Four top foreign minster level diplomats from Qatar, Iran, Turkey and the UAE travelled to Moscow this week, in as many days, in an impressive display of strategic realignment by regional states against the backdrop of the US-Russia conflict unfolding over Ukraine.

The arrival in Moscow of the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan on Thursday is the most striking. This is happening within a fortnight of the country’s inclusion on 4 March in the Grey List of the global financial crime watchdog, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), due to alleged financial crimes. The FATF recommendations for the UAE include:

• Implementing a more robust system to collect case studies and statistics used in money laundering (ML) investigations;

• Demonstrating a sustained increase in effective investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML cases;

• Probing increase in the number and quality of suspicious transaction reports filed by financial institutions and other entities; and,

• Monitoring high-risk ML threats, such as proceeds of foreign predicate offences, trade-based ML, and third-party laundering.

The FATF is one of those tools of torture that the west has finessed in the international system to humiliate and punish developing countries whom it wants to teach a lesson or two. A cursory look at the countries figuring in the 22-member Grey List would reveal that the UAE shouldn’t really belong there — Albania, Burkina Faso, Haiti, South Sudan, Uganda, Yemen and so on.

But the west’s calculation is that the economy of a country gets affected in a negative manner when it figures on the Grey List — with international financial institutions starting to look at it as a risky nation for investment, which in UAE’s case also renders a lethal blow to its flourishing tourism industry.

Indeed, this happened under the watch of an American, Vincent Schmoll, who is holding interim charge as the acting FATF executive secretary since January. Schmoll used to be a functionary at the US Treasury. Conceivably, Washington’s writ runs large in this episode.

US-UAE relations have been experiencing some tumult during the past year. The trouble began soon after President Donald Trump’s departure from the White House. In January 2021, on Trump’s last full day in office, Abu Dhabi had signed a $23 billion agreement to buy 50 F-35 fighter jets, 18 Reaper drones, and other advanced munitions, but incoming President Joe Biden froze the deal as soon as he entered the Oval Office.

A number of factors might have influenced the Biden administration’s calculations, apart from the fact that the lucrative F-35 deal was a Trump legacy. As it transpired, in a delaying tactic, Washington began voicing serious concerns about the UAE-China relationship and the particularly strong economic ties developing between Abu Dhabi and Beijing. Notably, Washington wanted the UAE to put an end to a 5G contract with Chinese tech giant Huawei, which is the undisputed global leader in next-generation 5G technology.

Meanwhile, in addition to the Huawei issue, US intelligence agencies claimed to have discovered that Beijing was building what they thought to be a secret military facility at the Khalifa port in the UAE.

Emirati officials denied the allegation, but under pressure from Washington, were forced to halt the project, although the Persian Gulf states in general, and the UAE in particular, do not like being pushed to take sides between Washington and Beijing. They consider that their best interest lies in maintaining neutrality and balancing relations.

The end result, as everyone knows, was that much to the annoyance of Washington, Abu Dhabi finally hit back by opting for 80 Rafale combat aircraft from France in a deal worth over $20 billion last December.

Then came the bombshell in February with the sensational disclosure that the UAE has plans to order 12 L-15 light attack planes from China, with the option of purchasing 36 more. A UAE defence ministry statement said the purchase is part of the country’s efforts to diversify weapon suppliers. As an aside, the UAE air force operates mainly American-made F-16 and French-made Mirage fighters.

Only a week later, all hell broke loose when the UAE resisted American pressure and abstained (twice) on US-led Ukraine-related UN Security Council resolutions condemning Russia. Subsequent reports said that the Biden administration conveyed its displeasure to Abu Dhabi.

Soon after that, according to a Wall Street Journal report last week, Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan failed to take a call from Biden who apparently wanted to discuss the US expectation that the UAE would pump more oil into the market to bring down skyrocketing prices.

Yet another complicating factor is that the Biden administration blundered into the intra-Gulf rivalries by designating Qatar as a ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’ (MNNA). On 31 January, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani became the first Persian Gulf leader to meet with Biden in the White House and media accounts of the visit highlighted a $20 billion deal for Boeing 777X freighter aircraft. Additionally, the emir met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and discussed weapons sales.

Given this backdrop, Foreign Minister Abdullah Al-Nahyan’s arrival in Moscow couldn’t have been any less dramatic. The Russian side has divulged few details about the visit. The big question is whether any arms deal was been discussed.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made a statement that the talks covered “a wide range of issues related to our bilateral relations and international agenda. For obvious reasons, we paid a great deal of attention to the Ukrainian developments. We spoke in detail about the goals and objectives of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine to protect people from the Kiev regime, and to demilitarize and de-Nazify this country.”

The UAE foreign minister reportedly told Lavrov that his country aimed at further systematic development of relations with Russia and diversification of the areas of bilateral cooperation. In what was possibly an indirect swipe at the US sanctions aimed at isolating Russia from the world economy, Al-Nahyan said:

“It is always important for us to keep our finger on the pulse and make sure that relations between Russia and the UAE move forward. There is no doubt that we are aimed at the systematic development of these relations and the diversification of the areas of bilateral cooperation so that it meets the interests of both our citizens and state institutions and other structures.”

He stressed that the parties should strengthen cooperation on energy and food security. Clearly, the US cannot count on the support of the Persian Gulf region in its campaign to isolate Russia or to dismantle OPEC+ – an increasingly influential body consisting of the 13 OPEC members plus ten non-OPEC oil exporters, which is chaired by the largest producers Russia and Saudi Arabia. The Gulf countries are, one by one, seeking out Russia to signal their solidarity and register their own desire to shake off US hegemony.

Interestingly, last Tuesday, Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa had called Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss “topical issues of Russia‒Bahrain cooperation in politics, trade and the economy… (and) expressed the shared intention to further develop the friendly ties between Russia and Bahrain.” This, despite the fact that the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and the US Naval Forces Central Command are based in Bahrain.

Such display of solidarity by the ‘non-western international community’ brings some vital nuance to the global geopolitical chessboard: for one, it makes a mockery of the western sanctions against Russia. The Gulf countries are avid ‘globalizers’ and trading nations — Dubai, in particular. As time passes, western companies are sure to find ingenious ways to trade with Russia via resourceful intermediaries in the Gulf region.

Abdullah Al-Nahyan’s trip to Moscow is a demonstrative act of defiance, both symbolically and strategically. It is a mark of the Persian Gulf region’s growing alienation from Washington. Reports suggest that UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who travelled to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia this week to press for increased oil production to lower oil prices, also came back empty-handed.

Contrary to Washington’s hopes, there is every likelihood that the OPEC+ will continue to strengthen its strategic autonomy vis-a-vis the US. Previously, Russia used to be a voice of moderation within the group. This will have profound implications for the world oil market.

The high attention Russian diplomacy paid to the West Asian region in the recent decade is returning dividends, for sure. Russia offered its Persian Gulf interlocutors something they never experienced before with a great power – an equal partnership based on mutual respect.

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Boris Johnson’s words themselves may be prolific. He said at a conference on 19^th of February in Munich that a Ukraine invasion would “echo” around the world while asking for Europe to take a united stand against Russia. In fact, the Ukraine crisis, without even one Russian soldier entering Eastern Ukraine, is having quite an impact already simply due to the media bandwidth it has taken, depriving other big stories the oxygen they deserve – particularly affecting the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA).

These countries, certainly in the GCC region, are benefitting from the Ukraine standoff as the heat is taken off them. In particular the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been given a get-out-of-jail-free card by western media in the latter’s abandonment of Yemen, a bloody senseless war there which has wiped out generations and left the rest with starvation and whose gruesome images used to fill TV screens and mainstream media’s print and online portals. But no more.

In fact, sceptics might even go further and argue that in the case of Saudi Arabia, it would appear that its mercurial young crown prince has actually taken full advantage of the media blackout on Yemen by ploughing ahead with his reforms which include the banning of Mosque loudspeakers, significantly reducing hours spent on Islamic education and Arabic language in the national curriculum and even allowing bikini beaches in Jeddah. The hope presumably is that at some point western media will return to the region and notice such changes and start to feature them in their reporting.

But there might be a long wait.

Remarkably, Putin’s standoff with the West might go on for some time, even if there is no invasion as such. In the meantime, for many of the elite which make up countries in the region who are fearing another Arab Spring, the limited media attention given to Yemen is interesting. But it is Justin Trudeau’s extraordinary authoritarian behaviour in Canada against peaceful truckers who wish to protest which will have ramifications in the Arab world. Not only will Arab leaders note that also the press coverage is limited as is the opprobrium from the normal so-called experts in Washington and London, but that they now have the green light from the West to replicate anti-democratic measures all in the name of the sanctity of the state and woe betide Canada for criticising KSA’s human rights record as it did previously when it demanded the release of Saudi Blogger Raif Badawi in 2018.

Trudeau has truly shocked the world with his arbitrary move to criminalise the protests and has set a template for the Middle East and Africa to follow suit.

Indeed in Africa, tyrannical, brutal regimes will not doubt note how the Ukraine crisis and the media attention it has attracted has caused almost a media blackout on authoritarian power grabs in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea, western satellites which, in the case of Mali at least, have fallen into the hands of Moscow simply by its association with Wagner mercenaries. The very real fear that African dictators have which impacts their ability to scrounge aid from the World Bank and the IMF is press coverage itself from the media giants. When that line of communication is closed down, there’s no telling how African countries’ elites will react. There may well be a domino effect which will take many with it as it sweeps across the region, while the EU remains a impotent spectator to the winds of change.

And in the EU itself, Poland is no longer alone in being seen as the rude boy in the class who might be expelled from the club, or rather leaves unceremoniously. Others, like Hungary, are now falling victim to EU laws which challenge their constitutions and place them on a collision course with the maniacs in Brussels who cannot see how they are digging their own graves with their bellicose language and ultimatums. A recent study by the EU revealed that MEPs themselves are asking for a special slush fund of billions of euros to head off the next anti-EU referendum which is sending some EU leaders into a panic as many believe that one more EU member to follow Britain might be the end of the project as we know it.

None of these stories are getting any real traction or attention by journalists who are either heading to Ukraine or have turned all their attention to the tensions in their copy and left these subjects aside. Is this what Boris Johnson meant when he warned leaders in Munich about the consequences echoing around the world?

It’s impossible to understand the resumption of the JCPOA nuclear talks in Vienna without considering the serious inner turbulence of the Biden administration.

Everyone and his neighbor are aware of Tehran’s straightforward expectations: all sanctions – no exceptions – must be removed in a verifiable manner. Only then will the Islamic Republic reverse what it terms ‘remedial measures,’ that is, ramping up its nuclear program to match each new American ‘punishment.’

The reason Washington isn’t tabling a similarly transparent position is because its economic circumstances are, bizarrely, far more convoluted than Iran’s under sanctions. Joe Biden is now facing a hard domestic reality: if his financial team raises interest rates, the stock market will crash and the US will be plunged into deep economic distress.

Panicked Democrats are even considering the possibility of allowing Biden’s own impeachment by a Republican majority in the next Congress over the Hunter Biden scandal.

According to a top, non-partisan US national security source, there are three things the Democrats think they can do to delay the final reckoning:

First, sell some of the stock in the Strategic Oil Reserve in coordination with its allies to drive oil prices down and lower inflation.

Second, ‘encourage’ Beijing to devalue the yuan, thus making Chinese imports cheaper in the US, “even if that materially increases the US trade deficit. They are offering trading the Trump tariff in exchange.” Assuming this would happen, and that’s a major if, it would in practice have a double effect, lowering prices by 25 percent on Chinese imports in tandem with the currency depreciation.

Third, “they plan to make a deal with Iran no matter what, to allow their oil to re-enter the market, driving down the oil price.” This would imply the current negotiations in Vienna reaching a swift conclusion, because “they need a deal quickly. They are desperate.”

There is no evidence whatsoever that the team actually running the Biden administration will be able to pull off points two and three; not when the realities of Cold War 2.0 against China and bipartisan Iranophobia are considered.

Still, the only issue that really worries the Democratic leadership, according to the intel source, is to have the three strategies get them through the mid-term elections. Afterwards, they may be able to raise interest rates and allow themselves time for some stabilization before the 2024 presidential ballot.

So how are US allies reacting to it? Quite intriguing movements are in the cards.

When in doubt, go multilateral

Less than two weeks ago in Riyadh, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in a joint meeting with France, Germany and the UK, plus Egypt and Jordan, told the US Iran envoy Robert Malley that for all practical purposes, they want the new JCPOA round to succeed.

A joint statement, shared by Europeans and Arabs, noted “a return to mutual compliance with the [nuclear deal] would benefit the entire Middle East, allow for more regional partnerships and economic exchange, with long-lasting implications for growth and the well-being of all people there, including in Iran.”

This is far from implying a better understanding of Iran’s position. It reveals, in fact, the predominant GCC mindset ruled by fear: something must be done to tame Iran, accused of nefarious “recent activities” such as hijacking oil tankers and attacking US soldiers in Iraq.

So this is what the GCC is volunteering to the Americans. Now compare it with what the Russians are proposing to several protagonists across West Asia.

Essentially, Moscow is reviving the Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region, an idea that has been simmering since the 1990s. Here is what the concept is all about.

So if the US administration’s reasoning is predictably short-term – we need Iranian oil back in the market – the Russian vision points to systemic change.

The Collective Security Concept calls for true multilateralism – not exactly Washington’s cup of tea – and “the adherence of all states to international law, the fundamental provisions of the UN Charter and the resolutions of the UN Security Council.”

All that is in direct contrast with the imperial “rules-based international order.”

It’s too far-fetched to assume that Russian diplomacy per se is about to accomplish a miracle: an entente cordiale between Tehran and Riyadh.

Yet there’s already tangible progress, for instance, between Iran and the UAE. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri held a “cordial meeting” in Dubai with Anwar Gargash, senior adviser to UAE President Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. According to Bagheri, they “agreed to open a new page in Iran-UAE relations.”

Geopolitically, Russia holds the definitive ace: it maintains good relationships with all actors in the Persian Gulf and beyond, talks to all of them frequently, and is widely respected as a mediator by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, and other GCC members.

Russia also offers the world’s most competitive and cutting edge military hardware to underpin the security needs of all the parties.

And then there’s the overarching, new geopolitical reality. Russia and Iran are forging a strengthened strategic partnership, not only geopolitical but also geoeconomic, fully aligned to the Russian-conceptualized Greater Eurasian Partnership – and also demonstrated by Moscow’s support for Iran’s recent ascension to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the only West Asian state to be admitted thus far.

Furthermore, three years ago Iran launched its own regional security framework proposal for the region called HOPE (the Hormuz Peace Endeavor) with the intent to convene all eight littoral states of the Persian Gulf (including Iraq) to address and resolve the vital issues of cooperation, security, and freedom of navigation.

The Iranian plan didn’t get far off the ground. While Iran suffers from adversarial relations with some of its intended audience, Russia carries none of that baggage.

The $5.4 trillion game

And that brings us to the essential Pipelineistan angle, which in the Russia–Iran case revolves around the new, multi-trillion dollar Chalous gas field in the Caspian Sea.

A recent sensationalist take painted Chalous as enabling Russia to “secure control over the European energy market.”

That’s hardly the story. Chalous, in fact, will enable Iran  – with Russian input – to become a major gas exporter to Europe, something that Brussels evidently relishes. The head of Iran’s KEPCO, Ali Osouli, expects a “new gas hub to be formed in the north to let the country supply 20 percent of Europe’s gas needs.”

According to Russia’s Transneft, Chalous alone could supply as much as 52 percent of natural gas needs of the whole EU for the next 20 years.

Chalous is quite something: a twin-field site, separated by roughly nine kilometers, the second-largest natural gas block in the Caspian Sea, just behind Alborz. It may hold gas reserves equivalent to one-fourth of the immense South Pars gas field, placing it as the 10th largest gas reserves in the world.

Chalous happens to be a graphic case of Russia-Iran-China (RIC) geoeconomic cooperation. Proverbial western speculative spin rushed to proclaim the 20-year gas deal as a setback for Iran. The final breakdown, not fully confirmed, is 40 percent for Gazprom and Transneft, 28 percent for China’s CNPC and CNOOC, and 25 percent for Iran’s KEPCO.

Moscow sources confirm Gazprom will manage the whole project. Transneft will be in charge of transportation, CNPC is involved in financing and banking facilities, and CNOOC will be in charge of infrastructure and engineering.

The whole Chalous site has been estimated to be worth a staggering  $5.4 trillion.

Iran could not possibly have the funds to tackle such a massive enterprise by itself. What is definitely established is that Gazprom offered KEPCO all the necessary technology in exploration and development of Chalous, coupled with additional financing, in return for a generous deal.

Crucially, Moscow also reiterated its full support for Tehran’s position during the current JCPOA round in Vienna, as well as in other Iran-related issues reaching the UN Security Council.

The fine print on all key Chalous aspects may be revealed in time. It’s a de facto geopolitical/geoeconomic win-win-win for the Russia, Iran, China strategic partnership. And it reaches way beyond the famous “20-year agreement” on petrochemicals and weapons sales clinched by Moscow and Tehran way back in 2001, in a Kremlin ceremony when President Putin hosted then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami.

There’s no two ways about it. If there is one country with the necessary clout, tools, sweeteners and relationships in place to nudge the Persian Gulf into a new security paradigm, it is Russia – with China not far behind.

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Just how “special” is the so-called special relationship between oil-rich Gulf Arab states and Washington? One could argue, since Joe Biden became President, that relations have hit an all time low with many looking to broker better relations with Russia, China and even Iran. Royal elites in the GCC club know that in the event of a new Arab Spring sweeping across the region, that they cannot rely on Biden for any support whatsoever to cling onto power and so have taken an entirely new look at their foes and are asking themselves “are these people really our enemies?”

This partly explains why the shift in policy to welcoming Assad back into the fold, who will no doubt soon be a fully accepted member of the Arab League. And it also justifies why, since Biden took office, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are more open than ever before towards developing relations with Russia – even as far as, one day, defence procurement. In recent weeks, the lobbying in Washington from GCC states to convince Biden to cut Assad some slack is part of the trade-off, which no doubt the Syrian leader asked for. And to some extent this is happening.

The big thinking from Gulf Arab states is that the ethos behind the Trump move to pull out of the so-called Iran deal (JCPOA) which would have restricted Tehran’s abilities to develop nuclear weapons hasn’t achieved what it set out to do: bring Tehran to its knees begging for a respite to the crippling sanctions.

However, the cruel sanctions which Tehran has had to endure, has made the Gulf Arab leaders themselves beggars and Joe Biden in the awkward position of having to listen to their gripes. Just recently, the GCC made their case to Washington to do something about the Iran deal. And do it as soon as possible.

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) on November 18^th joined Jordan, Egypt, France, Germany and the UK in calling for a return to the nuclear deal following a meeting with U.S. Iran envoy Robert Malley in Saudi Arabia.

According to reports, the 12 countries issued a joint statement noting that “a return to mutual compliance with the [nuclear deal] would benefit the entire Middle East, allow for more regional partnerships and economic exchange, with long-lasting implications for growth and the well-being of all people there, including in Iran”.

Several GCC states expressed scepticism when the nuclear deal was first negotiated under former president Barack Obama, with Saudi Arabia calling it “flawed”.

Yet, analysts have to wonder now if the Saudis and Emiraties regret the bullish move by Trump and would have the old deal back. The “flaw” now appears that the West has underestimated how Iran’s more recent activities in the region – from hijacking oil tankers to even attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq – are paying off, combined with the foot-dragging which we’ve seen with the Vienna talks.

The GCC call for a return to the deal comes on the eve of indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran scheduled for November 29.

It also follows a similar joint statement that the U.S. and its GCC partners issued in Saudi Arabia which called for an “urgent mutual return to full compliance” with the nuclear deal, while condemning a “range of aggressive and dangerous Iranian policies, including the proliferation and direct use of advanced ballistic missiles” and drones.

So the message is clear for Biden. The Gulf Arab states are now desperate to get the Iran deal back, fearing that Iran’s overtures are left unchecked and will only get worse. They are asking, bluntly, for Biden to drop the Trump sanctions, fearing that a conflict is imminent, if we are to believe the chest-beating statements from Anthony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State. The coming weeks now will put the relationship between the GCC and the Biden administration on tenterhooks if Biden doesn’t take the hint and take Obama’s notion of “soft diplomacy” to a new low.

GCC countries have so much to learn from Assad on how to survive an uprising and how to stay in power. But what he can really teach them is how to handle Moscow

In early June, the world was rocked by news from the Middle East that Gulf Arab leaders are now moving even further to becoming a full-on ally of Syrian leader Bashir al-Assad. Now, all countries have their embassies re-opened in Damascus with Saudi Arabia being the last to jump on the bandwagon and the new position of these GCC states is to go beyond merely bringing him in from the cold but to embrace him. Soon, we will see Syria reinstated in the Arab League, an institution largely known around the world as an Arab elite talk shop which only makes the headlines when its members have a very good lunch and often nod off in the afternoon during the speeches.

On the face of it, the move is pragmatic, even erudite. Assad is the ultimate survivor who has fought and won a counterrevolution against the very people – the Muslim Brotherhood – which most (not all) GCC states hate vehemently.

Yet there is some irony now with those same Gulf Arab countries using their influence in Washington to try and convince Joe Biden’s administration that it is time to lift sanctions against Syria. Indeed, it is the Biden touch which has pushed Saudi Arabia, UAE and others towards this extreme measure of “if you can’t beat them, join them.” America may “be back” for most of the world, but for the Middle East the only thing it is “back” to, is Obama’s “soft power” touch in the region.

And what this translates to for the elite of these wobbly states, is forget about the U.S. ever helping us with another Arab Spring revolution.

With Trump, they may have believed that he would do his best to keep them in power. With Biden, they know this is impossible and that they are truly alone.

And this is where Assad comes in.

While it is absolutely true that the GCC states will want to exchange info and intel with Assad about his own experiences fighting an uprising, which will also extend to the darker side of autocratic governance like new torture techniques, Assad would be very useful as a conduit to deal with a new, stronger threat from Iran, which, again, the GCC states don’t believe the U.S. will help them with.

A stronger Iran, run by a hardliner president, calls for extreme measures and these Gulf Arab countries are hedging their bets that if they can use Assad as a communicator and backchannel negotiator, then this could be useful in calming tensions while appealing to his pan-Arabism. In fact, the idea is nothing new. In 2007, the EU and the U.S. wanted to use Assad to communicate with Hamas, Hezbollah and the Iranians in exactly the same way.

Yet there is more to it than meets the eye.

The jewel in the crown for GCC countries to restore their relations with Assad is Russia. In September 2015, when Moscow intervened in the Syria war, Assad clung on to power by the Russian air force arriving in Syria. This game changer is the main reason why Assad is still in power today as without Putin’s help, Syria today would be run by Islamic extremists and would almost certainly not be one country.

And so to be close to Assad means being even closer to Russia. In fact, some Gulf Arab leaders had already started talking to Russia about arms deals in what is becoming an increasingly difficult relation to sustain with the U.S. under Joe Biden. It is unclear how far those talks went although they did stir the wrath of Washington which complained the moment the news went out. Biden wants to crack the whip in the Middle East on human rights, reigning in authoritarian leaders like MbS, Sisi and perhaps even MbZ, but also wants those same countries to keep their loyalty to U.S. arms makers.

Perhaps in those talks Putin’s top advisors mentioned that striking huge deals on jets and tanks, for example, would have to come with some guarantees about those weapons not being used on Moscow’s allies. Of course, no GCC state would ever use a jet, wherever it is made, to bomb Iran. That is unthinkable. But they might consider bombing Iran’s allies and proxies in the region.

Most likely the move to get closer to Assad is to appease Russia before a new deal is signed off. If these same GCC countries can agree not to use Russian weapons to arm proxies which fight Assad, Hezbollah, Iranian militias in Iraq or the Houthis, then the new relationship with Assad is a win-win for them. Throw into the bargain that it would also alienate Qatar, who would certainly not sign up to a Russia arms deal and is still very much a supporter of the opposition in Syria, and the Saudis and Emiratis are laughing all the way to the bank. Yet Qatar may prove to be a pivotal player in the endgame. If GCC countries go ahead with arms purchasing – with the tacit agreement from Moscow that its forces will keep them in power come any uprising – it may well be Qatar, which has one of the largest U.S. military bases in the world, will be more warmly welcomed in Washington.

Unimaginable reconciliations are taking place across the entire region, since Joe Biden was sworn into office and indicated that he wasn’t going to tolerate regional leaders ‘behaving badly’ and the previous carte blanche from the White House which came with abhorrent human rights scandals.

The Khashoggi murder will not be swept under the carpet and forgotten. But then neither will the Trump-initiated border closure of Qatar with the rest of its GCC neighbours, or for that matter the phony crisis with Iran.

What else would you call the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in particular in the previous four years during the Trump administration? Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and other GCC countries were expecting a second Trump term where what was hoped to be Iran being forced to withdraw its financial aid to Hezbollah or the Houthis in Yemen didn’t happen, when Biden took office. Qatar being alienated even more and MBS getting off scot free, not to mention the war in Yemen raging on, have all also been marked up as ‘non-starters’ by Biden from the off as he has put precedence on MBS himself over the Iran deal.

And it is working.

The cavalier young Saudi Prince’s actions in recent weeks have taken everyone by surprise as he has boldly taken it upon himself to build bridges with Qatar, bring Turkey completely in from the cold and – amazingly – agree to talks brokered by Iraq aimed at sketching out a peace treaty of sorts, based on the same premise of how the EU was formed at the end of the second world war: if you have shared interest with a neighbour, it makes it much harder for either party to go to war.

Saudi Arabia is looking at ways how it could cooperate with its arch foe Iran and is keen to be part of the new ‘Iran Deal’ talks in Vienna where there is an impetus on any new deal extending beyond uranium enrichment but also regional cooperation.

No matter what you might think about MBS, this turnaround shows two things: the young crown prince is capable of doing Mea Culpa. And he also a deft political thinker.

Or, put differently, he is learning fast. For a peace deal of sorts to be hammered out with Iran under the umbrella of Biden-initiated Iran talks, MBS is set to clean up. He could not only win even more political support both at home and abroad, but might catapult himself closer to the ambitious plans he has of economically reforming his country with a grandiose foreign investment scheme including a new ‘Dubai’ type Las Vegas in the desert. 2030 suddenly looks more than just a number.

In moving so quickly to clean up his back yard, it will be hard for Biden to keep playing the Khashoggi card and we could see a more dynamic, bigger relationship between Washington and its EU partners and Saudi Arabia – which goes beyond pumped-up defence procurement and energy dependency. The relationship is set for a reboot and the talks in Iraq now may well be a boost for the Iran deal coming off as there are indicators that the Iranians are ready to build a more sensible relationship with their neighbours in exchange for sanctions being busted and them being allowed to sell their oil on the world market.

Of course, the U.S. pays a very heavy price in the short term in this. Part of the Trump doctrine was always to lead the Saudis and their neighbours away from a model of governance and more bent on being cruel dictatorships which could fool their own people that such behaviour was all about defending oneself from a powerful enemy which has its missiles pointed at you. Forcing the Saudis to talk to the Iranians debunks this old myth that there really was a threat in the first place as enemies red in tooth and claw don’t scramble so quickly to the teak tables of diplomacy and talk about cooperation with such zeal when the air is thick with hatred and revenge. But perhaps more importantly it also dispatches into the long grass the need for such absurd defence spending, which is of course linked to western leaders scare-mongering their hosts about the so-called threat, while providing the solution on the same white marker board.

Does Riyadh really need to spend such obscene amounts of money on U.S. hardware to protect itself when, as we saw in the oil field missile attacks last year, it often doesn’t even work in the first place. And secondly, the spending is counterproductive, both on how much it keeps the rancid atmosphere of impending war but also how it prevents the incumbent from thinking about adopting a governance model.

If the talks in Iraq lead to the arms race being wound down and the same amounts of money can be put into investment, start-ups, research and renewable energy, then just think of the capabilities of what KSA could do in the region and its own young people who look to MBS as a modern-day saviour. The crown prince is looking forward and not looking back at what has passed and for this, western media should cut him some slack and acknowledge his achievements as the early steps of at least opening the doors to governance – as opposed to rule – are shaping up.

The bigger they are, the harder they fall. This certainly applies to countries in the GCC which are attempting to pick themselves up again. It’s a cruel irony, some might argue, that the UAE’s diversification in its economy away from oil dependency, made it more vulnerable than Saudi Arabia’s and so was hit harder by the virus. An economy dependent on tourism, hospitality and affordable air fares was always going to buckle under the weight of a new world order, post corona.

And so it’s hard to imagine how the regional policies of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE would pan out in the two hot spots, namely Yemen and Libya. Do they scale back, given that both these wars are costly and show little sign of ending? Or do they plough ahead and focus on the huge dividends of reconstruction – both in the building work itself and then in what the economy can offer, once things have got back to normal?

If we look at other countries in the region who are also suffering from low oil prices and the corona crisis, the signs are not so clear. Although Iran is also suffering from crippling sanctions from the US and others, for months analysts have been wondering how they would continue to finance Hezbollah in Lebanon which before Trump’s sanctions kicked in, was receiving about 700m dollars a year. Experts in Lebanon tell me that this figure has been reduced although in the midst of a political and economic meltdown there, we have seen a fair amount of showing off from Hezbollah which takes great joy in serenading its loyal supporters and their wads of cash.

However, the first real signs of belt-tightening were seen in early May when some commentators in the region spotted that Iran will pull out of Syria some of its military garrisons and soldiers. Keen pundits will watch closely now to see if this has an impact on the number and level of vociferous air strikes against Hezbollah movements there or not – which are beginning to be felt both by Assad and his partners, Tehran being a chief one going back to 1979. A recent airstrike against the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center in Aleppo (linked to a precision missile project) is one of many hits which are taking their toll. The thinking now in Tehran is to be more frugal in the region as US sanctions may well bite for at least another five years and having its big clients like India and Turkey shift their business to Iraq is a bitter pill to swallow. In Syria, Iran continues to supply the Assad regime but is reported to not receive cash, as such, for the shipments which arrive through a complicated game of Lebanon shell companies moving crude oil from ship to ship in the Mediterranean.

Tough new corona measures and low oil prices are affecting the regional policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well, as India and Turkey went to Iran’s closest oil supplying ally for its needs and both these Gulf Arab countries have not capitalised on Iran’s US sanctions.

There are signs even that the UAE may well be trying to reduce its vast costs to punch above its weight, certainly in Libya where it is seen as the main sponsor of so-called “renegade” army chief, Khalifa Haftar. In May, rumours were circulating, albeit in the press of Haftar’s enemies, that the Saudis had offered “support” to the UAE and Haftar in Libya. It’s unclear what this support is, but most likely it is cash. There are other reports circulating that mercenaries in Sudan are being recreated for as little as 200 USD a month.

However the same reports underline that the UAE remains the boss and hinted of a split in the country, which would give both players almost a monopoly on reconstruction contracts. The talk of a similar split in Yemen is less shrouded as the UAE’s proxy in the south of Yemen, which jostles for power with the Saudi-backed incumbent, is calling for Yemen to go back to its pre-unified borders of a north and south. Such a move is a hard one to swallow though as it would give the UAE the upper hand there and make the Saudis almost a peripheral player.

In Libya, it’s a different story as both the UAE and Saudi Arabia can focus on a common foe: Turkey. And it’s hard to see if this idea of a divided country, where Haftar could remain a leader in the east and south of Libya, is just wishful thinking of Turkey or really an option for these two Gulf Arab countries to mull. And, of course, when pundits talk of “the south and the east” this really mean “over 90 percent of the entire country”.

If there is some truth in it, then both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are looking now to spend less time and money on backing wars, and have their eyes fixed on how these battlefields can be turned into cash cows. There is much talk of the UAE using its mendacious  disinformation network of “media outlets, troll and bot nets, think tanks, and policy makers” to further a PR sting in Libya, which is simply that the Haftar camp is there to be a force against terrorism. Of course, much of this bedwetting is hypocritical nonsense spouted by press room wasters in Washington and Brussels whose countries do the same dark practice themselves, which they simply call “lobbying”. But the idea that either side in Libya is an antidote to terrorists or at least Islamic hardcore groups is awkward, if not comical. While Turkey supports an expired Muslim Brotherhood power structure in Tripoli as well as bankrolling extremists shipped in from Syria which were fighting Assad’s forces in Idlib before, Haftar’s forces are well known to have recruited some hardcore Salafist groups (called Madkhalists) themselves to fight for him with his LNA forces. Terrorism is a very abused and pliable word which can take on a number of meanings, although it is fair to say that Haftar did win a number of important battles against terror groups in Benghazi.

The fanciful notion floated by the Turks of a two-nation state is interesting. Yet it’s hard to see if the ruse can work for Haftar, the UAE or its coalition partners. Most of the country’s oil fields are in Haftar’s control and this is a key subject which proves to be a thorn in the side of any negotiations, as his forces now are reported to be exporting oil directly to new markets, with the assistance of the UAE. Would a two-state solution mean some sort of new deal on shared oil revenues? Would the UAE and the Saudis, who eye huge reconstruction contracts, be held back by an international community which would struggle with such a new set up, given that the UN still backs a Tripoli posy as a legitimate government?

Turkey and Qatar (via Al Jazeera) tend to be winners in the media war and so get to take the lead in planting untruths or twisting facts. This latest idea comes from this camp so, one would have to assume that both these countries are tired of the campaign and are looking for a way out. But critical to the idea succeeding is Russia being included in the spoils of war, as Putin badly wants a naval base in Libya and, as we have seen recently in Syria, is vexed by his own people not being given fair market access in the peace which Russia enabled, when it stepped in, in 2015 to help Assad. Recent reports of a media campaign in Russia criticising Assad on this coincide with others that Russia is planning on moving its troops from Syria to Libya, to further bolster the mercenaries already there. Whether this was premeditated or is as a lesson to Assad is unclear. But with Iran and Russia out of Syria, it’s hard to see how long the Syrian leader can remain in power. Libya is now where the money is, or where the smart money wants to go. Keep an eye on Yemen though. If the UAE and Saudi Arabia can settle their differences there, then this will be further indications that the focus now is on money, rather than ideology. But not including Putin will be a major error of judgement in Yemen or Libya. The Russian leader’s outside bet to back both camps in the latter might just pay off.

It’s often said that the Achilles’ heel of Arab countries is their public sector infrastructure and certainly the coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated how they are vulnerable, even in much lower numbers, to being hit hard. And the link to low oil prices as Saudi Arabia calls a truce on its own price war with Russia, is also a factor, which impacts oil-rich countries even harder as OPEC+ cut its oil production by ten million barrels a day in an Easter day deal, which has steered Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners away from 25 dollars a barrel oil, at least.

Oil-producing countries in the Gulf are now facing a new crisis though linked to oil, which is that the world’s lockdowns mean that planes sit on tarmac, businesses run on tick-over (if they run at all) and billions of people stay at home and barely use their cars parked in their driveways – while the oil tankers continue to fill up and set sail.

And so, the elites of all Arab countries are taking stock of their losses after corona and looking at how to reduce their own expenditures even more for the future, which has, in turn, made them look at old relationships in a different light. And new ones.

In countries like Morocco, a country which has dreams of being an oil producer one day, there was a positive buzz in late February when rumours emerged of a new relationship with Saudi Arabia beginning. The latter was to supposed to put aside its differences and embrace Morocco and its controversial dependency, namely the Western Sahara, ahead of a visit of his Majesty Mohamed VI to Riyadh, which was put on hold when the coronavirus emerged.

For Morocco, the full lockdown reaction was swift and absolute for the business elite to protect their investment from being swept away from the virus and it appears that this Arab country will survive the knock and probably come out of it on top. Whether it can sustain better relations with Saudi Arabia, or, for that matter, the bête noir of the Gulf – as far as Rabat is concerned – the UAE is another matter, as the Saudi Royal family itself has been struck by the virus and the Emiratis have locked horns with Morocco over their differences over the Libya conflict, with no detente in sight. At home, Morocco also took advantage of the crisis to make radical decisions it would normally not make, but can execute under the guise of the ‘emergency’. A minster in Rabat was fired, thousands of political prisoners were released and the King harangued the super-rich to contribute to a fund, which he already put 200m euros into, to act as a counterweight to corona.

But the GCC countries may look at Morocco with some envy, as it being a poor country, the dollar goes a lot further; not having an economy stringently linked to oil prices, also is a bonus as is indeed is having an elite which controls most of its private sector. In Morocco’s case the elite acted swiftly to protect their own investment with little if any draw on public sector coffers or banks.

Rabat’s quick thinking, royal bailout and an EU aid package worth half a billion euros should jumpstart the economy in a few weeks and give it an edge over others in the Arab world.

In the Gulf Countries which make up the GCC, it’s a much more dramatic story, especially economically ,as state actors – and the royals who run them – are invariably part of the ownerships of private banks and so when push comes to shove, their loyalties are first to the state itself, rather than the banks. Some efforts have been made from some GCC countries to give workers relief on rent and utility bills. Qatar recently unveiled an 800m dollar plan to support its foreign workers even, but this was not followed by its neighbours who are having a harder time with the impact of corona, in particular the UAE, which just recently gave a zero percent interest loan of 13bn dollars to local banks to try and keep real estate borrowing buoyant’ although with meagre margins and a dip in both borrowing and selling, it’s considered that banks will have a tough time in the UAE in the coming months – not least because much of their assets which they use as capital adequacy, is owned by governments and so they will be reluctant to draw from it. It’s unclear how much the UAE banks are affected by state deposits but it is likely to be in the region of between 20 and 30 percent, based on its neighbours exposures (in the case of Qatar, 30% of deposits are the state itself; with Saudi Arabia it is 20%). What is clearer is that banks in GCC countries don’t have the ‘wiggle room’ to bail out businesses, which only represented between 5 and 7 percent of their total lending anyway, according to an IMF study, while the governments themselves are certainly not in a position to offer bail outs anything like Spain or the UK has in recent months.

These ripples, which have resulted from a corona outbreak (combined with an oil crisis) which has had very low impact in the UAE, in terms of numbers, will be felt long after the virus is contained and certainly the adage ‘the bigger you are, the harder you fall’ will apply in the entire Peninsular. The UAE has a total lockdown on public sector spending presently which even extends to media outlets around the world that it financially supports.

Jordan, which is not a GCC member, also has started a radical rethink towards its own oil dependency and is looking to increase its own shale oil production and look more towards gas exploration too.

But the realities of this pandemic in the Gulf region have also shaken up the geopolitics. The UAE, which has not had an ambassador in Rabat for a year due to its support for General Haftar in Libya (which Morocco entirely opposes) is also annoying its neighbours in Riyadh not to mention in Washington with its direct assistance to Iran with emergency aid to cope with the coronavirus there, which officials in Tehran are noting has improved relations no end with Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Iran is presently becoming a real thorn in the side of the Trump administration as it refused medical aid from the US and is now using an EU payment system which bypasses US sanctions, to get [buy] equipment from Europe. It’s also holding talks with Qatar and Turkey over the US move to withdraw US troops in Afghanistan, proving to still be a mover and shaker in the region as it cosies up to the Taliban in Kabul. Will Iran’s crisis with corona bring it even closer to the UAE that the latter uses its clout in Washington to ensure that Tehran keeps a distance from the Taliban? Anything is possible during this crisis.

Over the past two decades, Israel and Arab Gulf monarchies have forged a tacit partnership, increasingly aligning their interests and agendas, while hiding behind a public perception of being enemies.

Saudi-Israeli links are not new. They’ve made covert contacts through back-channels since Sheikh Kamal Adham’s time, when he ran the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate from 1965 to 1979. Though still having no official diplomatic relations, in recent years the Kingdom and Israel have put far less effort into concealing their unspoken strategic partnership.

Developments in the region — from Iran’s geo-political ascendancy in the region following Iraq’s Ba’athist regime’s destruction in 2003, to Lebanon’s Hezbollah battlefield performance during its war with Israel in 2006, and to the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 — have allowed Riyadh and Tel Aviv to be more overt about their connection. The same can be said about the other Gulf Cooperation Council member-states and Israel (with the notable exception of Kuwait.)

Smoke over Haifa, Israel, after a rocket launched by Hezbollah hit the city; Aug. 12, 2006. (Tomer Gabel, CC BY-SA 2.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Turning Point in 2006

The Saudi-Israeli partnership reached a turning point during the Hezbollah-Israel war of 2006, in which Riyadh slammed the Lebanese Shi’a group for taking actions against Israel that amounted to “illegitimate resistance” and a “miscalculated adventure.” Twelve years later, in 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), told The Atlantic that “there are a lot of interests we share with Israel and if there is peace, there would be a lot of interest between Israel and the [GCC] countries.”

Last year, an Israeli journalist leaked MbS’s comments during a meeting with pro-Israeli leaders in the U.S.: He reportedly said, “It’s about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiations table or shut up and stop complaining.” In early 2019, during the Warsaw Mideast Summit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office leaked video footage of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states’ foreign ministers supporting Israel’s right to defend itself while stating that confronting Iran was a higher priority than addressing the Palestinian question.

If Saudi-Israeli relations continue to strengthen, analysts should not be surprised. The two nations agree about the region’s conflicts and Iran’s role, and perceive what they regard as the same emerging threats; thus they have put religious and ideological differences aside at a time of unabated hostilities in Iran’s relationship with both Saudi Arabia and Israel.

As most other GCC states join Riyadh in normalizing relations with Israel, with Egypt and Jordan having established official diplomatic ties decades ago, it is increasingly clear that, despite some Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians remaining militantly opposed to Israel, it is no longer an “Arab-Israeli conflict.”

Opposition to Democratic Reform

Although many analysts attribute the growth of Saudi-Israeli relations to the perceived Iranian threat, broader concerns about the region’s instability also explain the deeper tactical alliance. Put simply, neither country would welcome an “Arab Spring 2” or any events that could strengthen Islamists, or secular groups’ demands for democratic reforms. For Saudi Arabia, such movements could lead to its citizens’ challenging the rulers’ political, moral and religious legitimacy. For Israel, it is far less risky to have pro-U.S. regimes in Arab states led by strongmen such as Egypt’s Abdel Fateh el-Sisi, who keep their countries at peace with the Jewish State, than to have Arab societies’ electing governments that could adopt a fundamentally different approach to Israel and the Palestinians.

Doubtless, if Saudi Arabia (or any GCC state) and Israel officially normalize relations, it would mark a major diplomatic victory for the Trump administration, which has been pushing for them to move closer and unite against the perceived Iranian threat. If this happens before the 2020 presidential election, Trump could claim a watershed achievement on the international stage.

President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump arrive in Rihad, Saudi Arabia, 2017. (White House/Shealah Craighead)

Occasional Condemnations

To mitigate such risks, Saudi leaders will probably continue to occasionally condemn some Israeli actions or rhetoric in relation to the Palestinians: A case in point was Riyadh’s reaction to Netanyahu’s pre-election pledge to annex the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea (roughly 30 percent of the West Bank). On Sept. 11, Riyadh condemned Netanyahu’s vow as a “dangerous escalation” and “flagrant violation of the UN charter and the principles of international law.” As the Saudi Press Agency reported, officials also urged an “emergency meeting” of the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The next day, King Salman spoke with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas by phone and reiterated Riyadh’s stance against Netanyahu’s pledge to extend Israeli sovereignty.

Regardless of these occasional public disagreements, the odds are good that the Saudis will pragmatically continue unofficial relations with Israel, as will most of the GCC states. However, Riyadh would likely see official diplomatic ties with Israel as a bit too much of a stretch for the Saudi Kingdom–despite Trump’s desires.

Most likely, it would rather wait for either Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to establish official diplomatic relations with Israel before Riyadh would make the move. And because Bahrain lost much of its sovereignty to Riyadh in the post-2011 period, it is difficult to imagine how its diplomatic overtures to Israel during the past few years could have occurred without Saudi authorization—if not the Kingdom’s blessings.

Forecasting Saudi-Israeli relations is difficult. Still, in a region where both states feel increasingly threatened and most Arab officials only pay lip service to the Palestinians, Saudi and Israeli overlapping interests will likely drive the governments ever closer.

consortiumnews.com

The GCC, like NATO, on which it is modeled, also began fishing for new members far outside its geographical area. At first, the GCC was interested in enlisting as members the remaining two Arab monarchies, Jordan and Morocco. In 2011, there was interest in having Egypt join the GCC. Yemen’s civil war and the presence in Iraq of a large pro-Iranian Shi’a population have prevented the GCC from accepting either two as members.

However, cracks between Qatar and the Saudis began emerging in 1995, when Qatar’s new emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, decided that Qatar should have a foreign policy independent from that of the Saudis. An early rupture in relations occurred in 2002, when the Saudis withdrew their ambassador from Doha, the Qatari capital, as a way to punish Qatar for its independent streak. Qatar was able to flex its muscles against the Saudis by brandishing its Al-Udeid Airbase, America’s largest military base in the Middle East and the home to the regional headquarters of the US Central Command (CENTCOM).

In 2014, a major crack developed within the GCC. Qatar was accused by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain of supporting groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Lebanese Hezbollah. The Saudis and Emiratis were also upset about the reporting of the so-called “Arab Spring” by Qatar’s state-funded Al Jazeera satellite news network. During a GCC summit, the Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis recalled their ambassadors in Doha.

After Donald Trump’s inauguration as president in Washington, the Saudis and Emiratis, sensing their illegal contributions to the Trump campaign and presidential inauguration should pay some dividends, decided to wage a drastic economic and political war against Qatar. Working against Qatar on behalf of the UAE and Saudis was a lobbying cabal headed by the co-chair of the Republican Party’s Finance Committee and Trump friend, Elliott Broidy, and adviser to the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi George Nader. It was later discovered that the UAE ambassador in Washington, Yousef Al-Otaiba, was working in concert with the neo-conservative and Israel Lobby-linked Foundation for the Defense of Democracies – once known as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) – to whip up anti-Qatar fervor within the Trump administration and Congress. PNAC was the neo-con contrivance that helped lie the United States into war with Iraq.

Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi-based hackers linked to Erik Prince, the founder of the US mercenary company, Blackwater, began waging a cyber war targeting Qatar computer networks. One target was the Qatar News Agency (QNA) that saw its system hacked. QNA began distributing hacker-written stories falsely attributing remarks by Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The emir was falsely painted as favoring Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and, ironically, Israel. These bogus QNA wire stories were reported as true by Abu Dhabi-based Sky News Arabia and Dubai-based and Saudi-owned Al Arabiya.

On June 5, 2017, a month after the Saudis hosted Trump at the Riyadh Summit of Muslim nations, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. The GCC members also instituted a ban on direct flights between GCC nations and Qatar and Qataris and their businesses were banned from operating within the GCC. Saudi and UAE ports refused docking privileges for Qatari merchant vessels. Qatar’s sole land border, its frontier with Saudi Arabia, was closed. Saudi banks refused to handle Qatari riyals and the UAE cut postal service with Qatar. Qataris were also banned from visiting GCC countries unless they had a spouse as legal residents in the other member states.

The Saudis also began backing a pretender to the Qatari throne as a sign it wanted nothing less than “regime change” in Doha. Qatar has its own “Game of Thrones” cards to play in the UAE, where a growing rivalry separates UAE president-in-waiting, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), and UAE Vice President and Dubai Ruler, Emir Mohammed Rashid bin Maktoum. In June 2018, there was a meeting in Abu Dhabi of the Saudi-UAE Joint Coordination Council. All of the top members of the Saudi and Abu Dhabi royal clans were present, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Absent was the Dubai emir, a royal slap in MBZ’s face that did not go unnoticed in either Doha or Tehran.

Eventually, the Saudi-UAE axis, with the quiet encouragement of Israel, convinced Jordan; Mauritania; Djibouti; Senegal; Maldives; Comoros; the Tobruk-based government of General Khalifa Haftar in Libya; Saudi Arabia’s puppet regime in Yemen; and the semi-autonomous Somali regions of Puntland, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug to sever diplomatic relations with Qatar.

Ironically, the Saudis and Emiratis accused Qatar of backing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), when, in fact, ISIL received more backing from the Saudis and Emiratis than Qatar.

Through the efforts of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis, the attempt to foment a rupture in US-Qatari relations was forestalled.

Qatar appears to be defending itself against UAE cyber-warfare operations. The UAE’s patronization of cyber-warfare operations involving Broidy’s Virginia-based Circinus LLC, which maintains an operation in Abu Dhabi involving Arabic-, Farsi-, and Hebrew-speaking information operations analysts, and an Abu Dhabi company called DarkMatter, which recruits intelligence analysts from the US National Security Agency (NSA) for cyber-operations contracts in Abu Dhabi. Broidy’s paranoia concerning his operations on behalf of the UAE have grown to the point where his legal representative falsely accused this author of being a covert agent for the government of Qatar.

The diplomatic warfare between the Saudi-UAE axis and Qatar had some farcical moments. In June 2017, the Saudi state media erroneously reported that Mauritius had severed relations with Qatar. In fact, the Saudis had mistaken Mauritius for Mauritania. It was Mauritania, an Arab League member, that broke relations with Qatar. The Mauritius government was forced to issue a demarche refuting the Saudi claim and pointed out its relations with Qatar were unaffected. Pakistan, likewise, refuted claims by Saudi media that it planned on cutting relations with Qatar.

On the diplomatic front, Qatar regained diplomatic ties with countries the Saudis had encouraged to sever relations with Doha. These included Chad, Maldives, and Senegal. Qatar restored ties with the Somali federal administration in Mogadishu after the UAE was ordered to withdraw its personnel from the country. Qatar also managed to establish close military ties with Mali and Burkina Faso, despite Saudi-UAE efforts to curtail such relations. Qatar continues to back the Tripoli-based government of Fayez al-Sarraj, the Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya, against the forces of the Tobruk-based Haftar government. A similar stand-off exists in Khartoum between the Saudi-backed military government that took over from Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir after his recent ouster in a coup and a Qatar-backed anti-Saudi/Emirati opposition bloc. Qatar is also holding its own in a diplomatic battle for influence against the UAE in Madagascar, Algeria, Tunisia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

In November 2017, the UAE was widely ridiculed after its chief of security called for the Saudi-UAE axis to bomb Al Jazeera’s headquarters in Doha. The last person to call for the bombing of Al Jazeera’s Doha headquarters was George W. Bush, who discussed the idea with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on April 16, 2004. Blair talked Bush out of the idea.

The Saudi-UAE multi-front war against Qatar has faltered since 2017. Turkey, Iran, and Oman have helped limit the effects of the axis’s sea, land, and air blockade of Qatar. The Saudi and UAE ban on receiving Al Jazeera broadcasts have been defeated by satellite dishes that directly receive Al Jazeera signals in defiance of the law. HSBC and Goldman Sachs have defied Saudi and UAE warnings to curtail their financial services with Qatar. Qatar Petroleum has concluded lucrative deals with oil-producing Angola and Nigeria, edging out Saudi Aramco competition.

Turkey established a military base in Qatar, which was construed as a direct warning to the Saudis and Emiratis not to think about any military action against Qatar. France delivered 26 Rafale jet fighters to Qatar despite warnings to Paris from the Saudis.

To emphasize the point that Qatar is far from being vanquished by the Saudis, its lobbyists in Paris have lobbied the Parisian municipal government to name a street in the French capital for the late Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, who was brutally tortured, murdered, and dismembered in the Saudi Consulate-General in Istanbul in October 2018. For the Qataris, a “rue Jamal Khashoggi” in Paris would deal to the Saudi-UAE axis what the French call a “coup de grâce.”