Dublin City University says it is “astonished” over a complaint made by the Embassies of Georgia and Ukraine in Ireland about the university’s teaching of a course on the geopolitics of the Caucasus and Ukraine.

The two embassies sent a joint letter to the President of DCU, Professor Dáire Keogh, and copied it to a number of senior DCU academics and a senior official at the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin on 8 April.

The letter claimed the course was spreading “disinformation and Russian propaganda narratives” – a view flatly rejected by DCU, which says the criticism amounts to political interference and seeks to undermine the core democratic principle of academic freedom.

The course, “Russia and the post Soviet space” at DCU’s School of Law and Government is run by Professor Donnacha Ó Beacháin, an internationally respected academic on the politics of the region.

Prof Donnacha Ó Beacháin

A Georgian Embassy staff member was among the students from a varied international background who enrolled on the course, as well as Irish students. The module includes lectures with speakers from Georgian and Ukrainian backgrounds and also presents Russian perspectives too. A Russian professor and authority on the Caucusus, Sergey Markedonov, gave a lecture to the course by Zoom from Moscow.

DCU President Prof Dáire Keogh responded by letter to both embassies on 16 April.

“Academic freedom is a fundamental principle that applies in DCU as it does in all universities in Ireland. It is essential that within DCU we fully respect and uphold this principle, which is underpinned by legislation (the Universities Act 1997) and which is enshrined in our University Statutes. In accordance with the principle of academic freedom, it is important that the School of Law and Government should determine its own curriculum, taking into account university quality assurance standards, regulations, and feedback provided on the content of its courses,” Prof Keogh wrote.

“As you know, Professor Ó Beacháin is a highly-respected member of academic staff in DCU with an excellent reputation in his field, internationally as well as in Ireland. In relation to the module in question, I understand that Professor Ó Beacháin has invited guests from different backgrounds to expose students to their points of view, promote a better understanding of various conflicts in the European region, and explore prospects for the future.

“Those invited to contribute to the module include speakers from Georgian and Ukrainian backgrounds, including former officials. This reflects the extensive cooperation between DCU and Georgia and Ukraine, which we look forward to developing further with the continuing valuable support of you and your Embassy colleagues,” Prof Keogh wrote.

Speaking on RTÉ’s This Week programme, Prof John Doyle, Director of the Institute for International Conflict Resolution at DCU and one of the academics written to by the embassies, expressed astonishment at the diplomats’ action.

“This is absolutely unprecedented in my experience. I have taught international relations for more than 25 years in DCU. We’ve taught all of the major geopolitical conflicts and wars over that time … there hasn’t been a single other incident where not only did they write to the university president effectively asking them to censure a colleague but also CC’ing it to the Department of Foreign Affairs, trying to make some sort of diplomatic issue out of it,” said Prof Doyle.

“I’ve no difficulties with embassies presenting their views and in fact I’ve personally introduced the Georgian Ambassador to a group of students where he was allowed to present the Georgian point of view to our class without interruption and the students allowed ask him questions.”

Prof John Doyle

Prof Doyle said that another academic presented the Ukrainian position a week after the Russian academic gave his Zoom lecture from Moscow. He said this reflected DCU’s approach to teaching and learning which was to present a complete range of views for study.

“DCU is in the top 200 universities in the world for both politics and for journalism/communications, the only Irish university in both rankings. There’s no way you get into those sort of rankings if you’re perceived as a university in which your teaching and research just gives out one point of view, whatever the lecturer’s point of view happens to be on a given issue. You have to introduce people to all sides. We do that and we encourage our students and in fact we equip them with the skills to distinguish fact from fiction and to interrogate where there are clashing points of view.”

He said DCU had extensive contacts with Ukraine and Georgia and wanted that to continue.

But he added that that if the complaints had been driven by the foreign ministries of Georgia or Ukraine and not just the embassies in Ireland, this could have serious implications for both states’ attitudes to academic freedom as recognised in the European Union and in EU-funded academic programmes in which both countries take part.

“I think the Charge D’Affaires and the Ambassador are mistaken if they think this is just a normal intervention. They could have written to the Irish Times. They have spoken in DCU. There are other ways to do it but to seek to intervene with the president of the university to get them to change how a course is taught and what questions students are asked to address goes well beyond the limits of the role of an ambassador in a democratic society.

“The letter was unprecedented and it was wrong that they sent it,” added Prof Doyle.

The Ukrainian Embassy issued a statement to the This Week programme.

“We would like to note that our correspondence with the DCU never meant to impact our good and long-lasting cooperation with the University. Any allegations of our intentions to attack academic freedom are emotional and groundless,” the statement said.

The letter said both Ukraine and Georgia had been subject to Russian aggression.

“With respect to the essential principle of presenting alternative views, as the official representatives of our countries in Ireland, in the joint letter by the Embassies of Ukraine and Georgia to the DCU we delivered irrefutable facts of the ongoing Russian aggression against our countries that are internationally recognised and are the subject to a large number of resolutions by international organisations, as well as legal cases in international tribunals and courts,” the statement said.

“The Embassy fully shares the European values and educational standards. Definitely, the academic freedom, alternative views and perspectives are absolutely essential in teaching and learning in an academic context.”

The DCU course covers both Georgia and Ukraine which have been in conflict with Russia in recent years, with part of their sovereign territories under de-facto Russian control. South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s declarations of independence from Georgia are recognised only by Russia and a handful of countries.

In Ukraine, pro-Russian forces control parts of the east and Crimea was annexed by Russia in 2014, in breach of international law.

Around 13,000 people have lost their lives and 1.5 million people internally displaced by the fighting in eastern Ukraine.

rte.ie

Russia just ended a bloody war on its former territory by diplomacy. Watch the video and read more in the Editorial article.

During six weeks of intense fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces which erupted on September 27 over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, it is estimated that up to 5,000 lives were lost. As many as 100,000 civilians were displaced. The ceasefire brokered this week by Russia has to be welcomed as preventing further escalation and suffering which could have presaged a wider war in the Caucasus region.

The truce this week is the fourth attempt at bringing about a cessation over the past 44 days. But the latest ceasefire which came into effect on Tuesday appears to be holding because both sides have given a firmer public commitment to abiding by the agreement. A joint statement was issued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev along with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Crucially, Turkey has also agreed to support the cessation. Ankara’s supply of advanced weaponry to Azerbaijan had given Baku a decisive advantage against Armenian forces in the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.

The enclave is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan’s national territory but it has been ruled by ethnic Armenians since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. A war in 1992-94 saw 30,000 dead and expanded territorial control by the Armenian side. Much of those past territorial gains have been recovered by Azerbaijan in the latest conflict. However, the Armenians still retain governance of the capital city Stepanakert in the self-declared republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. The internationally unrecognized republic is also known as Artsakh which is aligned with the Republic of Armenia. The Artsakh leadership has given its consent to the ceasefire.

The ceasefire is being implemented with the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops who arrived this week and will patrol the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and a corridor linking the territory to Armenia. The peacekeeping arrangement is to hold for five years on a renewable basis in order to give parties to the conflict time to negotiate a final settlement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Armenian side had no choice but to accept the ceasefire. From a military point of view, it stood to lose all of the disputed territory. Casualties were bound to be even greater if the war continued. Furthermore, the conflict was endangering the entire Caucasus region if Armenia and Azerbaijan had hurtled towards direct hostilities between the two nations. Russia due to a defense pact with the Republic of Armenia could have been dragged into war with NATO member Turkey which backs Azerbaijan with which it shares Turkic ethnicity.

It was therefore imperative to halt the slide towards disastrous war. Russian diplomacy achieved a vital way out of spiraling hostilities.

Moscow has friendly relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is thus in Russia’s interest to maintain peace among its southern neighbors. One wonders if there was a hidden agenda by foreign powers in reigniting this conflict in the Caucasus. The deployment by Turkey of mercenary fighters from Syria and Libya in support of Azerbaijan had the potential for dangerous escalation. Azerbaijan borders Dagestan and Chechnya in Russia’s southwest where Moscow waged a war against Islamist extremists in the late 1990s. It is remarkable how absent the United States and European powers have been in helping to resolve the crisis.

The situation remains perilous. But having Russian peacekeepers separating combatants will give peace a strong chance of holding and diplomacy working. It is not going to be easy to negotiate. Under the terms of the ceasefire, the Armenian side is obliged to cede areas of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan which it had controlled for nearly a quarter of a century since the 1992-94 war.

In Armenia there are bitter recriminations over the ceasefire deal. Protesters decrying it as a “sell-out” stormed government buildings in Yerevan demanding the resignation of premier Nikol Pashinyan. Critics point out too that since Pashinyan came to power in 2018 he has pursued an adventurist policy of declaring Nagorno-Karabakh independence which provoked Azeri nationalist reaction. Many Armenians, however, seem resigned to accept the reality that a ceasefire was the only option to avoid more grievous losses. Russia has a defense pact with the Republic of Armenia, not Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow is not a guarantor of Yerevan’s external aspirations.

Russia’s standing as a peace broker in Syria and its trusted diplomatic power was no doubt key to averting the brink of disaster in the Caucasus.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region has been contested between Yerevan and Baku since the fall of the USSR but things remained mostly quiet after the end of the war for the region in 1994. Now Turkey has become a new world player.

Pepe ESCOBAR

Few geopolitical hot spots across the planet may rival the Caucasus: that intractable, tribal Tower of Babel, throughout History a contentious crossroads of empires from the Levant and nomads from the Eurasian steppes. And it gets even messier when one adds the fog of war.

To try to shed some light into the current Armenia-Azerbaijan face off, let’s crisscross the basic facts with some essential deep background.

Late last month Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s proverbial “strongman”, in power since 2003, launched a de facto war on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh held by Armenia.

At the collapse of the USSR, Nagorno-Karabakh had a mixed population of Azeri Shi’ites and Armenian Christians. Yet even before the collapse the Azerbaijani Army and Armenian independentists were already at war (1988-1994), which yielded a grim balance of 30,000 dead and roughly a million wounded.

The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991: but that was not recognized by the “international community”. Finally there was a ceasefire in 1994 – with Nagorno-Karabakh entering the gray area/no man’s land of “frozen conflict”.

The problem is that in 1993, the United Nations had approved no less than four resolutions – 822, 853, 874 and 884 – establishing that Armenia should withdraw from what was deemed to be roughly 20% of Azerbaijani territory. This is at the core of Baku’s rationale to fight against what it qualifies as a foreign occupation army.

Yerevan’s interpretation though is that these four resolutions are null and void because Nagorno-Karabakh harbors an Armenian-majority population who wants to secede from Azerbaijan.

Historically, Artsakh is one of three ancient provinces of Armenia – rooted at least in the 5^th century B.C. and finally established in 189 B.C. Armenians, based on DNA samples from excavated bones, argue they have been settled in Artsakh for at least 4,000 years.

Artsakh – or Nagorno-Karabakh – was annexed to Azerbaijan by Stalin in 1923. That set the stage for a future powder keg to inevitably explode.

It’s important to remember that there was no “Azerbaijan” nation-state until the early 1920s. Historically, Azerbaijan is a territory in northern Iran. Azeris are very well integrated within the Islamic Republic. So the Republic of Azerbaijan actually borrowed its name from their Iranian neighbors. In ancient history, the territory of the new 20^th century republic was known as Atropatene, and Aturpakatan before the advent of Islam.

How the equation changed

Baku’s main argument is that Armenia is blocking a contiguous Azerbaijani nation, as a look in the map shows us that southwest Azerbaijan is de facto split all the way to the Iranian border.

And that plunges us necessarily into deep background. To clarify matters, there could not be a more reliable guide than a top Caucasus think tank expert who shared his analysis with me by email, but is insistent on “no attribution”. Let’s call him Mr. C.

Mr. C notes that, “for decades, the equation remained the same and the variables in the equation remained the same, more or less. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that Armenia is an unstable democracy in transition and Azerbaijan had much more continuity at the top.”

We should all be aware that “Azerbaijan lost territory right at the beginning of the restoration of its statehood, when it was basically a failed state run by armchair nationalist amateurs [before Heydar Aliyev, Ilham’s father, came to power]. And Armenia was a mess, too but less so when you take into consideration that it had strong Russian support and Azerbaijan had no one. Back in the day, Turkey was still a secular state with a military that looked West and took its NATO membership seriously. Since then, Azerbaijan has built up its economy and increased its population. So it kept getting stronger. But its military was still underperforming.”

That slowly started to change in 2020: “Basically, in the past few months you’ve seen incremental increases in the intensity of near daily ceasefire violations (the near-daily violations are nothing new: they’ve been going on for years). So this blew up in July and there was a shooting war for a few days. Then everyone calmed down again.”

All this time, something important was developing in the background: Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power in May 2018, and Aliyev started to talk: “The Azerbaijani side thought this indicated Armenia was ready for compromise (this all started when Armenia had a sort of revolution, with the new PM coming in with a popular mandate to clean house domestically). For whatever reason, it ended up not happening.”

What happened in fact was the July shooting war.

Don’t forget Pipelineistan

Armenian PM Pashinyan could be described as a liberal globalist. The majority of his political team is pro-NATO. Pashinyan went all guns blazing against former Armenian President (1998- 2008) Robert Kocharian, who before that happened to be, crucially, the de facto President of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Kocharian, who spent years in Russia and is close to President Putin, was charged with a nebulous attempt at “overthrowing the constitutional order”. Pashinyan tried to land him in jail. But even more crucial is the fact that Pashinyan refused to follow a plan elaborated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to finally settle the Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh mess.

In the current fog of war, things are even messier. Mr. C stresses two points: “First, Armenia asked for CSTO protection and got bitch slapped, hard and in public; second, Armenia threatened to bomb the oil and gas pipelines in Azerbaijan (there are several, they all run parallel, and they supply not just Georgia and Turkey but now the Balkans and Italy). With regards to the latter, Azerbaijan basically said: if you do that, we’ll bomb your nuclear reactor.”

The Pipelineistan angle is indeed crucial: for years I have followed on Asia Times these myriad, interlocking oil and gas soap operas, especially the BTC (Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan), conceived by Zbigniew Brzezinski to bypass Iran. I was even “arrested” by a BP 4X4 when I was tracking the pipeline on a parallel side road out of the massive Sangachal terminal: that proved British Petroleum was in practice the real boss, not the Azerbaijani government.

In sum, now we have reached the point where, according to Mr. C,

“Armenia’s saber rattling got more aggressive.” Reasons, on the Armenian side, seem to be mostly domestic: terrible handling of Covid-19 (in contrast to Azerbaijan), and the dire state of the economy. So, says Mr. C, we came to a toxic concourse of circumstances: Armenia deflected from its problems by being tough on Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan just had had enough.

It’s always about Turkey

Anyway one looks at the Armenia-Azerbaijan drama, the key destabilizing factor is now Turkey.

Mr. C notes how, “throughout the summer, the quality of the Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises increased (both prior to July events and subsequently). The Azerbaijani military got a lot better. Also, since the fourth quarter of 2019 the President of Azerbaijan has been getting rid of the (perceived) pro-Russian elements in positions of power.” See, for instance, here.

There’s no way to confirm it either with Moscow or Ankara, but Mr. C advances what President Erdogan may have told the Russians: “We’ll go into Armenia directly if a) Azerbaijan starts to lose, b) Russia goes in or accepts CSTO to be invoked or something along those lines, or c) Armenia goes after the pipelines. All are reasonable red lines for the Turks, especially when you factor in the fact that they don’t like the Armenians very much and that they consider the Azerbaijanis brothers.”

It’s crucial to remember that in August, Baku and Ankara held two weeks of joint air and land military exercises. Baku has bought advanced drones from both Turkey and Israel. There’s no smokin’ gun, at least not yet, but Ankara may have hired up to 4,000 Salafi-jihadis in Syria to fight – wait for it – in favor of Shi’ite-majority Azerbaijan, proving once again that “jihadism” is all about making a quick buck.

The United Armenian Information Center, as well as the Kurdish Afrin Post, have stated that Ankara opened two recruitment centers – in Afrin schools – for mercenaries. Apparently this has been a quite popular move because Ankara slashed salaries for Syrian mercenaries shipped to Libya.

There’s an extra angle that is deeply worrying not only for Russia but also for Central Asia. According to the former Foreign Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh, Ambassador Extraordinary Arman Melikyan, mercenaries using Azeri IDs issued in Baku may be able to infiltrate Dagestan and Chechnya and, via the Caspian, reach Atyrau in Kazakhstan, from where they can easily reach Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

That’s the ultimate nightmare of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – shared by Russia, China and the Central Asian “stans”: a jihadi land – and (Caspian) sea – bridge from the Caucasus all the way to Central Asia, and even Xinjiang.

What’s the point of this war?

So what happens next? A nearly insurmountable impasse, as Mr. C outlines it:

1. “The peace talks are going nowhere because Armenia is refusing to budge (to withdraw from occupying Nagorno-Karabakh plus 7 surrounding regions in phases or all at once, with the usual guarantees for civilians, even settlers – note that when they went in in the early 1990s they cleansed those lands of literally all Azerbaijanis, something like between 700,000 and 1 million people).”

2. Aliyev was under the impression that Pashinyan “was willing to compromise and began preparing his people and then looked like someone with egg on his face when it didn’t happen.”

3. “Turkey has made it crystal clear it will support Azerbaijan unconditionally, and has matched those words with deeds.”

4. “In such circumstances, Russia got outplayed – in the sense that they had been able to play off Armenia against Azerbaijan and vice versa, quite successfully, helping to mediate talks that went nowhere, preserving the status quo that effectively favored Armenia.”

And that brings us to the crucial question. What’s the point of this war?

Mr. C: “It is either to conquer as much as possible before the “international community” [in this case, the UNSC] calls for / demands a ceasefire or to do so as an impetus for re-starting talks that actually lead to progress. In either scenario, Azerbaijan will end up with gains and Armenia with losses. How much and under what circumstances (the status and question of Nagorno-Karabakh is distinct from the status and question of the Armenian occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh) is unknown: i.e. on the field of battle or the negotiating table or a combo of both. However this turns out, at a minimum Azerbaijan will get to keep what it liberated in battle. This will be the new starting point. And I suspect that Azerbaijan will do no harm to the Armenian civilians that stay. They’ll be model liberators. And they’ll take time to bring back Azerbaijani civilians (refugees/IDPs) to their homes, especially in areas that would become mixed as a result of return.”

So what can Moscow do under these circumstances? Not much,

“except to go into Azerbaijan proper, which they won’t do (there’s no land border between Russia and Armenia; so although Russia has a military base in Armenia with one or more thousand troops, they can’t just supply Armenia with guns and troops at will, given the geography).”

Crucially, Moscow privileges the strategic partnership with Armenia – which is a member of the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) – while meticulously monitoring each and every NATO-member Turkey’s movement: after all, they are already in opposing sides in both Libya and Syria.

So, to put it mildly, Moscow is walking on a geopolitical razor’s edge. Russia needs to exercise restraint and invest in a carefully calibrated balancing act between Armenia and Azerbaijan; must preserve the Russia-Turkey strategic partnership; and must be alert to all, possible US Divide and Rule tactics.

Inside Erdogan’s war

So in the end this would be yet another Erdogan war?

The inescapable Follow the Money analysis would tells us, yes. The Turkish economy is an absolute mess, with high inflation and a depreciating currency. Baku has a wealth of oil-gas funds that could become readily available – adding to Ankara’s dream of turning Turkey also into an energy supplier.

Mr. C adds that anchoring Turkey in Azerbaijan would lead to “the creation of full-fledged Turkish military bases and the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the Turkish orbit of influence (the “two countries – one nation” thesis, in which Turkey assumes supremacy) within the framework of neo-Ottomanism and Turkey’s leadership in the Turkic-speaking world.”

Add to it the all-important NATO angle. Mr. C essentially sees it as Erdogan, enabled by Washington, about to make a NATO push to the east while establishing that immensely dangerous jihadi channel into Russia: “This is no local adventure by Erdogan. I understand that Azerbaijan is largely Shi’ite Islam and that will complicate things but not render his adventure impossible.”

This totally ties in with a notorious RAND report that explicitly details how “the United States could try to induce Armenia to break with Russia” and “encourage Armenia to move fully into the NATO orbit.”

It’s beyond obvious that Moscow is observing all these variables with extreme care. That is reflected, for instance, in how irrepressible Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, earlier this week, has packaged a very serious diplomatic warning: “The downing of an Armenian SU-25 by a Turkish F-16, as claimed by the Ministry of Defense in Armenia, seems to complicate the situation, as Moscow, based on the Tashkent treaty, is obligated to offer military assistance to Armenia”.

It’s no wonder both Baku and Yerevan got the message and are firmly denying anything happened.

The key fact remains that as long as Armenia proper is not attacked by Azerbaijan, Russia will not apply the CSTO treaty and step in. Erdogan knows this is his red line. Moscow has all it takes to put him in serious trouble – as in shutting off gas supplies to Turkey. Moscow, meanwhile, will keep helping Yerevan with intel and hardware – flown in from Iran. Diplomacy rules – and the ultimate target is yet another ceasefire.

Pulling Russia back in

Mr. C advances the strong possibility – and I have heard echoes from Brussels – that “the EU and Russia find common cause to limit Azerbaijani gains (in large part because Erdogan is no one’s favorite guy, not just because of this but because of the Eastern Med, Syria, Libya).”

That brings to the forefront the renewed importance of the UNSC in imposing a ceasefire. Washington’s role at the moment is quite intriguing. Of course, Trump has more important things to do at the moment. Moreover, the Armenian diaspora in the US swings drastically pro-Democrat.

Then, to round it all up, there’s the all-important Iran-Armenia relationship. Here is a forceful attempt to put it in perspective.

As Mr. C stresses, “Iran favors Armenia, which is counter-intuitive at first sight. So the Iranians may help the Russians out (funneling supplies), but on the other hand they have a good relationship with Turkey, especially in the oil and gas smuggling business. And if they get too overt in their support, Trump has a casus belli to get involved and the Europeans may not like to end up on the same side as the Russians and the Iranians. It just looks bad. And the Europeans hate to look bad.”

We inevitably come back to the point that the whole drama can be interpreted from the perspective of a NATO geopolitical hit against Russia – according to quite a few analyses circulating at the Duma.

Ukraine is an absolute black hole. There’s the Belarus impasse. Covid-19. The Navalny circus. The “threat” to Nord Stream-2.

To pull Russia back into the Armenia-Azerbaijan drama means turning Moscow’s attention towards the Caucasus so there’s more Turkish freedom of action in other theaters – in the Eastern Mediterranean versus Greece, in Syria, in Libya. Ankara – foolishly – is engaged in simultaneous wars on several fronts, and with virtually no allies.

What this means is that even more than NATO, monopolizing Russia’s attention in the Caucasus most of all may be profitable for Erdogan himself. As Mr. C stresses, “in this situation, the Nagorno-Karabakh leverage/’trump card’ in the hands of Turkey would be useful for negotiations with Russia.”

No question: the neo-Ottoman sultan never sleeps.

sott.net

As of September 29, the Azerbaijani advance in the Nagorno-Karabakh region struck the Armenian defense and Azerbaijani forces were not able to achieve any military breakthroughs. Armenian troops withdrew from several positions in the Talish area and east of Fuzuli.

The Azerbaijani military has been successfully employing combat drones and artillery to destroy positions and military equipment of Armenia, but Azerbaijani mechanized infantry was unable to develop its momentum any further.

While both sides claim that they eliminated multiple enemy fighters and made notable gains, the real situation on the ground remains more or less stable with minor gains achieved by Azerbaijani troops. Armenian sources say that 370 Azerbaijani troops were killed and over 1,000 injured. The number of killed Armenian fighters, according to Azerbaijani sources, is over 1,000. Armenian sources also note the notable role of Turkey in the developing conflict.

Armenian President Armen Sarkissian said that Turkey has been assisting Azerbaijan in its war against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with advisers, mercenaries and even F-16 fighter jets. He added that the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still possible through dialogue. However, the President emphasized that the Armenian nation cannot allow a return to the past.

“105 years ago, the Ottoman Empire carried out the genocide of the Armenians. In no case can we allow this genocide to be repeated,” Sarkissian said.

Armenia threatens to use Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems obtained from Russia against Azerbaijani targets if Turkish F-16 warplanes are employed on the battlefield.

Meanwhile, Armenian Ambassador to Russia Vardan Toganyan said that members of Turkish-backed Syrian militant groups have been already participating in the conflict. He said that recently about 4,000 Turkish-backed militants were deployed to Azerbaijan. In turn, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan said that “people who have arrived from Syria and other countries of the Middle East” are fighting on the side of Armenia. Earlier, pro-Turkish sources claimed that Armenia was transporting fighters from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Thus, the sides are not only claiming that they are gaining an upper hand in the war, but also accuse each other of using foreign mercenaries and terrorists.

On the evening of September 28, the Defense Ministry of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic confirmed that 84 of its troops were killed in the recent escalation. The Armenian side also claimed that its forces had shot down an Azerbaijani aircraft. However, this claim was denied by the Azerbaijani military. Baku continues insisting that all Armenian claims about the Azerbaijani casualties in the war are fake news.

On September 29, the Armenian side continued reporting about Azerbaijani helicopters being shot down, and declaring that they repelled Azerbaijani attacks. Nonetheless, the scale and intensity of the strikes by the Azerbaijani side did not demonstrate any decrease. On top of this, the Armenian Defense Ministry said that a Turkish Air Force F-16 fighter jet shot down an Armenian Su-25 warplane. The F-16 fighter jet allegedly took off from the Ganja Airbase in Azerbaijan and was providing air cover to combat UAVs, which were striking targets in Armenia’s Vardenis, Mec Marik and Sotk. Azerbaijan and Turkey denied Armenian claims that a Turkish F-16 shot down the Su-25.

So far, no side has achieved a strategic advantage in the ongoing conflict. However, the Azerbaijani military, which receives extensive support from Turkey, is expected to have better chances in the prolonged conflict with Armenia, if Erevan does not receive direct military support from Russia.

southfront.org

The long cordial relations between the United States and Azerbaijan (since the dissolution of the Soviet Union at least) have lately taken some interesting twists and turns.

Similarly to Macedonia and Albania, since acquiring independence Azerbaijan has sought (or that at any rate has been the stated goal of its post-Soviet political elite) to be Washington’s reliable flunkey in the Caucasus, rendering valuable services as one of its springboards to the Middle East. That eagerness to help was undoubtedly pleasing to the American partners because the U.S. could benefit from Azerbaijan’s services in the pursuit of its regional interests. As usually occurs in such situations, the result was a complex game played out between the two countries. That sort of game, however, was characterized by the fact that the players are not even remotely of equal stature. When the playground is more carefully examined, it turns out that it was a game played by a large cat with a tiny mouse, and with predictable consequences for the mouse.

That was manifested with particular clarity against the background of the violent assassination of the Iranian general Soleimani in February 2020. That hugely significant event put Azerbaijan on the spot since, on the one hand, it was a U.S. ally in the Caucasus, but also a cordial neighbour of Iran, on the other. To Baku, relations with Tehran are also of great significance. As a result, Azerbaijan found itself in an extremely ambiguous situation: picking the side of the U.S. and Israel in the hypothetical conflict carried the risk of Iranian military intervention on Azeri territory. Significantly, as soon as the assassination crisis broke out the Azeris rushed to undertake some very active diplomatic initiatives in order to lower tensions and reduce the likelihood of a bellicose confrontation. Azeri diplomacy used the full spectrum of its resources: phone calls, multilateral contacts, notes, and all the rest. The Azeri leadership’s initiatives, however, brought the country no palpable relief. As the crisis unfolded, the realization hit them like a brick wall (they would have been better prepared had they studied Dr. Kissinger before making decisions on their geopolitical alignment) that the distant hegemon is serenely disinterested in the fate of a tiny ally such as Baku. Having swept away an obstacle to its Middle Eastern policy and provoked tensions almost to the point of war, the hegemon thought nothing of compromising Azerbaijan’s security when it suited the attainment of its larger objectives. Azerbaijan was essentially left to fend for itself.

On closer examination, the dismayed Baku was also hit rather hard by the disconcerting realization of its great Western partner’s condescending treatment of one of the most sensitive issues in Azerbaijan’s political agenda: Nagorno Karabakh.

Nagorno Karabakh is an enclave surrounded by Azeri territory populated mainly by rival Armenians, but claimed by Azerbaijan. Promises of assistance to engineer a favourable settlement of the Karabakh problem were a key factor which motivated the Azeri leadership to enter into an informal alliance with its Western partners and to seek their support. On the whole, however, their gambit has not paid off. After Armenia’s recent color revolution and installation of a West-friendly regime there, Western partners have suddenly become attentive to Armenian arguments, to Baku’s bitter chagrin.

While technically remaining co-chair of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and spouting all the politically correct verbiage, in its approach to the Karabakh problem the U.S. has in practice failed to adhere to the principles of even-handedness. Despite verbally proclaiming their commitment to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, in practice the Americans have been caught flirting with representatives of the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic. An example of this sub rosa relationship that has irked the Azeris was the visit paid to Stepanakert on October 2, 2019 by the co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues, Cong. Frank Pallone. The official purpose of the visit was to study ways to strengthen ties between the U.S. and Nagorno Karabakh (referred to pointedly by its Armenian designation, Artsakh) and to consider various projects that Washington was ready to finance in the enclave. The visit was framed in terms of laudable objectives, such as assisting a “young, developing democracy”. But the point was not lost on the Azeris. Flowery rhetoric aside, Washington’s position was couched in conspicuous ambiguity in regard to what for them was the key issue: where Nagorno Karabakh belongs. Hardly a fitting reward for loyally toeing the line.

While the U.S. has committed rhetorically to a peaceful and fair resolution of the Karabakh issue and is still offering to assist in creating conditions for constructive negotiations, the impression is dawning on the astonished Azeris that the U.S. is actually facilitating the legitimization of Nagorno Karabakh’s de facto indpendence. They cannot help but view it as “creeping” recognition, whatever ingenious formulas may be used to disguise the process.

Adding insult to injury is undoubtedly the allotment of funds earmarked for “democratic and economic reforms” in Armenia, broadly understood of course to include the disputed territory, to the tune of $17,6 and the September 2019 legislative amendments designed to help Armenia reach military parity with Azerbaijan.

There are, of course, other items besides Nagorno Karabakh that affect relations between Azerbaijan and the U.S. The Azeris are unlikely to immediately give drastic vent to their disappointment. But the damage has been done and once again it was principally caused by the utter lack of deftness in American diplomacy.

If this were true, simple common sense would lead to Russia being condemnatory towards Armenia, along the lines of Turkey's position. Instead, Moscow takes a comparatively more neutral approach on Azeri-Armenian differences. Moreover, the Kremlin is sophisticated enough to realize that Azerbaijan will do what it deems as being in its best interests and that Russia has limits – something evident in varying degrees with the other major powers. This pragmatic realization recognizes Baku's overall worldview, which sees wisdom in maintaining good relations with a range of nations, including Russia, Turkey, the US and EU members.

It's ideally in Russia's best interests to see Armenia and Azerbaijan on good terms with each other and Russia. Moscow is in a kind of juggling act in its relations with Baku and Yerevan, while hoping that the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute will somehow end.

On former Soviet Caucasus and some other former Soviet matters, Thomas de Waal of Carnegie Europe and Goble, have been among the main US foreign policy establishment sources. Overall, de Waal's April 7 New York Times article «Solve the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Before It Explodes», is pretty much in line with the biases evident at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which has frequently utilized de Waal and Goble.

This excerpt is from de Waal's most recent New York Times piece:

«Recept Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's president, has blamed France, Russia and the United States, the countries charged with mediating the conflict by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for failing to clean up the mess. This is wrong too. Yes, more could have been done over the years to resolve the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, but mediators mediate – they cannot alone solve conflicts between intransigent parties.

The bitter truth is that the leaders in Armenia and Azerbaijan have become trapped by their own rhetoric, promising their publics total victory that can never be achieved. They have employed the status quo as a weapon to shirk hard questions about their own legitimacy or to divert people's attention from socioeconomic problems.

A similar temptation is to identify Russia as the real villain. For sure, the Kremlin has played a role in manipulating the ethno-territorial conflicts that emerged from the breakup of the former Soviet Union. And Russia continues to sell weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. But Russia's role in Nagorno-Karabakh is much weaker than it is in Georgia's frozen conflict, let alone in Ukraine. Russia shares no border with the conflict zone, has no troops on the ground and, in different ways supports both sides. Its ability to control what happens in Nagorno-Karabakh is limited».

* * *

No Western countries are criticized unlike others. The leading Western nations don't make much noise over how the strategically important NATO member Turkey has maintained a decades long military presence in the northern part of the island nation of Cyprus – inclusive of Turkey's recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In support of the Albanian majority in Kosovo, the leading Western countries felt it okay to actively recognize Kosovo's independence, in contradiction to a standing UN Security Council Resolution (1244) and the preference of Serbia.

In essence, these kind of stances tell the pro-Russian majority in Crimea, the Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as some others, that it's okay to declare themselves independent from the respective national entity claiming them – and to fight for that change if necessary.

Geopolitical, historical and cultural biases are behind the inconsistent stances on territorial disputes. Putting aside politically correct niceties, the might makes right approach has been used in one way or another to influence the outcome of such disputes.

De Waal's criticism of Russia is comparatively greater than what he says about Turkey. The Turkish government has arguably encouraged ethno-religious nationalism, with its stated strong support for the predominately Muslim and Turkic Azerbaijan over the mostly Christian Armenia. In comparison (and as previously noted), Russia has taken a more neutral approach. This is evidenced by how key Russian government officials can formally travel to Armenia and Azerbaijan, much unlike what Turkish officialdom can reasonably expect to do.

Since the Soviet breakup, Turkey has gained influence in Azerbaijan with limits. Azerbaijan has exhibited neutrality in the developed spat between Russia and Turkey. Thru the course of the post-Boris Yeltsin political era, Russia has maintained pretty good relations with Azerbaijan, while having closer military and economic ties with Armenia. The Azerbaijanis are predominately Shia Muslims, unlike the mostly Sunni Muslim Turks. As is true with many Turks, many Azerbaijanis aren't so religious.

The countries of Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran recently held high level talks. Turkey, Armenia and the Western powers weren't present at this gathering. Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran plan on having another high level meeting. To date, Armenian-Iranian relations can be described as generally good. Iranian-Azerbaijani relations haven't been as good. Within the past couple of years, the Iranian-Azerbaijani relationship has improved.

Iran has sizeable ethnic Azerbaijani and ethnic Armenian populations. (There're more ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran than the entire population of Azerbaijan. Iran's ethnic Armenian population is noticeably smaller.) Russia also has a share of ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis (whose numbers in that country are more even than the Azerbaijani-Armenian differential in Iran).

In the above excerpt from de Waal's New York Times piece, the last paragraph has what amounts to as an obligatory Russia bashing, that serves to legitimize whataboutism. A more perfect Western mass media would see de Waal's and Goble's commentary challenged on a point by point basis, with extended give and takes, which include a knowledgeable opposite perspective. This broken record advocacy on my part is rehashed in reply to the ongoing Western mass media biases – slants that lead to a bit of hypocrisy, when Western mass media elites piously bash Russian mass media – which I accept as needing improvement as well. In answer to de Waal and Goble (who clearly leans in an anti-Russian direction), several points can be noted. (Goble's commentary on a Russia related matter is discussed in my July 2, 2016 Strategic Culture Foundation article «Propaganda In the Eyes of the Beholder».)

Western governments have been soft in condemning the nationalist violence in Kiev regime controlled Ukraine, in line with anti-Russian propaganda. As quoted in RFE/RL, the pro-Kiev regime Crimean Tatar activist Mustafa Dzhemilev, has called for the ethnic cleansing of Russians from Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin made it a point to condemn the Soviet WW II collective punishment of the Crimean Tatars and support a multiethnic Crimea – different from Dzhemilev's rhetoric. (Concerning this particular and some other matters, my February 28, 2016 Strategic Culture Foundation piece «Eurovision, Crimean Tatars and Some Digressions», provides further insight.)

Western mass media and Western influenced mass media at large have inaccurate anti-Russian segments, like a Nick Schifrin reported Al Jazeera segment that presented the erroneous image of Crimea's Jews, Tatars and Ukrainians opposed to Russia/Russians. Talk about stirring the pot of ethnic animosities with faulty babble. In point of fact, Crimea's Jews, Tatars and Ukrainians are by no means part of a uniform anti-Russian opposition. Moreover, there're indications that a noticeable portion of Crimea's Tatars aren't so opposed to Crimea's reunification with Russia. (Pardon my not having a direct hyperlinked video of the Schifrin-Al Jazeera bit, which I've accurately characterized. Al Jazeera doesn't appear to be as good as RT, when it comes to having an online access to prior segments.)

Within the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ossetians and Abkhazians generally seem to prefer Russia over Georgia. Is this aspect so much the result of any Russian instigating, or fault involving Georgia? If Russia is so bad, it stands to reason that the Ossetians and Abkhazians would be taking a different stance.

In his New York Times piece and (to my knowledge) elsewhere, de Waal doesn't offer a plan that finally settles the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. His call for the cessation of hostilities and further negotiations, with the future possibility of Nagorno-Karabakh becoming a fully recognized entity, leaves the conflict in limbo. In 2009, I provided a thinking out of the box settlement for ending that dispute. My proposed agreement would see Nagorno-Karabakh as a jointly recognized part of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Short of a full scale war, resulting in one clear winner and likely numerous casualties, what other practical final settlement option is there, besides a prolonged «frozen conflict», with a likelihood of periodic flare ups? The Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh shows no desire to become a loosely autonomous part of Azerbaijan. In turn, Azerbaijan is opposed to that disputed land becoming internationally recognized as non-Azerbaijani territory.

After my Nagorno-Karabakh settlement proposal, the next best case scenario is probably a northern Cyprus like situation of relative peace, without a full settlement. This latter prospect is iffy for Nagorno-Karabakh. In northern Cyprus, there's no sign of a great military challenge to Turkey. Nagorno-Karabakh concerns a closer military balance between the two rival sides wanting control of that area, in conjunction with some other variables.

The Armenians and Azerbaijanis appear firm in their respective preference. The smaller numbered Armenians face an Azerbaijani side which (because of its fossil fuel sale capability) can more easily increase its military spending. Conversely, the Azerbaijanis are facing a tough Armenian opponent. Having a greater number of personnel and arms doesn't necessarily lead to a final victory.

Movies are used to set official stories in stone, and a movie is going to be made about the heroic capture of a badly wounded 19 year old kid, not old enough to buy a beer, who, despite being shot up and severely wounded, is alleged to have written a confession in the dark on the side of a boat under which he was hiding to escape execution. Apparently, the 10,000 troops who violated the US Constitution and searched the houses of a shutdown Boston without warrants are going to be credited for “saving America from terrorism.”

I find it difficult to believe that a shot-up kid, who had to be put into intensive care when he was discovered, who was hiding from execution under an upturned boat, spent what little energy and life force he had left writing a confession in the dark on the inside of a boat.  What convenient instrument to write with did he happen to have on hand? 

Why would we believe assurances of such an unlikely confession from the same lying government that assured the world that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction justifying a multi-trillion dollar invasion that destroyed a county? We know for a fact that Saddam Hussein most certainly did not have weapons of mass destruction as President Bush later admitted, and even if he had, such possession is no justification for illegal US aggression that destroyed a country. Why would we believe  a government that assured the world that Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, which we know for a fact was Washington’s made up excuse for invasion? 

One wonders how much the Boston Marathon Bombing movie makers have been paid for setting the official story in stone.  As one correspondent asked:  “I’m wondering how they are going to portray Boston cops as heroes as they kill the older brother and then surround an unarmed teenager who is hiding under a boat. They start firing…they put a bullet through his face but the damned kid won’t die! Heroic Senator John McCain then explains how Miranda rights don’t apply in his case. Suddenly it’s discovered that while hiding in the boat he’s written a confession on the inside of the boat with a Sharpie…”

John Remington Graham has 48 years of legal experience as a defense attorney and as a prosecutor.  An aunt of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is herself an attorney in the Russian Federation, requested John Remington Graham to assist her in making an amicus curiae intervention in the federal district court in Boston.  Mr. Graham has since written to the US Attorney General about conflicts between the government’s evidence and the guilty conviction. After 3 months, he has received no answer, an indication that the US Department of Justice has no interest whatsoever in what appears to be a wrongful conviction carrying a death sentence.

Mr. Graham brings us up-to-date on what has the appearance of judicial murder of another innocent in order to serve the secret agenda of the military/security complex.  “America is under attack,” so we need a police state to protect us and more money for wars abroad that take the lives of massive numbers of innocents, while economic conditions at home drive the American people deeper into the ground. 

Here is John Remington Graham’s statement of the miscarriage of justice:

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Is Not Guilty

John Remington Graham

The government of the United States has prosecuted Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the knowledge that its evidence proves he is not guilty.

On August 17, 2015, Paul Craig Roberts published an account of the amicus curiae intervention by Maret Tsarnaeva, paternal aunt of the accused and a lawyer resident in the Russian Federation, before the federal district court in Massachusetts in the infamous prosecution of her nephew Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, on an indictment charging him with detonating a pressure-cooker bomb on Boyston Street in Boston on April 15, 2013, causing death or injury to many persons.  Mr. Tsarnaev was sentenced to death on June 17, 2015. Dr. Roberts’ account was published widely in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Russia. The report quotes verbatim from pertinent documents made part of public record by court order.  The link to the said report is paulcraigroberts.org.

While a number of other serious anomalies in this prosecution have been noted by highly qualified observers, the most decisive and indisputable facts of public record are these:  From evidence at the scene of the explosions, the FBI crime lab definitively established on April 16, 2013, that the culprits, whoever they were, carried large, heavy-laden black backpacks concealing pressure-cooker bombs. 

This information was not a mere temporary investigative hypothesis, but was incorporated into the indictment returned on June 17, 2013, and was part of the government’s case going into trial. 

On April 18, 2013, the FBI identified the culprits from a private street video, showing the brothers Tsarnaev on Boylston Street prior to the explosions. Two still-frames from this street video were used in FBI posters advising the public of the identity of the suspects. These two still-frames do not clearly portray what these young men were carrying on their backs. But a third still-frame from the same street video shows Dzhokhar from the rear, carrying over his right shoulder a small, light-weight, white backpack, with no bulging or sagging as would have appeared if he had carried a heavy pressure cooker bomb as claimed by the FBI and alleged in the indictment. Because the white backpack Dzhokhar carried is not the black backpack carried by the accused bomber as stated in the indictment, Dzhokhar stands excluded as a suspect and is necessarily not guilty as charged.

Alleged confessions or statements of self-incrimination introduced against Dzhokhar Tsarnaev are disproved by the findings of the FBI crime lab and the street video used by the FBI to identify the culprits.  In other words, the street video shows that the backpack carried by Mr. Tsarnaev does not match and has the opposite characteristics of the backpack which the FBI crime lab determined was carried by the guilty party. Therefore, no alleged admission of guilt by Dzhokhar can be true. 

In a criminal case, if the prosecution attempts to prove that the accused or a co-conspirator admitted wrongdoing, but objective evidence in the possession of public authority indicates that the accused did not commit the crime, the admission is worthless. The objective evidence stands, and the finding must be not guilty.

Widely published photographs reveal that, near the crime scene, at or about the time of the explosions, there were men in military-style jackets, pants, boots, and hats with identical logos carrying large black backpacks that matched perfectly the findings of the FBI crime lab. But these men were not investigated, questioned, or charged. The presence of these individuals was never mentioned during the trial of Mr. Tsarnaev.

Instead, Dzhokhar’s court-appointed lawyer forcibly told the jury he was guilty, although, as she well knew, FBI-generated evidence proved that Dzhokhar, at the time and place of the explosions, was carrying a backpack totally different from the backpack that the FBI proved was carried by the guilty party.

On January 7, 2016, as directed by Maret Tsarnaeva, I sent a petition to Loretta Lynch, Attorney General of the United States who is now the legal custodian of Mr. Tsarnaev. This petition describes and includes key exhibits of public record, and requests her to intervene in the case in order to prevent wrongful conviction and execution. The attorney general is obligated to intervene under rules of legal ethics promulgated by the American Bar Association that are universally accepted throughout the United States. 

The governing principle is that a public prosecutor must refuse to charge, or must seek dismissal of an accusation, when evidence in the possession of public authority shows that there is no probable cause, or that probable cause, once established, no longer exists or ceases to be credible. This principle has been faithfully observed in our time by Cyrus Vance Jr., state district attorney in New York City, in the prosecution of Dominique Strauss-Kahn when it was discovered that the main witness against the accused was a con artist trying to shake him down, and also by Jim Mattox, attorney general of Texas, once it was learned that guilty pleas of Henry Lee Lucas were false in light of undeniable, objective evidence.

Federal prosecutors, court-appointed counsel for the accused, and the major news media are aware of the basic facts here outlined; yet, acting together, they have misled the general public, and managed to convict an individual obviously not guilty. The attorney general of the United States has been duly advised of the situation but has failed to do anything about it or even to acknowledge or reply to my letter.

paulcraigroberts.org

The plans by the Adolf Hitler-praising Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to build military bases in Qatar, Somalia, the Republic of Georgia, and Azerbaijan are in keeping with Turkey’s more aggressive and neo-Ottoman foreign and military policies. Turkey is also building its first aircraft carrier that will extend Turkey’s naval presence into the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

The announcement that Turkey is building a base in the Republic of Georgia comes after the Turks announced plans for a military base in Qatar, where 3000 Turkish troops will be stationed, and in the failed state of Somalia, where the Turks already manage the port of Mogadishu on a twenty-year contract and are looking to take over operations of the port of Kismayo.

The plans for a Turkish military base in Georgia and a potential future Turkish base in Azerbaijan, perhaps in the Nakhichevan exclave between Armenia and Turkey, has prompted the mainly Armenian population of the Georgian regions of Javakhq and Tsalka to contemplate secession from Georgia and incorporation with Armenia. Armenians throughout the region have long memories about the Turkish genocide of the Armenian people in the early part of the 20th century.

The proposal for a Turkish base on Georgian soil was discussed at a meeting in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, of the defense ministers of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. In addition to creating worries in Armenia, a Turkish base in Nakhichevan would alarm Iran, which has been wary of Turkish ties to ISIL and other Sunni jihadist groups.

In the past, Erdogan has stoked the flames of Azerbaijani nationalism against Armenia. In 2010, Erdogan said, «Military cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the NAR (Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic) is one of the major components of our relations». It is believed that Turkish liaison officers have for some time been stationed at an Azerbaijan military base already maintained in Nakhichevan. Except when separatism achieves Turkey’s own Islamist aims, as in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Dagestan, Turkey has become the natural enemy of separatists in the Caucasus region due to Turkey’s own war against any notion of an autonomous or independent Kurdistan.

Ankara is also threatening separatists that lie at the heart of Turkey’s planned military base in Somalia, the official mission of which is to train the officer corps of the fledgling Somali National Army.

The first victim of the Turkish military in Somalia may be the de facto independent Republic of Somaliland, which has existed as a peaceful but unrecognized nation since 1990 when it broke from the brutal Somali regime of dictator Mohammad Siad Barre. Although Turkey allegedly tried to moderate between Somaliland and Somalia, Turkey's belligerent attitude toward separatists is well known in not only Somaliland but also in other separatist regions of Somalia, including Puntland, Jubaland, and others. These will be the initial targets of the Turkish military forces in Somalia.

Turkish ambassador to Somalia Olgan Bekar paid his first visit to Puntland in 2014 where he met the president, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali. In 2015, Bekar was present at the inauguration of the newly-engineered Central State in Adado. Abandoning his role as an ambassador, Bekar appeared to be taking on the role of an Ottoman viceroy in Somalia. The primary item for discussion was Puntland's re-integration into a federalized Somalia. In 2015, a Turkish business delegation, with Bekar's support, visited Jubaland, the location of the strategic port of Kismayo.

Ali's predecessor, Puntland President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, along with Galmudug State President Mohamed Ahmed Alim, pulled out of a Somali peace conference held in Istanbul in 2012. Both regional leaders stated that the conference was not «Somali-owned» and that the Turks had their own agenda. With the announcement of the Turkish base in Somalia, both leaders have been proven correct.

After subjugating Somali autonomous regions, the Turks will turn their attention to predominantly Christian Ethiopia, where the largely Muslim Oromo people are suitable «Trojan horses» for Turkish intrigue; Kenya, where there is a growing divide between the Muslim coastal region and the Christian interior; and Zanzibar, a secessionist-minded part of Tanzania dominated by the moderate Ibadi sect of Islam. Turkey has already shown itself to be a significant threat to Christian majority nations facing Islamist extremism, particularly Armenia, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

Turkey is also a threat to non-Sunni nations like Shi’a majority Iran and Ibadi sect majority Oman. Hence, Turkey is establishing a large military base in Qatar from which it can apply pressure on Iranian and Omani interests in the Persian Gulf.

In every move by Turkey to expand its military presence abroad, Ankara has the full support of NATO and the United States. The Turkish foray into Georgia and Azerbaijan would not be possible without NATO’s encouragement. NATO’s main objective in the Caucasus is to isolate Russia and apply direct pressure on such independence-minded republics as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, the latter an Armenian enclave located within Azerbaijan. In Somalia, the Turkish military adventurism has the support of the ever-present US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which oversees all US military operations in Africa. And in Qatar, the Turkish base will co-exist with the massive US airbase at Al-Udeid, America’s largest military base in the Middle East.

Will Turkey’s plans to become a regional superpower end with bases in Qatar, Somalia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan? Erdogan’s and his Justice and Development Party’s pan-Turkic appetite may see additional Turkish bases in Europe, Central Asia, and North Africa. Under an agreement with Albania, the Turkish Navy has the right to use the Vlore Naval Shipyard, also known as the Pasha Liman Base. Turkish military and intelligence involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia on behalf of Muslim Albanians and Bosniaks, including stoking Muslim tensions, is well-known.

Turkey has established a military base presence in Iraqi Kurdistan and within Syria using proxy armies of Turkmen and Sunni tribes. And, for many years, the Turks have operated military bases in Northern Cyprus, which it known as the «Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus», a secessionist entity recognized by no other nation.

Turkey’s choosing to support Muslim secessionist movements in Cyprus and Macedonia while opting to fight Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq, Somali groups in the Horn of Africa, and Armenian groups in Georgia may come back to haunt Ankara. By no means is the Turkish Republic immune to secessionism, from Turkish Kurdistan, former Assyrian and Armenian lands, and Lazistan in the east of Turkey to former Greek lands on the Turkish Mediterranean coast and to East Thrace, including Constantinople, in the western part of the country, there is ample room for external powers to use secessionism against the pan-Turkic regime of Erdogan and his cronies. Turkey, far from being a united Turkish republic beholden to a strong man like Erdogan, rests on an ethnic and religious house of cards. It would take only a strong gust of wind from Athens, Yerevan, Moscow, Belgrade, Skopje, Tehran, Hargeisa, and Addis Ababa to send the pan-Turkic regime’s troops home to deal with the rise of homegrown ethnic and religious nationalism far beyond that offered up by the Kurds.