Stoicism, in Ancient Greece, was pop culture —reaching out in a way that the sophisticated Platonic and Aristotelian schools could only dream of. Like the Epicureans and the Skeptics, the Stoics owed a lot to Socrates — who always stressed that philosophy had to be practical, capable of changing our priorities in life.

The Stoics were very big on ataraxia (freedom of disturbance) as the ideal state of our mind. The wise man cannot possibly be troubled because the key to wisdom is knowing what not to care about. So the Stoics were Socratic — in the sense that they were striving to offer peace of mind to Everyman. Like a Hellenistic version of the Tao. The great ascetic Antisthenes was a companion of Socrates — and a precursor of the Stoics.

The first Stoics took their name from the porch — stoa — in the Athenian market where official founder Zeno of Citium (333-262 B.C.) used to hang out. But the real deal was in fact Chrysippus, a philosopher specialized in logic and physics, who may have written no fewer than 705 books, none of which survived. The West came to know the top Stoics as a Roman trio — Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. They are the role models of Stoicism as we know it today.

Epictetus (50-120 A.D.) was born as a slave in Rome, then moved to Greece and spent his life examining the nature of freedom. Seneca (4-65 A.D.), a fabulous orator and decent dramatist, was exiled to Corsica when he was — falsely – accused of adultery with the sister of emperor Claudius. But afterwards he was brought back to Rome to educate the young Nero, and ended up sort of forced by Nero to commit suicide.

Marcus Aurelius, a humanist, was the prototypical reluctant emperor, living in a turbulent second century A.D. and configuring himself as a precursor of Schopenhaeur: Marcus saw life as really a drag. Zeno’s teachers were in fact Cynics — whose core intuition was that nothing mattered more than virtue. So the trappings of conventional society would have to be downgraded to the status of irrelevant distractions at best.

No wonder there are very few true cynics left today. It’s enlightening to know that the upper classes of the Roman empire, their 1 percent, regarded Zeno’s insights as quite solid, while — predictably — deriding the first punk in History, Diogenes the Cynic, who masturbated in the public square and carried a lantern trying to find a real man. As much as for Heraclitus, for the Stoics a key element in the quest for peace of mind was learning how to live with the inevitable.

Serenity Link

Venus reflected on the Pacific Ocean. (Brocken Inaglory, CC BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

This desire for serenity is one of their linkages with the Epicureans. Stoics were adamant that most people have no clue about the universe they live in (imagine their reaction to social networks). Thus they end up confused in their attitudes towards life. In contrast to Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics were hardcore materialists. They would have none of that platonic “forms” talk in an ideal world: for the Stoics these were nothing but concepts in Plato’s mind. For the Epicureans, the world is the unplanned product of chaotic forces (tell that to Evangelist fanatics).

The Stoics, by contrast, thought the world was a matter of organization down to the last detail. For the Epicureans, the course of nature is not pre-determined: Fate intervenes in the form of random swerves of atoms. Fate, in Ancient Greece, actually meant Zeus.

For the Stoics, everything happens according to Fate: an inexorable chain of cause and effect, developing in exactly the same way again and again in a cycle of cosmic creation and destruction — a sort of precursor of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence.

Resigned Acceptance

Zeus statue. (Mario Leonardo Iñiguez, CC BY 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Thus it’s pointless to get excited about stuff we cannot change. And it’s pointless to be attached to things that we will eventually lose. But try selling this notion to the Masters of the Universe of financial capitalism.

So The Way — according to the Stoics — is to own only the essentials, and to travel light. Lao Tzu would approve of it. After all anything we may lose is more or less gone already — thus we are already protected from the worst blows in life.

Perhaps the ultimate Stoic secret is the distinction by Epictetus between things that are under our control — our thoughts and desires — and what is not: our bodies, our families, our property, our lot in life, all elements that the expansion of Covid-19 now put in check.

What Epictetus tells us is that if we redirect our emotions to focus on what is in our power and ignore everything else, then “no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you — neither there’s any harm that can touch you”.

Power Is Ultimately Irrelevant

June 2, 2020: Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte on Republic Day. (Governo Italiano, CC BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

It’s a very serious business involving duty, discipline and self-control. This goes a long way to explain why over 70 percent of Italians now applaud the conduct of Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte in the fight against Covid-19. He did rise to the occasion, unexpectedly, as a neo-Stoic. The Stoics regarded death as a useful reminder of one’s fate — and the ultimate insignificance of the things of the world.

Marcus Aurelius found enormous consolation in the shortness of life: “In a little while you will be no one and nowhere, even as Hadrian and Augustus are no more.” When circumstances made it impossible to live up to the ideals of Stoic virtue, death was always a viable Plan B.

Epictetus also tells us we should not really be concerned about what happens to our body. Sometimes he seemed to regard death as the acceptable way out of any misfortune. At the top of their game the Stoics made it clear that the difference between life and death was insignificant, compared to the difference between virtue and vice. Thus the notion of a noble suicide.

Stoic heroism is plain to see in the life and death of Cato The Younger as described by Plutarch. Cato was a fierce opponent of Caesar, and his integrity ruled the only possible way out was suicide. According to Plutarch’s legendary account, Cato, on his last night, defended a number of Stoic theses during dinner, retreated to his room to read Plato’s Phaedo — in which, not by accident, Socrates argues that a true philosopher sees all of life as a preparation for death — and killed himself. Obviously he became a Stoic superstar for eternity.

The Stoics taught that wealth, status and power are ultimately irrelevant. Once again, Lao Tzu would approve. The only thing that can raise one man above others is superior virtue — of which everyone is capable, at least in principle. So yes, the Stoics believed we are all brothers and sisters.

Seneca: “Nature made us relatives by creating us from the same materials and for the same destiny.” Imagine a system built on a selfless devotion to the welfare of others, and against all vanity. It’s certainly not what inequality provoking, financial turbo-capitalism is all about. Epictetus: “What ought one to say then as each hardship comes? I was practicing for this, I was training for this”.

Will Covid-19 show to a global wave of practicing neo-Stoics that there is another way?

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A World of Postmodernism or the Newest Middle Ages?

The process already taking shape in the world of consolidating «larger spaces», and the return of the empires of by-gone eras may not, at first glance, seem to respond to the spirit of the times. However, we are living in an age which, in view of its uncertainty in people's minds, is indiscriminate to such an extent that it is no stranger to the most improbable policy prescriptions. 

The world is in a state of interregnum in which, as Zygmunt Bauman says, «change is the only constant, and the unknown – the only certainty»; in this world, Europe remains a battlefield, but nowadays the battle is between a Westphalian model of sovereign states and new forms of supranational governance… 

Traditional European empires of modern times, which is to say the modern age, have risen up on the ruins of feudalism. However, it is a peculiarity of postmodernism that it is ready, on a fairly eclectic basis, to take on the organisational forms of political relations of any era. Piracy, which was once from times of old (remember the famous Algerian pirates) is today once again firmly establishing itself along the shores of Africa; a by-effect, of course, but it has become indicative of a time in which the archaic and the modern intermingle in the most unimaginable way possible. 

This is nothing new, however. Similar era breakdowns have taken place time and again. The Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, in his work written between the two world wars entitled «The New Middle Ages», wrote: «We are destined to live in a historical time of era change». Berdyaev referred to this time as «the end of new history and the beginning of a new Middle Ages», defining it as a transition from the rationalism of new history to the irrationalism of a medieval type… «The spiritual beginnings of past history are being eliminated, its spiritual power exhausted… All the usual categories of thought and form of life of the most «advanced», «progressive», even «revolutionary» people of the 19th and 20th centuries are hopelessly outdated and have lost all meaning for the present and especially for the future». 

According to Berdyaev's observations, the transition to a new middle ages, just the same as the previous transition to an «old» middle ages, is accompanied by a noticeable expansion of old societies and the indiscernible addition of new ones. «Individualism has eliminated all of its possibilities in new history, there is no longer any energy left in it… The end of the spirit of individualism is the end of new history… Liberalism, democracy, parliamentarianism, constitutionalism, legal formalism, humanitarian morals, rationalist and empirical philosophy are all the offspring of an individualistic spirit, of a humanitarian self-assertiveness, and they are all dying away, they are all losing their former importance… Is there much that is ontologically real about stock exchanges, banks and money, about monstrous factories producing useless objects or weapons for destroying life, about superficial luxuries, speeches by parliamentarians and lawyers, about newspaper articles? Is there much that is real about the growth of insatiable demands?» The Russian philosopher noted that Christianity had previously played a unifying role for at least a substantial proportion of mankind. Its very existence «signified an escape from pagan nationalism and particularism». At the end of new history, «we are once again seeing before us an unfettered world of pagan particularism, inside which there is a deadly battle and destruction taking place». 

However, many of Berdyaev's ideas do not seem to be so pertinent these days; it would obviously be wrong to place an equals sign between the time in which he wrote and the beginning of the 21st century. Although the turns of the historical spiral are linked with each other, each one is also unique, and since the New Middle Ages has already taken place, then in imitation of Berdyaev it might be possible to call the trend of our times the Newest Middle Ages.

One of the most noticeable features of this period, for example, is the emergence of various complex networks, and not just networks of an information-technology and sociological nature, but also those encompassing relations between states. Strategies for using network warfare to control nations are extremely popular in Washington. The Pentagon, in particular, has officially adopted a new military doctrine of net-centric warfare aimed at «superior knowledge» and «information dominance». (1) At the same time, our internationally-networked world with its apparent independence of individual centres of power which are, in fact, incorporated into more complex hierarchical relations and interdependencies surprisingly reminds one, in an ontological sense, of the world of the Middle Ages. 

In particular, a system of multilayered vassalage is forming before our very eyes in which there will no longer be a supreme «liege lord» as before (because he cannot and does not want to do it), interfering in literally everything to do with the rulers in his area of dominance on the principle of «A vassal of my vassal is not my vassal». Washington understands that it is both financially and physically impossible to delve into the particulars of all 200 world powers, but that is exactly what they have been trying to do there so far and with increasing amounts of effort. It is simpler to choose half a dozen or a dozen trusted agents («vassals») and entrust/trust them to do it, controlling them themselves. This is why some of the recent actions of America's close allies, first and foremost France, are so similar to the principle of distributing feudal lands. It is probably possible to talk about a plan for a kind of super empire in place of a sole super power which, on the basis of the network principle, would be subordinate to the regional or traditional empires currently acquiring a new lease of life. The centre would be the same, but now it would be more like a coordinator than a straight omnipresent steward; it would be considerably more economical and consequently, or so the Americans are hoping, no less efficient. Full sovereignty, meanwhile, including the right to military intervention, would undoubtedly be centred at the top of this pyramid. As the well-known American academic Noam Chomsky writes, the principles of international order lie in the fact that the United States has the right to use violence whenever they like. And nobody else has that right. «Of course not. Well, maybe our clients do. So they inherit the right. Other American clients do, too. But the rights really reside in Washington. That's what it means to own the world. It's like the air you breathe. You can't question it». (2)  

In fact today, on a new turn of history, a neofeudal system of vassal dependence is re-establishing itself in the world which, in its day, replaced the mighty Rome. Today's Rome is Washington, which in many ways is in exactly the same state of imperial exhaustion, including moral, and which in reality is trying to continue its hegemony using exactly the same methods, although with the very latest technology; but really it makes no different, it is only technique and there is nothing new in that. 

Neo-vassalage has a lot of benefits. Firstly, if something is going wrong, it is always possible to make it seem like the one responsible is not who is really pulling the strings, namely Washington, but the vassal state. Using this vassal, it is completely possible to deny one's own involvement in the fates of other states and pull on the robes of impartial arbitrator. Secondly, such a mechanism for projecting global power also allows for the costs of managing territories to be kept to a minimum, which is rather important given the global financial crisis. At the same time, while setting about reorganising the world, Washington also needs to factor in the costs that this would bring. At some point, the interests of the main liege lord may not coincide with the interests of large vassals capable of obstinacy. Furthermore, those against whom this game is being directed may be in a position to set about strengthening their own alliances, the contours of which are already discernible. Consequently, while on the way to putting its plan into action, Washington still has a number of complex problems to solve. 

(To be continued)

The recent expeditions of the French in Africa clearly smack less of neoimperialism than they do neocolonialism, and have prompted many to wonder whether the events are the start of a new cycle of world politics in which an outgoing unipolarity is perhaps being replaced by a forthcoming multipolarity not hailed by everyone, or something different, something new or maybe a repeat of history, but in new packaging? Maybe something that would allow, for example, the United States «to leave without actually leaving», to continue implementing their global plans in a more complex system of interstate relations? If so, then the imperial projects and vassal relations of by-gone eras that had seemingly vanished forever will turn out to be much in demand… 

One of the first instances of this trend was noted and identified by Jürgen Habermas, a well-known German philosopher, at the beginning of President Barack Obama's first mandate. He observed, for example, that the «realistic» school of international relations that had restored its influence in Washington after Bush differed from the «neocons» not so much in its aims to preserve America's global hegemony, as the way these aims would be realised. According to Habermas, the desired world order of this school is largely in response to Carl Schmitt's theory of larger space (Großraumtheorie). Schmitt thought of «larger spaces» as the spheres of influence of dominant imperial powers and their «strong ideas». 

One could say that America was still at a crossroads during Obama's first mandate, leading rearguard actions to preserve its global leadership, while at the same time becoming increasingly aware of the inefficiency and onerousness of its attempts, especially amid the global financial crisis. From the beginning of his second term in office, however, Obama is starting to decisively reformat the world. The problem being faced by Washington is not only that maintaining its unipolarity is becoming impossible, but that multipolarity is undesirable. Washington is already uncomfortable with the fact that while preserving the existing order, China will eventually arrive at the point of global hegemony and could behave exactly as America itself is doing. As Habermas shrewdly observed: «It is more in America's own interests to attempt today to bind tomorrow's global powers to the kind of international order that no longer needs a superpower». 

Meanwhile, more and more research is appearing in the West showing that a natural rebirth process of the imperial policies of a number of former parent states has begun in reaction to the devolution of America as global leader and the growing chaos of global politics, and often not in the direction that America would find favourable. The return of empires is described metaphorically in the Italian geopolitical magazine Limes: «Empires will never die so long as their roots are not dug up or covered with salt. Their spirit lives on in many generations of descendants and ascendants, as well as subordinate nations. They are ready to rise again at the first available opportunity, the moment geopolitical pressure on them begins to wane and the systems that have been declared immortal turn out to be brittle and dilapidated». Unable to withstand this «hurricane», the White House, according to proposed recommendations, should be at the head of this process and send it in the «necessary direction». It is advisable to contrast the natural formation of new empires with the organised construction of the kind of empires that America would be able to act jointly with, whilst as far as possible slowing down the creation of potentially hostile formations. 

Thus in the newspaper National Interest, Dov Zakheim, former undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the US Department of Defense, points to «the growing triumphalism of several empires manqué». According to Zakheim, «In East Asia, China is increasingly flexing its political, economic and military muscles as a commanding power to which others must perform the kowtow ritual of subservience. In the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey is exploiting its newfound economic and political prowess to extend its influence over the many states that once constituted the Ottoman Empire. And Russia is drawing upon the power and influence it derives from its energy resources to pursue a neo-czarist policy in Europe and in the outlying regions of the old Russian Empire. Nor should one overlook the influence in South Asia of India, whose economy dwarfs that of its neighbors and where the Moghuls once were the dominant force, and Brazil’s inheritance of the Portuguese Empire’s mantle in Africa, facilitated by its own increasing economic clout. The imperial legacies of these states have provided impetus to their nations to cut a greater figure not only within their regions but also on the world stage. When visiting these countries or meeting with their elites, one senses a growing sense that they are reverting to their traditional roles as major powers». 

Most worrying to Zakheim, however, is that «all believe that the United States, and even more so Europe, no longer should monopolize decision making for the international community. They reject the post-World War II settlement as outdated and will not automatically accept American leadership on any given issue. Washington policy makers, currently obsessed with that other imperial legatee, Iran, would do well to recognize that there is more to these states than impressive economic growth, military expansion and political influence. Americans are known for their lack of historical sensitivity. They will need all the sensitivity they can muster in order to deal successfully with states whose claim to a greater role on the world stage is motivated as much by past glory as by present success». (1) It is not difficult to see that Zakheim's misgivings are akin to those expressed in Samuel Huntington's prophecies regarding a future «clash of civilizations».

One of the main dilemmas being faced by the United States’ imperial policy at the present moment, according to the German academic Herfried Münkler and expressed in his book «Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States», is the discrepancy between recognising the irrelevance of further expansion and the fear that this will be perceived by others as a sign of weakness. «It is harder to put down an imperialist, civilizing, humanitarian, value-expanding mission by which an empire has defined itself, without being seen – by those within the empire as well as by others – as in decline». Another peculiarity of America, as defined by Münkler, is that America is, by nature, an «empire in a hurry», a consequence of its short four-year election cycle. «Probably, Washington's growing tendency in recent years to use the military for problem-solving also has something to do with the time pressure built into democratic mechanisms. Military solutions offer themselves with a suggestion of speed and finality, so that an «empire in a hurry» may grasp at them more often than would be sensible or advisable». (2) 

Academics also believe distinct traces of imperial ambition are evident in the policies of the European Union. In an article entitled «The Imperial Re-Bordering of Europe: the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, June, 2012), it has been pointed out, for example, that the European Neighbourhood Policy could be interpreted as a declaration of the European Union's imperial intentions. In particular, the fact that the EU's neighbouring countries would be more like its subordinate subjects than equal partners, according to the plans for integrated relations laid out in the policy, could also be part of its imperial strategies. In keeping with the strategies of a multicultural empire, the European Union is using the European Neighbourhood Policy to create new borders and division lines between its neighbours following the example of the Balkans. According to the article’s author, the imperial policy of transforming borders being carried out by the European Union uses less noticeable, but more importunate instruments of control based on voluntary subordination and the acceptance of imposed regulations. (3)

And so the construction of «larger spaces» in global politics has begun. There is undoubtedly no point in waiting for the borders of these new/old empires to be formalised or officially announced. After all, the point here is not their direct reinstatement with all the accompanying paraphernalia (that would look like a farce), but the return to an appropriate modus operandi for projecting the interests of former parent states. The future global hierarchy which is emerging at the behest of Washington will, in every way possible, avoid identifying itself with the colonial empires of former times, for fear of stirring up the memories of nations. And not just the former colonies who were subjected to ruthless exploitation, but the imperial capitals themselves, whose inhabitants are not so keen on saddling themselves with a burden they have already shaken off and who do not want to see the arrival of new and overwhelming streams of migrants from these territories. Neither is there any point waiting for conventions or agreements similar to the capitulation regimes or acts of vassalage, since modern legal bondage can be far stronger evidence of the dependence of former times. The neoimperialist renaissance of Western powers is easier to follow when it comes to the logic behind their ideas and actions, if one does not attach too much importance to the «high moral standards» they hide behind.

(To be continued)

(1) http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/old-empires-rise-again-7074

(2) http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/why-empires-fail-7320

(3) http://inosmi.ru/belorussia/20120711/194779406.html