and disagreements arose immediately between him and al-Maliki. The president refused to sign the death sentence of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tarek Aziz, tried to overrule the prime minister's decision to include the disputed Kirkuk province in the area of responsibility of the Tigris command center, etc. On December 18, 2012 the Iraqi federal media reported the death of the country's president. Only two days later did it become known that Jalal Talabani was alive, but had suffered a stroke and was undergoing treatment in Germany. After that his name was not mentioned in the central Iraqi press, and it was only six months later that the Iranian news agency FARS reported that the 79-year-old president of Iraq had «returned to life after being in a coma for several months.» There was no official confirmation of this from Baghdad, nor have there been any new reports or comments since. And this is regarding the country's president!

Since late 2012 the activities of the parliament have been practically paralyzed (over a third of the representatives are boycotting sessions). But the executive branch gets along just fine without the legislators; in some sense it's even an advantage. As for the judicial branch and the media, they are under the strict control of the head of government's office, and no one has any illusions on that count. 

In December 2012 in the Anbar Province, which is populated mostly by Sunnis, mass protests against political persecutions and reprisals against dissidents began. Sit-ins continue to this day, and there is no hint that the crisis is being settled. On the contrary, while in early 2013 the prime minister made some concessions (he gave orders to release women who had been in prison for a long time with no accusations made and to investigate information about violence by prison wardens, etc.), soon it became clear to everyone that al-Maliki had chosen the path of unyielding confrontation. Sunni protestors, meanwhile, have received support for their demands not only from their fellow tribesmen living in other provinces of the country, but from Kurds and even Shias in southern Iraq. The demonstrations have taken hold of other regions, including the third largest city, Mosul. Protestor tent camps have appeared in the Kirkuk province, which itself (or rather, the gas and oil fields there) is the object of fierce disagreements between Baghdad and the Kurdish autonomous region as well.

The central authorities started to get nervous, and on April 23, 2013 and order was given to disperse the tent camp in al-Hawija, a small town near Kirkuk. The army and police used weapons, and over 150 people were killed and dozens were injured. In response, on April 24 armed groups seized the city of Sulaiman Bek in the Salah ad-Din province, which neighbors Kirkuk. Government forces were able to regain control of the city just three days later; military helicopters, artillery and heavy armored vehicles were used in the operation 

The results of the municipal elections testified to a drop in the authority of the central authorities and growing discontent with it among the majority of the country's population. In April 2013 the State of Law Coalition, headed by al-Maliki, lost gubernatorial posts in such key provinces as Baghdad and Basra (and the new governors are people who are close to Islamists). It is worth noting that elections were held in only 12 out of the 18 provinces of Iraq; in another three the elections were postponed from April until June, and the three provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan demonstratively refused the proposed date in order to emphasize their special status. 

Many very serious unresolved political and economic problems have built up in the relations between Baghdad and Arbil (the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan): the status of the autonomous territory, which is not fixed in the constitution; disputed territories; the procedure for developing oil and gas fields; the status of the Peshmerga Kurdish military formations; etc. The three northern provinces of the country are de facto no longer under the control of the central government and conduct their own policy, the main goal of which is to declare an independent state. 

On September 15, 2013, the first national conference of Kurds in history will open, with delegations from Iran, Turkey, Syria and Armenia; it is expected that at the conference a declaration will be made about the indivisible Kurdish nation and the issue of creating a united «sovereign state of Kurdistan» will be raised. On August 10 the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani, touching on the situation in Syria, in the north of which clashes between Islamist fighters and Kurds continue, stated, «If it turns out that innocent Kurdish citizens, women and children are threatened by death and terrorism, Iraqi Kurdistan will be prepared to defend them.» 

A side note: According to UN figures, there are already over 180,000 refugees from Syria in Iraq, mostly elderly people, women and children, and this stream is growing every day. If strikes are made against Syria and a total massacre follows, it is to Iraq that the main stream of refugees will go, as around 1.8 million people from Syria have already found refuge in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and these countries' capacity to take them in has been exhausted. Iraq does not have the conditions to take them in and house them either (which is why there have been relatively few of them), and furthermore, there are almost 1.7 million «internal refugees» (or forced migrants) in Iraq, but the Syrians will have no other choice. This will further exacerbate the situation in Iraq. 

On September 21, by the decision of the president and government of the region, parliamentary and presidential elections are to be held in Iraqi Kurdistan in which a new Constitution for the region is expected to be passed; the Kurdistani leadership sees this as an important step in the advancement of the idea of independence. The supreme electoral commission in Baghdad demanded that the elections be postponed to November 21 in order to hold them at the same time as the elections to the provincial councils. It is unlikely, however, that the Kurdish authorities will abandon their plans, especially since President of Iraqi Kurdistan Massoud Barzani plans to run for a third term.

Such political decisiveness has a solid economic basis; in September 2013 the commissioning of an oil export pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan into neighboring Turkey with a capacity of 1 million barrels a day is planned (currently exports are around 30,000 barrels a day, which are transported by truck).

Consulates General of many countries have been opened in Arbil, foreign companies and banks are operating, a favorable investment climate has been created in Iraqi Kurdistan, security has been established and there are understandable rules of the game which do not change sporadically and unilaterally. As for the rest of Iraq, only oil extractions sites have been restored and are in active operation; practically the entire volume of oil extracted is exported, forming the main source of currency earnings (over 94 billion dollars in 2012). However, there is an acute shortage of diesel fuel on the domestic market, and there are periodic «gas crises»; the capacities of the local refineries is insufficient, and petroleum products are purchased in neighboring Iran and a few other countries. Iran supplies gas, electricity, many basic consumer goods, automobiles and motorcycles, etc.

The obvious inability of the central government to dramatically improve the situation is causing oil-rich provinces to seek their own ways of resolving problems, stimulating decentralization. In August 2013 the council of the Wasit Province began considering the possibility of creating an oil company which would be independent of the Midland Oil Company and would be responsible for developing the oil industry in Ahdab and Badra. Oil extraction in the province has exceeded 100,000 barrels a day, and the fight to control the revenues is gathering momentum. A similar «local» company was formed earlier by the government of the Maysan province, and this experience is now being studied attentively. The government of another province neighboring the Maysan province, Basra, has already repeatedly expressed its extreme displeasure at the unfair distribution of revenue from oil exports (only one dollar per barrel of oil sold is allocated to the province from Baghdad) and hinted transparently that if the situation does not change a Confederation of Southern Iraq may be created, and then they would decide for themselves how much money to leave for development in the region and how much to allocate to Baghdad. Baghdad sensed that such intentions are not a bluff, and in early August the Iraqi parliament passed an amendment to the law «On the Powers of the Provinces» giving local governments the right to somewhat increase allocations to local budgets from the revenues received from oil extraction by foreign operators. 

One of the main reasons for the catastrophic state of the economy (and other areas) is believed to be embezzlement, which encompasses all levels of authority and has become almost a norm. According to a study by Transparency International, since 2003 Iraq has constantly been among the ten most corrupt states in the world. According to data from the parliamentary anti-corruption commission, in the period from 2003 through 2009 embezzlement of state funds amounted to 139 billion dollars. Since then the situation has taken on a more threatening scale, but the measures being taken are clearly inadequate; the abovementioned commission is physically unable to manage the «epidemic of corruption» (16860 cases were examined in 2011 alone), and its powers are substantially limited. In all, in the course of several years dozens of high-ranking officials (including six ministers) have fled the country, obviously not empty-handed; the losses to the treasury are estimated at 195 billion dollars.

Besides the problems described above, there is one more which is of literally vital importance to the country's citizens: security. While in 2011 4,147 people in Iraq were killed as a result of terrorist attacks, since the beginning of 2013 over 5,600 people have already been killed, more than in all of 2012 (4574); this is the highest figure since 2008. Since April – May 2013, every week there have been no less than 200 acts of terrorism and armed attacks, with numerous victims… 

Escalation of violence has overtaken most of the country's provinces, and while previously terrorist attacks targeted mostly crowds near mosques, hospitals, at markets, etc. and the attacks were made, as the saying goes, on the sly (homemade explosive devices, car bombs with timers or remote detonators, more rarely suicide bombers or killings from weapons with silencers) this year both the scale and the nature of the attacks have changed.

Attacks on oil industry sites have abruptly become more frequent; since the beginning of the year export of oil via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline has been disrupted over 30 times as a result of bombings; pumping stations and convoys of tanker trucks have been attacked; and on August 17 a terrorist attack took place at the strategically important port of Umm Qasr when a powerful explosive device (according to expert estimates, over 250 kg) planted in the fuel tanks of a trailer detonated. 

Army and police checkpoints, military convoys, garrisons and well-fortified strongholds are more and more frequently the object of attacks. On July 23 armed attacks were made on two prisons (in Abu Ghraib and in Taji, a suburb of Baghdad), as a result of which over 1000 prisoners escaped. In some regions of the country genuine battles are taking place; since the beginning of the year over 400 members of federal military and law enforcement agencies have been killed, and over 1200 have been wounded.

Among «priority targets» are preeminent political and religious figures, officials of various rank, and army, police and intelligence officers. No one can be certain of his own safety, even well-guarded persons. For example, on August 8 Lieutenant General Hasan Karim Hudeir, the commander of the new operative command center al-Jazira, was shot to death by one of his own guards. In mid-August under the guise of «obtaining information on planned attempts on the prime minister and the seizure of parliament» almost all army and intelligence divisions in a specially guarded «green zone» were replaced. During an inspection trip to a «palace» military unit which had been deployed near Baghdad, the personal guard of the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi armed forces Nouri al-Maliki consisted of a dozen foreign mercenaries…

In Baghdad they do not trust even the highest army and police officers, and personnel «purges» and chaotic appointments take place periodically. On July 31, 2013 the commander of a group of troops in the Anbar province, Major General M. al-Mahlawi, was removed from his post with the explanation «for noncompliance with orders to detain people accused of terrorist attacks. In late August it was announced that there would be large-scale changes in the leadership of military and law enforcement structures, including the return of previously dismissed generals and senior officers to the ranks of the armed forces and police . Constant movement of troops and police forces from one place to another testifies to the fact that the federal authorities are not in control of the situation, and the number of «trouble spots» is constantly growing. In Baghdad they see a lack of military equipment and an insufficient level of training among military and law enforcement personnel as the reason.

In July 2013 the Iraqi Ministry of Defense placed several more orders with the U.S. for deliveries of weapons and military equipment. On the list are 50 Striker armored vehicles, 12 Bell 412EP utility helicopters, etc., as well as spare parts and technical service for previously delivered armored vehicles, including M113 armored vehicles and HMMWV armored transport vehicles, for a total of 4.3 billion dollars. Over the past several years Iraq has purchased 12 billion dollars’ worth of military equipment from the U.S., and another almost two billion were spent on training programs conducted under the leadership of American advisors and instructors.

On August 15 the fourth session of the joint coordinated committee on strategic partnership between the U.S. and Iraq, created in 2008, was held in Washington. The delegations, headed by Secretary of State J. Kerry and Iraqi Foreign Minister H. Zibari, discussed the situation in the region, the Syrian crisis, and questions of macroeconomics and energy diplomacy, focusing the greatest attention on the necessity of «providing uninterrupted supplies of Iraqi energy resources to the international market». This brief phrase is the most meaningful of all.

The Syrian crisis has metastasized to Iraq. The part of the country which remains after the de facto separation of Iraqi Kurdistan is on the brink of civil war. Its result is completely predictable: division into Sunnite and Shiite areas, blood, chaos, instability and «wild lands» in which extremists will «frolic».

The statement made by Martin Dempsey in early July just added fuel to the fire. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the U.S. is prepared to increase the amount of military assistance (and the number of advisors) to Lebanon and Iraq. It is worth noting that this readiness is motivated by «the return of al-Qaeda». Baghdad, to the surprise and dismay of Tehran, was very well-disposed to this initiative; the media advisor to the prime minister, Ali al-Mussawi, stated practically the next day that Iraq «will welcome an increase in the amount of military assistance from the U.S».

Incidentally, either of the two possibilities, civil war or the expansion of American military presence in Iraq, will be unacceptable for Tehran. In either of these possibilities it loses its «corridor» to Syria, which in turn will give the anti-Syrian coalition, which is currently experiencing hard times that look more like death throes, its second wind.

The strategic partnership which arose between Baghdad and Tehran in 2008 was Ahmadinejad's accomplishment. That is why it is completely logical that it is he who flew to Baghdad at Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's critical moment; during Ahmadinejad's presidential term Iran spent a considerable amount of political and financial resources on supporting him.

Ahmadinejad's visit to Baghdad in 2008 was justly assessed by many experts as a serious diplomatic victory of the Islamic Republic. During the visit of the Iranian party they were able to convince Baghdad that collaboration with Tehran would give it a guarantee of security and stable development, which was completely fair considering the influence Iran had on a great number of Shiite organizations. Incidentally, not all Iraqi Shiites approved of the rapprochement with Iran, and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani even refused to meet with Ahmadinejad, as he was unable to forget the support the Iranian president gave his «competitor», Muktada al-Sadr. But such «trivial matters» didn't bother Iranian leadership too much when they placed their bets on al-Maliki and openly pressured pro-Iranian organizations (for example, the supporters of al-Sadr) when al-Maliki needed support.

The importance of the strategic partnership with Iraq required certain sacrifices, and not only financial ones. Iran's financial expenses paid off in spades; trade volume between the two countries showed astounding growth (according to various figures the trade volume was between 7 and 12 billion dollars). In conditions of a constant «sanctions war», , Iraq became a real «breathing hole» for Iran; the Iranian goods supplied to Iraq were then sold throughout the Middle East, providing Iran's economy with an influx of finances and Iraqi traders with stable profits from their intermediary services.

With the help of Iraqi business, Iran was even able to tap into the international financial system, which infuriated U.S. financial intelligence agents. For example, in October 2010 American experts established that the purpose of opening two private Iranian banks in Iraq was to service international financial transaction from Iran. And one of these financial institutions turned out to be connected with the state bank Melli, which was under the strictest of sanctions. In addition, various companies in Iraq and Turkey served as loopholes in the sanction regime through which Iran obtained technologies for the needs of its own economy.

From a financial and economic point of view, the partnership was more than profitable for both parties; in the political sphere, however, negative feelings started to build up. It is difficult to say whether Tehran understood that al-Maliki was not at all pro-Iranian. Most likely they recognized this circumstance perfectly well. There was no secret about it. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad (the first Muslim to have a successful career in a U.S. diplomatic agency), who exerted himself greatly to support the political career of the current Iraqi leader, accurately described al-Maliki as a person who is «not dependent on Iran and positions himself as an Arab nationalist. His collaboration with Iran was always dictated first and foremost by the political interests of part of the Iraqi elite, and only then by some kind of «ideas».

But such a system suited Tehran perfectly, as al-Maliki professed the principle of «equidistance» with regard to the U.S. as well, stating during a visit to Washington: «I consider myself a friend of the U.S., but I am not America's man in Iraq». Furthermore, as the leader of the Dawa party, he was the image of the representative of a Shiite Islamic party, which fit in well with the concept of «Islamic awakening in the Shiite crescent proclaimed by Tehran. The only thing Iranian officials allowed themselves to do is restrain al-Maliki from responding with massive repressions to any protests against his party or him personally.

Thanks to his own political talent and astounding political self-preservation instinct, al-Maliki managed to be seen as «one of ours» both in Tehran and in Washington.

However, it proved impossible to maintain such a balance after the beginning of the Syrian conflict. Tehran's economic interest in the partnership with Baghdad was further increased by the fact that Iraq was a corridor for delivering Iranian equipment to Syria; it was an important channel via which Tehran shows support to Bashar al-Asad and the Syrian Arab Republic which was fending off the aggression of Salafi jihadists. Furthermore, since the end of last year Iraqi Shiite volunteers have begun to take fairly active part in military actions in Syria on the side of the government forces.

The situation was further complicated by the link between former members of the overthrown Ba'ath Party with Sunnite radicals in Iraq. And soon Saudi Arabia, which has been part of all violence in the Greater Middle East since the days of the USSR's Afghan campaign, got actively involved in stirring up internal conflict in Iraq.

It must be said that the Saudis' activities in Iraq had a quite understandable explanation. In the opinion of King Abdullah expressed in 2009, Maliki is an «Iranian agent» and his governance «opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq». Considering Saudi «Iranophobia», this statement was tantamount to declaring al-Maliki persona non grata. And while no direct proof has been found, in expert circles there exists the belief that the Saudis, mediated by the representatives of the U.S. Republican Party, paid off a long-term contract with the company Barbour, Griffith and Rogers in August 2007 for conducting an informational war against al-Maliki and his party.

By this summer a situation had formed where the interests of the anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian coalitions (while outwardly similar, there are still differences in their configurations, so it makes sense to speak of them as different groups) interlock on Iraq. The Sunnite opposition in Iraq, besides having joined with the Ba'athists – , also received armed reinforcements from Islamists who were broken in in fighting in Syria and dream of settling accounts with the Shiites on Iraqi territory as well. Behind protests in the regions where Sunnite Arabs live stands “al-Qaeda in Iraq». Basically, a certain part of the Iraqi Sunnite opposition is already under the control of Islamist extremists, and the demands of this opposition are becoming tougher and more unachievable every day. The plan of this coalition, in which Salafis, Ba'athists and outright terrorists have come together like a nest of serpents, is also becoming clear – either to remove al-Maliki (and all Shiites) from power, which is not realistic, or civil war and the division of Iraq into Sunnite and Shiite parts in a state of permanent war among themselves.

In the face of such a powerful coalition, al-Maliki has seriously begun to think about the possibility of Iran giving him serious support. Naturally, neither the removal of the current government nor the division of Iraq could please Tehran; either of these cases would be a strategic defeat, and the outcome of the Syrian conflict would once again be hanging by a thread. But at the same time, Tehran, tied up with the conflict in Syria (and Ahmadinejad has been criticized many times in the Islamic Republic for getting too involved in this conflict )and, to put it mildly, limited in its capabilities due to the difficult economic situation, is unlikely to be able to hold the «Iraqi front» as well.

An indirect confirmation of this is the constant calls from Iranian officials for al-Maliki and other Iraqi Shiite leaders, to show restraint and try to resolve the crisis using political methods.

It is worth noting that during a visit to Iraq in early April of this year, the Iranian Minister of Intelligence, met with Nouri al-Maliki and other high-ranking state leaders and offered Baghdad complete and comprehensive collaboration in the field of security. Judging by the fact that this offer did not meet with much understanding from the Iraqi leadership and was clearly let drop, one can assume that al-Maliki's team is inclined to place its hope for maintaining security in Washington. 

In connection with this, the exchange of statements during Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Baghdad is very much worth noting. «We are filled with determination to use all available methods to develop brotherly relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not see any limitations for the further expansion of our ties with Iraq,» stated the Iranian president, and received the following noncommittal answer: «Today Iraq has an open door policy, and we advocate the expansion of collaboration and relations with friendly countries with common historical and cultural traditions.»

Such restraint is very alarming for Tehran; it indicates the appearance of a real and very serious threat. And Ahmadinejad's visit to Baghdad two weeks before the end of his presidential term is a sign of the Iranian leadership's serious concern about the situation which has arisen literally over the past few months. And here individuals are not important, nor is division into «Rouhani's team» and «Ahmadinejad's team», the «former» and the «future». This is a challenge to the entire Islamic Republic of Iran, and in such situations the Iranian elite knows how to work around political differences.

But then, Kurdish national question is not a mere Iraqi matter, since only 4-5 million ethnic Kurds as such live inside the territorial boundaries of Iraq out of a total Kurdish population estimated variously at around 25 million, the bulk of whom live in the southeastern and eastern parts of Anatolia, and the rest in Iran or Syria. 

Apart from the emergence of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, the civil war in Syria is also undermining Iraq’s unity as the balance of power between the Sunni and Shia communities begins to change. Patrick Cockburn, author and longtime observer of Iraqi politics, wrote recently in Britain’s Independent newspaper that the Sunni minority in Iraq, which has lost power in Baghdad and is increasingly embittered and angry at the discrimination against it by a hostile state, «is emboldened by the uprising of the Syrian Sunni, as well as growing sense that the political tide in the Middle East is turning against the Shia and in favor of the Sunni». 

Yet, neither the Shia religious authorities in Najaf – the Marji’yyah – nor the nationalist religious leader Muqtada al-Sadr wants the sectarian card to be played in Iraqi politics by appealing to Shia solidarity. Paradoxically, the Shias of southern Iraq have become stakeholders in upholding the banner of Iraqi nationalism today. All the same, the Sunni community in Iraq is largely united. The government in Baghdad alleges that the Sunni protests are orchestrated by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. There could be an element of truth here, but, equally, the bitterness among the Sunnis of Iraq over the discrimination runs deep. Thus, as Cockburn points out, the government in Baghdad led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki «has military superiority but not dominance in Iraq, fully controlling only about half the country. It has no authority in the Kurdistan Regional Government’s three provinces or in the Kurdish-held disputed territories further south. Its authority is contested in the Sunni majority provinces and cities in western and central Iraq». 

Meanwhile, enter Big Oil. The international oil companies have been migrating from southern Iraq to the northern Kurdistan region despite fierce opposition from Baghdad to the outside world’s direct dealings with the government in Erbil headed by Massoud Barzani. ExxonMobil (United States), Chevron (United States), British Petroleum (UK), Total (France), Gazprom Neft (Russia) – they are all in the game, taking advantage of the liberal terms offered by Barzani while granting exploration rights in Kurdistan’s fabulous oil reserves. However, the towering presence in Erbil today is of Turkey. Ankara and Erbil are apparently finalizing the construction of new oil and gas pipelines from Kurdistan to Turkish export terminals on the Mediterranean, bypassing Baghdad’s state pipeline network to Turkey. 

Turkey hopes to kill many birds with this single shot of the arrow from its bow.  Evidently, Turkey, which is a net importer of energy, hopes to cut down its heavy dependence on Russian and Iranian supplies by dipping into the Kurdistan’s massive reserves, while at the same time projecting itself as an «energy hub» linking the energy producing countries of the Middle East with the European market. In 2011 Turkey met 60% of its gas requirements through imports from Iran and around 20% from Russia. In addition, the United States Energy Information Administration estimates that Turkey has been importing about half of its crude oil from Iran. Ankara views this state of affairs as an unhealthy level of dependency on two countries with which Turkey’s relations have become problematic lately. Apart from the blatant Turkish interference in Syria, Ankara’s decision to deploy the US missile defence system has annoyed Moscow and Tehran. 

In political terms, Ankara is offering a vital lifeline to Kurdistan, which is land-locked and whose economic viability as a separate entity independent of Baghdad’s control depends solely on its access to the world energy market. But Turks seldom give away anything for the sake of mere friendship and goodwill. In this case, they expect a solid helping hand from Barzani to finesse the separatist Turkish Kurds who take shelter in his fiefdom of Kurdistan, and prompt them to come to the negotiating table. 

The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is making a renewed attempt to win Kurdish support for the constitutional changes his government is seeking. Erdogan is offering a measure of autonomy for the Kurds in lieu of their support for his main agenda, which is to create an executive presidency (which he himself probably covets). On Thursday, Erdogan approved a list of pro-Kurdish politicians to visit the militant leader Abdullah Ocalan who is interned in the Imrali Island near Istanbul. There is growing speculation that Erdogan is inching toward striking a deal with Ocalan. On the other hand, Ankara expects Barzani to coax the Syrian Kurds to rally behind with the opposition in Syria pressing for «regime change» in Damascus. 

But in Ankara’s estimation, the glue that really binds Barzani to it lies in the burgeoning business ties between Turkey and Kurdistan. Put differently, Ankara is offering to Erbil the honeypot of vastly increased revenues from oil exports through Turkey from northern Iraq and flourishing Turkish trade and investments in Kurdistan. The indications are that Kurdistan is inching toward replacing Germany as Turkey’s number one trading partner. More than 1000 Turkish companies are currently operating in Kurdistan. Clearly, Turkey hopes that in the fullness of time, its much bigger economy would integrate and assimilate Kurdistan. Thus, the earlier mood of angst in the Turkish mind about the emergence of Kurdistan in northern Iraq has given way to one of optimism about new opportunities for Turkish regional expansion. 

In terms of its regional agenda also, Ankara sees a convergence of interests with Kurdistan. Simply put, Turkish regional policies are increasingly feeding into the Shia-Sunni tensions fostered by Saudi Arabia and Qatar across the Middle East. Thus, Ankara openly encourages the Sunni Iraqi aspirations, which militate against the Shia empowerment in that country. Ankara’s refusal to extradite Tariq al-Hashemi, former Iraqi vice president who was charged with running death squads and sentenced to death in absentia in 2012 can be seen in this light. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has gone to the extent of alleging that Ankara has made a deal with Kurdistan «aimed at dividing Iraq».

To be sure, Iraq is also becoming a turf where Turkey’s rivalries with Iran are playing out and Ankara resents the Baghdad-Tehran axis supporting the Syrian regime. (On Tuesday Iraqi cabinet approved Tehran’s proposal to construct a 1500-kilometre natural gas pipeline connecting Iran’s giant South Pars fields to Syria and other export markets via Iraqi territory)…

Thus, Ankara estimates that in every sense it stands to gain from the weakening of Baghdad’s authority and effective control over the Iraqi territories. Baghdad has hit back by blocking the Turkish national energy firm TPAO from bidding for a lucrative oil exploration contract in southern Iraq but Ankara is undeterred. But Ankara has begun cutting its losses in an atrophied relationship with Baghdad. The Baghdad-controlled oil pipeline to Turkey is operating way below its capacity of 70 million tonnes annually. 

Significantly, the United States has distanced itself from the manner in which Ankara is pushing the envelope in Kurdistan. This was evident in the recent public warning administered to Ankara by the US ambassador Francis Ricciardone who waved the red flag at Turkey’s dalliance with Kurdistan. Ricciardone said, inter alia, «Turkey and Iraq have no choice but to pursue strong ties if they want to optimize the use of Iraq’s resources and export them via Turkey. If Turkey and Iraq fail to optimize their economic ties, the failure could be worse than that. There could be a more violent conflict in Iraq and [the chances of] disintegration of Iraq could be [strengthened]». He added ominously, «And that would not be good for Turkey, the United States, or anybody in the region». 

Of course, at the end of the day, the trust deficit between Barzani and Ankara, which is a legacy of the violent history of the region, cannot evaporate overnight. Also, Barzani is fighting for his turf, as new political forces are raising their head in the Kurdistan region and increasingly challenging his and his family’s leadership role. Ata any rate, his bonhomie with the Turks will not go down well with the Kurdish «peshmerga» and Barzani would know he is actually skating on thin ice. Moreover, the recent illness of Jalal Talabani (Iraqi president) also puts strains on the unity between the Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP] and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] and Turkish-Iranian rivalries could further fracture Kurdish unity. A period of intra-Kurdish violence seems to lie ahead. 

Barzani is not new to eddies of regional politics. He knows Bashar al-Assad is still ensconced in power and Erdogan’s doomsday predictions for the Syrian regime turned out to be vacuous posturing. The reluctance on the part of the Barack Obama administration to come to the aid of the Syrian rebels militarily is apparent to him. All factors taken into consideration, Barzani is savvy enough to realize the fallacy of keeping all his eggs in the Turkish basket.

The Minister of Finance has become the next target for Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s attacks (In Iraq such decisions are taken only upon his say-so, when he gives a direct order). It’s not because he is a Sunni, the matter is he got control of the documents that prove giant scale of corruption and open embezzlement of state funds by power structures, including the very top. Some of these papers were submitted to the parliamentary integrity commission. The cancelled arms deal with Russia played its part. The row sparked when Baghdad said the deal was to be reconsidered because of corruption involved (they mentioned the sum of $900 million dollars or a quarter of the deal). As a result of the special commission’s investigation State Minister Ali Mehdi Jawad Aldabbagh, who was close to Prime-Minister, had to retire (some sources say he had to quietly leave the country along with some other people who belonged to the “inner circle”). It damaged the Nouri Al-Maliki’s reputation, the man who is not accustomed to make excuses, even more admit guilt. The Prime Minister has got a lot to lose, so he took the initiative into his hands and launched the attack. True, the moment was outright disadvantageous: the conflict between Baghdad and Kurdistan’s local authorities exacerbated to the utmost by December 2012. It almost split over into full-scale combat. The matter is that the Al Maliki’s government took a decision to create the army operational Tigris command (named after the river) in Taamim Governorate (the Kurds call it Kirkuk and consider it to be their territory). The command was formed (on the basis of former Diyala command) and the military stated to patrol the disputed areas. The Kurds reaction was fast and tough – they put forward an ultimatum demanding troops withdrawal. And they refused to talk. The central government started to increase the force bringing in the reinforcements from the provinces of Diyala and Salah ad Din governorates and even from the capital (totally 10 brigades). In response the Kurds deployed a 15000 strong peshmerga formation with armor, field artillery and other heavy weapons. It went as far as hitting an Iraqi unmanned aerial vehicle and shooting at an Iraqi army helicopter. They said the chopper was involved in intelligence gathering. A number of times there was shooting on the ground (there were killed and wounded). The Tigris commander was assailed (a powerful explosion took place as his car was passing by, two body guards were killed, three more servicemen were wounded). The Kurds made it clear they would not tolerate pressure and were ready to fight. They refused the Baghdad’s offer to create coordination centers saying the “peshmerga” will not ever be under federal direct or indirect control of the federal powers. The sides hardly managed to agree on the troops pull out.

One thing should be noted, the formation of the Tigris command evoked a very negative reaction on the part of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and he even tried to revoke the decision but to no avail. On December 1 President Talabani told Al Arabia TV channel that Prime Minister had no right to get armed forces involved into the issues under the police jurisdiction. On December 2 the President of Iraq told the very same TV station that the President of Kurdistan Masoud Barzani knew about the meeting of senior armed forces officers when they talked about the F-16 US fighters to join the Air Force inventory soon, so that they could be used to make the Kurds hide in the mountains. In less than a week the President’s official website reported he was hospitalized being tired out and ill. The abrupt deterioration of his health happened as a result of his relentless efforts to improve the situation in the country. Since then the Jalal Talabani, who is 79 years old, lives in Germany while Iraqi media listlessly discusses the issue of who may become the President’s successor…

Now back to the Minister of Finance. The Sunnis support was no surprise, but the authorities didn’t see it as serious threat. As soon as mass protests hit Ramallah and Fallujah (Anbar province) the supporters and sympathizers started to gather there. They were not only Sunni Muslims coming from neighboring provinces but also the Shiites from the country’s south. Acting Defence Minister Saadun al-Dulaimi (a Sunni Muslim) was sent from Baghdad to Ramallah. He didn’t meet the protesters but held a meeting of the Anbar operational command staff giving orders to stop movement of those who were coming to take part in the demonstrations. The Minister allowed to use force if need be. The news strengthened the will power of those who hit the streets. Saleh Muhamed al-Mutlaq. Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, came the next day. He faced such strong disapproval that the guards had to use arms to get him safely to Baghdad (one man was killed, 22 wounded).

The demonstrators said the protests would continue till their demand were met, including:

1.    Unconditional adherence to the Constitution, the powers that be, especially Prime Minister are openly accused of desire to establish dictatorship in the country;

2.    The termination of repressions against the dissidents and attempts to physically eliminate political competitors, the annulation Article 4 of the war on terror law (the article allows to keep people behind bars for a long time without trial under the pretext of investigation), which presupposes death sentence as an extreme penalty;

3.    Immediate release of women from jails, where they are kept without being sentenced and are subject to sexual abuse;

4.    General amnesty law.

Prime Minister Al-Maliki ceded ground a bit, he ordered to reconsider the cases of women kept in jails and to change the guards there. A few dozen of 700 women were released. Still he was tough on other issues: the protesters were accused of getting funds from abroad. He threatened to use force to restore law and order and prevent the Baath supporters from coming to power. Army and police reinforcements came to Anbar and practically encircled Fallujah and Rammadi; they intensified street patrols and started searches and manhunt. On January 13 there was an assassination attempt against Finance Minister Rafi Hiyad al-Issavi. Aifan al-Issawi, An Anbar parliament deputy, a member of the Iraqi List opposition block was killed the next day in Fallujah (a terrorist had an explosive belt around his waist, he managed to come over to the politician, – four men died and twelve were wounded). There was a rapid response – attacks against military and police multiplied, including mortar shooting.

The protesters were getting more support: it spread to Nenawa province (Mosul, the capital, is the second largest Iraqi city), its governor (a Sunni Muslim, a relative of the parliament’s speaker – Osama Nujeifi) came out in open support of protesters and offered them to use the city’s central square (the protests take place there on and off since December, no matter tough countermeasures by police and military). Solidarity mass actions took place in Baghdad, Hilla, Basra and many other cities. The authorities tried to arrange counter protests in Maliki’s support (like it took place in Baghdad, Nejef, Basra and a number of other cities), but the numbers of participants didn’t speak of the government’s wide support no matter administrative measures were taken to boost it).

The Iraqi supreme mufti, Kurdistan leaders, Shiite clerical leader Muktada al Sadr, the Sunni and Shiite tribal sheikhs – all of them came out in support of the protesters lawful and justified demands. The parliament’s speaker Osama Nujeifi convened an emergency parliament session on January 6. But it was ignored by Al Maliki supporters from State of Law coalition, there were no votes enough to take decisions. The Prime Minister demonstratively went to the Ministry of Defense that day to deliver a big speech on the Army Day calling on the military to keep away from politics and diligently carry out the orders of superiors (According to the Constitution, it’s not President, but Prime Minister who is the Supreme commander of the armed forces).

The government decided to exert economic pressure along with the military presence in Anbar province: On January 9 the Jordanian border was closed, on January 13 they closed the border with Syria. In response the sheikh of the leading Sunni tribe (al-Dulaimi) said if the central government kept the Jordanian border closed, then the people living in the province would open it themselves, using force if need be, because they got all the necessary goods from Jordan (the strategically important Baghdad-Amman-Aqaba highway crosses Anbar province). In a week the border was opened again under international pressure as well as upon the request of the Jordanian government. The Iraqi Kurdistan local authorities opened the Syrian border on December 29 for “humanitarian reasons”.

The Kurdistan’s political parties and officials, including President Massoud Barzani didn’t miss the chance to display their independence from Baghdad. At the same time the Kurdistan’s government restarted direct crude oil exports to Turkey and intensified consultations with multiple foreign delegations that have started to frequently visit Erbil recently. On January 24 M. Barzani met Stephen Breyer, the executive director of Chevron, the US oil giant, to hail the decision to launch the full scale operations in Kurdistan (as is known it’s an irritating issue for Baghdad). Basra is the richest oil producing province. Its local authorities abruptly reduced oil production letting know other parts of the country should not be ignored, especially in case they make up about two thirds of the state budget …

The Iraqi situation is serious enough to make Baghdad-based foreign diplomats intensify their activities – especially from some states of the West, China and the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Martin Kolber. He became so intruding that on January 23 MP Ibrahim al-Mutlaq from Iraqi List initiated a formal request to the United Nations asking to immediately replace Kolber accused of being partial and exercising “negative influence”. The member of parliament actually said that his activities were guided by the USA and other states intruding into Iraqi internal affairs. He wondered what role Kolber played concerning the protests and thousands of people kept behind bars without trial or according to politicized verdicts handed down under administrative pressure or thanks to graft.

The very same day on January 23, a representative of influential Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr said two ministers from Ahrar block leave the so called seven member committee led by Hussein Shahristani created especially for consideration of the protesters demands. According to him the decision was taken as a protest against the lack of professionalism and incompetence of the committee. Another reason was not taking into account the opinion of the religious leader, something greatly complicating the situation. It is serious enough, at least for the reason that the Iraqi Constitution says (item 1, article 2) that Islam is an official religion of the state and the main basis for law making. Indeed, no effective working group has been formed to start a dialogue. The government and the opposition are warning each other not to use force.

It couldn’t have lasted long, so The situation exploded on January 25, when millions of Muslims gathered for Friday prayer. It’s hard to say what exactly the mullahs in the Fallujah mosques were saying but the people clashed with army servicemen. It went on for a few hours, after lunchtime the city saw mobile groups of armed men who opened fire against the military. The daily death toll was three servicemen and five civilians, over 80 people were wounded. The events unfolded to the burning point. Prime Minister Maliki went on TV to address people calling upon military to show restraint and the people of Fallujah to be wise enough not to blow the fire further. According to him, some outside forces, the remnants of the fallen regime, as well as local groups pursuing their narrow interests, were responsible. Upon his decision the curfew effective since 1800 was declared in the city. Simultaneously army units started to leave to be replaced by police.

The authorities thought better of it and the next one-two weeks will show how deeply the country is plunged into chaos. At the beginning of January Iraqi List, the largest opposition block, threatened to ignore the local elections slated for February 4. Back then the reason was to counter attempts to make the issue be swept under the bureaucratic rug. After the escalation of the situation in Fallujah the opposition toughened its stand: The very same Iraqi List warned that if the protesters demands were not satisfied, the party alliance would leave the government and the parliament. The Iraqi Front for National Dialogue warned it may ignore the elections too. Some influential political forces said openly they supported the idea of parliament’s dissolution and forming an interim coalition government to last till next general election.

The Iraqi parliament is actually paralyzed, the government is plunged in scandals, armed violence is one of the highest in the world, the desire for changes is rapidly spreading around in the Iraqi society… No doubt, the time for changes is ripe, but it’s hard to predict what kind of changes are in store. Anyway there is it’s no rapid radical improvement in sight.

Allawi’s cabinet stayed afloat for only one year, but the result was impressive: over 140,000 military officers, medical doctors, scholars, and other types of specialists solely guilty of past membership in the banned BAAS party or of the Sunni origin faced repressions, plus tens of thousands of others became displaced. Curiously, at the same time five ministers from the freshly assembled government fled and were put on the wanted list forhaving stolen a total of $1.3b despite the permanent U.S. oversight. One of those was Iraq’s first post-Hussein defense minister Hazim al-Shaalan who, back in 2004, aired a futuristic plan to have fighting transplanted from Iraq to Damascus. Al-Shaalan, however, somehow failed the expectations of his overseas curators and currently resides in Jordan. 

Nouri al-Maliki became the Iraqi prime minister in 2006. In a creeping political offensive, he grabbed control over virtually all of Iraq’s armed formations: at the moment, he is the Iraqi supreme commander and minister of the interior, while also directly managing a conglomerate of security and intelligence services. Critics charge that al-Maliki’s practice of personally handing out high assignments in the Iraqi armed forces, with no council taken from the parliament, is a breach of the constitution. In a case that drew ample coverage, the post of the defense minister was given to Saadoun al-Dulaimi, a Sunni Muslim, who was supposed to demonstrate the softening of the Iraqi policies, but it transpired later that al-Dulaimi defected from the Iraqi army in 1984, amidst the war with Iran, and fled to the West. He repatriated immediately upon the toppling of S. Hussein and, thanks to a U.S. recommendation, landed in the position of the army chief in 2005 when al-Shaalan was out. 

Al-Maliki lost the 2010 elections but retained his post with the backing from his powerful patrons. The outcome triggered an authority crisis in Iraq as gaps between the Iraqi political factions widened and the executive authority largely lost the grip on what was happening. Iraqi president Jalal Talabani constantly makes attempts to contribute arbitration to the conflict, but his own powers are nominal and his voice is barely heard against Iraq’s political cacophony.

The December, 2011 U.S. withdrawal became a prologue to a new round of wrestling for power in Iraq. When the last U.S. convoy crossed into Kuwait on December 19, literally on the day al-Maliki ordered the arrest of vice president Tariq al-Hashimi, the highest-positioned of the Iraqi Sunni Muslims who openly accused the premier of dictatorial ambitions. Al-Hashimi went into hiding in Iraqi Kurdistan and, at the moment, stays in Turkey. Baghdad issued an international arrest warrant for the fugitive and put him on trial in absentio over terrorism and murder charges. 

Having removed al-Hashimi from the political scene, al-Maliki switched to the next Sunni target – vice premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, the grievances list against him being built around “administrative violations”. The conflict between the State of Law bloc run by al-Maliki and Al-Iraqiya supporting his predecessor Allawi – both politicians being Shia Muslims – escalated as Al-Iraqiya, to which Sunni leaders pledge allegiance as to a lesser evil, slammed al-Maliki over the dictatorial course, disregard for the views of the country’s political spectrum, power abuses, and violations. The opposition announced suspending its involvement with the parliament and the government and called for a 'no confidence' vote, and now quite a few important pieces of legislation, including those pertinent to the Iraqi oil sector, are stuck half-way through the parliament. 

The dubious credentials of the government and the tensions brewing across the society led the opposition to unite, to connect to new partners, and to boost coordination in a bid to displace al-Maliki. On April 28, 2012, a patchy crew comprising former premier Allawi, current parliament speaker Usama al-Nujayfi, radical Shia cleric Muqtadā al-Ṣadr, Kurdish president Massoud Barzani and a number of lower-profile figures convened to demand, in the form of a de facto ultimatum, that the premiere abide by the constitution, appoint independent army and security chiefs by May 17, and take steps towards a nationwide consensus. Al-Maliki brushed off the message, prompting more angry outpourings from the opposition. Speaker al-Nujayfi suggested summoning al-Maliki to the parliament for an ”interrogation” as the first move towards the decisive vote. In the beginning, the reaction of the ruling coalition was uninventive as it leveled various charges against the speaker and made a weak attempt to have him replaced, but later al-Maliki adopted a stronger stance and urged snap elections in Iraq (the regular parliamentary poll in the country is due in 2014), hinting that the presidential council under his control should have the authority to disband the legislature. 

The threat had no effect – the opposition took to vigorous campaigning to attract a wider constituency ahead of the elections, which should be easy considering the numbers of the discontent in Iraq. Still, so far al-Maliki’s opponents are short of the clout in the parliament for the 'no confidence' vote (the constitution requires that 164 parliamentarians out of the 325 total agree to the procedure). The blocs behind al-Maliki and Allawi are equal in weight with roughly 90 seats each, with the remaining scattered among petty political groups who are chronic undecideds). 

Under the circumstances, the role of Muqtadā al-Ṣadr, a Shia figure at the helm of a movement with some 40 seats in the legislature, automatically rises. On July 4, he suggested toning down the discord and called the Iraqi government (which means al-Maliki) to admit to being responsible for mounting fatalities and for a collapse of all security measures in Iraq, and to agree to security agencies’ chiefs not directly subordinate to the premier. On July 8, Muqtadā al-Ṣadr said his movement would partake in the 'no confidence' vote provided that the opposition proves having 124 legislators on board. On the other hand, he rejected the idea of subjecting al-Maliki to parliamentary examination, but expressed a view that the premier’s term should be reduced from 3 to 2 years. 

In three days, a spokesman for the party led by Barzani declared that Al-Iraqiya and the Kurds had up to 150 parliamentarians on their side and hoped that Muqtadā al-Ṣadr would make a serious effort to enable the parliament to question al-Maliki and to proceed with the 'no confidence' vote. Explainably, no legible response followed – Muqtadā al-Ṣadr, an Iranian graduate with an ambition to be the leader of the whole Shia community, maintains strong ties with Tehran which is on friendly terms with al-Maliki and persistently asks al-Ṣadr to prevent the plan aimed at the removal of the current premier from materializing. 

The key obstacle in the way of the initiatives meant to depose al-Maliki is that the Iraqi nation in its present shape totally lacks consensus in defining the problems confronting it, least in charting the corresponding solutions, while external forces have unchecked sway over the situation (the latter aspect of the matter should be a subject of a separate study). Today's Iraq is a country best described by the Arab proverb about “three parties per two people”. The above holds true even with the multitude of barely noticeable parties dropped from the list. From a wider perspective, order in the East traditionally depends on a determined and hard-handed charismatic leader, a figure absent from the incoherent Iraqi political spectrum. As a result, any attempts to achieve a sort of concert appear doomed from the outset. 

For example, the national reconciliation meeting slated for April 7 never took place because the potential participants fell out of phase already when drafting the event's agenda. On June, 23 around 150 tribal leaders and politicians from the Taamin, Neynava, and Saladin provinces organized a conference as suggested by Allawi to advance the anti–al-Maliki cause. The gathering only stated that the people it represented were aware of the threat posed by the current government. An Iraqi congress of tribal leaders, with around 1,200 of them attending, was to be held in Baghdad on July 7, but was canceled a day before the date with a reference to the technical problem that invitations had not been sent out timely to some of the potential participants. 

In the meantime, rage against the al-Maliki regime is spilling. Even the premier's supporters complain that corruption in Iraq is pervasive and the living standards in the country where they used to be completely decent sank to the third-world level. Unemployment in some of the provinces approaches the 40% mark, the energy-rich country suffers recurrent fuel undersupply, electric power blackouts occur routinely, the prices are sky-rocketing, the healthcare and education systems are crumbling. The security landscape in Iraq is frightening: for many of its regions, terrorist attacks and murders of policemen, army officers, government officials, and clerics are almost becoming habitual. In June, 237 people were killed and 603 – wounded, making the month the bloodiest over the past couple of years. Strikingly, according to official reports the death toll on July 23 reached 107.

No doubt, blaming the disastrous conditions entirely on al-Maliki would be a gross overstatement, but it is also true that the premier had enough time and serious resources to bring about some positive dynamics, which are nowhere to be seen. It came as an indication of the government's inability to stem violence in the country – and highlighted the incompetence of the security services – that recently al-Maliki unveiled his decision to stop the persecution of Hussein's army officers corps and to invite back the former officers willing to resume military service, though the ranks offered would be lieutenant-colonel or below. The underpinning of the plan is that the people can contribute to the Iraqi army their much-needed expertise and skills. 

The opposition presses a constantly expanding array of criticisms ranging from the trivial – an obscure lawyer supposedly discovered that the Iraqi anthem had been adopted and confirmed by Mr. Bremer, a U.S. citizen, in 2003 without due formalities – to heavy charges that al-Maliki ignored the acting laws and Article 118 of the constitution on the forming of regions in Iraq, which both require that the government launch referendums on power sharing upon the local authorities' request. Consequences of the disputes linked to the latter theme can have far-reaching consequences for the Iraqi central authority as the unity of the country can be called into question and examples abound of how explosive the problem can prove. 

Iraqi Kurdistan increasingly turns a death ear to Baghdad and, politically and economically, behaves as an independent state on the world stage. In May, 2012 Erbil began to supply oil to Turkey with the Iraqi central government completely shut out of the scheme. Ankara paid no attention to the outcry from Baghdad and, moreover, announced that Turkey's foreign minister would visit Iraqi Kurdistan shortly to discuss bilateral cooperation opportunities. In the past 2-3 years, the Kurdish administration signed over 40 hefty contracts in an autonomous mode, and the trend seems steady as Erbil's partners already include Exxon, Chevron, and Total. The transnational grands remained immune to Baghdad's invectives and opted for Iraqi Kurdistan, a zone with a reasonable business climate, functioning infrastructures, and tolerable security conditions, instead of South Iraq.

The pattern appears to be contiguous. The administration of Basra, the province sitting on Iraq's top oil reserves, claims that the sharing of the revenue from the oil production in the south of Iraq – the way 75% of the Iraqi budget are split, in other words – is unfair. Indeed, Basra keeps only $1 per barrel, and the provincial administration already clashes with the petroleum ministry in court, for now setting its minimal share at $3 per barrel. If the government makes no concessions, practical steps towards the establishment of a confederation of South Iraq comprising Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Basra may jump to the agenda. A coordination meeting in the framework of the plan was held in Basra on May 31 and made it clear that Baghdad's cutting deals without consulting the locals was being frowned upon. As the January, 2013 provincial elections draw closer, ever stronger campaigning will be centered around the issue and Baghdad will have to respond, considering that hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake. 

The question pops up frequently: where do the Iraqi oil revenues go? Corruption surely absorbs a lot, but it is still of interest what happens to the rest. Due to reasons that are not deeply hidden, the federal authorities prefer not to notice that in part the question reads: why, since 2004, have the US and British companies been allowed to exploit ready infrastructures and to pump out of Iraq as much oil as is technically possible given the existing pipelines and terminals? The answer may be known overseas – the cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom topped one trillion dollars and makes sense only if proper returns on the investment are derived. 

Paradoxically, ejecting al-Maliki would exacerbate Iraq's political and security problems rather than defuse the simmering crisis. If the opposition eventually launches the 'no confidence' vote, the constitution dictates that the government must resign and a new one should be put together within 45 days. Under the arrangement, the country would have no government for quite some time, considering that forming one in today's Iraq is not going to be fast. A vacuum of authority lasting indefinitely is a big risk, plus al-Maliki, a remarkably cunning operator, managed to secure support from both Washington and Tehran. Against this background, the missing majority support in his own country – a familiar problem in many parts of the world – does not really count. Anyhow, the Iraqi drama is rolling on…