Twice in the past week, the United States has clumsily weighed into mounting tensions in the East Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey.

First, Washington announced last weekend the opening of a maritime security base on the island state of Cyprus, which is allied with Greece. Then the U.S. followed up by formally clearing the way to send weapons to Cyprus, ending a 33-year arms embargo. Washington claims the arms are “non-lethal”, but we have seen that semantic ruse played before with regard to U.S. weaponizing Ukraine and other places. Never mind the hairsplitting, the move is a military involvement whichever way it’s presented.

Both U.S. moves have infuriated Turkey, which lies to the north of Cyprus and which maintains territorial claims over the northern part of the island populated by Turkish-Cypriots. The main part of the island, the Republic of Cyprus, is historically aligned with Greece. Cyprus became divided in 1974 after Turkey invaded following a coup led by the Greek military. The territory has been a source of tensions ever since and a recurring cause for confrontation between Greece and Turkey over competing claims.

This year tensions have flared up again over disputed rights to oil and gas exploration in the East Mediterranean Sea. The area is reckoned to be rich in untapped hydrocarbon resources. There are even fears of a military confrontation escalating between patrolling Greek and Turkish navy vessels.

What is remarkable too is that both neighboring states are members of the U.S.-led NATO military alliance, which claims to be a protector of global peace and security. Yet here we have its own members jostling on a hair-trigger which could erupt into war on the southern arc of Europe.

What’s even more remarkable is the ham-handed, destabilizing way that the U.S. is intervening in the dispute. The establishment of a new “security” (read “military”) base at Larnaca in southern Cyprus and the supply of weaponry are viewed by Turkey as a flagrant attempt by Washington to put its thumb on the scale in favor of Greece and Cyprus against Ankara.

Last weekend, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, where he signed a memorandum of understanding to set up the maritime base at Larnaca. Ironically, the installation is to be known by the acronym, CYCLOPS, after the mythical one-eyed giant of ancient Greek legend.

During his visit, Pompeo rebuked Turkey for stoking tensions in the region and he called for diplomatic resolution of the dispute. Pompeo went on to make a jab at Russia, saying: “Increased tensions help no-one except adversaries who would like to see division in the transatlantic unity.”

The U.S. top diplomat appeared to be referring to a visit to Nicosia only days earlier by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In his meeting with the Greek-Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades, Lavrov offered Moscow’s help in mediating the conflict with Turkey. Given Russia’s cordial relations with both sides, the offer by Lavrov was certainly a reasonable and pragmatic one. Why Pompeo should seek to portray the Russian intervention as pernicious only betrays the typical reflexive Russophobia that dominates in Washington.

In any case, the reality is that it is the United States which is evidently fomenting tensions in the East Mediterranean through its destabilizing initiatives. Its exhortations for diplomatic resolution is empty hypocrisy belied by its actions.

What is behind the U.S. moves? One reason is the intense umbrage taken by Washington over Turkey’s decision last year to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system. That represents a big commercial loss for the American military-industrial complex. Ankara’s adopting of Russian air-defense technology also grievously undermines NATO propaganda seeking to portray Russia as a security threat to Europe.

Another factor is Turkey’s warnings that due to American bullying over the S-400 issue it may shut down the NATO base at Incirlik in southern Turkey. If that were to happen, then the U.S. loses an important power-projection point against Russia. Therefore, it seems that the U.S. move to set up a new base at Larnaca in Cyprus may be a hedge against potential closure of Incirlik.

A third factor is proximity to Syria. Cyprus is only 200 kilometers from Syria which hosts strategically important Russian naval and military air bases at Tartus and Hmeimim. Those bases have been crucial in Russia’s alliance with Syria to defeat the U.S.-sponsored covert war for regime change in Damascus. By gaining a foothold in Cyprus, Washington may be trying to curb Russia’s pivotal support for Syria.

Whatever the precise calculus, it is nonetheless clear that Washington’s posturing is both reckless and hypocritical. Cyclops, the ill-fated clumsy giant outwitted by Ulysses, has a 21st century counterpart – the United States.

In other words, it is the economic facts on the ground that are intended shape the political outcome — an attenuated political landscape that anyway has been minimised by Trump’s pre-emptive removal of key pieces of any Palestinian negotiating leverage.

The financial squeeze on the Palestinians is well attested. On the one hand, the Palestinian Authority (historically dependent on Saudi subvention) is gently slipping into bankruptcy; whilst Gaza is held in virtual abject dependency through the drip-feed of subventions channelled into Gaza by Qatar, with Israeli permission — the size of this latter monthly ‘lifeline’ subvention being carefully adjusted by Israel according to what it judges to be the norms of (generally Hamas) ‘good conduct’.

So, on the one hand there is the financial siege that is intended to make the Palestinians pliant to the ‘quality of life package’ which the ‘deal’ is supposed to bring — the Bahrain summit later this month being its shopfront. But there is another less well recognised side to the Deal which is summarised in the title to a McClatchy article entitled, White House sees Egyptian energy forum as a ‘roadmap to Middle East peace’.

In a later piece, McClatchy publishes the newly declassified map of the US East Mediterranean energy ‘roadmap’. And here the fuller picture becomes clear: the US sponsored ‘gas forum’, “according to three senior administration officials, that map [the] declassified one, obtained by McClatchy – has motivated members of the [US] National Security Council to prioritize the formation of a gas forum in the Eastern Mediterranean that would simultaneously boost and entangle the economies of several countries that have been at odds for decades”.

Well, let’s translate that little euphemism: ‘boost and entangle’. What that formula translates into is — the means to integrate Israel into the economic regional sphere is firstly, through energy. Yet, it is not intended to integrate Israel alone into this Egyptian economic sphere, but also to make Jordan, the PA (and maybe even Lebanon), too, partially dependent on Israeli energy – alongside putative partners, Italy, Greece, and (the Greek-linked part) of Cyprus — with the US offering to help flesh out the structure of the ‘gas forum’ with U.S. expertise.

This is the heart of ‘the deal’. Not just political normalisation for Israel into the region, but the making of economic dependency of the Egyptians, Palestinians, Jordanians (and possibly – but not so likely – Lebanon) on the US East-Med gas ‘hub’.

Source: McClatchy

And, inevitably there is a sub-plot to all this, (as McClatchy notes):

“On this front, the administration enjoys support from unlikely allies. Eliot Engel, the Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee … said the Mediterranean gas forum project was a strategic opportunity for the U.S. to stymie Russian influence efforts over local energy resources. “I think that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and Russia can’t and should not be able to control the situation,” Engel stated”.

So, the US Administration is pursuing two bipartisan congressional efforts to ‘stymie’ Russia in the region: One is a bill promoting energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean; and a parallel bill which threatens to sanction European firms supporting the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline taking Russian gas into Germany.

There are however, two obvious big ‘catches’ to this notion of both ‘stymying’ Russia, whilst simultaneously normalising Israel economically into the region. The first, as Simon Henderson of the Washington Institute notes, [is the notion that] the area’s underlying geology could help Europe offset, or even replace, its dependence on Russian gas “seems farfetched at the present level of discoveries. Several more giant fields like Leviathan or Egypt’s Zohr would have to be found before this reality changes”:

“The idea that East Mediterranean energy could impact on the European energy balance in such a way as to dent Russian market share is a fantasy – Europe’s thirst for gas is so huge, and Russia’s ability to provide that gas is so great, that it’s a wild dream to even hope we can achieve it given the limited reserves discovered thus far,” Henderson said. “Hoping you can find gas is not the same as finding gas”.

In short, an Egyptian ‘hub’ serving exports, might only ‘work’, as matters stand, through patching some of the smaller East-Med discoveries – together with a large Israeli contribution – through pipelines into the two Egyptian gas liquefying plants near Port Said and Alexandria. But LNG availability globally is high, prices are hugely competitive, and it is by no means certain that ‘the hub’ can be commercially viable.

And here is the main catch: Geo-politics. Anything aimed at integrating Israel into the region is bound to be sensitive. So, whilst US officials are optimistic about Egypt’s leadership of their ‘gas forum’ in the wake of President Sisi’s April meeting with Trump – Egypt – a mainstay to the separate US Iran confrontation plan – shortly afterward the visit, rather notably withdrew from the strategic military alliance the Trump administration was trying to build to confront Iran: The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), to the consternation of US officials.

When it comes to energy deals, however, even having a treaty with Israel does not put an end to public sensitivities about rapprochement with Israel, Henderson notes. Notwithstanding any ‘peace treaty’, many Jordanians still oppose the prospect of using (Israeli) Leviathan gas to provide for large-scale electricity generation, beginning early next year. Amman has tried to deflect such anger by calling the supplies “northern gas” or “American gas”, emphasizing Noble’s role in producing it.

But here is the other side to the issue: Clearly, Egypt does not want to be a part of any anti-Iranian US-led alliance (MESA). But equally, why should Egypt – or Jordan, or for that matter, or any other member of the ‘gas forum’ – wish to be tightly aligned with an US anti-Russian strategy for the region? Egypt may have signed up to the US ‘gas hub’ project. But at the very same time, Egypt also was signing a $2 billion contract to buy more than twenty Russian Sukhoi SU-35 fighter aircraft. Do ‘hub’ members really judge an Egyptian ‘hub’ to be a rival to Russian gas in Europe?

Probably not: For ultimately, the idea that a putative energy hub can ‘stymie Russia’ indeed is fantasy. Europe’s thirst for gas indeed is so huge, and Russia’s ability to provide that gas so great, that it is a wild dream to even think it. The EU shows, for example, no particular interest in the US supported $7 billion mooted pipeline linking the eastern Mediterranean through Cyprus, to Greece. The undersea terrain is too problematic, and the cost too high.

Israel too, hopes to find more gas (of course). But the deadline for bids on nineteen of its offshore blocks has been pushed back to mid-August – seemingly reflecting a lack of investor interest. For now, the oil majors seem more tempted by the Cypriot blocks – up for bid.

But politics again: being a part of America’s ‘gas forum’ in which the Nicosia (i.e. the Greek-linked) government is a key member, explicitly places the forum and its members on a potential collision course with Turkey, who will not readily yield on its ambitious claims on the East Med basin (it has just announced that it will establish naval and air bases in Northern Cyprus). Nor will Lebanon, either. Sisi and Erdogan share a mutual, personal dislike, but will the others wish to be drawn into that quarrel?

Russia anyway, seems not greatly interested in the production possibilities of the Mediterranean Middle East. Rather it is focused on a pipeline corridor stretching from Iran and Iraq to Europe via Turkey or (eventually) Syria.

In sum then, the Kushner – Trump ‘Deal’, in respect to the integration of Israel into the regional energy economy seems destined to draw the same skepticism and distrust, as does the ‘Deal’s’ other parts.

Turkey, which is traditionally reluctant to play by the European Union’s rules, is playing a particular role here. Ankara’s plans to build an Israel–Turkey pipeline are being superimposed on the desire of the Turkish elite to occupy key positions in the development of offshore natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, primarily around Cyprus. These plans are unleashing a whole host of problems between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, while, at the same time, affecting the interests of Israel, as well as Egypt and Libya, which are claiming their rights to the continental shelf. The world’s leading oil and gas companies are also pursuing their own economic objectives in the region, the most active of which are the French company Total and the Italian company ENI. 

The current focus of contention is the offshore «Block 11», situated in the territorial waters of Cyprus. Turkey, which is also speaking on behalf of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has already sent a frigate, TCG Gökçeada, to the region. The frigate’s commander has been ordered to use whatever measures necessary to counteract ‘undesirable’ activity around the continental shelf. But any actions by Nicosia and Athens in support could be deemed ‘undesirable’, since Turkey’s official position is that all the gas resources on Cyprus’ continental shelf belong not only to the Greek Cypriots, but also to the Turkish Cypriots. And by the latter is meant the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 

Speaking in July at the World Petroleum Congress in Istanbul, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated: «What we expect from anyone who takes sides in the developments in Cyprus is that they should refrain from steps that might pave the way for new tensions in the region. I would like to remind them that they could face the risk of losing a friend like Turkey, not just in the region, but anywhere and in any field».

Ankara has already sent its own flotilla to the potentially oil-rich regions of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, including the drilling vessel Barbaros Hayrettin Pa and several navy vessels. 

Athens has not stood idly by either, officially declaring that Greece will respond to Turkey’s «countermeasures against the development of Cyprus’ ‘Block 11’» and that the country is «ready to defend its sovereign rights». In this regard, it is worth remembering that in 1993, Greece and Cyprus adopted the Defence Doctrine of the Single Area, which aims to jointly react to an aggression by another country.

Israel, Libya and even Egypt are showing an increased interest in the deposits – each considers them to be extensions of their own continental shelf. And this interest is being reinforced by concrete military measures. The Israeli Ministry of Defence, for example, has signed a $420-million contract to equip the country’s navy with special systems to defend gas fields and navigable waterways. The deal is intended to supplement an earlier purchase of four Sa’ar 6 warships, which will be used to protect Israel’s economic waters in the Mediterranean Sea. As for Egypt, there is growing opposition to Turkey in connection with Ankara’s support of Qatar, which, in turn, is openly sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt.

Rivalries surrounding the gas fields of the Mediterranean shelf could mean that the possibility of constructing one of the world’s longest gas pipelines between Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Italy (more than 2,000 kilometres) comes to nothing. The estimated cost of the project stands at more than $6 billion, some of which the project’s participants are planning to obtain from the funds of the European Commission as part of the notorious ‘diversification’ of energy supplies. In this project, the bulk of the gas will come from Israel’s Leviathan gas field, the reserves of which amount to around 613 billion cubic metres of gas and 39.4 million barrels of gas condensate. «We are confident that in the future, Europe will buy gas produced in the Eastern Mediterranean», stated Israel’s Minister of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Resources, Yuval Steinitz. «Intensive talks are currently underway on the construction of two pipelines. One of these will stretch to Turkey and then on to Europe. The other pipeline will go through Southern Cyprus and Greece to Italy».

The Balkans could end up the biggest loser in disputes over the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, and calls from Brussels and Washington to diversify energy sources are hardly helping. There will simply end up being nothing with which to diversify Russian gas imports, especially given the current confrontation between the US and the EU on US sanctions against Russian energy projects. By imposing sanctions against Moscow, America is «restricting economic cooperation with Russia in order to foist US shale gas on Europeans. Resentment is growing at the dishonest way the US looks after its own interests at the expense of others», writes the German newspaper Handelsblatt. 

The tensions between the two nations have exacerbated recently over the Cyprus question and the disputed Imia (Kardak) islands in the Aegean Sea. Ankara believes the islands are in «gray zones» — meaning «undetermined sovereignty by Turkey» — and therefore Greece cannot claim them. Incidents at sea have become routine to sour the bilateral relationship. Dogfights have taken place over the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and the Dodecanese archipelago.

The Aegean dispute has been a major source of tension between Greece and Turkey since the 1970s, bringing the two countries to the brink of military confrontation in 1987 and 1996. The dispute revolves around a set of issues involving the delimitation of territorial waters, airspace, demilitarized zones and the status several Aegean Sea islands. Since oil was found on the Aegean Sea's continental shelf, the disputes over the uninhabited islands flared up. Both Greece and Turkey issued permits to their companies to extract oil in the disputed waters. No international effort has been able to mitigate the tensions.

The UN-sponsored talks to reunify Cyprus in Geneva have got stalled in January without tangible progress achieved. According to Al Jazeera, the process hit a hard wall recently after the Turkish Cypriot side decided not to attend a scheduled meeting between the island's rival leaders over a Greek Cypriot decision to celebrate a nationalist commemoration at schools. Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci were scheduled to meet on February 21 in the divided island's buffer zone. But tensions rose in recent days after the February 10 vote by Greek Cypriot MPs for public schools to honor the anniversary of a 1950 referendum for union with Greece. Ozdil Nami, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator in the peace talks, said a decision to commemorate such an event is at odds with the ongoing peace negotiations.

A Greek court’s decision to not extradite military officers who had fled the country as suspects in the July coup attempt was perceived as an unfriendly gesture in Turkey. All told, the situation is so tense that a single spark is enough to start a big fire.

The rising tensions with Greece could negatively affect Turkey’s relations with the EU, which are already strained because of the refugee crisis, the EU’s refusal to fulfill its promise to liberalize its visa requirements for Turkish citizens and disputes over human rights issues. The EU’s relationship with Turkey is complicated, but the last thing the Union wants is the breakup of the agreement on refugees.

The tensions between Greece and Turkey – both NATO members – have always been a headache for the alliance. If push comes to shove, NATO will face an unprecedented situation with two member states shooting at each other. The Washington Treaty does not foresee such a scenario. The US is too busy with domestic policies to effectively mediate an international dispute.

Russia is in a unique position to act as an intermediary. True, its relationship with NATO is at fairly low ebb, but nothing is absolutely black and white in international affairs.

Moscow’s enjoys a special relationship with Greece – a NATO member. The countries are incredibly close. Inside the EU, Greece has joined a group of countries comprising Hungary, Cyprus and the Czech Republic, which openly calls for lifting the anti-Russia sanctions. Last May, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Athens to sign a host of bilateral agreements. The bilateral agenda includes military cooperation. Athens is negotiating with Moscow for the purchase and maintenance of the Russian-made S-300 air defense systems delivered in the late 1990s.

Greek Defense Minister Panos Kammenos Greece will seek to obtain a license to manufacture Kalashnikov assault rifles in Patra as soon as the EU lifts ends its trade embargo against Russia. The co-production in a factory in Aigio in northern Peloponnese is expected to be a major boost for Greece’s defense industry.

Top NATO officials have even raised concerns that attempts by Greece to forge a defense pact with Moscow could seriously undermine the united front against Russia.

Turkey is Russia’s close ally in the fight against terrorists. Russian aviation supports the Turkish forces conducting the offensive to retake al-Bab, Syria, from Islamic State militants. No Turkey’s NATO ally has done it. Both nations have joined together in launching the Astana process aimed at achieving peaceful settlement in the war-torn Syria. Turkey is another NATO member willing to develop military cooperation with Russia. It is in talks with Russia regarding the purchase of advanced S-400 long-range air defense missile systems. The countries study the prospects for procurement deals in electronic systems, ammunitions and missile technology.

Unlike other major European powers, Moscow is really interested in maintenance of peace in the Aegean Sea due to its geographic position. Russia has mediated between Syria’s government and Turkey. Perhaps, it is best suited to accomplish the mission after NATO and the EU have proven to be inferior to the task.

One thing is for certain: Turkish Cypriots desperately need the water coming from Turkey. Rainfall and groundwater fall short of meeting the Turkish Cypriots’ demand which is projected to rise to 200 million cubic meters by 2020, with 70% of the amount to be used for irrigation and the rest for households. TRNC’s water storage capacity of 17 million cubic meters and its minuscule desalination capacity contribute little to the needs of the economy and a steady flow of water from the mainland is a must.

The water coming through the pipelines will make the Turkish Cypriots, who already count on subsidies from Ankara for their economic survival, even more dependent on Turkey. One scenario is, therefore, that being more closely bound to the mainland, Turkish Cypriots will have less freedom when negotiating reunification with their Greek Cypriot compatriots, which will make it difficult to reach a solution. This, however, does not necessarily have to be the case.

In the meantime, Greek Cypriots need water as much as their Turkish neighbors do. Their demand for water is expected to rise to 290 million cubic meters by 2020, and while this part of the island has the advantage of possessing much greater storage capacity than the northern part, 330 million cubic meters to be precise, reliance on groundwater and expensive desalination processes put the Greek Cypriots in an unsustainable position with respect to sourcing their water. Conveying water from Greece is an option that was tried in the past but could not be repeated as it is five times more costly than desalinating sea water.

Economic interdependence can and does reduce the likelihood of conflict between the nations and have positive spillover effects onto the political realm. Both communities of the island have to gain substantially from sharing the water; and while water cannot reunify Cyprus on its own, it can supply the economic rationale for an already existing political process and help to facilitate the negotiations.

The good news is that after decades of trials and failures, repeated attempts for peace that bore no fruit, political brinkmanship and distrust between the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus, there are now finally grounds for optimism. Both sides are effectively expressing their determination to achieve a solution for the island and genuinely embark on a dialogue to that end. Talks between the two sides resumed in May following the election of Mustafa Akıncı as the president of TRNC, who, together with his Greek Cypriot counterpart Nicos Anastasiades, not only stated a shared desire for an accord and promised to resume negotiations in a constructive manner, but also launched a number of concrete confidence building measures that took immediate effect. There is now a “new chance for Cyprus,” as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Martii Ahtisari wrote with three colleagues in an opinion piece in Project Syndicate: “even the conflict’s most hardened observers recognize that peace may now be within reach.”

For sure, there is no guarantee that there will be a deal. The issue is extremely complicated and laden with historical baggage, and shared goodwill is not always sufficient to solve problems. However, given the positive political environment, now seems to be the time for shared economic interests and political rapprochement to reinforce each other to produce concrete results in Cyprus. If the water coming from Turkey can be made to flow to the Greek part of Cyprus as well, this can strengthen the case made by those who want the island to be reunited as a federal state. If the objective is a reunified Cyprus, the idea of bringing much needed water to the entire island can be a building stone.

Turkish Cypriot scholar Ahmet Sözen has recently written about the “positive mood surrounding the talks in Cyprus” and stated that at this stage it is of vital importance to prepare both communities of the island for a federative solution and to make efforts for closing the large confidence gap between them that has developed over decades. A vision for sharing water can certainly support the confidence building efforts between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and help to prepare them for a joint future. After all, water is the source of life.

Dr. Altay Atlı is a lecturer at the Asian Studies program of Boğaziçi University in Istanbul and a non-resident research fellow at the Center for Global Studies of Shanghai University.

atimes.com

Sputnik

It is possible to expect that one of two things will happen in the next few days (and in no more than a week): either Athens will have to recall the humanitarian crisis law, or the ‘big troika’ (the EC, the ECB and the IMF) will take punitive action against Greece. The cost of the law (€200 million a year) is not that big, but it is a precedent that could inspire Greece and other debtors to the ‘big troika’ in Europe to carry out new acts of disobedience. 

It will be difficult for Athens to stand up to the ‘big troika’ but by no means hopeless, and there are at least two reasons for this.

Firstly, Brussels, Frankfurt and Washington are not the only pebbles on the beach for the Greek government. Athens can and should search for solutions beyond the borders of the eurozone and the European Union. Venezuela, for example, has been under huge financial and economic pressure from the US, but it recently became known that China is extending a long-term loan of $20 billion to the country to develop its oil industry. Greece could get a good impetus for development from cooperating with Russia. Even Greece’s refusal to take part in the economic sanctions against Russia has already breathed life into the country’s economy, especially its agriculture. It has been reported that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is to visit Moscow at the beginning of April.

Secondly, the position of the ‘big troika’ is becoming increasingly precarious. It is true that the level of Greek sovereign debt is definitely high, at 170 per cent of GDP (2014), but in many EU countries the picture is not much better. In 2013 in Italy, for example, this figure was equal to 132.6 per cent of GDP, and in Portugal it was 129 per cent of GDP. 

When assessing the situation, it is important to not just bear in mind the level of sovereign (state) debt, but the overall picture of external debt as well. Although it cannot be denied that Greece’s external debt is high (it was 234 per cent of GDP at the end of 2012), here the Greeks yield the palm to many other EU countries. The relative indicators of external debt for certain countries of Old Europe (% of GDP) are as follows: Switzerland – 417; Great Britain – 396; the Netherlands – 360; Belgium – 338; France – 236; and Portugal – 232. What’s more, the external debt of the EU’s engine, Germany, is not that insignificant either at 159 per cent. 

With the debt and financial situation the way it is, Brussels (EU), Frankfurt (ECB) and Washington (IMF) can hardly risk making drastic decisions regarding Greek debt. After all, the response could be a declaration of default on the Greek government’s obligations, which total around €320 billion. It would be more than enough to cause a chain reaction involving the bankruptcies of European banks and companies which, in turn, could bring on government defaults and the collapse of the house of cards known as the European Union. 

Both Athens and Brussels are frantically searching for unconventional ways out of the current situation. The European Commission unexpectedly called to mind Cyprus, or rather how the banks there were saved two years ago. Why not take on board the 2013 experience with Cyprus when solving Greece’s current problems? Let me remind you that as a result of the Greek debt restructuring in 2012, the banks, companies and funds that had been holders of large blocks of Greek Treasury debt securities suffered tremendously. The decision was then made to ‘discount’ approximately half of the demands of holders of Greek securities. This hit Cypriot banks hard. Neither the Central Bank of Cyprus, nor the ECB, nor the EC were going to help the banks of this island nation. The ‘big troika’ decided to save the banks by means of investors (deposit and other account holders). In actual fact, this was the confiscation of clients’ money (you can find out more in my article «The confiscation of bank deposits as a global perspective»). 

At present, Greek banks are in exactly the same sorry state as the Cypriot banks were at the end of 2012-beginning of 2013. Their assets include large blocks of Greek debt securities that are depreciating rapidly. The Greek government is unable to save the banks. ECB president Mario Draghi has stated that he will not refinance the Greek banks against Greek government debt securities. The bankruptcy process of Greek banks must not be left to chance, however, since it could have a ricochet effect on the banking systems of neighbouring countries. In March, therefore, the European Commission suddenly suggested imposing control in Greece over cross-border capital flows. Not too long ago, the freedom of cross-border capital flows was considered to be the cornerstone and the central dogma of financial liberalism. Countries that dared to violate this principle were severely dealt with by the IMF and the US. 

Now, however, everything is starting to resemble the Cypriot scenario. Severe restrictions on capital flows were also introduced there in the spring of 2013. It was done so that the clients of Cypriot banks would not be able to avoid fulfilling their sacred duty of saving the banks. I think that the same motive was present in the EC’s March initiative on Greece. The outflow of deposits from the Greek banking sector overseas is increasing, reaching €350-400 million on some days, and the EC’s statement regarding possible foreign exchange restrictions has only accelerated the flight of money. According to the rules of the EU, however, foreign exchange restrictions can only be introduced at the discretion of its member countries’ governments. Athens has not yet mentioned this option. In the meantime, the flight of investors’ money from Greece is continuing, and the risk of large-scale bankruptcies for Greek banks is growing. The Cypriot scenario in Greece is still possible until the end of the spring, but in a few months it will be too late – the deposits will have been reduced to nothing. 

The ‘big troika’ does have another idea, however, which is to bring Greece to its knees once and for all. The essence of the idea is simple – to subject the restructuring of Greek debt carried out in 2012 to an audit. Let me remind you that in 2011, the ‘big troika’ promised Greece an aid programme totalling €130 billion. A condition of the aid was the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt. The restructuring only applied to that part of the debt that was issued in the form of Treasury securities and the holders of which were private entities. The largest Western funds and banks agreed to write off 53.5 per cent of the principal on the securities, which is the equivalent of $107 billion. It was the biggest restructuring of government debt in history. The debt noose around Greece’s neck then grew even tighter. In 2012, the level of sovereign debt was 157 per cent of GDP, but by 2013 it had jumped to 175 per cent. 

The Greek restructuring took place against the background of dramatic events in a different part of the world – Argentina. This country also restructured its sovereign debt in the past ten years, but it became clear over time that a few of the holders of Argentine debt who had not agreed to the restructuring terms were beginning to destroy the agreements that had been reached. The affair ended up in court and, in 2012, Argentina’s debt restructuring scheme that had been successfully worked out over several years began to collapse under the blows of financial vultures – investors who buy up debt securities on the market for a pittance and then, through the courts of the US and the UK, demand payment at face value, so at a rate of 100 per cent, in other words. This phenomenon has come to be known as «legal imperialism». At present, financial vultures have driven Argentina into a corner and the battle has entered a critical phase. 

It is impossible to rule out the use of similar methods to put pressure on Greece. In 2012, the ‘big troika’ ignored the opinion of this small group of private investors who did not agree with the terms of the restructuring (according to our estimates, they accounted for no more than 3 per cent of the Greek debt), but the situation could change dramatically in 2015. One can expect that the ‘aggrieved’ investors will suddenly get the opportunity to express their outrage in the media and the doors of European courts and lawyers’ offices will helpfully swing open for them. Should the court rule in favour of the ‘aggrieved’ investors, then everything will be able to resume its course and the previously written off €107 billion will be added on to Greece’s current debt of €320 billion. Should this happen, Greek sovereign debt will be closer to 230 per cent of GDP. 

I am not saying that this is exactly how things will happen, but there is a strong possibility that the Argentine scenario will be repeated in Greece. One can only hope that the Greek government will scrutinize the experience of Argentina, which is being forced to stand up against international financial predators that have forced the country back into the debt trap it had only just started to fight its way out of. 

The European bureaucracy is bloated and slow to react making the EU decision making process very complicated. No matter that, the EU has taken a decision to impose sanctions against Russia. They are still in force. The US has spent too much time and effort to foster the European political elite after WWII; it won’t let it get out of its control, especially if it comes to the issue of strategic importance like the relationship with Russia. True, the sanctions backlash to strike Europe itself almost as heavily as the Russian Federation. Europe cannot overcome the consequences of financial and economic crisis. In some European countries unemployment exceeds 25%. But the dependence on the United States is great, so Europe continues to take decisions «shooting itself in foot», according to Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban. 

It would be naïve to think that in foreseeable future the united Europe will dare to question the principles of transatlantic solidarity. The issue of Ukraine and the sanctions war against Russia initiated by the United States make surface new trends to diversify the European political landscape. This is the background against which Nicos Anastasiades, the President of Cyprus, visited Russia on February 24-27. Cyprus is a small country. It has its own problems. In 1974 the island was effectively partitioned with the northern third inhabited by Turkish Cypriots and the southern two-thirds by Greek Cypriots. Two years ago the country was on the brink of default. It did manage to avoid the worst but it was a narrow escape. Cyprus hosts a British military facility. The island has many commitments to tie it to Brussels, London and Washington. It all restricts the freedom of action, especially when it comes to policy towards Russia. In other words, Cyprus is not China; it is not free enough to have the relationship with Russia it wants. In an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta (a Russian government daily newspaper), the Cypriot President put it bluntly saying that his country is not in the position to openly contradict the European Union and the United States. 

With all the factors limiting the freedom of action he signed a number of important documents during his visit to Russia. The most important of them was an agreement on military-technical cooperation which envisages the use of Cypriot seaports by Russian warships in humanitarian operations and emergencies, as well as anti-terrorist operations. This document got into the spotlight of Western press. But it was not the only result of the visit.

President Anastasiades emphasized that he opposed the idea of sanctions war with Russia. It’s not just a declaration; this point of view is supported by Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Together they constitute a force to reckon with which exerts certain influence on European politics bringing closer the day when such anomaly as anti-Russian economic sanctions will become a thing of the past. It may not happen today, or tomorrow, but the trend is obvious, the sanctions will be finally lifted. 

Talking about the trade over with Cyprus, Russian President Putin said «In 2014, unfortunately, our bilateral trade dropped, mostly due to economic circumstances of the moment, such as the fall in oil and petroleum product prices. The EU’s anti-Russian sanctions and our response measures have also had a negative effect in that exports of agricultural produce from Cyprus to the Russian market have fallen drastically. I am sure, however, that if we work together and in focused fashion, we will succeed in resolving the situation and set our trade back on an upward growth track». These words define the state of bilateral relations in the conditions of sanctions war launched by the European Union. The number of Europeans who refuse to shoot in the foot is growing. The extension of bilateral agenda is an incentive for finding a common language with Russia. The main thing is «to work together and in focused fashion», as President Putin said. 

The Russian Air Force will use the air base Andreas Papandreou, along with the international airport of Paphos in the southwest of the island. The Russian Navy will be able to permanently use the base of Limassol, the port bordering on the British air base of Akrotiri, which serves NATO operations and is also an important hub in the electronic military surveillance system of the alliance. Limasol has already hosted Russian warships starting from 2013, including those participating in the operation to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons and taking part in the Aden Gulf mission off the coast of Somalia. Now the port calls will be made on regular basis according to legally established procedures.

The military agreement is of special importance as sea bed gas deposits have been recently discovered in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia is to take part in the exploration and production process. Israel (which has flatly refused to joint anti-Russia sanctions), Lebanon, Cyprus, Turkey and Syria are all interested in the project and have corresponding security concerns to address.

For Russia, this is just the latest news of a budding military alliance. Over the year, Russia has been increasing its military cooperation with non-NATO members, including China, India, North Korea and Iran. But the Mediterranean region has acquired special importance recently.

On February 3, Greece’s Defence Minister and outspoken “Eurosceptic” Panos Kammenos announced that he was invited to Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu in the near future with the concrete date to be fixed soon. Greece is a NATO member, an organization that perceives Russia as a potential threat. Still, Athens and Moscow appear to be on the way to forming an alliance. On Feb.3, Kammenos met with the Russian Ambassador to Greece. “The discussion with the ambassador of Russia, Mr. Maslov, was also about the pending agreements between the Ministries of National Defence of Greece and Russia, the capabilities of a strategic cooperation, the organisation of the year of Greek-Russian friendship in 2016 which will take place in Greece and in Russia. I received an invitation by Russia’s Minister of Defence to visit Moscow within the next period of time,” Kammenos wrote on the Ministry of Defense website. The new Greek government has on occasion been openly critical of both the EU and NATO. Greece has come under harsh criticism from some European partners over its stance towards Russia at a time of escalating tension over Ukraine. 

On February 10, Russia and Egypt signed several agreements to reinforce military and economic ties. The agreements capped a two-day visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The use of naval faculty, most probably in Alexandria, by Russian ships is an issue on the agenda. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov mentioned such a possibility in his interview to Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

As the Libya’s branch of the self-proclaimed Islamic State beheaded Egyptians in mid-February, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin sent a message of condolence to his Egyptian counterpart and reiterated that “Russia is ready for the closest cooperation with Egypt in fighting all forms of terrorist threat”. Vitaly Churkin, permanent representative of Russia in the U.N. Security Council, doesn’t exclude Russia’s participation in the international coalition in Libya. (3) Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a telephone conversation with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry on February 16 confirmed Moscow’s readiness to act in concert with Cairo in the issues of counteracting terrorism threat.

Thus the possibility of Russia’s involvement in the international efforts to counter the radical organization is no longer ephemeral, but a real one. The Islamic State-connected forces in Libya have intensified their activities recently. The group has its people among boat refugees going to Italian shore (just 350 km to cross). It’s not without reason this country calls for an international effort to intervene in Libya.

Italian PM Matteo Renzi will visit Moscow in early March. Russia’s joining the international coalition against the Islamic State is on the agenda. Italy wants Russia to take part. The EU-imposed anti-Russia sanctions are hardly timely and helpful for the dialogue on the hot issue.

In theory Russia’s contribution could be of great value without exaggeration. Moscow could provide intelligence information and personnel training and arms supplies, especially as the internationally recognized Libyan government asked the UN for military aid. Russia has a group of ships in the Mediterranean which could carry out the mission of patrolling the Libyan shore to prevent illegal weapons supplies to terrorists.

There is something very important Russia has already done in concrete terms. On February 12, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2199 on curbing the revenues that terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq are getting from trade in oil and oil products. The document includes provisions aimed at curbing other sources of terrorist incomes, including the smuggling of precious metals, antiquities and cultural values from Iraq and Syria. The draft resolution was initiated by the Russian Federation and was co-sponsored by over 50 states. Russia hopes that all members of the international community will strictly abide by the provisions of the resolution with the international cooperation carried out on the basis of international legal standards.

The visit of Cypriot President has proven again that the affirmations about Russia being internationally isolated hold no water – it’s nothing but idle talk. To the contrary, Russia’s foreign policy has achieved important successes recently, take President Putin’s visit to Hungary of February 16-17 or the visit to Egypt on February 9-10, to name a few. Russia has a very important role to play in providing security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Anyone who is impartial can see that the situation creep makes its role ever more critical for tackling the burning problems of the region spreading to Europe and involving the USA. This is the time for intensive and constructive dialogue, not sanctions war.