Pepe ESCOBAR

At the start of their discussion marathon in Moscow on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with arguably the most extraordinary diplomatic gambit of the young 21^st century.

Putin said: “At the beginning of our meeting, I would like to once again express my sincere condolences over the death of your servicemen in Syria. Unfortunately, as I have already told you during our phone call, nobody, including Syrian troops, had known their whereabouts.”

This is how a true world leader tells a regional leader, to his face, to please refrain from positioning his forces as jihadi supporters – incognito, in the middle of an explosive theater of war.

The Putin-Erdogan face-to-face discussion, with only interpreters allowed in the room, lasted three hours, before another hour with the respective delegations. In the end, it all came down to Putin selling an elegant way for Erdogan to save face – in the form of, what else, yet another ceasefire in Idlib, which started at midnight on Thursday, signed in Turkish, Russian and English – “all texts having equal legal force.”

Additionally, on March 15, joint Turkish-Russian patrolling will start along the M4 highway – implying endless mutating strands of al-Qaeda in Syria won’t be allowed to retake it.

If this all looks like déjà vu, that’s because it is. Quite a few official photos of the Moscow meeting prominently feature Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu – the other two heavyweights in the room apart from both Presidents. In the wake of Putin, Lavrov and Shoigu must have read the riot act to Erdogan in no uncertain terms. That’s enough: now behave, please – or else face dire consequences.

The second Ataturk

A predictable feature of the new ceasefire is that both Moscow and Ankara – part of the Astana peace process, alongside Tehran – remain committed to maintaining the “territorial integrity and sovereignty” of Syria. Once again, there’s no guarantee that Erdogan will abide.

It’s crucial to recap the basics. Turkey is deep in financial crisis. Ankara needs cash – badly. The lira is collapsing. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is losing elections. Former prime minister and party leader Ahmet Davutoglu – who conceptualized neo-Ottomanism – has left the party and is carving his own political niche. The AKP is mired in an internal crisis.

Erdogan’s response has been to go on the offensive. That’s how he re-establishes his aura. Combine Idlib with his maritime pretensions around Cyprus and blackmail pressure on the EU via the inundation of Lesbos in Greece with refugees, and we have Erdogan’s trademark modus operandi in full swing.

In theory, the new ceasefire will force Erdogan to finally abandon all those myriad al Nusra/ISIS metastases – what the West calls “moderate rebels,” duly weaponized by Ankara. This is an absolute red line for Moscow – and also for Damascus. There will be no territory left behind for jihadis. Iraq is another story: ISIS is still lurking around Kirkuk and Mosul.

No NATO fanatic will ever admit it, but once again it was Russia that just prevented the threatened “Muslim invasion” of Europe advertised by Erdogan. Yet there was never any invasion in the first place, only a few thousand economic migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Sahel, not Syrians. There are no “one million” Syrian refugees on the verge of entering the EU.

The EU, proverbially, will keep blabbering. Brussels and most capitals still have not understood that Bashar al-Assad has been fighting al Nusra/ISIS all along. They simply don’t understand the correlation of forces on the ground. Their fallback position is always the scratched CD of “European values.” No wonder the EU is a secondary actor in the whole Syrian tragedy.

I received excellent feedback from progressive Turkish analysts as I attempted to connect Erdogan Khan’s motivations with Turkey’s history and the empires of he steppes.

Their argument, essentially, is that Erdogan is an internationalist, but in Islamic terms only. Since 2000 he has managed to create a climate of denying ancient Turkish nationalist motives. He does use Turkishness, but as one analyst stresses, “he has nothing to do with ancient Turks. He’s an Ikhwani. He doesn’t care about Kurds either, as long as they are his ‘good Islamists.’”

Another analyst points out that, “in modern Turkey, being ‘Turkish’ is not related to race, because most Turkish people are Anatolian, a mixed population.”

So, in a nutshell, what Erdogan cares about is Idlib, Aleppo, Damascus, Mecca and not Southwest Asia or Central Asia. He wants to be “the second Ataturk.” Yet nobody except Islamists sees him this way – and “sometimes he shows his anger because of this. His only aim is to beat Ataturk and create an Islamic opposite of Ataturk.” And creating that anti-Ataturk would be via neo-Ottomanism.

Crack independent historian Dr Can Erimtan, whom I had the pleasure to meet when he still lived in Istanbul (he’s now in self-exile), offers a sweeping Eurasianist background to Erdogan’s dreams. Well, Vladimir Putin has just offered the second Ataturk some breathing room. All bets are off on whether the new ceasefire will metastasize into a funeral pyre.

asiatimes.com

During many meetings I had with members of the opposition in several countries several years ago, they kept insisting that the first and central objective of their “Revolution”, was the downfall of President Al-Assad. This was a precondition for the start of the political process to establish a transitional governing body in line with Security Council Resolution 2254; under no condition, they insisted, would they negotiate with President Al-Assad.

That was then; today, the opposition has been reduced to a minority component of a Constitutional Committee to draft a constitution for Syria which amounts to an admission by the opposition and the regional and international powers who supported them, of the end of their presumed “Revolution”. It is also an admission of the legitimacy of the present Syrian constitution and the 2014 election of President Al-Assad, whose downfall they insisted on for years and now with whose representatives they will negotiate to draft a constitution; an anathema for the opposition and their sponsors. In fairness, it should also be noted that the willingness of the Syrian government to be part of the Constitution Committee and negotiate with the opposition is legitimizing the opposition which the government previously considered a terrorist threat.

Presently, a contentious issue between the Syrian authorities and the opposition revolves around whether the Committee shall draft a new constitution or rewrite the 2012 constitution. The 2012 constitution includes 157 articles, the majority of which should, rationally, be acceptable to the opposition. A minority of articles are contentious; of the most contentious and possibly insurmountable articles, the following stand out, starting with the least contentious ones:

1. Article 1. Syria and Syrians national identity. “The Syrian Arab Republic…” and “People of the Syrian Arab Republic are part of the Arab Nation.” Some groups of the Syrian secterian and ethnic mosaic, particularly ethnic, would object to identify Syria and Syrians as Arab.
2. Article 3. Religion in the constitution. “The President has to be part of the Muslim faith” and “Islamic jurisprudence doctrine is a primary source of legislation.” Here also some groups would object to involve religion in the constitution.
3. Articles 91-116. Distribution of executive powers, in which extensive executive powers are granted to the president. Some groups will note that this would be normal if the Syrian political system was Presidential. But the Syrian political system is Parliamentary in which the executive powers ought to be, by and large, delegated to the Prime Minister while the presidential powers would typically be mostly ceremonial.
4. Articles 88 and 155. Two term presidential service and retroactive limitation. Article 88 states, “The President may be re-elected for another single term.” Article 155 states “The provisions of Article /88/ of this constitution shall come into effect as of the next Presidential elections.” Thus, the constitution’s retroactive article permits President Al-Assad to be nominated in the next presidential elections in 2021. The government component will insist on including a provision in the new constitution similar to Article 155 of the present constitution which clearly means President Al-Assad is eligible for nomination in the 2021 presidential elections. Conversely, the opposition would most likely insist on including a retroactive two presidential terms article which will effectively prevent President Al-Assad from nomination in the next presidential elections; a potential deadlock!

For both the government and the opposition, the extensive presidential powers and President Al-Assad’s nomination in the next presidential elections in 2021, amongst others, are the crux of the matter, the carpenter’s knot, as the Arabs would say; an irresistible force colliding with an immovable object. In view of the adoption of the 75% majority voting rule, giving each component a veto power, either of these two issues, could sabotage drafting a new constitution, and rendering the attempt at a peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis null and void and back to square one, which the government probably would not mind.

The government is united with clear sequential peace process steps leading to where it wants to get. The first step is adopting a new constitution, after which other steps follow. Conversely, the opposition is plagued by many ills including disunity, disorganization, mismanagement, rivalries, etc. It is not united on a clear sequential peace process steps: Is the first step adopting a new constitution or establishing a transitional governing authority? Time is on the side of the government and it will use rules of procedures to delay the drafting of a constitution. The Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem has made it clear that there is no rush in drafting a constitution.

Finally, the government and the opposition are aware of the power disparity between them, which brings to mind Thucydides dictum “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” However, the ultimate question and determining factor is: will the influentials see to it that a new constitution is drafted and the peace process moves on to the next step?

Scott RITTER

The ceasefire agreement brokered by Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Thursday accomplishes very little outside of putting window dressing on a foregone conclusion. Simply put, the Turks will be able to achieve their objectives of clearing a safe zone of Kurdish forces south of the Turkish border, albeit under a U.S. sanctioned agreement. In return, the U.S. agrees not to impose economic sanctions on Turkey.

So basically it doesn’t change anything that’s already been set into motion by the Turkish invasion of northern Syria. But it does signal the end of the American experiment in Syrian regime change, with the United States supplanted by Russia as the shot caller in Middle Eastern affairs.

To understand how we got to this point, we need to navigate the four A’s that underpin America’s failed policy vis-à-vis Syria—Afghanistan, Astana, Adana, and Ankara.

The first, Afghanistan, represents the epitome of covert American meddling in regional affairs—Operation Cyclone, the successful CIA-run effort to arm and equip anti-communist rebels in Afghanistan to confront the Soviet Army from 1979 to 1989. The success of the Afghanistan experience helped shape an overly optimistic assessment by the administration of President Barack Obama that a similarly successful effort could be had in Syria by covertly training and equipping anti-Assad rebels.

The second, Astana, is the capital city of Kazakhstan, recently renamed Nur Sultan in March 2019. Since 2017, Astana has played host to a series of summits that have become known as “the Astana Process,” a Russian-directed diplomatic effort ostensibly designed to facilitate a peaceful ending to the Syrian crisis, but in reality part of a larger Russian-run effort to sideline American regime change efforts in Syria.

The Astana Process was sold as a complementary effort to the U.S.-backed, UN-brokered Geneva Talks, which were initially convened in 2012 to bring an end to the Syrian conflict. The adoption by the U.S. of an “Assad must go” posture doomed the Geneva Talks from the outset. The Astana Process was the logical outcome of this American failure.

The third “A”—Adana—is a major city located in southern Turkey, some 35 kilometers inland from the Mediterranean Sea. It’s home to the Incirlik Air Base, which hosts significant U.S. Air Force assets, including some 50 B-61 nuclear bombs. It also hosted a meeting between Turkish and Syrian officials in October 1998 for the purpose of crafting a diplomatic solution to the problem presented by forces belonging to the Kurdish People’s Party, or PKK, who were carrying out attacks inside Turkey from camps located within Syria.

The resulting agreement, known as the Adana Agreement, helped prevent a potential war between Turkey and Syria by formally recognizing the respective sovereignty and inviolability of their common border. In 2010, the two nations expanded the 1998 deal into a formal treaty governing cooperation and joint action, inclusive of intelligence sharing on designated terrorist organizations (i.e., the PKK). The Adana Agreement/Treaty was all but forgotten in the aftermath of the 2011 Syrian crisis, as Turkey embraced regime change regarding the Assad government, only to be resuscitated by Russian President Vladimir Putin during talks with Erdogan in Moscow in January 2019. The re-introduction of the moribund agreement into the Syrian-Turkish political dynamic successfully created a diplomatic bridge between the two countries, paving the way for a formal resolution of their considerable differences.

Russia’s rejection of the Turkish demands for a ceasefire were interpreted by the Western media as a sign of the summit’s failure. But the opposite was true—Russia backed Turkey’s demand for a security corridor along the Turkish-Syrian border, and accepted Ankara’s characterization of the American-backed Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) as “terrorists.” This agreement, combined with Turkey’s willingness to recognize the outcome of Syrian presidential elections projected to take place in 2021, paved the way for the political reconciliation between Turkey and Syria. It also hammered the last nail in the coffin of America’s regime change policy regarding Bashar al-Assad.

There is little mention of the four A’s in American politics and the mainstream media. Instead there’s only a skewed version of reality, which portrays the American military presence in Syria as part and parcel of a noble alliance between the U.S. and the Kurdish SDF to confront the ISIS scourge. This ignores the reality that the U.S. has been committed to regime change in Syria since 2011, and that the fight against ISIS was merely a sideshow to this larger policy objective.

“Assad must go.” Those three words have defined American policy on Syria since they were first alluded to by President Obama in an official White House statement released in August 2011. The initial U.S. strategy did not involve an Afghanistan-like arming of rebel forces, but rather a political solution under the auspices of policies and entities created under the administration of President George W. Bush. In 2006, the State Department created the Iran-Syrian Operations Group, or ISOG, which oversaw interdepartmental coordination of regime change options in both Iran and Syria.

Though ISOG was disbanded in 2008, its mission was continued by other American agencies. One of the byproducts of the work initiated by ISOG was the creation of Syrian political opposition groups that were later morphed by the Obama administration into an entity known as the Syrian National Council, or SNC. When Obama demanded that Assad must step aside in August 2011, he envisioned that the Syrian president would be replaced by the SNC. This was the objective of the Geneva Talks brokered by the United Nations and the Arab League in 2011-2012. One of the defining features of those talks was the insistence on the part of the U.S., UK, and SNC that the Assad government not be allowed to participate in any discussion about the political future of Syria. This condition was rejected by Russia, and the talks ultimately failed. Efforts to revive the Geneva Process likewise floundered on this point.

Faced with this diplomatic failure, Obama turned to the CIA to undertake an Afghanistan-like arming of Syrian rebels to accomplish on the ground what could not be around a table in Geneva.

The CIA took advantage of Turkish animosity toward Syria in the aftermath of suppression of anti-Syrian government demonstrations in 2011 to funnel massive quantities of military equipment, weapons, and ammunition from Libya to Turkey, where they were used to arm a number of anti-Assad rebels operating under the umbrella of the so-called “Free Syrian Army,” or FSA. In 2013, the CIA took direct control of the arm and equip program, sending teams to Turkey and Jordan to train the FSA. This effort, known as Operation Timber Sycamore, was later supplemented with a Department of Defense program to provide anti-tank weapons to the Syrian opposition.

American efforts to create a viable armed opposition ultimately failed, with many of the weapons and equipment eventually falling into the hands of radical jihadist groups aligned with al-Qaeda and, later, ISIS. The emergence of ISIS as a regional threat in 2014 led to the U.S. building ties with Syrian Kurds as an alternative vector for implementation of its Syrian policy objectives.

While the fight against ISIS was real, it was done in the context of the American occupation of fully one third of Syria’s territory, including oil fields and agricultural resources. As recently as January 2019, the U.S. was justifying the continued presence of forces in Syria as a means of containing the Iranian presence there; the relationship with the SDF and Syrian Kurds was little more than a front to facilitate this policy.

Turkish incursion into Syria is the direct manifestation of the four A’s that define the failure of American policy in Syria—Afghanistan, Astana, Adana and Ankara. It represents the victory of Russian diplomacy over American force of arms. This is a hard pill for most Americans to swallow, which is why many are busy crafting a revisionist history that both glorifies and justifies failed American policy by wrapping it in the flag of our erstwhile Kurdish allies.

But the American misadventure in Syria was never going to end well—bad policy never does. For the American troops caught up in the collapse of the decades-long effort of the United States to overthrow the Assad government, the retreat from Syria was every bit as ignominious as the retreats of all defeated military forces before them. But at least our forces left Syria alive, and not inside body bags—which was an all too real alternative had they remained in place to face the overwhelming forces of geopolitical reality in transition.

theamericanconservative.com

You would hardly know it from reading the U.S. press, but a summit of considerable significance took place late last month. German, French, Russian, and Turkish leaders convened in Istanbul Oct. 27 to create a comprehensive plan to end the seven-year war in Syria. On the agenda: increase humanitarian aid, rebuild ruined towns and cities, assist returning refugees, draft a new constitution and arrange internationally supervised elections. All this will take time, but the Syria story is evolving from one of conflict to one of reconciliation and reconstruction.

Two features of the summit deserve special note.

The four nations are not all fast friends, to put it mildly. But they drew together to find common interests in resolving what may count as the worst crisis since the Cold War’s end. Second, there was a conspicuous absence at the Istanbul gathering: the United States. Despite its prominent role in the Syrian conflict for at least the past six years, if not longer, the United States wanted no part of a many-sided summit dedicated to resolving it via negotiation.

A matter of days later came the Trump administration’s sweeping new sanctions against Iran, planned for many months and put into force at midnight on Nov. 4.

Never mind Washington’s adversaries: Even its traditional allies in Europe are resisting the United States.  This new round of sanctions rank among the stupidest foreign policy moves of Trump’s two years in office. Two others were withdrawing from the climate pact in June 2017 and  unilaterally recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital six months later.

At this point, three things are clear about the Trump administration’s approach to global affairs.

No. 1: Team Trump’s foreign policies are easily the most incoherent of any administration in recent memory. The United States does or does not want to settle the Korean question. It does or does not have an even-handed plan for peace in the Mideast. It has or has not abandoned its campaign to depose the Assad government in Damascus. What appears so on Monday appears otherwise by midweek.

No 2: Time and again, this administration overplays its hand. In case after case it acts on its own, expecting other nations to follow, only to discover that few or none do. Since Trump took office, misjudging U.S. prerogatives may be among the only consistent feature of his foreign policy.

No. 3: “America First” begins to shape up as “America Last” on the foreign policy side. We are a long way from “the indispensable nation,” the phrase that Madeleine Albright used for the United States during her time as secretary of state in the Clinton administration.  Two years into Trump’s presidency, Albright’s assertion—which was never more than U.S. hubris at its purest—looks like it might be headed to a museum.

This is not solely due to incompetence in the Trump White House, although this is considerable. The United States has been unable to find its place in a swiftly changing world order at least since the George W. Bush administration. It has consistently mishandled relations with China and Russia from one administration to the next, to take two prominent examples: trans–Atlantic ties with longtime allies (who too often behave like vassals) have deteriorated steadily for years due to Washington’s misjudgments.

The Trump administration’s confusion merely makes the gravity of our moment more difficult to deny: Absent last century’s simplicities—chief among them the binary East-West division—the United States is losing its grip on leading.   

Talk of Withdrawal

There is much talk in Washington these days of a U.S. withdrawal from global affairs. Ivo Daalder, a former ambassador to NATO and now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, recently co-authored a book, with James Lindsay, called “The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership.” It is a long lament about what its title suggests: the United States is surrendering—supposedly—its position as No. 1 among nations.

This is a misreading, perfectly upside down from reality. The United States is not surrendering anything. That is precisely the problem. It refuses to give up its long-asserted right to act unilaterally on the assumption other nations will either fall in line or silently acquiesce.

At the same time, Washington declines to participate in multilateral efforts to resolve wars, competing political or territorial claims, and other such problems via diplomatic negotiation, often with adversaries. This helps explain why the Trump administration repudiated the Paris climate pact and then the accord governing Iran’s nuclear programs: Both implicitly demonstrate that multipolarity is an inevitable 21st Century reality.

Daalder acknowledged this during a recent talk at the Council on Foreign Relations, even if he seemed not to have grasped his own lesson. “As the U.S. withdraws,” he said, “it’s not involved in building coalitions bringing people together to deal with global challenges, people are going to turn to others.”

The Istanbul summit on Syria is an excellent case in point. The United States should have been there. South Korea is another. While President Moon Jae-in has to manage Seoul’s traditional ties to Washington delicately, he has unmistakably seized the lead in Northeast Asia and repeatedly signals that he remains committed to a settlement with the North—ultimately with or without U.S. cooperation.

Nostalgia is part of the problem. The world turns, and Washington is lost in a kind of memory palace, where it nurses the desire to prolong those decades of unchallenged primacy that it enjoyed after World War II. It refuses to accept there is no turning back the clock. While it wants to play “follow the leader” other nations drop out of the game.

Vigorous, nearly universal opposition to the new sanctions against Iran, Seoul’s determination to press on toward peace on the Korean Peninsula, the summit on Syria in Istanbul: They all make the same point. Washington must abandon its Wilsonian ambition to shape the world in its own image if it is to remain an effective power—as it can and should—in the new global order. The new Iran sanctions already appear to be a turning point in this respect: Donald Trump’s Washington thought it could lead, but virtually no one is following. 

There is no “abdication” and no new isolationist era in the offing. But until the U.S. accepts the new norms of statecraft in a world of rising powers, we will watch as other nations withdraw from America—a very different thing.

Photo: @trpresidency

The four powers signed a communique emphasizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. It was Putin who underscored the inviolability of the Syrian government of President Assad as the internationally recognized authority in the Arab country. The communique also endorsed the right of the Syrian nation to self-determination over the future political settlement, free from external interference.

These principles have been stated before in a previous UN Security Council Resolution 2254. But it seems more than ever that the sovereignty of Syria has been widely accepted. Recall that not too long ago, Turkey and France were calling for President Assad to stand down. That demand is no longer tenable, at least as far as the four powers attending the Istanbul summit are concerned.

The upholding of Syrian self-determination bears the stamp of Russia’s long-held position. The acceptance of this position by Turkey, Germany and France is testimony to the key role Russia has established in ending the nearly eight-year war in Syria and now creating the framework for a peace settlement in the war-torn country. This framework has been made possible after Russia’s principled military intervention nearly three years ago, which prevented Syria from being destroyed by Western-backed insurgents.

Ironically, the US and Britain have been pursuing a policy of trying to isolate and delegitimize Russia in international relations. Evidently from the Quadrilateral Summit in Istanbul, Moscow is far from isolated. It is perhaps the linchpin power for the reconstruction of Syria. Furthermore, Russia has emerged as having newfound leadership on the international stage owing to its laudable contribution in salvaging Syria from a foreign-sponsored war to destroy that nation.

Another important takeaway from the Istanbul gathering was that Washington and London were not invited to attend. That speaks to the diminished role these two powers have previously claimed in international politics. Their absence also speaks to the tacit recognition that the US and Britain have played a destructive part in fomenting the war in Syria. Turkey and France have also blood on their hands from likewise sponsoring regime change. But at least, it seems, the latter two have come significantly some way to accepting that the illicit objective of regime change is now a dead-end.

It remains to be seen if the Istanbul communique can be translated into substantive results in terms of Syria’s reconstruction. Both Germany and France appeared at this stage to not commit to providing financial aid. Berlin and Paris appeared to with-hold specific aid, perhaps as a way to maintain some kind of leverage over shaping a final political settlement. That contradicts the principle of recognizing Syrian self-determination. Nevertheless, if millions of Syrian refugees are to return to their country – a paramount issue for the European Union – then the EU must do much more in financing Syria’s reconstruction.

Another glaring contradiction in the communique is that the territorial integrity of Syria is being violated by the US and Turkey. Both have troops occupying swathes of Syrian territory in what is an egregious breach of international law. For a comprehensive peace settlement, all foreign powers present in Syria without a legal mandate must be withdrawn from the country.

While the US was excluded from the Quadrilateral Summit, Washington still exerts a baleful obstacle to peace.

Days after the Istanbul conference, the US envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, made provocative statements that do not bode well. He gloated in the fact that the US has some 2,000 troops in the country, and the State Department official warned that Washington would not permit a normalization of Syria by giving up occupied territory.

Jeffrey told media in Brussels. “We are not going to put it [Syria] back together, and we are going to do everything we can, and that’s a lot, to ensure that nobody else does.”

It was a staggering admission of criminality by the US diplomat. It flies in the face of UN resolutions and the Istanbul communique endorsing Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, the threat of further destabilizing Syria by Washington illustrates that US objectives are in direct conflict with those of its European allies.

Germany, France and the rest of Europe need a peaceful reconstruction of Syria if they are to mitigate the refugee crisis that has destabilized the EU. A major political challenge to German Chancellor Angela Merkel from within her own country stems from the refugee crisis that the Syrian war has generated. The US policy of interminable interference in Syria is deeply incompatible with Europe’s interests for restoring peace to the Mediterranean and Middle East region.

Russia has helped decisively to win the war in Syria. But to win the peace, other powers must play a constructive role. Moscow has also decisively led the way to finding a peaceful settlement, from its diplomacy in previous summits in Astana and Sochi.

Far from being isolated or delegitimized, Russia has demonstrated an admirable leadership with regard to Syria. It is the US and Britain that are seen to be woefully isolated, and still pushing a destructive policy.

The Istanbul summit was a vindication of Russian policy. The coming together of Turkey, Germany and France with Russia is further vindication. What these four powers must do is insist on Washington abiding by international law and respecting Syria’s sovereignty. By getting illegal American forces out of Syria that would also go towards solving Turkey’s concerns over US-backed Kurdish separatists occupying territory in northeast Syria.

Washington is the one that is isolated over Syria, not Russia. The Europeans and Turkey are right to recognize Russia as a viable partner with regard to Syria’s future and their own security. By contrast, Washington as currently positioned, and for the foreseeable future, has nothing to offer except a dead-end.

Such an outcome can be interpreted in the following ways. First and foremost, a major regional conflict impacting international security was addressed without US participation. A sign of our times?

Second, participants didn’t quarrel over President Bashar Al-Assad’s “fate”. The debate becomes pedantic today in terms of ground realities. The Syrian nation should decide on its future. That’s also been Assad’s demand.

Third, some serious thought has been given to the journey towards a Syrian settlement – ceasefire, drafting of new constitution followed by elections under UN supervision. Four, the participants snubbed the US-Israeli plan to balkanize Syria into “spheres of influence” and have also squashed the Israeli dreams of getting international legitimacy for its illegal occupation of Golan Heights as part of any settlement.

Five, Germany and France have become amenable to the Russian demand pressing the urgency for rendering humanitarian aid to Syria and help in reconstruction. (US made this conditional on Assad’s removal.) We’ll have to see how it pans out, but the summit also stressed the importance of return of Syrian refugees (which is a key issue for European countries.)

Six, the participants recognized that the remaining terrorists in Syria must be destroyed – although, significantly, they also supported the Idlib ceasefire deal brokered by Turkey and Russia.

The bottom line is that it is the post-war Syrian order that is under discussion now. However, it must be understood as well that the proxy war is not ending but is rather morphing into the diplomatic war that lies ahead, which of course will be keenly fought, given the divergent interests of the foreign protagonists.

Generally speaking, Russia and Turkey are in command as of now. Their own equations are good but there are grey areas, too. The importance of close coordination between Russia and Turkey cannot but be stressed.

Iran cannot be happy that it has been excluded from the Istanbul summit. But it may prove an underestimation that Iran is in no position to assert its legitimate interests. The close consultations between Russia and Iran – not only regarding Syria – are of course the mitigating factor here.

Similarly, “post-Khashoggi” Saudi attitude to Syria remains the “known unknown”. The US is in a position to blackmail Saudi Arabia to continue to bankroll its military presence in Syria, but Saudis cannot be having their heart in the overreach to project power abroad. Something has fundamentally changed – Saudis are not used to their prestige being dragged in the mud as in this past month and the traumatic experience cannot but have a sobering effect.

Besides, Saudis dare not cross swords with Turkey on the latter’s Syrian playpen. Above all, Saudis would not want to undermine Russian efforts to stabilize Syria, since Moscow’s goodwill and cooperation is extremely vital for Riyadh in the coming period, now that the raison d’etre of Riyadh’s “Look East” is beyond doubt.

Basically, France and Germany are lightweights in Syria. They had a limited agenda at the Istanbul summit. Russia must know fully well that in the final analysis, US involvement is crucial. It is entirely conceivable that at the forthcoming Russian-American summit in Paris on November 11, Syria will be a major topic of discussion.

The US policy in Syria is at a crossroad and will hinge greatly on the standing of President Trump in the aftermath of the November 6 mid-term elections in the US.

Clearly, this was far from a situation of three major allies of the US staging a mutiny on the NATO ship. Germany and France would have consulted Washington most certainly ahead of the Istanbul summit (which has been in the making for months.)

The big question is how the Turkish-American relations evolve. The Khashoggi affair has brought about certain US-Turkey “proximity”. Ironically, the Deep State in America and Trump are on the same page here – rediscovering the vital importance of Turkey for the US regional strategies.

The spokesmen of the Deep State used to defame Turkish President Recep Erdogan for being “Islamist” and “authoritarian” and so on and probably even tried to overthrow him in the failed coup of 2016, but today, they laud him for espousing Islamic democracy as the panacea for the region.

Erdogan, in turn – or at least a part of him – had always hankered for recognition by the West when he sought Turkey’s historic leadership role in the Middle East and uniqueness to act as a bridge between the West and the region. Equally, Trump is eternally grateful to Erdogan to refrain from spilling the beans on the Khashoggi affair and for helping him finesse a major crisis for his presidency on the foreign-policy front.

Suffice to say, this “transition” in the US-Turkey tough love can profoundly affect the geopolitics of the Middle East – provided of course Washington plays its cards carefully in regard of Erdogan’s wish list on a host of pending issues, including some of great sensitivity.

Syria is somewhere at the top of Erdogan’s priorities. Howsoever unpalatable it may appear, Erdogan will expect the Americans to throw their Syrian Kurdish allies under the bus. Yesterday, Turkish army bombarded Kurdish positions east of Euphrates.

Now, how Turkish policies play out in Syria is difficult to predict, since the variables are too many. A US-Turkey rapprochement is hard to reach. But then, Turks and Americans are also old allies and they have a way of knocking their heads together and start working together again.

Photo: @trpresidency

Three months ago, the American military established an outpost in Manbij, in the wake of Turkey’s threats to seize control of the area. The US has some 300 soldiers based at two facilities there. In March, US Marines beefed up the military presence at the Al-Tanf base in southern Syria that is located just a few miles from the Jordanian border. The American military has established a 55-km. no-go zone around that facility.

On May 15, US personnel were reported to be setting up a new base in Badiyeh al-Sha’afa in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province. It’s hard to believe that this move is justified by the need to confront the Islamic State — that once-powerful enemy now on the brink of extinction. One does not need new bases to finish it off. The Syrian army is well versed in how to do that.

Last month US forces were also reported to be building a new outpost at the al-Omar oil field in southeastern Deir ez-Zor. They were deployed to positions around the Conoco and al-Jafreh oil fields. On April 7, the area around the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor was declared a military zone by the US-led SDF. That group has already clashed with Syrian forces in the fight to control the province.

The SDF is constantly reinforcing its positions in Deir ez-Zor as part of its ongoing Operation Al-Jazeera Storm, which was launched on May 1. It recently seized al-Baghuz and is pushing the remaining ISIS forces out of the pocket of Hajin and al-Dashisha along the border with Iraq. These operations are coordinated with the Iraqi air force. The SDF Arab-Kurdish forces have liberated about 65 square kilometers from Daesh. Making short work of whatever is left of the Islamic State is certainly a good thing, but Syrian troops will not be allowed in. The territory will become part of a quasi-state created to become a separate entity.

Despite its recent claims to the contrary, the US is hunkering down in Syria for the long haul. The US, Saudi Arabia, and France have already discussed the possibility of joint actions against Iran. The administration is pressing its Arab allies to do more. French forces are already operating in Deir ez-Zor together with the SDF.

The US buildup in northeastern Syria is important for cutting off any direct land route from Tehran across to the Mediterranean.

It is symbolic that the United States was not present at the Astana round of talks on May 14-15. It shows that Washington is no longer interested in de-escalation zones. It wants a divided Syria, with a new, pro-US entity on the map of the Middle East. It is creating local governing bodies that operate independently from Damascus, with enough money flowing in to keep them functional. And it would like to see other parts of Syria plunge into an all-against-all war. Instead of nation-building, Washington is engaged in nation-destruction. That’s why it continues to train rebel forces at Al-Tanf. The militants are not undergoing special exercises to hone their skills for peacekeeping operations, but rather for subversive activities.

Syria’s territorial integrity is guaranteed by UN Resolution 2254 — a binding document that the US, along with France, is in flagrant violation of.

But what if the US achieves in Syria what it wanted to do in Iraq — create a prosperous, pro-Western “democratic” state that can become a shining example for other Arab states to follow? The Iraqis have failed to grasp this “opportunity.” On May 15, they proved that once again by voting for Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of Saraya al-Salam, who fought against the US-imposed “liberation.”

The UN General Assembly’s condemnation of Washington’s decision to relocate its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem shows how badly the US needs a success to rescue its waning clout in the region. Becoming the leader of the anti-Iranian coalition is how they’ve decided to do that and the location for that is Syria. The creation of a pro-Western entity in northeastern Syria will weaken Iran’s influence in Iraq and keep Russia contained.

But things could go the other way around. What if the Kurdish-dominated forces plunge into clashes with the local Arab population and the problems of inefficient local governance mount, while the Astana process makes progress thanks to the cease-fire and restoration of peaceful life in the de-escalation zones? A Kurdish-dominated entity, even if it is pro-US, is not something that Turkey may like or accept. Will the partition of Syria boost US standing in the region? Other Arab nations will think twice about letting America play a role in the management of any conflict. There are more questions than answers, but we have what we have — the US military presence in Syria is ballooning, hampering peace efforts and provoking armed conflicts.

Post-war Syria is a scene of devastation. The creation of de-escalation zones has worked well to establish a cease-fire and a pause to catch one’s breath before the work of reconstruction begins. The Western powers are very unlikely to help rebuild Syria as long as Assad’s government, which is backed by Russia and Iran, remains in power. Legislation that has been dubbed the “No Assistance for Assad Act” has passed the US House of Representatives and has been read twice in the Senate. The bill seeks to channel US aid exclusively to the parts of Syria outside the control of the government.

The West’s reluctance to help rebuild Syria makes China a viable alternative. It is ready to contribute, which is a very welcome development. Chinese businessmen are already in Syria, exploring the opportunities for investment. Beijing has announced a plan to build a $2 billion industrial park for 150 Chinese companies. It has launched the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multi-billion, massive, intercontinental infrastructure development project, which includes Syria as a transit partner. China is for future investments around the world and Syria could be the beneficiary of much of that. It could also be used to assist Russia, Iran, and Turkey, the Astana process guarantor states.

China provides military and other forms of assistance to Syria. It has a vested interest in the settlement of the conflict, because stability in Syria reduces the risk that mercenaries from Xinjiang will return home to mount terrorist attacks. Last year, about 5,000 ethnic Uyghurs from that province traveled to Syria to train and fight for various militant groups. The normalization of the situation would prevent the country from becoming a haven and training ground for China’s Muslim extremists. But no stability is achievable in Syria without improved living standards.

Beijing has been playing a low-key yet active role in the peace process, without military involvement. It has joined Russia to veto several UN proposals put forward by the West that would sanction the Syrian government.

If China became the fourth full-fledged guarantor state for the Astana process, the peace effort could expand to bring in other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including India and Pakistan. These states have never taken sides in Syria’s conflict, and thus could be trusted to act as impartial mediators. Iran is an observer and Turkey is a partner in the dialog. Egypt and Syria have also submitted applications to be granted observer status. Cairo is considering the possibility of sending its forces to Syria. With so many members involved in the conflict, the SCO could launch a comprehensive, international peace initiative based on the Astana process.

If some progress were made, Syria could obtain a status in the group that would be a stepping stone to full-fledged membership. The SCO could speak with one voice at the UN-brokered Geneva talks. The Shanghai Organization could solve the Syrian conflict without the West imposing its own rules of the game. Such a political breakthrough would greatly facilitate the implementation of China’s BRI, with all the major actors participating in the project. The SCO’s clout would grow immensely. Europe would benefit as well, if an SCO-brokered peace halted the flow of refugees.

China and Russia are also members of BRICS, another powerful group with growing prominence on the world stage. Three out of the five BRICS states – Russia, India, and China – are members of the Shanghai group. Brazil and South Africa would boost their global clout by joining in an SCO-BRICS peace effort in Syria. It’s important that the Syrian government view the BRICS coalition as a legitimate player. The participation of BRICS and SCO in the settlement process would transform the international system into a more multilateral configuration. This would also be in line with the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was adopted by the UN in 2005. Syria is the right place to demonstrate that R2P is more than an empty phrase.

In theory, there may be reservations about bringing China in to act as the fourth guarantor state in the Astana process, but the advantages clearly outweigh any doubts. It would be a good thing for Beijing to play a greater role in the political efforts.

No peace will come if Syria is not rebuilt. The post-war reconstruction is too much for anyone to take on alone. It needs to be a comprehensive, international endeavor. This is a good opportunity for the SCO and BRICS to transform themselves into real international actors tackling urgent problems. Expanding the effort to bring peace to Syria is kind of a chain reaction that could be set in motion by bringing in China. This would be a step in the right direction toward resolving the conflict.

The statement was quite a surprise to Russia. On April 20, Staffan de Mistura said something quite different while on a visit to Moscow. Timing matters. The UN envoy’s statement was made prior to a summit scheduled to take place on May 14 under the auspices of the Astana process. The foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, and Iran are currently working hard to get ready for this event. They met in Moscow on April 28.

Other forums are welcome, Mr. de Mistura said. The US and France are already seeking new venues to address the Syrian crisis. French President Macron has slammed the Astana process, stressing the need for an alternative. A group of nations was established by France several weeks ago that includes the US, France, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, all working very closely with each other. The group is coordinating its activities with Turkey and Germany and intends to become a new forum for discussing ways to end the Syrian crisis. Mr. Macron believes that the French initiative is complementary to the Astana and Geneva talks. But do these forums need to be complemented? Is more always better? Is this approach appropriate when it comes to a crisis?

The US and France are calling on Arab countries to share the burden through military and financial contributions. Naturally they want the seats at the round table to be taken by their Arab allies, not Iran or Russia. The possibility of deploying troops from Arab countries is under discussion. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt are expected to join.

The leaders of the US and France have agreed to maintain “a strong and lasting footprint” in Syria. The presidents have vowed to prevent Iran from acquiring “open season to the Mediterranean.” President Macron promised to boost the French military presence in Syria during his visit to Washington.

And the goal is clear — the partition of Syria, with the rich Persian Gulf countries financing the rebuilding of large sections of the territory under the control of the US-led coalition. They want a partition, but the Astana process is premised on maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity. According to the Russian ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, some potential contributors are vowing “not to give a cent' until political changes take place in Syria." On April 24, the House of Representatives voted in favor of a bill that bans any American reconstruction support for the parts of Syria that are under the control of the government.

With other countries sending troops and providing funds to keep Syria divided, President Trump will be able to end, or at least reduce, America’s presence in Syria as he promised. But the troops won’t be headed home. They’ll be moving to Iraq. On April 26, Defense Secretary James Mattis told Congress that the fight is not over and that the US military will increase its operations on the Iraqi side of the border. That same day, the US defense secretary held talks with his Israeli counterpart, discussing the potential Israeli-Iranian armed conflict that will soon erupt. If that happens, US forces will be tasked with countering Iran from Iraq.

 On April 27, US military officials disclosed that US satellites, surveillance aircraft, drones, and ships had stepped up their surveillance operations to monitor the movement of Iranian anti-air and ballistic missiles inside Syria. The move was explained by the “rising concerns they could be used to strike Israel in the coming days.” The USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group is cruising near Syria, staying on high alert. That’s what the new venue is for. The Astana process is a venue for peace negotiations, but the US and France want a forum to discuss preparations for war. They prefer war zones to de-escalation zones.

Unlike the UN-brokered negotiations in Geneva, the Astana process has achieved a lot. Many human lives in Syria have been saved thanks to the cease-fire, which is largely holding. Large parts of Syria have been cleared of terrorists and are no longer battlefields. Gradual rebuilding has begun. This can be seen in the reconstruction of Aleppo.

The Astana talks have brought together Syria’s warring parties. The US is not excluded from the process, which can be gradually expanded to include other actors. The most recent meeting in Astana on March 16 extended the cease-fire in the de-escalation zones. Isn’t that much better than uncontrolled fighting that is responsible for so much civilian suffering?

Reaching a peaceful settlement in Syria is no bed of roses. But unlike all the other forums, Astana is the only one to have achieved real results. It’s not perfect. The YPG Kurds are excluded because of Turkey. The Congress of Syrian National Dialogue that was held in Sochi failed to agree on a new constitution. The Astana process is not all-inclusive but it has been blessed with a broad base. It’s the only forum with guarantors to monitor the implementation of its decisions.

A building needs a foundation to rest on. The Astana process is the platform that is best suited for the political management of the crisis. The creation of several forums, all working in parallel, will only dilute any achievements and stymie the whole negotiation process.

Does the goal of pushing Russia out of Syria and forcing a rollback of Iran justify reversing whatever successes may have been achieved and plunging Syria back into a never-ending free-for-all? Is it possible to create paradise in just one section of the country?

In 2003, the US flagrantly violated international law by invading Iraq in an effort to use that country to showcase the American way of life in the Arab and Muslim world. We all know how that ended.

There are many very specific problems in the part of Syria under the control of the US-led coalition. The way to tackle them is by creating an international, inclusive framework to help the Syrians solve their own problems, not by creating many venues separately pursuing the same goal. The choice is simple: the continuation of peace efforts, no matter how bumpy the road, or sliding into a new conflict. It looks like the US and France have chosen the second option. It’s a great pity that Mr. Staffan de Mistura is playing into their hands.

At first, Iraq could be granted an observer status at Astana on par with the UN, the US and Jordan. Expanding the format by bringing in pertinent regional actors involved in Syria is the right step forward. After all, Syria and Iraq have the same enemy: the Islamic State (IS). They share a common border. Both nations face the threat of partition and are ready to go to any lengths to preserve their territorial integrity. The Iraqi leadership understands well the problems faced by Syria.

Iraq is trying to implement independent foreign policy as a big regional power. It is friendly with Iran. Tehran enjoys significant influence among Iraqi Shiites but it does not hinder Baghdad’s efforts aimed at diversifying its foreign relations. The Iraqi Shiite community is not exactly pro-Iranian as many people believe. It is far from being united as to its loyalty to Tehran. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shiite cleric, objects to the politicization of religion and does not approve the idea of spiritual leaders’ involvement in politics. His 2014 fatwa called on the citizens of all religions to unite against the Islamic State. True, the 120,000 strong Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia is dominated by Shiites but they also include significant numbers of Sunni Muslim, Christian and Yazidi soldiers. The force reports to the Iraqi government. The Iraqi Army is normally supervised by Sunni ministers.

Iraq’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is thriving. The ties with Egypt and Jordan are improving. There has been progress in Iraq’s relations with Turkey. With the IS on the ropes, Iraq will concentrate on reconstruction to become an influential regional power.

Russia and Iraq have perfect relations. They are discussing the prospects of establishing a direct airline between the capitals and visa-free regime for diplomats.

Russian weapons were effectively used in the fight against the Islamic State group. The joint intelligence exchange center in Baghdad is a good example of cooperation. Last summer, the two countries signed a huge arms deal covering deliveries of T-90 tanks. This contract reportedly exceeds $1billion. Russian-made Sukhoi Su-25 jets have played an important role in the war against IS terrorists.

Last July, Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s Vice-President, visited Russia to say the Iraqi government welcomed Moscow’s substantial political and military presence in the country. A high-level Russian business delegation is taking part in a conference on Iraq’s post-war reconstruction held in Kuwait on Feb. 12-14. An Iraqi team headed by Foreign Minister Ibrahim Jaafari is coming to Russia this month to take part in the meeting of Russian-Iraqi intergovernmental commission. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said the next round of Astana talks is expected soon. There should be no procrastination in order not to lose the positive impulse given by the Syrian National Dialogue meeting held in Sochi. Moscow invited Iraq to participate.

New de-escalation zones are on the agenda of the Astana talks. No peace in Syria can be reached without some kind of agreement to make it secure. True, the peace in that country is in jeopardy today after the US missile and artillery strikes on Syrian targets in Deir ez-Zor, Israeli airstrikes in the south and the continuing fighting in Afrin and Idlib. Despite that, the de-escalation concept has proven to be effective. Violations do take place off and on but it works. It is much better than the ferocious free-for-all Syria had been without them. If peace effort is to proceed, some kind of de-escalation zones will be agreed on at Syria-Iraq border. It is not possible without Iraq’s participation. Baghdad is a pertinent actor many issues cannot be solved without. No doubt, Iraq joining the Astana talks will be a very positive step forward.