Due to Washington’s Cold-War-style confrontational policy towards China there is now an ever-growing rift with U.S. allies in the European Union and Asia-Pacific.

This was evident from G20 and ASEAN discussions this week where numerous countries expressed deep misgivings about Washington’s relentless push for divisive relations with China.

France’s Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire, while attending a G20 summit in Washington DC, told the New York Times of the stark difference emerging between the U.S. and the EU. “The United States wants to confront China. The European Union wants to engage China,” said Le Maire who added that the bloc needs to become more independent from American policy.

This call for European independence from Washington has been growing for some time. It reached more vocal levels during the presidency of Donald Trump owing to his hectoring style towards allies over NATO military spending and various alleged trade complaints. What has amplified these dissenting calls is the formation last month of the tripartite military pact between the U.S., Britain and Australia – known as AUKUS – which completely blindsided European allies. France was particularly aggrieved because it lost a submarine contract with Australia worth about €50 billion.

The new pact has been condemned by China as a provocative threat to security in the Asia-Pacific.

It’s not just about French national pride. The European Union counts China now as its biggest trading partner, having overtaken the United States. Germany’s export-led economy – the main driver of EU growth – is heavily dependent on China’s vast market.

It is becoming evident that Washington’s confrontational policy towards China – for example, the establishment of AUKUS – is detrimental to Europe’s strategic interests and trade with Asia. France takes over the rotating EU presidency soon and is showing that it will not indulge Washington’s divisive dynamic.

The same can be observed among Asian nations which are alarmed by Washington’s Cold War atavism.

Members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and others, have protested the way in which U.S. confrontational policy towards China is forcing them to choose sides between superpowers. The nations of Asia-Pacific have historic territorial disputes and other differences, but nevertheless there is a consensus that there must be cooperation and mutual development through dialogue and partnership.

It is notable how two of the three AUKUS members – the United States and Britain – are not geographically part of Asia-Pacific and yet these two powers have stoked much unrest since unveiling the military pact with Australia. Readers are recommended to check out this interview published by us on the subject this week with Professor Michael Brenner.

Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said last week that the Asian hemisphere wants peace and prosperity, and that nations do not want to be forced to take sides in any U.S.-China rivalry.

“We do not want to become an arena for proxy contests or even conflict,” he said.

Nations are well aware of the harmful impact of a previous Cold War. During the former Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union the stand-off was distorting normal development as well as increasing the risk of nuclear war. It seems incredible that in this day and age, there is still the shadow of Cold War looming over nations.

The main culprit for this pernicious polarity is the United States. Washington claims that it is not seeking a Cold War with China, yet it routinely incites provocations towards Beijing and casts international relations in a zero-sum manner. Washington tells other nations, in effect, that you are either with us or against us. This divisive policy is of course an essential element of American hegemonic ambitions.

The United States talks piously about upholding a “rules-based global order”. That is simply a euphemism for Washington’s decreed order according to its self-interests. What Washington always seeks is dominance over others. This is an indispensable function of U.S. global power.

In other words, mutualism, multilateralism, cooperation and co-development are anathema to U.S. global power. Cold Wars and confrontation are the essence of world relations, according to American designs for dominance. Lamentably, that ultimately means that world peace and security are in contradiction to Washington’s aims. That’s quite a damning revelation.

One salutary effect, however, is the growing realization among nations, especially among supposed allies of the United States, that their own self-interests are being sacrificed to placate Washington’s diktat.

How bitterly amusing that when Joe Biden was elected U.S. president he promised to bring allies together. The world is ineluctably diverging from the United States no matter who sits in the White House. And that’s because the world is finding that American power is the fundamental, irreconcilable problem.

The (jade) elephant in the elaborate room housing the military coup in Myanmar had to be – what else – China. And the Tatmadaw – the Myanmar Armed Forces – knows it better than anyone.

There’s no smoking gun, of course, but it’s virtually impossible that Beijing had not been at least informed, or “consulted”, by the Tatmadaw on the new dispensation.

China, Myanmar’s top trade partner, is guided by three crucial strategic imperatives in the relationship with its southern neighbor: trade/connectivity via a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) corridor; full access to energy and minerals; and the necessity of cultivating a key ally within the 10-member ASEAN.

The BRI corridor between Kunming, in China’s Yunnan province, via Mandalay, to the port of Kyaukphyu in the Gulf of Bengal is the jewel in the New Silk Road crown, because it combines China’s strategic access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Strait of Malacca, with secured energy flows via a combined oil and gas pipeline. This corridor clearly shows the centrality of Pipelineistan in the evolution of the New Silk Roads.

None of that will change, whoever runs the politico-economic show in Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Aung San Suu Kyi, locally known as Amay Suu (“Mother Suu”) were discussing the China-Myanmar economic corridor only three weeks before the coup. Beijing and Naypyidaw have clinched no less than 33 economic deals only in 2020.

We just want “eternal peace”

Something quite extraordinary happened earlier this week in Bangkok. A cross-section of the vast Myanmar diaspora in Thailand – which had been ballooning since the 1990s – met in front of the UN’s Asia-Pacific office.

They were asking for the international reaction to the coup to ignore the inevitable, incoming U.S. sanctions. Their argument: sanctions paralyze the work of citizen entrepreneurs, while keeping in place a patronage system that favors the Tatmadaw and deepens the influence of Beijing at the highest levels.

Yet this is not all about China. The Tatmadaw coup is an eminently domestic affair – which involved resorting to the same old school, CIA-style method that installed them as a harsh military dictatorship way back in 1962.

Elections this past November reconfirmed Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the NLD, in power by 83% of the votes. The pro-army party, the USDP, cried foul, blaming massive electoral fraud and insisting on a recount, which was refused by Parliament.

So the Tatmadaw invoked article 147 of the constitution, which authorizes a military takeover in case of a confirmed threat to sovereignty and national solidarity, or capable of “disintegrating the Union”.

The 2008 constitution was drawn by – who else – the Tatmadaw. They control the crucial Interior, Defense and Border ministries, as well as 25% of the seats in Parliament, which allows them veto power on any constitutional changes.

The military takeover involves the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. A year long state of emergency is in effect. New elections will happen when order and “eternal peace” will be restored.

The man in charge is Army chief Min Aung Hlaing, quite flush after years overseeing juicy deals conducted by Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. (MEHL). He also oversaw the hardcore response to the 2007 Saffron revolution – which did express legitimate grievances but was also largely co-opted as a by-the-book U.S. color revolution.

More worryingly, Min Aung Hlaing also deployed wasteland tactics against the Karen and Rohingya ethnic groups. He notoriously described the Rohingya operation as “the unfinished work of the Bengali problem”. Muslims in Myanmar are routinely debased by members of the Bamar ethnic majority as “Bengali”.

No raised ASEAN eyebrows

Life for the overwhelming majority of the Myanmar diaspora in Thailand can be very harsh. Roughly half dwell in the construction business, the textile industry and tourism. The other half does not hold a valid work permit – and lives in perpetual fear.

To complicate matters, late last year the de facto military government in Thailand went on a culpability overdrive, blaming them for crossing borders without undertaking quarantine and thus causing a second wave of Covid-19.

Thai unions, correctly, pointed to the real culprits: smuggling networks protected by the Thai military, which bypass the extremely complicated process of legalizing migrant workers while shielding employers who infringe labor laws.

In parallel, part of the – legalized – Myanmar diaspora is being enticed to join the so-called MilkTeaAlliance – which congregates Thais, Taiwanese and Hong Kongers, and lately Laotians and Filipinos as well – against, who else, China, and to a lesser extent, the Thai military government.

ASEAN won’t raise eyebrows against the Tatmadaw. ASEAN’s official policy remains non-interference in the domestic affairs of its 10 members. Bangkok – where, incidentally, the military junta took power in 2014 – has shown Olympic detachment.

In 2021, Myanmar happens to be coordinating nothing less than the China-ASEAN dialogue mechanism, as well as presiding over the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation – which discusses all crucial Mekong matters.

The mighty river, from the Tibetan plateau to the South China Sea, could not be more geo-economically strategic. China is severely criticized for the building of dozens of dams, which reduce direct water flows and cause serious imbalances to regional economies.

Myanmar is also coordinating a supremely sensitive geopolitical issue: the interminable negotiations to establish the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which pit China against Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and non-ASEAN Taiwan.

The Tatmadaw does not seem to be losing sleep over post-coup business problems. Erik Prince, former Blackwater honcho and now the head of Hong Kong-based Frontier Services Group (FSG) – financed, among others, by powerful Chinese conglomerate Citic – is about to hit Naypyidaw to “securitize” local companies.

A juicier dossier involves what’s going to happen with the drug trade: arguably Tatmadaw getting a bigger piece of the pie. Cartels in Kachin state, in the north, export opium to China’s Yunnan province to the east, and India to the west. Shan state cartels are even more sophisticated: they export via Yunnan to Laos and Vietnam to the east, and also to India to the northwest.

And then there’s a gray area where no one really knows what’s going on: the weapons highway between China and India that runs through Kachin state – where we also find Lisu and Lahu ethnic groups.

The dizzying ethnic tapestry

The Myanmar electoral commission is a very tricky business, to say the least. They are designated by the Executive, and had to face a lot of criticism – internal, not international – for their censorship of opposition parties in the November elections.

The end result privileged the NLD, whose support is negligible in all border regions. Myanmar’s majority ethnic group – and the NLD’s electoral base – is the Bamar, Buddhist and concentrated in the central part of the country.

The NLD frankly does not care about the 135 ethnic minorities – which represent at least one third of the general population. It’s been a long way down since Suu Kyi came to power, when the NLD actually enjoyed a lot of support. Suu Kyi’s international high profile is essentially due to the power of the Clinton machine.

If you talk to a Mon or a Karen, he or she will tell you they had to learn the hard way how much of an intolerant autocrat is the real Suu Kyi. She promised there would be peace in the border regions – eternally mired in a fight between the Tatmadaw and autonomous movements. She could not possibly deliver because she had no power whatsoever over the military.

Without any consultation, the electoral commission decided to cancel voting, totally or partially, in 56 cantons of Arakan state, Shan state, Karen state, Mon state and Kachin state, all of them ethnic minorities. Nearly 1.5 million people were deprived of voting.

There were no elections, for instance, in the majority of Arakan state; the electoral commission invoked “security reasons”. The reality is the Tatmadaw is in a bitter fight against the Arakan Army, which want self-determination.

Needless to add, the Rohingyas – which live in Arakan – were not allowed to vote. Nearly 600,000 of them still barely survive in camps and closed villages in Arakan.

In the 1990s, I visited Shan state, which borders China’s strategic Yunnan province to the east. Nothing much changed over two decades: the guerrilla has to fight the Tatmadaw because they clearly see how the army and their business cronies are obsessed to capture the region’s lavish natural resources.

I traveled extensively in Myanmar in the second part of the 1990s – before being blacklisted by the military junta, like virtually every journalist and analyst working in Southeast Asia. Ten years ago, photojournalist Jason Florio, with whom I’ve been everywhere from Afghanistan to Cambodia, managed to be sneaked into Karen rebel territory, where he shot some outstanding pictures.

In Kachin state, rival parties in the 2015 elections this time tried to pool their efforts. But in the end they were badly bruised: the electoral mechanism – one round only – favored the winning party, Suu Kyi’s NLD.

Beijing does not interfere in the dizzyingly complex Myanmar ethnic maze. But questions remain over the murky support for Chinese who live in Kachin state in northern Myanmar: it’s possible they may be used as leverage in negotiations with the Tatmadaw.

The basic fact is the guerrillas won’t go away. The top two are the Kachin Independence Army and the United Wa State Army (Shan). But then there’s the Arakan Liberation Army, the China National Army, the Karenni Army (Kayah), the Karen National Defense Organization and the Karen National Liberation, and the Mon National Liberation Army.

What this weaponized tapestry boils down to, in the long run, is a tremendously (Dis)United Myanmar, bolstering the Tatmadaw’s claim that no other mechanism is capable of guaranteeing unity. It doesn’t hurt that “unity” comes with the extra perks of controlling crucial sectors such as minerals, finance and telecom.

It will be fascinating to watch how the (Dis)United Imperial States will deal with post-coup Myanmar as part of their 24/7 “containment of China” frenzy. The Tatmadaw are not exactly trembling in their boots.

Singapore, aiming high for the status of Asia’s unofficial capital, seems like the ideal venue for a conference to discuss how the Middle East could learn a few lessons from ASEAN’s multi-layered relations with China, especially involving partnership in the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

But first, let’s get things straight. The “Middle East” is, of course, a Eurocentric, Orientalist denomination. From Asia’s – and China’s – cultural and geographical point of view, the “Middle East” is correctly seen as Southwest Asia.

It’s enlightening to evaluate two Chinese informed perspectives on how China is deploying its geopolitical soft power across Southwest Asia in contrast to the Trump administration’s immensely muddled strategy.

Duke University professor Bai Gao, also a visiting professor at Peking University, stresses how ASEAN privileges “a stronger regional identity that often unites these countries together to pursue their common interests when they deal with external great powers.” That’s in sharp contrast with Southwest Asia, where nations, geopolitically, are extremely selfish and eschew aligning on common interests.

Peking University Professor Wu Bingbing, also Qatar Chair Professor in Middle Eastern Studies, for his part, stresses how “China believes in partnerships and does not take sides with any single country.”

Enter, inevitably, BRI, which Wu describes as a “network of partnerships (and) projects” uniting a vast array of nations, aiming at win-win outcomes all across Southwest Asia. The objective is not “competition with the US, but cooperation.”

Beyond ASEAN and Southwest Asia that also happens to be the exact emphasis of the December 2018 China policy paper on the EU. Make trade, not war.

The Chinese think of the Middle East as Southwest Asia. Map: iStock

Watch those BRI figures

Contrary to rumors, BRI is not exactly a walking dead “debt trap” – as a constant update on business deals attest.

Trade flows between China and BRI partners are still set to grow by $117 billion in 2019, after an estimated $158 billion last year. China’s exports to BRI-related markets should grow by $56 billion in 2019, after $76 billion last year. From China’s point of view, even if the figures are smaller, the Big Picture remains. That means economic upgrading, internationalization of the yuan and reduction of internal Chinese imbalances.

BRI partners have already captured over $410 billion in Chinese investment in the period 2014-2018, always taking into consideration that BRI is still, officially, only in the planning stage.

BRI partners are also set to profit from over $61 billion in additional exports to China in 2019. This Asia-wide infrastructure expansion translates into lower transaction and transportation costs. Not only ASEAN, but Southwest Asia is also ideally positioned to take advantage from BRI’s non-stop expansion.

A measure of BRI’s challenges in Southwest Asia is offered, for instance, by the development of connectivity projects involving Israel. This study argues that for projects to work, China needs to turbo-charge its political “engagement” – something that for Beijing is a definitive red line.

By comparison, in ‘Gold at the End of the Rainbow? The BRI and the Middle East’, Anoushiravan Ehteshami of Durham University argues that “it is in the outlying regions such as Central Asia and the Middle East that the BRI’s metal will be tested, as indeed China’s resilience as a major power. If China is able to overcome the geopolitical, cultural, institutional and socio-economic barriers of these Asian regions then it will have made some headway towards creating Asia’s first international community, arguably an ‘Asian international society’.”

Asian international society

As it picks up speed in the next decade, BRI is certainly set to shake up the balance of power from ASEAN to Central Asia and to Southwest Asia. Ehteshami is right when he predicts BRI “will generate counter-forces as it traverses Asia’s sub-regions, and nowhere more so than in South Asia, where both Middle East countries and China are actively engaged in developing security and economic links.”

But Beijing’s ultimate target is way more ambitious. It wants to develop an “Asian international society” capable of rivaling, and surpassing, the West.

A key lab to watch will be the Gulf Cooperation Council. Geoeconomically, the GCC – as well as Iraq and Iran – are focusing on Asia much more than the West. China is their top – or near top – energy buyer. Arrays of Chinese companies are heavily investing across the GCC.

A glimpse of what’s to come is offered by China’s online Silk Road offensive in the UAE – a masterpiece of geo-connectivity.

The tall buildings of Abu Dhabi. Business people in the United Arab Emirates and other parts of the Middle East are thinking about being part of the Belt and Road scheme. Image: iStock

Tech consultant Sam Blatteis sums it all up: “Simply put, China is rewriting the rules on how to rise in influence in the Middle East. Because of the UAE’s Goliath-sized ports and the country’s geographic position almost sandwiched between Saudi Arabia to its West and Iran to its East, the UAE is thinking at-scale too about how to contribute to both Silk Road routes.”

Investors from ASEAN to Southwest Asia are increasingly convinced that China is the only game in town for new ideas and major capital investment, way ahead on 5G and just about every technology. Moreover, the Chinese have not yet commercialized all their advances. That’s something even Singapore, the “capital of Asia”, has not been able to crack.

asiatimes.com

When Russian President Vladimir Putin made his first-ever state visit to Singapore this month for the East Asia Summit (EAS) – a regional gathering never before attended by the Russian leader – observers saw the move as a signal of Moscow’s bid to play a larger role in regional affairs.

Despite a stronger emphasis on developing political and commercial ties with Asia-Pacific nations in recent years, Russia has largely focused on alignment with China and deepening relations with Japan, South Korea and India. The Kremlin has paid comparatively less attention to Southeast Asia, but there are signs that is now changing.

From new trade opportunities to arms purchases and diplomatic protection, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) appear to broadly welcome greater political, economic and defense cooperation with Russia and its moves to step up participation in the region’s multilateral institutions.

Moscow, for its part, aims to win new markets for its defense industries and vast energy sector amid tightening sanctions leveled by the United States against individuals, entities and third parties for their dealings with the Russian military and targeted defense companies. US attempts to limit Russia’s arms exports could, however, meet resistance from regional buyers.

In Southeast Asia, Russian defense companies sold US$6.64 billion worth of armaments between 2010 and 2017, outpacing their American counterparts’ US$4.58 billion in sales over the same period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank.

Vietnam is Russia’s largest arms purchaser, trading partner and ally in the region, a legacy of their Cold War ties. Hanoi’s defense purchases accounted for 78% of Russia’s total arms exports to the region over that same period.

Vietnam is also the only Asean member to have signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a trade grouping informally led by Russia but also comprising Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

Since the trade deal came into force in 2016, two-way trade between Moscow and Hanoi reached US$5.2 billion in 2017, an increase of 29% from the previous year. Both sides recently agreed to target a US$10 billion turnover by 2020. Similar agreements with other Asean members are in the works and more could follow if Russia intensifies its regional trade push.

Putin’s visit to Singapore saw the Russian leader and his counterpart Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reiterate their commitment to conclude an EAEU-Singapore FTA now under negotiation. Bilateral trade has risen from US$1.38 billion to US$5.38 billion over the last decade as Russian companies have expanded their operations in the city-state.

Analysts believe clinching a trade agreement with an advanced economy such as Singapore would be a boon for the EAEU, particularly if the deal facilitates services and investments rather than just tariff reductions on the current relatively small volume of exchanges. As a close strategic partner of the US, Singapore is unlikely to pursue defense purchases from Russia.

Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, however, signaled his willingness to seek deeper cooperation on defense and trade during a bilateral meeting with the Russian leader during his visit to Singapore. Their discussions saw the Malaysian premier reportedly ask Moscow for help in maintaining the country’s fleet of Russian-made fighter planes.

Former premier Najib Razak last year committed to a US$2 billion aircraft purchase of MiG-35 jets to replace the aging fleet of MiG-29s. But Mahathir’s administration suspended the purchase after taking office in May due to budgetary constraints.

Analysts see Putrajaya’s request for fighter maintenance assistance as an opportunity for Russia and Malaysia to deepen military-technical cooperation. Both leaders also affirmed their desire to increase and diversify their trade cooperation.

Russia is making inroads elsewhere in the region, too, forging closer defense links with the Philippines and Indonesia, the latter of which agreed last year to purchase 11 Sukhoi SU-35 fighter jets worth US$1.14 billion. Russia’s state-owned petroleum company Rosneft and nuclear energy corporation Rosatom are both pursuing multi-billion dollar projects with Jakarta.

Trade between the EAEU and Asean hit US$35.7 billion last year, an increase of 40% from 2016. At the Asean-Russia Summit held alongside the EAS, a memorandum of understanding signed between the two blocs signaled their intent to cooperate on customs procedures, trade facilitation, investments and business development.

Russia shares with Asean a belief in the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Momentum on Russian trade and diplomatic outreach is all the more applauded as certain Asean member states with poor human rights records continue to seek reliable, cost-effective arms without the political conditions or limitations required by Western arms suppliers, including the US.

Against a backdrop of US-China competition for regional influence, Moscow’s role as a rising major player could be welcomed by states looking to hedge their diplomatic bets.

“There is clearly a demand for balancing arrangements in Southeast Asia,” says Anton Tsvetov, an expert at the Center for Strategic Research, a Moscow-based think tank. Russia is unlikely to be positioning itself as a third force on par with the US and China, he says, as doing so would run the risk of jeopardizing Russia’s burgeoning relations with Beijing.

“Russia is unlikely to project significant military power to the region and cannot afford to lead on major investment like the larger economies,” he told Asia Times. “The Russian foreign policy community orients itself very much along the lines of the president’s signals and his trip may be taken as such a signal, thus launching a ‘campaign’ of sorts,” he believes.

“Russia could put its weight behind Asean-centered multilateral institutions – and it tries to do so. This will benefit what is left of the regional rules-based order and pay credit to Asean as the convening center for regional mechanisms,” says Tsvetov, who believes Russia can play a useful role in counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

“The key here for Moscow is not to play power politics in a region where it has a footing not nearly as strong as the US, China or even Japan, focusing instead on concrete issues in demand from Southeast Asian countries.” US-imposed sanctions, however, could turn out to be a major impediment for Russia’s increased presence in Southeast Asia, he says.

Critics of the law believe it could backfire on Washington through the unintended effect of enhancing Beijing’s influence by undermining the military capabilities of Southeast Asian countries that have for decades relied on Russian arms and equipment to deter China.

“US sanctions on Russia may turn out to be self-defeating in Southeast Asia. Russian arms provisions to Asean states – most importantly, Vietnam – are exactly what creates the deterrence capability against Chinese assertiveness,” says Tsvetov, referring in particular to Beijing’s militarization of the contested South China Sea to underwrite its sweeping territorial claims.

The CAATSA includes a narrow presidential waiver “intended to wean countries off of Russian equipment and allow for things such as spare parts for previously-purchased equipment”, according to the White House’s National Security Council (NSC). But countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and India would still be susceptible to US sanctions as they seek multi-billion dollar Russian arms deals to upgrade their capabilities.

Being the target of American sanctions is a risk that some “may not be ready to take” in pursuit of arms deals with Moscow, Tsvetov says. If sanctions inhibit the deterrence capacity of Asean members, however, “regional states are sure to become irritated by the way US differences with Russia over issues elsewhere are transferred into the Southeast Asian context.”

atimes.com

Speaking at the IV meeting of the Astana Club on Nov. 13, Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, proposed to create an Asian organization for security and cooperation. He claims that the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) could be used as a platform to launch the process. His idea includes the creation of a security zone throughout all of Eurasia and the introduction of a dialog between the CICA and the OSCE. A CICA-OSCE summit could take place in Astana in 2020 to mark the 45th anniversary of the Helsinki Act.

Kazakhstan hosted the OSCE summit in 2010. The fourth CICA summit, held in Shanghai in 2014, demonstrated that the group had the potential to become something much more than just a platform for dialog. It could generate new global initiatives. It was then that the term the Organization of Security and Development in Asia (OSDA) was used for the first time.

The recent EU-Asia meeting in May demonstrated this momentum, as the need to jointly tackle security issues is growing stronger. In theory, ASEAN could join the effort to expand the shared security zone. The new organization in Asia could become a kind of competitor for the OSCE, which has failed at a number of its missions, including the management of the conflict in Ukraine. Relevant bilateral military alliances would become more transparent and be incorporated into this new regional security system.

The idea proposed by Kazakhstan to create the OSDA, or the Asian OSCE, has been floating around for some time. The Asian continent is facing a myriad of security challenges. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourages the creation of “regional arrangements or agencies,” as appropriate initial actors seek to defuse tensions and resolve conflicts prior to the intervention of the Security Council. Article 52(2) of the UN Charter states that regional arrangements or agencies should “make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.”

In recent years, Russia has been working to advance a multilateral dialog on the prospects for creating an Asian security architecture. Consultations on the issue initiated by Russia were launched in 2013 as part of the East Asia summits. It has actively supported the CICA in its institution-building efforts. Moscow has participated in the ASEAN-led security dialogs and cooperation mechanisms. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Singapore to take part in the Nov. 13-14 Russia-ASEAN summit.

Speaking at the fifth Meeting on interaction and measures of trust in Asia (MIMTA), Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that the Asian continent needed its own platform to address international problems. Addressing the Russia-ASEAN summit held in Sochi in May 2016, President Putin made a pitch for launching the Greater Eurasia project (the Greater Eurasian Partnership), aimed at creating a shared zone in Asia that would include security cooperation and eventually encompass the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the countries involved in the integration of the China’s One Belt One Road initiative. According to him, the SCO could cement this construction. The implementation of the initiatives mentioned above could also be a practical step toward creating the unified trade and security zone “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” that Russia has proposed.

Events in Afghanistan and North Korea, the tensions between India and Pakistan and between India and China, the situation in the South China Sea, the emerging arms race, and the militarization of the region could all be placed on the agenda of the new organization, were it to be set up. The US cannot be shut out, but it should not become a dominant actor bringing its weight to bear on others. No US “exceptionalism” should be allowed to play a part or to influence the proceedings under the auspices of this new Asian security organization.

2018 is the year the OSCE marked its 45th anniversary and its experience should be taken into account. The Helsinki Act has played a very positive role, but the organization has failed to become a truly effective mechanism for ensuring security in Europe. The treaties concluded within the OSCE framework, such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), are either dead, or about to go belly up like the Open Skies Treaty. The NATO expansion has not added to the enhancement of European security. The organization has failed to prevent the tensions that are running high in Europe at present. Double standards are permitted, attempts to produce color revolutions are staged, and sanctions battles have not been prevented. The use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy has not been countered, or even condemned, by the OSCE, which flies in the face of the provisions and spirit of the Helsinki Act. The sad lessons of the OSCE should be kept in mind when the architecture of this new Asian security organization is discussed. It should be an alliance based on equality and transparency that is able to effectively handle problems in a multipolar world while keeping the so-called “Western influence” at bay.

The recent BRICS summit reaffirmed Ankara’s commitment to the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) that is geared toward de-dollarizing its member states’ economies, and the agreement to quickly launch a Local Currency Bond Fund gives that policy teeth. Turkey has also expressed its desire to join BRICS.

Ankara is gradually moving toward membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It has been accepted as a dialog partner of that organization. Last year Turkey became a dialog partner with ASEAN. On Aug. 1, the first ASEAN-Turkey Trilateral Ministerial Meeting was held in Singapore, bringing together Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, ASEAN Secretary General Dato Lim Jock Hoi, and Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, who is serving as the 2018 ASEAN term chairman. The event took place under the auspices of the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting that attracted foreign ministers and top diplomats from 30 countries.

Ankara is mulling over a free-trade area (FTA) agreement with the Eurasian Union. This cooperation between Ankara and the EAEU has a promising future.

Meanwhile, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) has provided a $3.6-billion loan package for the Turkish energy and transportation sector. Turkey and China have recently announced an expansion of their military ties. As one can see, Turkey is inexorably pivoting from the West to the East.

Russia has a special role to play in this process. The US Congress has prohibited the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey because of the risk associated with Ankara's purchase of the S-400 air-defense system. In response, Turkey is contemplating a purchase of Russian warplanes. Ankara prefers Russian weapons over the ones offered by NATO states. As President Erdogan put it, “Before it is too late, Washington must give up the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives.”

On Aug. 10, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Erdogan discussed the prospects for boosting economic cooperation. Both nations are parties to the ambitious Turkish Stream natural-gas pipeline project. Ideas for ways to join forces in response to the US offensive were also on the agenda during the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Turkey, Aug. 13-14, although Syria was in the spotlight of the talks. One mustn’t forget that Russia was the first country to be visited by the Turkish president after the failed 2016 coup.

As a result of some tough times resulting from US sanctions, Iran is redoubling its efforts at building foreign relationships. Under US pressure, European companies are leaving Iran, with China gradually filling the void. Now that US and European airspace companies are moving their business ventures out of Iran, this presents a good opportunity for Russian aircraft, such as the MS-21 or IL-96-400M. The Russian automaker GAZ Group is ready to supply Iran with commercial vehicles and light trucks powered by 5th generation engines.

Tehran is an observer state in the SCO, and it is to become an essential hub for the Chinese Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On June 25, a freight train arrived in the Iranian city of Bandar-e Anzali, a port on the Caspian Sea, having passed through the China-Kazakhstan-Iran transportation corridor and entering the Anzali Free Zone that connects China to both the Kazakh port of Aktau and to Iran, thus creating a new trade link to the outside world. This gives a boost to the BRI. On Aug. 12, the five littoral states (the Caspian Five) signed the Caspian Sea Convention — the fruit of 22 years of difficult negotiations. This opens up new opportunities for Iran and other countries of the region as well as the BRI. The idea to form a new economic forum was floated at the Caspian Five summit.

China and Russia back the idea of Iran’s full-fledged SCO membership. In May Tehran signed an interim FTA agreement with the EAEU. Greater EAEU-BRI integration under the stewardship of the SCO is also on the horizon.

According to the Daily Express, Iran could band together with Russia and China in an anti-US alliance. Iran may also get an observer status in the CSTO. Iran-Turkey trade has recently revived, and that bilateral relationship includes burgeoning military cooperation.

Nothing can be viewed in just black and white, and every coin has two sides. The US sanctions do negatively affect the economies and finances of the targeted countries, but in the long run, they will also push the nations hit by them to move closer to each other, thus encouraging the emergence of the multipolar world the US is trying so hard to resist.

Photo: Aluminium Insider

The event will be followed by a Russia-ASEAN Economics Ministers’ meeting to take place in Singapore at the end of August. ASEAN member states are expected to have a wide representation at the Fourth Eastern Economic Forum to be held from September 11 to 12 in Vladivostok.

Moscow joined ASEAN as a full dialogue partner in 1996. In 2004, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). It has since become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) 10+1, ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit.

Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to attend a Russia-ASEAN summit on the fringes of the 18-member East Asia Summit (EAS) slated for November in Singapore – the first time Russia will be represented by the head of state instead of prime minister. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong invited the Russian leader to the event. The EAS is held annually to bring together the leaders of Asia-Pacific states, including the US, Russia and China. The first summit was held in 2005. President Putin’s participation is an important sign that Russia is ready to promote its vision of East Asian security architecture at the highest levels.

Moscow has a lot to offer to East Asia, including partnerships in technology, counter-terrorism, arms trade and energy. Russian energy exports to ASEAN have increased fivefold since 2013. Russia is holding talks with Thailand on liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil exports. The relationship may deepen. Moscow is interested in transport, logistics, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. The development of the Eastern Economic Corridor is likely to attract Russian investors.

Moscow has come up with an initiative to boost the regional cooperation. At the Russia-ASEAN summit in Sochi in May 2016 Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced for consideration the Greater Eurasia project, or the Greater Eurasian Partnership, to create a common space through agreed rules and standards, joint projects and trade facilitation. Economic, logistic, information and security cooperation is to encompass the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the countries involved in the integration of the China’s One Belt One Road initiative. The SCO can act as a binder in this construction.

In 2016, the Eurasian Union and Vietnam signed a free trade area (FTA) agreement and memoranda of cooperation with Cambodia and Singapore, which could be viewed as first steps on the way. An FTA is being negotiated between the EAEU and Singapore.

In August, 2017 the SCO and ASEAN secretaries-general agreed on the expansion of relations based on the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding between the ASEAN and the SCO secretariats. At present, the two organizations are preparing road maps to go further.

ASEAN states and Russia are getting close to a cyber-security agreement. Singapore suffered its worst cyber attack in July when hackers stole the personal information of about 1.5 million people. Malaysia had fended off an attempted cyber heist on its central bank.

In 2018, defense cooperation between Russia and ASEAN was literally thriving. In March, Russia and Laos signed an agreement to establish a facility in Vientiane to promote military cooperation. In July, Russian Helicopters completed the first service contract for the Ministry of Defense of Laos and turned over four Mi-17 helicopters. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited Laos in January.

A Russia-Vietnam military cooperation agreement from 2018 until 2020 was concluded in April. The parties will hold joint exercises among other things. Vietnam also operates a Russian K‑300P Bastion‑P coastal defense system.

The Philippines has just confirmed its intent to buy Russian weapons despite the US threats to impose sanctions.

Las year, Manila inked a $7.48 million purchase of 750 RPG-7B rocket-propelled grenade launchers from Russia's state-owned Rosoboronexport. The transfer has not been completed as yet. Russia has donated assault rifles and trucks to that country. The grenade launchers deal is the first purchase. In 2016, Russia also donated arms to Fiji. Russia held a joint exercise with Indonesia last December.

Last October, Russia participated in the 4th ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting in the capacity of the organization’s dialogue partner.

Russia is a Pacific nation. It’s only natural for it to move eastwards, diversifying the relations. The upcoming visit of President Putin to Singapore in November demonstrates Moscow’s desire to move to the East. It has no doubt that the relationship with ASEAN states offers a promising future.

On the eve of the East Asia Summit now under way in the Philippines, diplomats from the United States, Japan, Australia and India met in Manila on Sunday to discuss the issues of security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

The only precursor to the quadrilateral format in Asia-Pacific – American slang is “Quad” – was when these four countries (plus Singapore) held a similar meeting in May 2007 – coincidentally, in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Singapore was absent from Sunday’s event. Singapore is reviewing its China policies (despite its strong alliance with the US). It hopes to be a regional hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and as the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations through next year it plans to calm the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

No joint statement was issued after the Quad on Sunday, leaving it to the four capitals to issue press releases. Nuances, inevitably, crept in, which provide useful pointers.

Importantly, the press releases issued in Washington and Tokyo were particularly assertive. The US referred to “quadrilateral partners,” while Japan claimed that the Quad meeting “discussed measures to ensure a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific.”

In a major policy speech last month at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson came close to the US too favoring a regional security architecture through “greater engagement and cooperation” among “Indo-Pacific democracies.” But then he added that “it is going to be an evolving process.”

China’s growing pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific region worries all four countries, and the recent Communist Party Congress in Beijing wouldn’t have eased the angst. Having said that, their priorities vary.

The last thing New Delhi wants is to be hustled into a bloc that restricts its ability to maneuver in the present volatile environment. India retains strategic options, too, which include engaging China bilaterally.

After all, the US$235 billion worth of business deals President Donald Trump secured during his recent “state visit-plus” to China carry a big political message that “America First” dominates US foreign policies.

The last thing New Delhi wants is to be hustled into a bloc that restricts its ability to maneuver in the present volatile environment

The big question, therefore, is: How consistent are the Trump administration’s Asia-Pacific policies? Both Trump and Tillerson say nice things about India to promote US business interests, especially exports of weapons and shale oil, which create jobs in America.

Arguably, Tillerson at times speaks like a strategist, but then, Trump must be believed in that it is he who makes policies – not Tillerson. And Trump is obsessed with transactional diplomacy that is consistent with America First.

India’s strategic dilemma explains the ambivalence that crept into its press release on the Quad event. New Delhi says the diplomats held “consultations.” While the discussions focused on “cooperation based on their converging vision and values” as regards peace, stability and prosperity of the “interconnected region,” they agreed that “a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region” is in regional and global interest.

Besides, they also “exchanged views” regarding terrorism, proliferation linkages and on “enhancing” regional connectivity. Most important, the Indian press release underscored that New Delhi’s Act East policy would remain the “cornerstone of its engagement” with the Asia-Pacific region.

Evidently, Indian diplomats are in wait-and-watch mode. The Indian press release conspicuously refrained from using the word “commitment” in any context – unlike the US, Japanese and Australian versions.

Nonetheless, Delhi will seek to create synergy out of the Quad event. In immediate terms, India is to host the Russia-India-China format at the foreign-minister level, possibly on December 11.

There is bound be a “bilateral” between Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and the visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. New Delhi’s focus will be on carrying forward the spirit of consensus at the leadership level to get the India-China relationship on the right track to pursue “healthy stable bilateral ties” and to ensure that “differences don’t become disputes.”

Quite obviously, the US and Japan are in some hurry to herd India to an exclusive regional format, which to some extent would mitigate the steady deepening of ties between the ASEAN countries and China. Incidentally, Singapore hopes to initiate ASEAN-China naval exercises in the disputed South China Sea next year and to finalize the code of conduct to navigate the territorial disputes.

Events are outpacing US (and Japanese) diplomacy and making it look listless and unimaginative. The salience of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Da Nang is that other than America First in trade, the Trump administration lacks a comprehensive regional strategy.

On the other hand, stoking the fires of regional tensions for geopolitical purposes is not what India’s Act East policy has been about. India always sought to harmonize with the ASEAN consensus rather than create a counterpoint or an alternative narrative.

atimes.com

China’s State Oceanic Administration recently published a document titled A Scientific Guide to Realising China’s Dream as a Maritime Great Power—Learning In-Depth from Secretary-General Xi Jinping’s Important Remarks on the Strategy to becoming a Maritime Great Power.

This document highlights China’s intent to more actively participate in global maritime governance, including in maritime safety and environmental protection. It alludes to China’s vision of reshaping the international maritime order to one that is “fairer, more just and reasonable.” The document also puts forward a “maritime security concept” that is aligned with Xi Jinping’s broader “Asian security concept.” Such a vision is explicitly linked with China’s responsibility as a great power and its desire to increase its “maritime soft power.”

Prominent international-relations scholars, such as Hedley Bull and Iver Neumann, have suggested that both material resources and moral standing are crucial in a country’s quest for great-power status. Historically, for example, Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany had extensive military powers, but insufficient soft power. On the other hand, Poland in the interbellum period had moral standing, but did not possess significant material resources. None of these countries could be considered as great powers.

China is aware of the importance of international moral standing. Its leaders have repeatedly emphasised the need to bolster China’s soft power in order to fulfil “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

The question is whether China will bolster its soft power through working within the existing international world order, or increasingly develop its own set of rules as it continues to rise. John Ikenberry has famously argued that rising powers such as China will not challenge the “Western-oriented world order,” because the existing world order is “historically unique . . . more liberal than imperial—and so unusually accessible, legitimate, and durable” . . . Nonetheless, despite the beliefs of liberal scholars like Ikenberry, China has vehemently disagreed with the United States over international norms and what constitutes as “moral” and “legitimate” behavior. China perceives the status quo as American hegemony that stands in the way of its “Chinese Dream.” Two areas stand out in this regard.

The first is cybersecurity: China and the United States disagree on the interpretation of internet freedom, internet surveillance and whether the state or other stakeholders should play the leading role in defining the rules. China perceives Western media as being unfairly critical of China, and has emphasised that the “freedom of opinion and expression” cannot pose a threat to internal law and order. The issue of internet freedom, therefore, becomes a competition for global influence. The failure of the group of government experts (GGE) at the United Nations to even issue a consensus report following its June 2017 session shows Beijing is increasingly confident about working with other like-minded nations in challenging U.S. efforts to develop and entrench cyberspace norms in international institutions.

Second, China and the United States have in recent years intensified their debates on what freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight means under international law. This includes whether the freedom of navigation for military vessels should be distinguished from that for commercial ones, and the circumstances under which prior notification and authorization are required. The United States’ freedom-of-navigation operations, in particular, have become a major bone of contention between the two countries. This competition between China and the United States could also extend to other areas such as norms development in the outer space.

Military Reforms and Capability Development

Recent reforms to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) look poised to increasingly challenge the United States’ moves in the maritime, cyber and information domains. Over the past two years, the PLA has embarked on a series of reforms to improve its joint and multidimensional capabilities at the national and theater levels. These reforms are the latest iteration of the PLA’s modernisation process since the 1970s. What separates the latest modernization effort from previous ones is the improvement of the PLA’s toolkit that will allow China to compete with the United States in a more multidimensional manner.

Much attention is often paid to the improvements in the PLA Navy’s force-projection capabilities in the form of aircraft carriers, major surface combatants and amphibious assault craft. These capabilities are indeed crucial for China to realize its ambitions of becoming a maritime great power. What remains relatively hidden, however, is the increasing centrality of the information domain, particularly cyberpower, in the PLA’s capability development.

China’s growing information warfare capabilities have also extended beyond that of the PLA to include civilian government agencies and nongovernmental entities. This “civil-military fusion” allows China to draw from the commercial sector and academia to support the PLA’s military missions. Such missions can include the control of information flows, disruption of an opponent and shaping of perceptions in social media and cyberspace. The integration of China’s civil-military information warfare expertise on a national scale is distinct from the United States’ approach, which tends to draw clearer boundaries.

The improvement of the PLA’s capabilities in the maritime, cyber and information domains provides the muscular tools for China to better challenge the United States in the shaping of norms, and to deny the U.S. efforts to reinforce nascent norms that China perceives as against its interest.

Implications on ASEAN and the Way Forward

In recent years, Southeast Asia has become fertile ground for China and the United States to compete and play out their differences. Since the failure of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to issue a joint communiqué following the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Phnom Penh in 2012, much has also been said about how ASEAN has been caught up in the strategic and economic rivalry between China and the United States, threatening ASEAN’s unity and credibility.

Differing strategic and economic interests aside, ASEAN countries also disagree on various aspects of norms and international law. For example, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand share China’s interpretation that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea impose restrictions to the freedom of navigation for military vessels. Other ASEAN countries have adopted the U.S. view that the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and high seas could be used for military purposes. These differences within ASEAN have thus far been kept under control. They could, however, exacerbate should ASEAN member-states take sides in the intensifying normative competition between China and the United States for short-term political gains.

The preferences of China and the United States could shift over time. China is a rising great power with expanding global interests, and its existing interpretation concerning freedom of navigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea would limit the PLAN’s activities in the EEZs of other states. China’s heavy reliance on internet censorship may also be unsustainable as more Chinese regions become inextricably linked with the global community through China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.

In the meantime, however, ASEAN needs to enhance cooperation and agree to a common set of norms and behavior, independent of the U.S.-China dynamics. ASEAN has achieved some success thus far. For example, in the cyber domain, Singapore’s minister for communications and information and the minister-in-charge of cybersecurity, Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim, said during the inaugural ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity held last year that while staying engaged in global conversations on cybersecurity, ASEAN must ensure that “norms and behaviors are kept relevant and applicable to [ASEAN’s] unique context and culture.” ASEAN member-states have also agreed on the importance of developing “a set of practical cybersecurity norms of behavior in ASEAN.”

It remains to be seen whether ASEAN countries could work with the United States and China to manage differences and find common ground, including in the normative realm. To do so, ASEAN countries would have to clearly define and agree upon what constitutes ASEAN’s “unique context and culture,” as well as what is in the interest of ASEAN as a whole. This would in turn provide a more solid foundation for ASEAN to engage and negotiate with the great powers through ASEAN-led platforms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and ASEAN Regional Forum. Track Two networks in ASEAN, United States and China could also play a constructive role in this regard.

nationalinterest.org

Mischief Reef is 900 miles from the mainland of China, and 12,000 miles from the mainland of the United States. It has been built up by China from a sandy pile of rock into a habitable base and lies in the Spratly Island chain which is claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam, both members of the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN.

A week before the United States sent a warship to «demonstrate that Mischief Reef is not entitled to its own territorial sea regardless of whether an artificial island has been built on top of it» there was a meeting attended by representatives of China and all ten ASEAN countries. The purpose was to continue discussions aimed at establishing a code of conduct in the South China Sea, and on May 18 an announcement of progress was made. It was stated that all concerned nations «uphold using the framework of regional rules to manage and control disputes, to deepen practical maritime cooperation, to promote consultation on the code [of conduct] and jointly maintain the peace and stability of the South China Sea».

As stated by the head of the Chinese delegation, deputy foreign minister Liu Zhenmin, «the draft framework contains only the elements and is not the final rules, but the conclusion of the framework is a milestone in the process and is significant. It will provide a good foundation for the next round of consultations». It wasn’t a breakthrough in agreeing about allocation of territory or anything like that — but it was indicative of peaceful progress in an important matter affecting regional countries.

In 2012 the countries involved had agreed that «the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region» and issued a statement that included reaffirmation of «their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations».

All these countries are, of course, signatories to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which, according to the Voice of America «provides guidelines for how nations use the world's seas and their natural resources. It also contains mechanisms for addressing disputes».

But the United States of America, whose coast is 12,000 miles from the South China Sea where its ships zig-zag in ‘Freedom of Navigation’ operations, and its electronic warfare aircraft roam the skies forcing China to activate its mainland defensive radars so that they can be identified as future targets, refuses to sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Berkeley Journal of International Law notes perceptively that «Although ratification of UNCLOS is unlikely today given staunch opposition to it in the Senate, the treaty remains an essential instrument of international law, particularly for resolving international maritime disputes. America’s abstention from the treaty is significant in this context, since as the preeminent naval power in the world it should hold a leading role in shaping the law of the sea. Instead, other nations are playing a larger role». But the US Senate is not known for a logical approach to international affairs, and its reaction is usually confrontational.

On May 10, just before the China-ASEAN conference and the zig-zagging antics of the USS Dewey, several US senators, including the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to President Trump expressing concern that the US Navy had not carried out patrols «upholding freedom of navigation» in the South China Sea since October 2016. This caused them to «urge your administration to take necessary steps to routinely exercise freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, which is critical to US national security interests and to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region».

There has been no instance of any international commercial vessel being in any way denied passage through the South China Sea. There has never been a case in which any nation in the world has had cause to protest that one of its transiting merchant ships has been approached or in any fashion intimidated, endangered or even mildly disconcerted by the actions of a Chinese warship. There hasn’t been a single Chinese zig-zag.

These US Senators appear unable to understand that for China to take such action would be economically disastrous. The New York Times records that «$5.3 trillion worth of goods moves through the sea every year, which is about 30 percent of global maritime trade. That includes huge amounts of oil and $1.2 trillion worth of annual trade with the United States». Surely these representatives of the American people, elected presumably because of their outstanding levels of intelligence, flexibility, shrewdness, self-discipline and overall integrity, can see that if there were any real threat to passage of mercantile craft in the South China Sea there would be a catastrophic impact on making profits?

Even if they are not intelligent or shrewd or possess any of the other qualities desirable in a national legislator, they should realise that if the world’s financial community thought there was a threat to merchant ships in the South China Sea then insurance rates would go through the roof. There would be worldwide rocketing of commodity prices and a massive financial crisis. That is basic enough for even the dumbest senator to understand.

The only overflights in the region that have drawn attention have been the coat-trailing provocative electronic warfare missions of US military aircraft. There has not been one occasion on which an overflying civil aircraft has experienced interference of any sort.

Maintenance of peace and furtherance of prosperity of the region are being handled satisfactorily by regional countries, as demonstrated by the recent amicable gathering of Asian nations who agreed to «jointly maintain the peace and stability of the South China Sea». The major problem in the region is interference by warships and military aircraft of the United States. There is little doubt that China’s deputy foreign minister had his tongue firmly in his cheek when he told the media he hoped the China-ASEAN consultations would not be «subject to any outside interference», because he knew very well that cordial agreement between China and other Asian nations concerning the South China Sea would be anathema to Washington.

The Congress and the Pentagon are marching in step, as evidenced by the declaration of the senators that «We are encouraged by the statement made by Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of US Pacific Command, during his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 26, that he expects new FONOPs to take place soon. We also share Admiral Harris’s assessments that ‘China’s militarization of the South China Sea is real’ and that ‘China continues its methodical strategy to control the South China Sea’».

Much of the world believes that the United States, 12,000 miles from the South China Sea, is the country that wants to control it. Methodical strategy might be the way to go about it, but

as we have seen in the swathe of nations from Afghanistan to Libya, by way of Iraq and Syria, the strategy of the United States is not methodical. But it is decidedly confrontational. And disastrous.