Now everything one needs to know – and especially not know – about the Indo-Pacific is contained in a detailed Pentagon report.

Still: is this an act, or the real deal? After all, the strategy was unveiled by “acting” Pentagon head Patrick Shanahan (the Boeing guy), who latter committed hara-kiri, just to be replaced by another, revolving door, “acting” secretary, Mark Espel (the Raytheon guy).

Shanahan made a big deal of Indo-Pacific when he hit the 18^th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last month, picking up on his introduction to the Pentagon report to stress the “geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions” and demonizing China for seeking to “reorder the region to its advantage”.

In contrast, all the benign Pentagon yearns for is just “freedom” and “openness” for a “networked region”; calling it the New Pentagon Silk Road wouldn’t be far fetched.

Anyone remotely familiar with “Indo-Pacific” knows that’s code for demonization of China; actually, the Trump administration’s version of Obama’s “pivot to Asia”, which was in itself a State Dept. concoction, via Kurt Campbell, fully appropriated by then Secretary Hillary Clinton.

“Indo-Pacific” congregates the Quad – US, Japan, India and Australia – in a “free” and “open” God-given mission. Yet this conception of freedom and openness blocks the possibility of China turning the mechanism into a Quintet.

Add to it what hawkish actor Esper told the Senate Armed Services Committee way back in 2017:

“My first priority will be readiness – ensuring the total Army is prepared to fight across the full spectrum of conflict. With the Army engaged in over 140 countries around the world, to include combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, training rotations to Europe to deter Russia, and forward deployed units in the Pacific defending against a bellicose North Korea, readiness must be our top priority.”

That was 2017. Esper didn’t even talk about China – which at the time was not the demonized “existential threat” of today. The Pentagon continues to be all about Full Spectrum Dominance.

Beijing harbors no illusions about the new Indo-Pacific chief they will be dealing with.

Surfing FONOP

“Indo-Pacific” is a hard nut to sell to ASEAN. As much as selected members may allow themselves to profit from some “protection” by the US military, Southeast Asia as a whole maintains top trade relations with China; most nations are participants of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); and they will not shrink from enjoying the benefits of Huawei’s 5G future.

Actually even the other three in the Quad, as much as they are not linked to BRI, are having second thoughts on playing supportive roles in an all-American super production. They are very careful about their geoeconomic relations with China. “Indo-Pacific”, a club of four, is a de facto late response to BRI – which is indeed open, to over 65 nations so far.

The Pentagon’s favorite mantra concerns the enforcement of “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOP) – as if China, juggling the countless tentacles of global supply chains, would have any interest in provoking naval insecurity anywhere.

So far, “Indo-Pacific” has made sure that the US Pacific Command was renamed US Indo-Pacific Command. And that’s about it. Everything remains the same in terms of those FONOPs – in fact a carefully deceptive euphemism for the US Navy to be on 24/7 patrol anywhere across Asian seas, from the Indian to the Pacific, and especially the South China Sea. No ASEAN nation though will be caught dead performing FONOPS in South China Sea waters within 12 nautical miles of rocks and reefs claimed by Beijing.

The rampant demonization of China, now a bipartisan sport across the Beltway, on occasion even more hysterical than the demonization of Russia, also features proverbial reports by the Council on Foreign Relations – the establishment’s think tank by definition – on China as a serial aggressor, politically, economically and militarily, and BRI as a geoeconomic tool to coerce China’s neighbors.

So it’s no wonder this state of affairs has led Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on a recent, frenetic Indo-Pacific related tour, including Quad members India and Japan and possible associates Saudi Arabia, UAE and South Korea.

Geopoliticians of the realist school do fear that Pompeo, a fanatic Christian Zionist, may be enjoying under Trump a virtual monopoly on US foreign policy; a former CIA director playing warmongering top “diplomat” while also “acting” as Pentagon head trampling other second string actors who are not under full employment.

His Indo-Pacific roving was a de facto tour de force emphasizing the containment/demonization not only of China but also Iran, which should be seen as the major US target in the Indo/Southwest Asia part of the club. Iran is not only about strategic positioning and being a major BRI hub; it’s about immense reserves of natural gas to be traded bypassing the US dollar.

The fact that the non-stop demonization of Iran and/or China “aggression” comes from a hyperpower with over 800 military bases or lily pads spread out across every latitude plus a FONOP armada patrolling the seven seas is enough to send the hardest cynic into a paroxysm of laughter.

The high-speed train has left the station

In the end, everything under “Indo-Pacific” goes back to what game India is playing.

New Delhi meekly opted for not buying oil from Iran after the Trump administration lifted its sanctions waiver. New Delhi had promised earlier, on the record, to only respect UN Security Council sanctions, not unilateral – and illegal – US sanctions.

This decision is set to jeopardize India’s dream of extending its new mini-Silk Road to Afghanistan and Central Asia based on the Iranian port of Chabahar. That was certainly part of the discussions during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, when full members Putin, Xi and Modi, plus Rouhani – as the head of an observer nation – were sitting at the same table.

New Delhi’s priority – embedded deep in the Indian establishment – may be containment of China. Yet Putin and Xi – fellow BRICS and SCO members – are very much aware that Modi cannot at the same time antagonize China and lose Iran as partner, and are deftly working on it.

On the Eurasian chessboard, the Pentagon and the Trump administration, together, only think Divide and Rule. India must become a naval power capable of containing China in the Indian Ocean while Japan must contain China economically and militarily all across East Asia.

Japan and India do meet – again – when it comes to another more geoeconomically specific anti-BRI scheme; the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which so far has had a minimal impact and stands no chance of luring dozens of nations across the Global South away from BRI-related projects.

The chessboard now clearly shows Indo-Pacific pitted against the three key hubs of Eurasia integration – Russia-China-Iran. The definitive unraveling of Indo-Pacific – even before it starts gaining ground – would be a clear commitment by New Delhi to break apart the US sanctions regime by restarting purchases of much-needed Iran oil and gas.

It won’t take much for Modi to figure out that taking a second role in a Made in USA production will leave him stranded at the station eating dust just as the high-speed Eurasia integration train passes him by.

Last week, writing in these pages, I noted that any encounter between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin that would take place at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, would have to address two critical questions if there was to be any clarity in U.S.-Russia relations. We’ve now gotten a first draft of answers.

I argued that, for the Russian side, the overarching issue is whether or not Donald Trump is calling the shots on U.S. policy. Seven days ago, the White House press operation was signaling that there would be a formal encounter between the two presidents, a scheduled meeting with a defined agenda. As the week progressed, the United States began to back away from those announcements. By the end of the week, the encounter was a far less structured event, essentially folded in around an informal stroll to a photo opportunity and brief chats in between APEC sessions—nothing at all like the meeting that took place at the G-20 summit in Hamburg in July. What happened? And does it suggest that Donald Trump has a George W. Bush problem—the apparent inability to take a personal rapport with Vladimir Putin and transform it into concrete policy directives?

Because of the way the United States geographically boxes Russia in as only a “European” state, Trump’s “Russia hands” were not scheduled to join his delegation to APEC. Thus, there were concerns that any substantive meeting between Trump and Putin would occur without the U.S. officials who would be most likely to provide necessary expertise (and who would wind up implementing any results). Linked to that were fears that, if another meeting followed the Hamburg precedent (of just the two presidents and their chief diplomatic officers), Putin might convince Trump to accept a series of compromises: trading Russian support of Trump’s initiatives in return, for instance, for concrete sanctions relief and acceptance of Russian preferences for Syria and Ukraine. There had already been some advance warning of this, such as, when Saudi Arabia’s King Salman visited Moscow last month in an historic summit, the Saudi delegation seemed to suggest that a Russia playing a more constructive and stabilizing role in the Middle East would outweigh the logic of maintaining the full raft of U.S. sanction, imposed after the 2014 incursions into Ukraine and after the 2016 elections.

But then we have Trump’s comments to the press following the Da Nang summit. Much of that coverage has focused on Trump’s willingness to accept Putin’s denials of Russian interference in the 2016 election at face value, but two other items deserve greater attention. The first is that the president, having been convinced, guided, or maneuvered into not having a formal sit-down with Putin in Vietnam, is apparently committing to a full-fledged summit meeting of the two presidents and their respective “teams” at some indefinite point in the future. If so, then how the agenda for that meeting is set, and what parameters are established for the negotiations, will be critical. The second is what role Trump himself intends to play in Russia policy. What struck me at times about his comments on Air Force One was how he seemed to view himself, as “the president,” as something separate and distinct from the executive branch as a whole. As chief executive, Trump is in charge of the U.S. intelligence community, the diplomatic corps and the military. Yet his comments seem to suggest that, at times, the government is pursuing a policy towards Russia that he personally disagrees with but somehow has little power to change.

So while we’ve gotten a first set of answers, the questions still remain unresolved. Sideline encounters at the G-20 and at APEC were not successful in changing the dynamic of the U.S.-Russia relationship. So will a direct Trump-Putin summit be a game changer? Only if those original questions can be answered definitively.

nationalinterest.org

The result confirmed the Chinese scholars’ hypothesis about the origin of smog that shrouds many Chines cities – a real scourge hitting the country. It has three key components: sulphur dioxide produced by burning coal, vehicular emission and dry air. The temporarily introduced air cleaning measures clearly showed that the country has a real chance to drastically improve its ecological situation. If not immediately, it can be done in a more distant future.

In 2013 Beijing defined the goal to be reached by Hebei authorities – to reduce the production of steal and cement (by 60 million tons each) and cut down on the consumption of coal by 40 million tons. There is already a tangible result achieved: in three quarters of the year PM2.5 or micro particles in the air have been reduced by 12, 5% in comparison with the previous year, the number of «ecologically bad days» has been somewhat reduced in the cities of the region. At the summit China declared its commitment to reduce greenhouse emissions till 2030. By this time Beijing plans to increase the share of renewable energy sources up to 20% of total consumption. The goal could be reached sooner than planned. The China’s economy has grown mature. An ecological revolution normally takes place at the final stages of industrial and consumption revolutions. 5 trillion yuan (over $ 800 billion) were allocated for ecology protection according to the current five year plan (2011-2015) or two and a half times more than in 2011. 

Overdependence on coal is the main problem for China’s economy and ecology. It gets exacerbated by the fact that technologically obsolete enterprises account for around 20% of coal production. The government is adamant to unswervingly continue the policy aimed at reducing the dependence. In the autumn of 2013 it ordered to close the coal mines producing less than 90 tons a year. Only mines with planned production exceeding 300 thousand tons will be given licenses. (1) 

20% is impressive enough in relation to the overall coal consumption in China (over 3, 6 billion a year). How rapidly could it be replaced with renewed energy sources? What exactly will be used instead of coal? In 2013 the coal production in China grew only by 0, 8% while the consumption increased by 3, 7%. 

Energy consumption is a global burning problem which is especially important for renewed energy and industrial cleaning equipment production. 

China has learned to use desulphurization systems at thermal power stations. Now foreign systems are two and a half times more expensive than the Chines ones. The same happened with photovoltaic panels.  The Chinese production made prices fall down while the countries that take a strong stand in favor of environmental protection have banned the import of Chinese photovoltaic panels. 

According to preliminary data, coal production in China may go down in 2014 – the first time in many years. It testifies to the fact that the government takes resolute steps on the way to reduce the coal dependence. 

The battle for eco-friendly China will be in focus of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders. Like legendary Shun who changed the whole landscape of the country, (2) the members of incumbent government can make their names go down in history written in green hieroglyphs. 

While green modernization takes place inside China the government launches a vibrant diplomatic offensive aimed at efficient resolution of global problems related to climate change. This policy has broad support in Europe. American climatologist John Abraham skillfully described in the Guardian the successes of Chinese ecologists and the wide support they enjoy from the government. He believes that China will turn into a world scientific research center achieving new successes in other areas too. (3)

The US Republicans begin to get exasperated by China’s successes. It’s not only the desire to attack Democrats on a major issue. The shale revolution that boosts the US economy is too unstable because of ecological problems, something they don’t like to talk about in America. Are they afraid of Greenpeace? 

_________________________

Before that the US President visited China in 2009. A lot of things related to the bilateral relationship have changed since then – with its global clout grown, China has become increasingly confident and assertive. 

The title of the article A Beleaguered Barack Obama Goes to Meet a Confident Xi Jinping at APEC published by US weekly Times mirrors the things almost precisely as they are. 

The plan for deeper greenhouse emissions reductions, that President Obama unveiled at the summit, sounded rather impressive but immediately went under harsh criticism by US Senate now under the Republicans’ control. It’s not the only thing that makes the US President weak. 

The summit made clear the nature of relationship between the two leading powers. In a nutshell, it’s a stand-off between a hegemon and a leader demonstrating two absolutely different policies and approaches to the problems of contemporary world. 

One party strives to preserve its position and the possibility to impose its will on others while the other is obviously inclined to change this world, and what is important – it can really do it. It wants the world to become better, or, at least, adapt to the historic changes and new reality 

The US-China rivalry is an important factor to influence the APEC agenda, but the relationship does not boil down to economic or geopolitical competition only. The two different civilizations are divided by a wide gap in approaches to economic development and international economic cooperation. 

The US policy in the Asia-Pacific region is aimed at making the America-dependent countries join the group where the members play by the already established rules with possible changes introduced by Washington according to its interests. Beijing by and large abides by the rules in force at global and regional level. At the same time it believes that the existing pattern does not facilitate economic growth. China realizes that the relationship based on the balance between the groups of states is of discriminatory nature and in many instances may lead to the loss of economic independence. It makes China put forward concrete initiatives to broaden the prospects for all states of the Asia-Pacific region, including providing them with an opportunity to independently choose the right strategies for development and tools to implement the plans. 

It would be right to say that Washington holds on to the past while Beijing looks to the future making its policy more realistic. 

With the financial crisis over, the West faces the end of globalization along with the emergence of multipolar world. Fruitful interaction is rapidly developing between newly emerged world actors making the relationship with old centers of global influence based on more equal footing. 

China is comparable with the United States in many areas. Its growing commercial, economic, financial and technological strength is viewed by many countries as a counterweight to balance the influence of the overseas partner. It’s no wonder that Beijing took the baton from the West to adopt free trade rhetoric. China has reasons to rebuke the West of protectionism and does it with spectacular propaganda effect. 

One can definitely say that the Washington-proclaimed Asia pivot and the Trans-Pacific Partnership – TTP (a proposed regional free-trade agreement leaving out China) do not match reality and have a dim chance for success. 

Having a look at prospects for economic growth even tried friends do realize that by going too far in their loyalty to Washington they risk to miss out on the opportunities offered by dynamically developing Chinese market. 

For instance, four TTP founding states: New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei and Chile view China as a more important trade partner than the United States. Three out of them (excluding Brunei) believe that China is an important trade counter agent. China is also an important trade partner for the five states that have joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks: Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Peru and Vietnam. Taiwan is another party to the talks with its economy almost integrated into China. Only three participants in the negotiation process (the United States, Canada and Mexico) consider China to be the second most important trading partner. 

It should be noted that the talks on the initiative to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership are held in great secrecy. At the APEC summit the idea came under perfectly organized two-frontal attacks launched simultaneously by Beijing. China finalized and signed two bilateral free trade agreements with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Australia. Besides, Beijing insisted that the initiative on the creation of free trade zone in the Asia-Pacific be included into the final declaration of the forum. 

Unlike the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Beijing-backed agreement is not of discriminatory nature. Looks like the talks on the free trade zone proposed by China will be more open. 

Beijing came up with other important proposals. China plans to establish a new bank to fund development of the "New Silk Road" pouring 40 billion dollars into the project besides the China-launched Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an international financial institution that has already been provided $50 billion – half of the start-up capital. 

No need to say that the funds allocated for long-term projects are crucially important for many Asian states and their implementation would have multiplier effect. Beijing allocates enough funds to improve the lending standards, including for credits granted from other sources and not in Asia only. It’s worth to mention the negative reaction of the United States. Washington believes that the China-initiated projects lack transparency. Actually the United States can see a clear threat to the international banks it controls. 

Other financial news before and after the APEC summit also had evident political connotations. In early November China reached an agreement with Qatar on the use of yuan for trade transactions and investment projects. On November 8, a similar agreement was concluded with Canada. On November 13, another financial agreement was signed with Malaysia. With all these agreements in force the influence of the dollar in global markets will decrease.

The trend is quite stable and indicative. 

Foto – AFP

The United States stayed true to form with the Obama administration reiterating its desire to see more Australian troops, among other contingents, deployed to a doomed Iraq.  (There are already 200 Australian special forces engaged.)  In his meeting with Abbott at the US embassy in Beijing, Obama spoke of how the Australian prime minister had personally “expressed his extraordinary commitment to battling foreign fighters that threaten both of our homelands.”  Again, a distant enemy, posing threats to regimes that have enabled, in part, their existence to prosper, become localised foes in need of military punishment.  Misguided sponsors tend to be aggrieved.

The Chinese and Japanese delegations were unsurprisingly glacial, a relationship placed in refrigeration after recent territorial spats.  An Abe-Xi meeting, one lasting 25 minutes, may have been grating to the duellists, but it did at least take place.

Then there was the great hoodwinking rhetoric of free trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, something, it should be added, China is not a party to.  Enter the lair of the beast, Obama seemed to be suggesting, then poke its eyes.

The disjunction was even noted by the dimmer members of the press corps, who found the idea of running APEC in Beijing simultaneously with side room chats about the TPP in the snubbed host country a touch jarring.  The Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was characteristically oblivious.  “I think that everyone wants to see freer trade in the Asia-Pacific region” (The Age, Nov 11).

Abbott, along with the leaders of Canada, Mexico, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, Brunei, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, were all being “hosted” in the US embassy in Beijing at Obama’s insistence.  “This has the potential for being a historic achievement,” uttered the president.[1]  Those at China’s Xinhua News Agency saw it as an ominous affront.  “What the United States [has] done aroused suspicions in this region.”

The issue of China, trade, and agreements designed to keep it shackled, if only superficially, is always doused with a good deal of water when it flares up. China is both problem and salvation, a necessary nuisance dealing with the global pocket book.  Obama, in response to a question by an Australian journalist, proferred the old line that, “it’s in all our interests for China to be successful, prosperous and to be an outstanding international partner.”

For all of that, hegemons don’t like equal company in the theme parks of history.  The American variant of this is to seek submissive “partners” via trade and security agreements dolled up as informed consent.

The biggest issue regarding the TPP lies, as it often does, in a term.  Free trade is fanciful, and at worse, a dangerous fantasy.  Such trade junkies would actually have you believe that a regime without tariffs, or reduced tariffs, entails giddy, heart-felt freedom.  Instead, such arrangements usually entail restrictions, exclusions, and intrusions.  Governments may believe they cannot control the global economic environment, but it would be better to suggest that they simply don’t want to.

Old canards have filled the press conferences and speeches given by Obama at the gathering.  They are larded with the talk of manic production, dreamily inflated trade figures, and mechanical like outputs.  During the course of “the next five years,” he reminds the APEC CEO gathering, “nearly half of all the economic growth outside the United States is projected to come from right here, in Asia.”[2]  There is no actual discussion – or at the very least open discussion – about the ways such growth is meant to be attained.  Will it be through protecting the intellectual property rights of developed states in the partnership?  What of environmental protections in the wake of accelerated economic growth?

The truth is that the winds have started to cool in the TPP discussions, at least when it comes to specific countries concerned by the Washington agenda.  This is hardly mentioned in the banal script befitting an APEC gathering.  Nor should it be surprising except to anyone who has ventured to the released chapters on WikiLeaks.  (It is questionable whether some of the delegation members in Beijing are actually well briefed about its contents at all.)

Countries who might have initially felt enthused by the prospects of trade Nirvana are starting to retreat to more conservative domestic positions.  Electorates can only be lied to some of the time. There are always exceptions."Australia,” explained Obama, “has been an outstanding partner on that front.”  Washington will not tolerate wobbly doubters.

Making sure it won’t be left out of all the excitement about free trade that is free as long as it excludes China, Xi Jinping is vigorously pursuing a rival Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific.  Beijing is doing its own bit of Asia-Pacific “rebalancing”.  He promises that China will invest amounts in the order of $1.25 trillion abroad over the next 10 years, while importing something in the order of $10 trillion goods over the next five years.  All of this is punchy stuff, though Xi tends to do what his American counterpart does: fantasise about the unpredictable, and posture about the present.  Market Leninism, for all its exotic strengths, has its own glaring weaknesses.

Dr. Binoy Kampmark, globalresearch.ca

The first out of three items does not stand out as something unusual at first glance: it states that the so called Bogor Goals are still acute and remain effective to implement gradual and planned lowering of trade barriers in the Asia-Pacific till 2020 according to decisions taken at the Bogor summit (Bogor, Indonesia, 1994). The stated goal has become a kind of trade mark for APEC. With the due courtesy done, the host country remembered that according to the existing agreements every participant sticks to its own liberalization schedule taking into consideration the specific features of individual state.  

«Sustainable and inclusive growth» is offered as a priority goal by Indonesia.  It does not sound like anything new at first too, but the substantiation is far from being characteristic for the usual APEC style. 

Indonesian Deputy Finance Minister Mahendra Siregar elaborates that the crisis has encompassed the markets of developed countries making some Asia-Pacific economies unstable due to the very same reason that had been considered to be an advantage before – the export orientation. The reliance on export does not lead to balanced progress of all branches of national industry causing social inequality – a factor that spurs instability. The solution lies in more even distribution of income, raising the income of the poor, boosting internal markets and opening new opportunities for economic progress thanks to growing internal consumer demand.       

Besides that, according to Indonesia, connectivity is an important reserve to be used for spurring trade, investments and economic development of the region.  The English term is taken from computer language. In relation to economy it means a number of measures to boost and diversify the interaction between regulators and market entities  – from building and enhancing material  infrastructure  to logistical innovations, easing visa regimes, cooperating in management personnel training etc. The theme has already been highlighted by key documents defining the guidelines for ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations), in particular the 2010 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, so the stage for the Indonesian initiative is already set.   

All these steps are nothing more than just an attempt to have the traditional APEC agenda added by the provisions that could make it less dogmatic and more responsive to contemporary needs. Is there a chance the proposals put forward by Indonesia will be endorsed by other APEC members?   I believe there is, at least talking about the previous APEC chair and host country – Russia, or China which is to be the next host in 2014. I don’t see any reason why these three large and influential states should not tackle the issue of upgrading the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation agenda adding the «Bali Tunes» to the «Bogor Goals».    

Victor Sumsky holds a Ph.D. in history and is the director of the ASEAN Center at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) under the Russian Foreign Ministry

In the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Russia's interests in the Asia-Pacific region look like a developed and fairly clear set of goals. Central among them is the improvement of the socioeconomic status of the population in the eastern part of the country, home to over 25 million people, of which 6 million live in Transbaikal and the Far East. Reaching this goal requires the coordinated use of internal and external resources, including contacts with Asia-Pacific countries. Participation in the high economic performance of Asian countries is one such resource.

Representing various stages of economic development, as well as diverse foreign policy orientations, the Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region understand Russia's eastern project in different ways. But the «turn to the east» is perceived as a process which is completely natural for Russia and, of course, as an acknowledgement of the growing role of Asia in world affairs as well.

Having opened up its eastern project to the outside world (including at the APEC summit in Vladivostok in 2012), Russia is continuing to determine the most suitable partners, including for participation in the reintegration of its enormous expanses. 

It is along these lines that the strategies of key Russian players are currently being built: the large petroleum corporations have connected Siberia and the Pacific coast with a pipeline, gas infrastructure development in the eastern regions of the country remains in Gazprom's plans, Russian Railways is planning the reconstruction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Main Line, and programs for the development of general aviation have been adopted. The development of the Northern Sea Route, the entry of Siberian LNG into Asian markets, and the construction of new gas liquefaction plants on Sakhalin and in Primorye bring great promise. Furthermore, eastern defense industry facilities have received large government contracts. The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, created in May 2012 with its headquarters in Khabarovsk, is becoming an increasingly noticeable and influential coordinator of economic activity. 

The grounds for relying mainly on Russian state international enterprises in developing the territory of Russia east of the Urals are quite obvious. Only state organizations are capable of competing on an equal basis for new markets with powerful Asian corporations, which are supported in one way or another by national governments. State international enterprises play an exceptionally important role in China, and China is now Russia's most important partner among Asia-Pacific countries. It is sufficient to mention that at the beginning of this decade the total trade volume between China and Russia exceeded the total volume of trade between Russia and its three largest other partners in the megaregion: the United States, Japan and South Korea. Thus, the building of symmetrical relations with Russia's main partner in the Asia-Pacific region requires Russian state enterprises to continue to take a leading role.

Incidentally, in the Asian countries of the Asia-Pacific region, Russia's reliance on the public sector in its eastern project encounters much more understanding than the same Russian organizations do in the markets of Western countries, where they are often subjected to discrimination. 

It is no accident that Russia's current eastward movement is accompanied by a gradual restoration of its leading positions in the former Soviet Union. The beginning of implementation of the concept of the Eurasian Economic Union and the creation of the Customs Union gives the eastern project additional weight, making it possible to count on the effect of scale, the replenishment of demographic potential, fresh private initiative and, in the end, on an increase in the density of the area connecting the Pacific coast with Central Eurasia: the Urals, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan. 

Consolidation of this area is also seen as diversification of its economic specialization. Among promising fields are the production of food, a shortage of which is rapidly growing in China; modernization of forestry and wood processing; advanced processing of fish and seafood; and the revival of Pacific commercial shipping. 

The fact that the continuing outward migration from several northern regions of the Far East has changed somewhat in recent years can also perhaps be considered a favorable sign. Rather than leaving for «the continent», migration to the south of the same region – to Primorye and the Khabarovsk Territory, as well as the Amur region – has become a more popular route.

Russia's policy in the Asia-Pacific region takes into account several power lines which determine the course of most countries in the region. First of all are Chinese-American relations and the particular sensitivity of the U.S. to the PRC becoming a world economic leader. The U.S. is motivated in its relations with Beijing not only by China's growing and apparently inevitable geopolitical ambitions. Two circumstances evoke anxiety in Washington: first, the high interdependence of the economic systems of the two countries, and second, the lack of U.S. means to influence the independent behavior of the PRC, and not only in the Asia-Pacific region.

Thus, the implementation of Russia's eastern project is taking place in conditions where the rise of China – now its main economic partner in the region – has brought about increased alarmism in the U.S. due to its own financial problems and failures in the Middle East. The «reorientation» of the U.S. toward Asia at the turn of the decade was justifiably perceived by many as Washington shifting to the military and political containment of Beijing, although in 2013 Obama tried to smooth over this impression. 

The continuing intensification of China's geoeconomic influence in the Asia-Pacific region, active attempts by the U.S. to counteract this trend, and the geoeconomic weakening of Japan due to its internal economic problems and the recent deterioration of its relations with Beijing are further compounding the current situation's similarity with the bloc standoff of the Korean War or Cold War eras.

Thus the solution to this more complex equation of forces in the region must be a maximal increase in the number of active participants in economic and political relations in the Asia-Pacific region, with the end, among others, of making it impossible for one power to dictate to other states making up this transcontinental area. 

At the same time, despite the importance of stable ties with Beijing for Russia and its eastern project, its very Eurasian scale excludes the possibility of making China its only partner, and in a certain sense they are a competitor for China's «silk road» project.

Attempts to get past exclusive relations with China can be seen in the operations of Russian fuel corporations which are trying to diversify exports of Siberian petroleum and gas in the region, in similar practices of Russian arms suppliers, and in Moscow's increasingly active policy in ASEAN countries.

While China took a central role in the first stage of Russia's eastern project, which has already been sealed by the signing of important agreements and the preparation of further ones, for Russia to make China its only partner would be a strategic mistake. And here we must make special mention of the role of the Southeast Asian region, which has in recent years become a field for the energetic endeavors of major world powers, including the United States, China and India. 

High economic performance and the gradual transformation of ASEAN into a sort of symbol of the peaceful interaction of civilizations make the region of special interest, including from the viewpoint of studying existing practices of interstate integration, so relevant to the Eurasian project. In turn, the countries of Southeast Asia often link their newly-acquired international status with the preservation of individual political sovereignty in the course of economic integration. This is an important distinction between ASEAN and European integration. Damage to national sovereignty is now perceived by many residents of the Old World as a very painful loss, which furthermore borders on a loss of real democracy. 

The new role of the Southeast Asian region as an obvious beneficiary and skillful user of the polycentric world which is now taking shape is also worth mentioning. While accepting the «courtship» of more powerful economic centers, the ASEAN countries also demonstrate an ability to preserve their cultural distinctiveness, support weak participants of integration, and skillfully regularize international conflicts.

The eastern orientation of Russian foreign policy objectively increases the role of the countries of Northeast Asia for Russia as well. In the same way, South Korea and Japan's participation in Russia's eastern project can significantly broaden the horizon of their independent existence in the field of foreign policy.

Note, by the way, that Moscow abstained from solidarity with Beijing in its interpretation of the current Japanese cabinet's foreign policy.

Russia's eastern project could also become a platform for inter-Korean dialog. The recruitment of capital from South Korea and workers from North Korea to the project is a practical possibility. 

In this difficult period for world economics and trade, the socioeconomic development of Russia's territory east of the Urals is an open program which could make a definite contribution to increasing growth rates, providing project participants with reliable sources of fuel and raw material for the future, and creating a large market and transcontinental logistics in Northern Asia. 

Maintaining economic growth in East Asia, albeit not as rapid as before, means a further increase in the share of world resources consumed in this region due to population growth, building of infrastructure, urbanization, consumer revolution, etc. And the shift occurring in the physical consumption of the bulk of world resources in Asia will bring about the gradual reorientation of world export flow. World prices will increasingly be formed in East and Southeast Asia.

Russia's economic establishment on the Pacific, geographically closing the topic of building a Eurasian Economic Union, is returning the Russian state to the historical format familiar to its neighbors.

* * *

Pranab Mukherjee is regarded as one of India’s most experienced and authoritative politicians. Apparently his election as President of India will add the required logic and coherence to the Indian foreign policy, the qualities it has evidently lacked in the recent 5-7 years. First, such super large entity as India will promote strengthening of existing economic structures in the world’s most economically dynamic region. It will also counter the attempts to change the fundamental principles of international relations, first of all the presumption of unity and territorial integrity of states and societies. Second, India’s joining APEC will facilitate the efforts to solve the problem of strategic importance: strengthening horizontal economic ties in the Southwest Asia and enriching the content of external economic activities of regional actors. (The Indian experience of getting the best out of  «plan» and «market»  collectively may prove really invaluable under conditions of global economic slowdown). Third, India has already moved ahead substantially in this direction. It has done solid preparatory work in the form of «Look East» policy initiated in 1997. The Gujral Doctrine has become an effective instrument of strengthening India’s diplomatic ties with the states of Southeast Asia. The economic relations with these countries have also undergone  a qualitative evolution: today the region has become the largest market for India’s goods accounting for over half of exports (it was only 40% at the beginning of the century). The economic relations have solid political foundation. India has signed agreements with important APEC members like: Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. 

It’s relevant to recall against the backdrop of the upcoming APEC summit that Indian interest concerning the situation in the Asia-Pacific region has its own story of rather long duration.

The Indian ruling circles see the cyclic recurrence of world processes as the main driving force boosting general dynamics of international relations in the spirit of traditions laid down by the country’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (1) If the XIX century was dominantly British, the XX – was predominantly American, then, apparently, the XXI is to become the «Asia century». Naturally it will require «adjustment» of the foreign policy strategy to the changing environment of world development. 

The «adjustment» has become a natural continuation of India’s 1991 economic reform. Back to the mid- 1990s, the Gujral Doctrine (2) or the «Look East» policy materialized as its sublime political expression that is being actively implemented nowadays. 

The Indian elites outpaced their many other foreign counterparts to catch the «wind of change» in world economy and international politics. They succeeded in  taking advantage of the shift towards the Asia-Pacific to emerge as the new pivot of world development. 

Delhi seems to understand that the on-going increase of economic influence, military might and geopolitical capabilities of China will become the dominant trend of «Asia century».

The foreign policy of India in the Asia-Pacific is finally shaped by the relations of the «world’s largest democracy» with actors like: 1) China; 2) the United States of America; 3) the most influential states of Southeast Asia and Far East, naturally including Russia. 

What is the Indian political elite’s actual perception of the driving forces and motives behind the China’s policy in the Asia-Pacific? According to the Indian experts, the China’s leaders realize the Celestial Empire needs dozens of years to acquire the geoeconomic and geopolitical status equal to that of the United States. That’s exactly why they are actively supportive of the «genuine multipolarity» concept. At the same time, the Indian experts presume, the main goal of Beijing in the Asia-Pacific is monocentricity in Asia, under the Chinese «auspicies». As they see it, India is granted a place only in the «second echelon» of the Asia-Pacific area. According to the present author, such vision is explicitly oversimplified. 

To my humble mind such assessments of India’s capabilities in the Asia-Pacific are based on the twenty years old analysis.  Intellectually, this analysis is not supported by the successful experience of India’s economic reforms that have greatly enhanced the geoeconomic and geopolitical resources of the country; effective search for new foreign policy paradigm («Look East» policy) by the ruling political class; actual recognition of India’s nuclear status by world community; positive changes in relations with two other world politics «centers of gravity» – the USA and Japan. That’s why the Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, appear to emphasize the notion of cooperation between the Elephant and the Dragon. They stress that the two largest states have quite enough space to bring into life national development strategies on the basis of «sound competition» instead of rivalry. Still, as experts note, the boundaries between rivalry and «sound competition» are quite flexible an, especially taking into consideration the fact that, in comparison with other world leaders, India borders on the states that really create problems for its national security (Pakistan, Bangladesh, not to mention the Celestial Empire itself). Let’s not forget the old territorial dispute over the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, that is still called «East Tibet» in Beijing. Further, Indian scholars pay attention on stepped up pace of Tibet’s economic progress, calling the policy of China’s central powers a «double purpose strategy». For instance Ranjit Gupta from Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, writes: "Given the serious territorial issues between China and India, the development of state- of- the- art rail, road and civil aviation infrastructure in very difficult terrain and sparsely populated Tibet, the conscious policy of rapidly increasing the Han Chinese population in Tibet, and deployment of very significant conventional and strategic military assets there, cannot but be a source of major concern. This is especially so when viewed together with the fact that China has spun a web of very strong economic, military and political relationships with India's neighbours, and in particular with Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan". (3)

Really, today India fails to favorably change the foreign policy of Bangladesh that continues to fall under growing economic dependence of Beijing. That’s exactly where the factor of cooperation between the three super large states, bolstered by the prospects of APEC membership, should bring positive results. Or, perhaps, it’s not the «expansion» of Celestial Empire into the Asia-Pacific that it’s all about, but rather the fact that a part of Indian establishment simply depends on the USA, that actively imposes on Delhi its own vision of world situation as well as its fears and «complexes»? 

The «Way» of India to the Asia-Pacific lies through South-East Asia. It starts from Myanmar (Burma). The importance of this country for the «largest Democracy in the world» is finally determined by four major factors. First, the security, political stability and social-economic progress in the northeastern part of India depend on it. Second, the relationship is of special importance for keeping up strategic balance not in the Bay of Bengal only, but rather in the whole eastern part of Indian ocean. Third, Myanmar is the only geographic bridge between India and economic group of ASEAN states that is the backbone of Delhi’s «Look East» policy. Fourth, there is a natural necessity to diversify the sources of energy security. That makes Myanmar a potentially significant source of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) so much needed for Indian economy. 

It’s a well-known fact that seven northeastern Indian states are in a way separated from the mainland by Bhutan, Bangladesh, the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and Myanmar. Myanmar enjoys a critically important place in this complex territorial configuration that finally explains the Delhi’s policy towards this country. So, the development of seven Indian northeastern states and their security depend on permanent connection to the «mainland» to prevent the feeling of territorial isolation and being separated from the rest of the country among the population of North-East. The statement recently made by Indian Minister of Development of North Eastern Region M. Shankar Ayar said: «East Asia begins in North East India». These words have sound historical foundation. WWII and the partition of India in 1947 had, going to the bottom of it, broke the traditional cultural, ethnic and economic ties between India and South-East Asia. Delhi is trying to revive it with the help of «Look East" policy. 

One of the most important missions is termination of «insurgency» in North-East. Experts say the «insurgents» operate from the territory of Bangladesh that significantly enhances the importance of Myanmar among the foreign policy priorities of India in South East Asia. Besides the relations with Myanmar are of strategic importance for the security and vital needs of the Andaman and Nicobar islands situated in the eastern part of the Bengal Gulf. Finally the «New Look East» policy is based on the assumption that Myanmar is a «gate» to Thailand and Laos, the shortest way to South East Asia. 

The strategic interests of India and the economic «core» of South Asia – the ASEAN – to great extent coincide concerning the issue of «political turbulence» in Myanmar. These interests are defined by the following strategic reasons. First, abatement of Myanmar’s dependence on China that is becoming too dangerous (as some see it). Second, the principle of non-interference into internal affairs of other states should be maintained as a «sacred» basis of international relations. Third, last but not the least, Myanmar boasts an extremely advantageous geostrategic position, and it is rich in natural resources, including hydrocarbons. 

As a chairman of the authoritative organization Russia should take into account the «concerns» of Indian elite and the logic of its behavior on international scene while supporting the India’s APEC membership. This way it’s easier to build security in the Asia-Pacific and implement the idea of polycentric world. 

(1) Glimpses of World History by Jawaharlal Nehru.

(2) Inder Kumar Gujral successively held the positions of minister of foreign affairs and prime minister of India in 1996-1998. 

(3) IDSA Asian Strategic Review, 2008. New Delhi, 2008, c. 315.

The Russian Federation has great interest in large scale projects like APEC. Besides geopolitical and general security agenda, the issues related to the Trans-Urals region development are of key importance. At the beginning of September the traditional meeting of APEC member states leaders will take place on Russian soil, in Vladivostok and the Russky Island. 

The Far East is not only the land of 6,2 million square kilometers, making up for a third of Russia’s territory, it’s also the area boasting enormous investment potential that is still to be realized. Nature, energy, transport, communications and manufacturing are the areas for attracting money flows. It’s a real treasure land of mineral, raw material and biological resources that have been barely developed. The prospects for this region to great extent depend on changing the balance between the world economic centers… 

Even now it’s the Asian giants like China and India who act as the locomotives of world economic progress. One of the prime missions of Russia’s external economic policy in the East is getting maximum profit from beneficial cooperation with the Asia-Pacific states, getting access to financial-investment, commodities, technology and other markets. 

In the times of President Yeltsin the issue of incorporating the huge, richest territories into one social-economic entity was not on the agenda. To say pure and simple the country was just not viewed as a single integrated economic complex. There were no investments in the region; the richest lands were becoming devastated. 

At last at the beginning of the century, after the hard times of the 90s, the country started to shape its eastern policy that envisaged creation of up-to-date engineering, transport and social infrastructure around already existing populated areas, as well as those in the process of construction. The concrete measures already taken in this direction give birth to the hope of converting the Trans-Urals Russia into a vast area of economic growth. Among the measures in question are: 

• The preparation of Vladivostok for the APEC summit, one of national priority mega-projects,

• The creation of adequate infrastructure around Vladivostok, the Pacific sea-port city, to facilitate its becoming a center of international cooperation with the world economic leaders situated in the Asia-Pacific, 

• Large scale construction funded by government that creates new stimulus for business,

• The regional investment projects protected by federal budget,

• Using the airport as a basis for making Vladivostok a hub (transport-logistical junction) that would allow integration into macro regional transportation system and become a Russia’s “gate” into Asia, 

• The construction of new facilities, in particular bridges, to support internal consumption as a way to strengthen the”eastern gate” of Russia. 

The Chinese Jemin Jibao newspaper has mentioned the speeded up development of Siberia and Far East and economic growth as one of five most important goals for the tenure of President Vladimir Putin. The newspaper said these were the regions clearly underdeveloped, with obsolete infrastructure but rich in resources. Speaking in front of State Duma V. Putin himself said the development of Russia’s territory including Siberia and Far East were his main priority along with tackling demographic problems. 

The country has everything to make this effort a success.  First of all the unique transit and energy potential. Russia is ready to play a key role in creating a new transport and energy architecture in the Asia-Pacific – along with the APEC partners and using their opportunities as a base. 

It’s well known, or instance, that cargo transit through Russia’s territory is much cheaper than the sea trade routes between Europe and Asia. The Russian President mentioned it not once that the use of these opportunities requires an international effort within the boundaries of the super large region. APEC is the mechanism for this type of cooperation. 

Energy projects are no less profitable for APEC. It allows Russia to broaden the geography of gas and other energy supplies encompassing far away areas (the gasification of East Siberia, for instance). 

The creation of wide Pacific free trade zone from Canada and Chili to China and Far East within the framework of APEC has already been initiated and is taking shape. The “workshop” created as a result of unification could, for instance, come up with offers of beneficial projects that the “golden majority” ruling the WTO and oriented on the USA would not be able to block. It should be noted that the Customs Union members: Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have started talks on creation of a free trade zone with the European Free Trade Association. Now Russia is intent on promoting the stance previously agreed on by all members of Eurasian economic space. It finds it propitious to add it to the agenda of the APEC forum that gives great importance to the issues of liberalization of commerce and doing away with the barriers on the way of economic cooperation. 

The economic, transport and energy projects aimed at speeded up development of Russia Trans-Urals immediately influence Russia’s prospects in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in the Arctic taking into consideration great attention paid by Moscow to the development of North, in particular within the framework of Arctic Council. 

The Siberia’s agricultural products have wide opportunities for gaining access to East Asia, not to mention the colossal deposits of oil, natural gas, precious stones, gold, silver, copper and other natural resources. The development of all these riches requires utmost strengthening of Russia’s sovereignty over its Trans-Urals space by speeding up the elimination of the infrastructural backwardness. A lot of things are needed here: stimulating national private capital investments in the region, attraction of small businesses into providing northern areas with goods, enhancement of industrial and technological level of developing the natural resources, including the resources of the Pacific ocean, the reconstruction of railways, sea ports and moorings, stable, mutually beneficial ties with the APEC member states and a lot of other things. 

The main thing is to create decent living conditions for people and to attract qualified workforce to the European part of the country and the Community of Independent States. The Far East makes up for a third of the Russia Federation’s territory but it boasts only around 5% of the country’s population. The number dwindles every year. What is needed is that the people would go there from here not vice versa. Make it so that they would not just move but get settled down to live, work, strike roots, give birth to children. That’s the goal that was set a hundred and fifty years ago by the first governor general of Eastern Siberia, count Nikolai Muravyev-Amursky whose mission was to cultivate the huge unpopulated lands. He understood well that the guarantee of success was in the formula “state for people, not people for state”. Today it serves as the formula for revival of a strong and prosperous state “from taiga to the outskirts”. That’s the prime state’s priority.

US-China tug-of-war

A U.S.-China tug-of-war over Southeast Asian influence is proving to be a critical test for Washington's "pivot" East as Beijing strengthens its economic and military clout in its own backyard. On June 28 a Chinese Defense Ministry statement said that the United States' reinforcement of military deployment in the Asia-Pacific is not conducive to security and mutual trust in the region. Spokesman Geng Yansheng made the comment in response to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's above mentioned remarks he made at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore at the beginning of June. According to Geng China is concerned about his words. He said that deliberately highlighting the military and security agenda, and deploying more military forces in the Asia-Pacific go against the world's pursuit of peace, development and cooperation, as well as trust among nations in the region. The biennial Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world's largest US-led naval exercise, was held from June 27 to August 7 on and around the Hawaiian Islands, with 22 nations and 25,000 personnel participating. The list of participants excluded China, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 

The countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), one of the world's fastest growing regions, are weighing up how to play their cards as the United States plays catch-up with the Chinese juggernaut and tries to reassert itself in Asia.

Washington's recent flurry of engagement with ASEAN states – from the Philippines and Thailand to Singapore and Vietnam – is a potential source of friction with China, especially as tempers flare over territorial disputes and the rapid Chinese military build-up in the resource-rich South China Sea.

Some countries try to balance ties to get the best out of both of the big players, while others will seek to use the rivalry as an opportunity to extract leverage for economic or military advantage. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, ASEAN's poorest states, remain in China's orbit as a result of no-strings loans, desperately needed infrastructure development, military support and floods of investment from Chinese firms. Beijing also has close economic ties with Singapore and Malaysia and has been aggressively wooing Thailand – a major ally of Washington since World War Two and the launch pad for its Vietnam War operations – offering loans and technology for a high-speed rail network, hundreds of university scholarships to Thai students and recently agreeing to supply Bangkok with 10,000 Chinese-language teachers. China's strategy in Thailand and several other ASEAN countries was not just trade and investment, but building close relationships to serve its long-term strategic interests. 

In the middle of July the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations convened the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting and the ASEAN Regional Forum. For the first time in its 45-year history, ASEAN failed to agree on even a joint communiqué at the end of the event. It did not bode well for an organization that is trying to create a security community by 2015. The meetings foundered on South China Sea issues, reflecting deep divisions among ASEAN members. The participants refused to meet the Philippines insistence on including a reference to its recent confrontation with China at Scarborough Shoal. It was decided not issue a statement at all rather than include such a reference. Vietnam also wanted a statement of "respect for exclusive economic zones" — something that happened to be unacceptable to Cambodia. This country argued that the Philippines and Vietnam tried to turn their disputes with China into a dispute between China and ASEAN as a whole. This significant disagreement was likely to complicate if not disrupt negotiations on an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct for activities in the South China Sea. The South China Sea disputes could have been an opportunity for China to bridge the discords with its neighbors and a chance for ASEAN to unite on security issues. The chances were lost. The ASEAN faces difficulty to stay united against the backdrop of US-China’s rivalry. After the meeting, Xinhua accused the U.S. of "meddling" in the South China Sea disputes while just before the meeting, the U.S. stated its position on the issues and essentially encouraged ASEAN to stand up to China. It’s just another example of the fact the security situation in the region causes legitimate concern. 

The USA clearly woos India seeing it as an actor in the South China Sea situation. Speaking to the Indian Parliament US President Barack Obama said termed the ties between the two democracies as the "defining partnership of 21st century". He was echoed by US Defense Secretary visiting India in July when he said: “America is at a turning point. After a decade of war, we are developing the new defense strategy. In particular, we will expand our military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South Asia. Defense cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy.” So the US strategy presupposes involving more players into the game. 

While the standoff continues, reports last week in China’s state-controlled media and online military websites suggested that the first of a new class of a stealthy littoral combat frigate, the type 056, had been launched at Shanghai’s Hudong shipyard with three others under construction. Naval analysts said the new 1,700-ton ship, armed with a 76mm main gun, missiles and antisubmarine torpedoes, would be ideal for patrols in the West Philippine Sea. These new warships would easily outgun the warships of rival claimants in the strategic waterway. The type 056 is the latest example of an accelerated military buildup that allows China to dominate its offshore waters. While these warships were designed for lower-level regional conflict, experts say one of the primary goals of Beijing’s wider deployment of advanced, long-range missiles, stealthy submarines, strike aircraft and cyber weapons appears to be countering the growing US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The ship is an example of China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. It also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises. ASBMs a unique weapon destined especially to counter aircraft carrier battle groups – the major assets of US Navy that other countries cannot afford. 

Prospects

The world was on the brink of a major change both on regional and international levels. It is caused by the systemic crisis in the world economy and by the rocketing rise of Asia. So the region’s agenda encompasses a wide range of economic and security issues which are intertwined and should be addressed without delay in a reasonable way. The military buildup seems to be an inevitable part of rising economic prosperity; anyone understands that use of arms may undo all the progress of the entire region. Diplomacy is the way for resolution of disputes. For instance it would be propitious to include a binding code of conduct to address conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea into the agenda of international forums. The proliferation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements among countries in the region is the way to alleviate regional tensions. It is necessary to evade confrontation in the Pacific and to avoid the reestablishing of military bloc security system endorsed by the USA. The rivalry for resources, protection of economic interests are the issues to be solved with the help of round table discussions not naval race.

The APEC summit to be held in the Russian city of Vladivostok at the beginning of September is the right place and time for addressing the burning security issues. Russia is a Pacific country and an active member of regional organizational structures ready to make its contribution to regional stability. It realizes that, no matter economic issues top the list, the unsolved security issues can poison integration efforts in Asia that Russia is interested in. There is one more issue I’d like to stress. The disagreements between Russia and NATO on missile defense in Europe are a pressing issue of the contemporary global security agenda. But the Pacific is the place where 95% of the world’s ballistic missile capabilities are located. The bulk of US missile defense capability is ship based. And Navy is the service that plays the major role in boosting the US military might in the region. The countries contributing to the missile defense technology and capability are Japan and Australia – the major Pacific actors. Boosting naval power means enhancing the sea-to-shore strike potential and the US surface ships and nuclear submarines are the platforms. So there is a very substantial security agenda to be addressed along with the economic issues topping the agenda of Asia-Pacific high-level forums. Russia, China, India and other states could elaborate new security architecture in the region avoiding European bloc politics and hard-power approach to international politics. The time is now and the place to start is Vladivostok.