The hypothesis is that Karzai is systematically discrediting and undermining the credibility of the present national unity government led by President Ashraf Ghani with a view to overthrowing the set-up in Kabul and reset the power calculus by positioning himself as the savior of Afghanistan duly anointed by a Loya Jigha.

Karzai’s own categorical denials have had virtually no impact on the tirade against him in the western media. Last week, the campaign escalated significantly with the Wall Street Journal firing all eight cylinders.

A report with Kabul dateline said: “Capitalizing on popular discontent as the Taliban advanced and international financial aid dried up, Mr. Karzai and his circle of former senior officials, who continue to meet regularly, have used this time to build an alternative power center. That circle increasingly attracts regional power-brokers and, diplomats say, now may threaten the current government’s very survival. Some of these politicians are even openly calling for a removal of Mr. Ghani…

“For now, the current and former presidents have agreed to a fragile truce widely seen as temporary… Afghanistan’s Western donors, led by the U.S., are watching these intrigues with mounting apprehension.”

The report went on to allege that Karzai is being backed by “powerful foreign friends” who are interested in overthrowing Ghani’s government. It specifically mentioned Moscow, Tehran, New Delhi and Beijing as the regional capitals where Karzai has enjoyed “connections”.

What could be the reason behind such an orchestrated western media campaign against Karzai? On the face of it, mentioning Russia, Iran, India and China together in the same breath is the height of absurdity. Anyone who knows Afghanistan and regional politics would know that these countries have specific interests to pursue in the Hindu Kush and these interests do not necessarily overlap, while in their perspectives on the power dynamic in Inner Asia are strikingly dissimilar.

Why should these four regional powers incite Karzai to usurp power in Kabul? Among the four countries mentioned, it is with India that Karzai maintained very close ties. He openly claimed India to be his second home, where he lived his youth, received university education and enjoys a wide circle of friends.

Without doubt, as president Karzai went the extra league to promote ties with India so much so that his retirement as president literally handicapped India’s Afghan policies and rendered them ineffectual. Ghani never really warmed up towards India and he reportedly rolled back the close security cooperation between the two countries that had flourished during the Karzai presidency.

To be sure, India is deeply skeptical about Ghani’s overtures to Islamabad and the trust he is willing to place on the Pakistani military and the ISI to help kick-start the peace talks with the Taliban leading to a negotiated settlement.

But having said that, India has scrupulously refrained from undermining Ghani and has instead only tried to woo him, remaining rooted in the belief – rightly or wrongly – that in the fullness of time the Afghan president would be a sadder and wiser man in his dealings with Pakistan.

Two things compel India to wait patiently and mark time. One, the plain truth is that India no longer has any special links with any Northern Alliance [NA] groups, which in the nineties spearheaded the anti-Taliban resistance.

The best-known NA leader today, Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah in Ghani’s government himself is more beholden to the Americans for his political future than to India or any other country in the region.

In fact, name any NA leader, and the story repeats itself – most of them have been bought and sold in the Kabul bazaar by foreign intelligence agencies at some point or another through the past decade – and some probably sold themselves to more than one benefactor at the same time. In sum, India has no “guaranteed proxy” today on the Afghan chessboard.

Secondly, India has a fair knowledge of the extent to which the US has gone to catapult Ghani to power last year. And anyone who knows anything about the foreign policy orientation of the present Indian government would vouchsafe that Prime Minister Narendra Modi will never undercut the US’ regional strategies in Asia.

What Modi has done during the past one year in power to dilute India’s non-aligned policies and to get the country to identify with the US’ strategies in Asia has been absolutely breathtaking. None would have suspected that this politician with such a robustly nationalist reputation could have secretly harbored such a pronounced pro-American bias.

That being the case, why should Modi let loose the Indian agencies against Ghani and to undermine the government in Kabul, which has been installed in power by Washington with such painstaking personal involvement on the part of Secretary of State John Kerry? It will be an insult to President Barack Obama, which Modi will never allow. Simply put, it belies logic that India is egging on Karzai to seize power.

True, Ghani has dealings with Pakistan. He has injected much warmth into Afghan-Pakistani equations. But then, Americans also have dealings with Pakistan but that doesn’t deter the Modi government from working closely with the US’ containment strategy against China.

If this is the actual story about India and the Karzai conundrum, the story with Russia, Iran and China is not very different, too. Russia and China probably have misgivings about the US’ intentions in keeping its (and NATO’s) open-ended military presence in Afghanistan, but having said that, neither would want the Americans to get the hell out of Afghanistan, either.

In fact, Moscow and Beijing will be terrified of a situation where they are called upon to bear the main responsibility to mould Afghanistan’s future. Most certainly, they want the US to continue to be involved in Afghanistan.

A curious thing in common between the Russian and Chinese foreign policies is that both are manifestly keen to engage constructively with the US on as many fronts as possible in regional politics and internationals security issues. This is only natural in the present-day big power politics, which is devoid of ideology.

Thus, despite the US’ containment strategies toward them and the tensions over Ukraine or the South China Sea, both Russia and China have bent over backwards in the recent period to be helpful in the US’ negotiations with Iran. President Obama actually phoned up his Russian and Chinese counterparts to express appreciation for the help they rendered in concluding the Iran nuclear deal.

It is also useful to factor in that neither Russia nor China has spent anything more than a tiny fraction of the money that the US has spent on Afghanistan during the period since its intervention in 2001. They are acutely conscious of a cost-effective Afghan policy, which brings dividends without heavy financial commitments. (India and Iran have spent far more money than Russia or China in Afghanistan so far by way of economic assistance.) In sum, Moscow and Beijing do not want to replace the US as Afghanistan’s principal donor country and take on a multi-billion dollar burden.

Finally, the core issue in Afghanistan is terrorism and both Russia and China have consistently underscored their abiding interest in working with the international community in the struggle against terrorism. They may harbor suspicion that the US would use the extremist groups as its proxies or as geopolitical tools and they will most certainly safeguard against such negative fallouts, but the priority nonetheless is to work with the US to defeat the terrorist groups – be it in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan.

Above all, there is hardly any evidence to show that Karzai was a hot favorite of the Russians or the Chinese. As president, Karzai’s equations with Moscow and Beijing were cordial but were based on considerations of mutual benefit. (With Moscow, Karzai was even distinctly cool for much of the time.)

Equally, it is inconceivable that these two big powers ever really forgot that Karzai was originally installed in power by the Americans as their trusted man in Kabul. Wouldn’t they know that Karzai depended heavily on the Americans for even his personal safety, leave alone for bankrolling his government? Of course, they knew.

Therefore, while Karzai’s outspoken criticism of the US’ policies in Afghanistan might have made platinum grade stuff for anti-American propaganda, neither Moscow nor Beijing would have been under any illusions about getting entangled in what was essentially a family quarrel that at times spun out of hand and became unpleasant or embarrassing to onlookers.

Suffice it to say, it is illogical for Russia or China to destabilize the Ghani government at a juncture when the security situation in the country has reached a criticality. Like India (or Iran), Russia and China too are “stakeholders” in Afghanistan’s stability and they also are extremely concerned about the spectre of the Islamic State that is haunting Afghanistan.

All four regional powers – Russia, China, India and Iran – would know that once constitutional rule is derailed in Afghanistan, it may take generations before it could be restored, and what lies ahead could well be the disintegration of the country itself.

If so, what explains the exaggerated stories that foreign powers are egging Karzai on to seize power by creating a power vacuum? Put differently, who stands to gain from spreading such dark rumors that Karzai is stoking the fires of a coup in Kabul? This indeed needs further probing.

M. K. Bhadrakumar, atimes.com

Hindu Kush gets a godfather

Al Pacino in the film The Godfather Part II 

The outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai used his national address in office before leaving the presidential palace to warn the new government headed by Ashraf Ghani that the ongoing violence in Afghanistan provided a convenient excuse for the US to maintain its bases in the country. 

«My advice to the next government is to be very careful with America and the West», Karzai cautioned in his speech, saying that Afghanistan could be friendly with Western countries but only if the relationship was balanced. 

Karzai insisted that his peace process with the Taliban had failed because «America did not want peace» and that the war was not among Afghans but «for the objectives of foreigners». 

On a bitter note, he added, «War in Afghanistan is based on the aims of foreigners. The war in Afghanistan is to the benefit of foreigners. But Afghans on both sides are the sacrificial lambs and victims of this war». 

Indeed, stung to the quick, the Empire struck back almost immediately. Apart from the signing of the US-Afghan security pact, the second major step taken by the Ghani government has been the reopening of the file on the infamous Kabul Bank fraud case, which the Americans had been pressing for. 

Anyone who has been following Afghan politics closely over the years would know that the reopening of the Kabul Bank controversy is an unmistakable warning by Washington to Karzai and his associates – in fact, to the ancien regime as such: ‘Behave or else.’ 

Blackmail and threats of retribution are going to be the most lethal weapons in the hands of the US in steering the Afghan political transition along a sequestered avenue. The heart of the matter is that a huge section of the Afghan political class stands compromised through various doings during the past decade beyond the pale of law. 

Never mind, Washington only might have led some of these souls up the garden path. The important thing is that Washington has an institutional memory of the DNA of the Afghan political class and it has had selective use of it in the past as well. 

Thus, at times, Washington had implicitly threatened even powerful Afghan personalities who once collaborated with the US but lately showed signs of intransigence – deceased or alive still – that they could be hauled up for trial before international war crime tribunals. Ironically, Ghani’s first vice-president Abdul Rashid Dostum himself faced the American music at one time for allegedly having committed human rights violations as a «warlord». 

The rampant corruption and venality and the propensity of Afghan elites to salt away their ill-gotten wealth abroad – Dubai is a favorite destination – works well for the US in today’s circumstances, as they could be easily silenced if they dared to pose impediments to the working of the national unity government. What comes readily to mind is the famous line in movie legend by Marlon Brando, «I’m gonna make him an offer he can’t refuse». 

This is where detractors among foreign analysts who doubt the sustainability of the newly-installed national unity government in Kabul need to hold breath. They tend to overlook that the US is immensely experienced in the making and marring of politicians in the developing countries. 

Indeed, in the Afghan context, the US has a counter-strategy to make the arrangement that it tenaciously put together in Kabul through months of effort, including at the personal intervention of President Barack Obama, to work. The US is not going to throw in the towel and helplessly watch the national unity government disintegrate, the serious contradictions within it notwithstanding.

Indeed, this is not to underestimate the contradictions, either, because the national unity government is not merely a co-habitation of two rival politicians but its future also is predicated on the cordial sharing of power (for which there is no historical precedent in Afghanistan) between two sets of diverse constituents comprising figures (many of whom also with sharply etched ethnic identities and who themselves may represent interest groups.) 

In sum, many of the constituent groups are not monolithic and are in a state of incessant mutation depending on how interests coalesce or conflict at any given time – not only in Kabul but also at the local level. Suffice to say, the Americans have introduced in Kabul an incredibly complex power calculus and the challenge of making it work will be formidable. 

However, on the other hand, there are signs that the US is taking the Afghan intelligence set-up firmly into its hands – with the British intelligence ably supporting. (Significantly, British Prime Minister David Cameron was the first foreign dignitary to visit Kabul after Ghani’s government took over.) It is improbable that any regional power such as India or Iran could hope to have the kind of working relationship they might have enjoyed with the Afghan security establishment during Karzai’s rule.

All in all, therefore, the main thrusts of Washington’s approach to the political transition in Kabul would suggest that Afghanistan is turning into a crucial hub of the US’ regional strategies – imposition of a national unity government involving figures who have worked very closely with America in the past; the signing of the security pacts providing for establishment of long term American military presence in bases over which Kabul cannot exercise any control whatsoever; the overtly-threatening posturing toward Karzai and his associates or other potential ‘trouble-makers’ in the Afghan political spectrum; and, the tightening of the grip over the Afghan intelligence. 

Curiously, the security pact compels the Afghan government to surrender sovereignty over the country’s airspace and freely allows the US to bring in «technology» – shades of the missile defence system!

It is almost certain that the bases in Afghanistan provide the Pentagon and the US intelligence a good platform to undertake spying missions on neighboring countries. Again, it is inevitable that at some point the US and NATO may deploy components of the missile defence system in these military bases. Article 7 of the pact (Use of Agreed Facilities and Areas); Article 8 (Property Ownership); Article 8 (Positioning and Storage of Equipment and Materiel); Article 10 (Movement of Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft); Article 12 (Utilities and Communications); Article 15 (Entry and Exit); and, Article 16 (Importation and Exportation) – these articles virtually mean a surrender of Afghan sovereignty over a range of activities that the US may undertake from its military bases in Afghanistan in the neighboring countries. 

So, what could be the American game plan? What emerges beyond doubt is that the US is consolidating in Afghanistan against the backdrop of its «pivot» strategy in Asia and at a time when the Central Asian region itself could be heading for a «transition». The Obama administration deliberately cultivated in the recent years an impression to the effect that the US forces are «withdrawing» from Afghanistan. Many regional powers, including India, began beseeching Washington with pleas not to do that. But the stunning reality is that the US is, on the contrary, becoming deeply embedded in the hugely strategic region of what has been known as «Inner Asia» – but with greater efficiency, cutting out unnecessary flak, reducing the financial burden of the war and avoiding combat role that imperils the lives of soldiers and would militate public opinion at home. 

Of course, the US’ consolidation in Afghanistan still remains dependent on three or four key factors. A crucial factor here will be the outcome of the Taliban’s concerted strategy to demoralize, weaken and destroy the Afghan armed forces – and, in turn, the latter’s capacity to weather the storm. 

A second factor will be the progress toward good governance in Afghanistan, which on the one hand means winning the trust and confidence of the people and eroding the Taliban’s support base within the country, while on the other hand, creating a favorable environment for the revving up of the Afghan economy, which today is all but one hundred percent dependent on foreign aid. 

Thirdly, the big question remains: What are the prospects of a settlement with the Taliban? Equally, it is also necessary to ask: Is the US indeed interested in a settlement with Taliban – except on its own terms; and, paradoxically, would Taliban serve the US’ regional strategies as a geopolitical tool, as Karzai seemed to suggest. 

Finally, regional politics has always been a major vector of the Afghan problem and currently, the international mileu has also become considerably volatile of late. 

Each of these factors becomes a variable in itself with the potential to modulate the US strategies in the post-2014 scenario.

Both developments are of historical importance in their own ways. Ghani’s presidency signifies a rare peaceful transition of power in the ebb and flow of Afghan history. 

As for the second, Afghanistan has been invaded and occupied before in its tumultuous history dating back to Alexander the Great – the last famous occupation followed the British invasion in the 19th century – but never before has that country had to agree to foreign military presence on its soil in such an open-ended fashion. 

Equally, for the first time in its history, Afghanistan is taking help from a foreign military alliance. Indeed, the subplot here is also that the foreign military presence is not of a regional character, but is «extra-regional» drawn from countries from a faraway region which is tens of thousands miles away from South or Central Asia and have had no shared history or culture with Afghanistan. 

Therefore, this is a poignant moment in Afghan history and what has happened in the recent weeks is undoubtedly of profound significance to the country’s future and to regional security. Right at the outset it can be safely noted that a major element of uncertainty arises simply out of the absence of any reliable estimation as to what exactly are the thoughts churning in the mind of the Afghan nation as regards these developments. 

The public opinion surveys have been conducted largely by the Western agencies or under Western sponsorship and a question mark needs to be put on their credibility. At best, only conjectures can be made, which of course is inadequate anywhere, and more so, given the inscrutable nature of the Afghan personality, formed through centuries of historical experience, the culture and the traditions of the land. 

How the Afghan people’s fierce sense of independence gets tempered in the period ahead will have a huge bearing on the future developments. The Taliban have forthwith rejected the authenticity of both Ghani’s presidency and the Afghan-US security pact as lacking authenticity and legitimacy. 

A second aspect is that, paradoxically, neither of the two developments has quite come as a surprise. Any close observer of the runoff in the Afghan presidential election held in June would not seriously quarrel with an impression that formed almost from the outset as the votes began to be counted that one of the candidates, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, had all but begun speaking as the voice of the «opposition». 

Put differently, an impression inevitably gathered amidst the widely- acknowledged charges of correction, rigging and other practices in the conduct of the election, that Ghani’s election would be somehow a foregone conclusion, and what happened in the run-up to it was a mere shadow play. 

Again, an impression was formed that the US was the master of ceremonies on the political theatre. Karzai is on record that Washington was closely involved all along, although it studiously conveyed a public posture of non-interference. Indeed, once the controversy surfaced regarding the transparency and fairness in the conduct of the election, Washington raised its head above the parapet and began assuming a heavy presence appeared overtly playing the role of the monitor-cum-arbiter. 

In fact, President Barack Obama himself stepped into the ring not less than three or four times and the Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kabul twice. Kerry actually introduced the novel idea of a «national unity» government in Afghanistan, which today forms the very basis of the political transition. 

Interestingly, Obama dealt directly with the two candidates involved in the runoff – Ghani and Abdullah – and he simply by passed Karzai. Obama did not once talked with Karzai during the entire period since the controversy erupted over the runoff in June. 

In sum, the US has decided on its own, exclusively, where to peg the «bar of democracy» in Afghanistan. Not even its closes ally, Britain, the mother of all democracies, would appear to have played any significant role. 

This holds serious implications for the future. What comes to mind is the famous Pottery Barn rule splet out by the former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld – ‘If you break it, you own it’. Simply put, after having waded so deeply into the politicking leading to the formation of the national unity government in Kabul – having choreographed and piloted the idea, having, perhaps, imposed the idea on the reluctant Afghans – the ultimate responsibility – even obligation – rests now with the Obama administration to ensure that the political arrangement survives and brings about the political stability that Afghanistan needs. 

Most certainly, the Obama administration faces a formidable challenge here. The only examples of national unity governments in contemporary world politics have been in Cambodia in 1993 and in Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2008, and they have not exactly been encouraging experiments. 

Therefore, the really worrisome question is whether the Obama administration is willing to play the kind of role envisaged in Rumsfeld’s wise opinion? Does the Obama administration have the necessary attention span – with so many distractions from Ebola virus to the Islamic State – making pressing demands on its time, energy and resources? 

Clearly, the Ghani government cannot be left as «America’s latest orphan», which by the way, was the rubric of a recent seminar held at at the New York University’s Center on International Cooperation with some of the best-known American experts as participants. 

Speaking at the NYU seminar, Barnett Rubin, who had served as senior advisor to the special representative for AfPak late Richard Holbrooke, ruefully noted, «The president’s [Obama’s] job description does not entail reforming and creating a new Afghanistan. The most important thing for stabilizing a country is to maintain a sufficient level of funding to support the unity of the national government [in Kabul], and to build a coalition of regional powers that would be supportive of Afghanistan.» 

Rubin warned, «Missions to stabilize and missions to counterterrorism cannot coexist, and, in my experience, the [US] mission to counter terrorism will always win. Yet we cannot ignore how the absence of a certified government or external funding has led to weak institutions.» Indeed, where is all that money to «stabilize» Afghanistan going to come from? 

Equally, it is an open secret that even if the US-Afghan pact had been delayed for a further period of time beyond 2014, the US would have found some way to avoid having to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year – that is to say, Obama (and NATO) never really had the so-called «zero option» in the consideration zone. In fact, the Obama administration has come under heavy criticism already within America for having exercised the «zero option» in Iraq. 

On the other hand, a closer examination of the US-Afghan security pact would raise many questions regarding the US’ interests. A widespread perception among the Afghan political class happens to be that the security pact would have as much, if not more, to do with the US’ regional strategies as Afghanistan’s national security needs. 

President Obama has pledged that the strength of the US forces would be pegged at 9800 soldiers through 2015, which will be halved next year and tapered off to a token presence by end-2016. The thing that lends credibility to Obama’s pledge is that end-2016 coincides with the end of his presidency. On the contrary, a detailed examination of the security pact raises serious doubts about the efficacy of Obama’s stated plans of troop withdrawal. 

(To be continued)

The innuendos by American commentators and media reports, amply supplemented with conspiracy theories by Karzai’s Afghan adversaries, had put a question mark on the sincerity of Karzai’s pledge and had prophesied that he intended to hold on to power for as long as he could. Today, that malicious propaganda stands exposed as canard. The six-week long campaign work for the election by the eleven candidates in the field formally began last weekend.

Meanwhile, the US has decided not to hold any more opinion polls in Afghanistan, ostensibly to give an impression of strict neutrality. But in reality, the US manipulation is shifting into high gear. The launch of former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah’s election campaign in a blaze of publicity with a high-voltage interview with Christiane Amanpour of the CNN speaks for itself.

The American opinion-makers are creating an impression that Abdullah is the ‘frontrunner’. He is of course media savvy, is close to American think tanks and has a pro-western outlook. From the US viewpoint, Abdullah robustly backs the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement.

However, there are some boulders impeding his victorious march. Abdullah lacks a Pashtun identity and remains unacceptable to the Taliban while his links with hardline elements in India are viewed with suspicion in Pakistan. Equally, there is not only an ethnic polarization in Afghanistan, but also overlapping regional tensions, which makes it difficult for Abdullah to forge a pan-Afghan identity. The recent abortive attempt to assassinate the charismatic leader of western Afghanistan Ismail Khan and the murder of two of Abdullah’s election agents soon after in Herat underscores intra-Tajik tensions. (Ismail Khan is opposing Abdullah in the April election.) Again, the ‘Panjshiri’ camp to which Abdullah belongs is also faction-ridden today.

Having said that, Abdullah makes no bones about sharing the US’ visceral antipathy toward Karzai, and when he runs into the formidable coalition that Karzai has assembled over time, sparks are bound to fly in the coming weeks. This is where the need arises for Washington to cut down Karzai to size.

Washington will pull all stops to scatter Karzai’s coalition. Already, a campaign has begun that Karzai has been diabolic in his dealings with the NA. His detractors cite as evidence that the memoirs of former US defence secretary Robert Gates contains reference to a private conversation with Karzai who made an odd remark blaming the ant-Taliban forces in Afghanistan as equally responsible for perpetrating violence in the country. The campaign aims at creating discord within Karzai’s coalition (which includes some powerful personalities who belonged to the NA).

While the controversy is still simmering, Karzai has been dealt a blow by Washington from yet another angle – this time around, undercutting his nascent contacts with the Taliban.

Now, it’s an open secret that Karzai has striven in the recent years to keep a line of communication open to the Taliban despite the absence of any formal peace talks. Karzai’s policy of reconciling the Taliban has not been a spectacular success, but in his reckoning, without accommodating the Taliban in some form of settlement, enduring peace will elude his country and the senseless bloodshed and destruction cannot be ended.

While the Americans have tried to portray Karzai as a maverick personality opposing the signing of the BSA, the Afghan leader has been nurturing his own alternate road map for post-2014 Afghanistan. This road map envisages getting rid of US occupation of his country and transforming the political calculus into an exclusively intra-Afghan affair without Uncle Sam’s involvement.

Karzai envisages a constructive engagement with the Taliban through the traditional Afghan methods of consensus making, leading eventually to the return of the Taliban as a participant in national life. Indeed, there is no surety that he would succeed, given the Taliban’s intransigence, but his policy is the only show in town in the absence of any peace talks taking place – the CIA’s clandestine dealings with the Taliban notwithstanding.

Unsurprisingly, there is a tug of war going on between Karzai and the Americans. The heart of the matter is that despite paying lip service to an «Afghan-led», «Afghan-controlled» peace process and so on, Washington will not relinquish its stranglehold over Afghan politics. Washington’s excessive interference ensures that any settlement would serve the US regional strategies.Thus, the US intelligence has been keeping an eagle’s eye on Karzai’s dealings with the Taliban.

This is where the April election in Afghanistan becomes a ‘flashpoint’. The Obama administration has concluded that despite all the tricks in the trade – threats, cajoling, arm-twisting, ‘psywar’ – Karzai refuses to blink apropos the BSA, which means that the April election in Afghanistan has assumed an extraordinary significance for the US’ future regional strategies. Indeed, any kind of understanding, howsoever nebulous or tacit, that Karzai may reach with the Taliban would impact profoundly on the April election.

Therefore, a sensational report that appeared on Wednesday in the New York Times, based on briefings by the US officials and laying bare the secret contacts between the Taliban and Karzai becomes highly topical. According to the report, the representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban met in Dubai recently.

Whereas, the US should have been pleased that Karzai is making headway with the Taliban, the Obama administration actually seems to be annoyed. And it has proceeded to undermine Karzai’s «Afghan-led» and «Afghan-controlled» track with the Taliban.

The New York Times article says nothing new in content. Karzai’s contact with the Taliban is as ancient as the hills and his aides even acknowledge it. Its main purpose appears to be to give an impression that Karzai is a sly person. And that effort seems to have succeeded with wire services the world over lapping up the report. On the one hand, by tarnishing Karzai as being hand in glove with the Taliban, seeds of doubt are being sown in the minds of his Northern Alliance partners as regards his intentions.

On the other hand, Washington has effectively torpedoed the nascent intra-Afghan contact by embarrassing the Taliban (whose posturing has been that they won’t deal with Karzai) and thereby preventing them from entering into any more direct talks with Karzai before the April election.

To be sure, Washington doesn’t want any substantive «Afghan-led», «Afghan-controlled» peace talks except under its auspices. Most important, it does not want any serious dealings with the Taliban to take place before Karzai retired and a proxy has been put in power in Kabul who would duly put his signature on the dotted line on the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement, formalizing the establishment of the US-NATO military bases in Afghanistan…
 

The resolution of this problem is clearly late in coming. American foreign policy makers have no strategic plan, and the efforts being undertaken are poorly coordinated with analogous steps taken by the Afghan government. Washington and Kabul do not have a unified understanding of where, in what and how much it is permissible to compromise with the Taliban. And now it seems that the creation of a new organization in the State Department is a tactical move on the part of the Obama administration, which is concerned with how to come to an agreement with the Taliban such as to minimize losses when withdrawing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In itself, this will not bring stability to Afghanistan.

First, ISAF command is trying to convince everyone that the transition process in Afghanistan is proceeding normally. However, this optimism is unfounded. The possibility of Afghanistan's further development without the participation of the Taliban is the most preferable for Washington, but it is also the most dangerous, as it would inevitably lead to widespread rebellion after the withdrawal of international coalition troops. National reconciliation should be based on a broader spectrum of sociopolitical forces than the Afghan government on the one hand and the Taliban on the other.

Second, it is obvious that until the withdrawal of the troops, counting on a military victory over the Taliban by Afghan security forces is unjustified. The authority of the Taliban has been established over a significant territory in the country. Last year the twelve provinces with the greatest number of clashes were Helmand, Kandahar and Oruzgan (southern region), Ghazni, Paktika and Khost (southeastern region), Nangarhar and Kunar (eastern region) Herat and Farah (western region), and Kabul and Wardak (central region). According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), the southern, southeastern and eastern regions form a practically uninterrupted battlefield. 70% of all security incidents were registered there. In 2012 there were over 10,000 rebel attacks here, and over 2500 civilians were killed. In 2013 armed clashes increased by 44%, and the number of fatalities increased by 63%; the absolute majority of these (73%) were residents of these regions.

Third, reports that there are no Talibs in the northwestern and western regions of Afghanistan are also inaccurate. The Taliban has to a significant degree regained its influence there in recent years as well. For example, while in early 2009 the military presence of the Taliban was visible on 62% of the country's territory, by early 2010 it was visible on 82%. As of early 2014 there are practically no provinces where there are no Taliban representatives or militant groups. The leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, who appoints shadow governors in 30 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, has not forgotten the north and northwest of the country. The situation in northern Afghanistan, in the provinces of Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan, is especially alarming; here the total number of fighters from various militant groups – the Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami, Hizb ut-Tahrir and others – has reached 10,000.

Fourth, throughout their time in Afghanistan, the Americans and their allies have not paid serious attention to the training of new leaders, placing their emphasis on creating defense and law enforcement agencies and farming out the creation of government organizations to Karzai. Now Washington speaks of this as a mistake. Corruption, cronyism and abuse of power seriously undermine the effectiveness of the Afghan government in the eyes of the populace, which has not forgotten its puppet status.

Fifth, for the country's religious minorities the pro-American leadership of Afghanistan has not been an alternative to the Taliban, with their religious intolerance toward minority confessions. The Afghan constitution establishes Islam as the official religion; other religions are permitted, but in practice everything remains as it was under the Taliban. Afghan Shiites, for example, are not protected from violence and persecution. They are subjected to discrimination by the Pashtun Sunnite majority, encounter oppression, do not have equal access to government service, do not have the right to educate their children in their own schools, and are subjected to physical attacks in public places.

Sixth, the presence of 160,000 foreign troops in the country has not ensured the safety of ordinary Afghans. The Taliban still organizes suicide bombings in public places, including civil government institutions, crowded marketplaces, mosques, weddings and tribal leaders' meetings. Terrorist attacks cause huge fatalities among the civilian population. The number of casualties from attacks in 2013 rose by 57% compared to 2012 and by 800% compared to 2011.

Seventh, the Americans have distanced themselves from protecting their supporters in the ranks of Afghan government agencies. Over the past two years, as the ISAF has ceased combat operations, the number of ground battles between government forces and anti-government groups has decreased, while the number of assassinations of officials, especially those connected with the Karzai regime, has increased. Potential victims of the Taliban include high-ranking government officials; generals and senior officers of the defense, intelligence and interior ministries; and provincial leaders. In 2013 the number of officials who were the victims of attacks rose by almost 30% compared with 2012.

Finally, the U.S. and NATO unjustifiably neglect the role of regional states in ensuring peace in Afghanistan. Russia is of interest to the U.S. and NATO as a transit country providing diversification of transportation to and from Afghanistan. Fearing that Moscow's role in Afghan affairs could become greater, the Americans are prepared to support only those Russian projects with regard to Afghanistan which do not touch on the strategic interests of the West (joint anti-drug-trafficking projects, prevention of the growth of Islamist terrorism, economic assistance). The Americans have also ignored the potential of China, which is an ally of Pakistan and a strategic partner of Moscow and plays a key role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran, which traditionally has a strong influence on a significant part of Afghanistan's population, has also been left out of America's policy. With regard to the states of Central Asia, it is planned to tie them more closely to U.S. interests, up to the point of moving NATO military bases from Afghanistan to the territory of some of them.

The tasks of ensuring security in the Northern Caucasus and in Russia's allies in Central Asia have made it a priority for Moscow to work toward counteracting the threats of extremism and international terrorism. Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the U.S. and NATO on Afghanistan remains perhaps the only area in relations between Moscow and the West where there have been no significant disagreements. This does not mean, however, that the West can continue to try the Kremlin's patience with its inability to find a way out of the military and political dead end which has resulted from the ineffective actions of the Western coalition for keeping peace in Afghanistan…

Afghanistan sits at a strategically important crossroad in the world and the United States has always sought to capitalize on this. The idea of an American military withdrawal from NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan has always been viewed by the Pentagon as a strategic rollback in Central Asia and more broadly as a rollback from Eurasia. Regardless of the US government’s claims, leaving NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan it has always been out of the question for the US military. Nonetheless, it was claimed in July 2013 that President Obama was mulling a total withdrawal from the NATO-manned Central Asian country, or so claim the unnamed US and European officials that the reporters Mark Mazzetti and Mattew Rosenberg quoted for The New York Times (NYT). When it was published, the July 2013 NYT report by Mazzetti and Rosenburg raised many skeptical eyebrows. The news came while Washington was trying to stamp out some type of long-term security pact with Kabul to let the Pentagon continue using Afghanistan as a giant military base.

The quibbling between the US and its own indigent Afghan puppet, President Karzai, has been nuanced by another set of negotiations that the US had started. Washington had started secretive negotiations with the Taliban that scared America’s Afghan puppets in Kabul. The fear of being betrayed by Washington caused Karzai to protest and eventually forced the Obama Administration into using intimidation by threatening a total withdrawal that would leave the puppets in Kabul to fend for themselves against the Taliban and the opposition groups in NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan. Even US Secretary of State John Kerry’s personal pleas in October 2013, during an unannounced visit aimed at getting Kabul to sign the security treaty, were rejected by Karzai. Finally, US National Security Advisor Susan Rice delivered an ultimatum to Karzai in November 2013 saying that if he delayed signing that he would be left to his own devices against the Taliban in 2014.

Is the Taliban back in Washington’s Good Graces?

US talks with the Taliban are a threat to the interests of China, India, Iran, and Russia. It was the old Taliban that had kept all of America’s rivals out of Afghanistan for Washington. The talks also come at the expense of Washington’s own Afghan pawns. Karzai, long derided jokingly as the “Mayor of Kabul” due to his lack of authority outside of the Afghan capital, has been deeply alarmed by Washington’s negotiations with the Taliban. His corrupt administration has also objected to the fact that a Taliban office has been given recognition by the US government under the name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is the name that the old Taliban had imposed on Afghanistan during their reign of terror that was supported by the US and only recognized diplomatically by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban office in Doha essentially functioned as an embassy or diplomatic mission. This status could even have led to the germination of a parallel Afghan government.

Although the Taliban of 2013 is very different from the Taliban of 2001, the tune of American officials has changed since George W. Bush Jr. and Tony Blair invaded Afghanistan and vowed to cleanse the country of the Taliban. The US now appears to be ready to throw in the towel in the fight against the Taliban fighters fighting American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Taliban of 2013, more properly described as a series of armed groups opposed to the US-supported Afghan government and to foreign troops on their soil, is insidiously gaining favour in Washington. This is the same brand of geopolitical-cum-regime change US favour that Al-Qaeda affiliated groups like Al-Nusra have enjoyed in Syria and Libya since the so-called Arab Spring erupted.

Saudi Arabia Steps into Qatar’s Shows?

The Taliban office that was opened for negotiations with the US government was located in Doha, Qatar. As noted earlier, the Taliban office in Qatar functioned as the embassy of a Taliban government-in-exile. Karzai repeatedly protested about the Taliban office in Qatar until the office was closed by the Taliban itself in July 2013. Formally, the Taliban closed the office after its white standard version of Afghanistan’s flag and its sign were both removed by Qatari authorities. There is a chance that the office was closed just to eliminate the limelight and end Karzai’s protests while negotiations between the US and the Taliban continued silently.

Just as the Emirate of Qatar tried to act as the patron of the Muslim Brotherhood, Doha appeared to have been positioning itself to become some type of patron for the Taliban too. This could possibly have been an attempt to compensate slightly for Qatar’s lost investments on the declining Muslim Brotherhood’s regional project or it could have been part of the same initiative all along. Regardless, Qatar’s Al-Thani regime would never have dared to take such bold steps as hosting the Taliban without American approval. Ultimately, Qatari patronage over both the Muslim Brotherhood and its planned patronage over the Taliban have been in service of Washington’s interests and, in a manner of speaking, the US had outsourced these particular jobs to the Qataris.

Qatar’s regional role declined after the Saudi-supported military coup in Egypt toppled President Morsi and the failure of the regime change project in Syria. Qatar was sidelined by the Saudis in Syria too. Prince Bandar had taken over the lead in trying to oust the Syrian government too. It now seems that Saudi Arabia may also take the lead with the Taliban. In discussions between Afghani and Pakistani officials it was announced that a Taliban office may open up either in Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Karzai has tried to push instead for a Taliban office closer to home, and to his spies and informants, in neighbouring Pakistan as a means of being able to monitor the group’s negotiations with the United States.

A Redo of Egypt in Afghanistan?

Would the US let Karazi be ousted and replaced with the Taliban even though he has admittedly been on the CIA’s payroll as a US employee? The answer is absolutely yes. Just looking at what happened in Egypt at the start of July 2013, it should be clear why Karzai may be nervous or distrustful of the US. The Obama Administration betrayed the very same Muslim Brotherhood government that Washington itself was propping up in Egypt. The Egyptian military even consulted the Pentagon before the coup against President Morsi took place. It was Washington that gave the green light for the military to roll out the tanks in Cairo and to oust their own ally Morsi. Of course there are more nuances about the events in Egypt and about why Obama abandoned Morsi, but the example of betrayal, or expendability, here is still undeniable. Obama played all sides and used the Egyptian military, Muslim Brotherhood, and segments of the Egyptian opposition against one another. The same thing can happen in NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan. It is not surprising that Karazi and his corrupt Kabuli entourage have become alert over Washington’s secret talks with the Taliban.

Egypt’s military leaders want to diversify their ties precisely because of the US strategy of playing one domestic faction against another. In Egypt it has been realized that Cairo can no longer be too dependent on the US. Moreover, all of America’s allies and clients realize that the US imperial order is sinking in the broader Middle East. This is also one of the reasons why the American clients and puppets in the Middle East are suddenly becoming brave and speaking out against Washington.

Who can blame the officials in Kabul for thinking that the US government is involved in Machiavellian backdoor deals that could see Obama playing the Taliban against them. Ironically, the Taliban itself use to be an American, which the US government even provided with financial and logistical support, before it was tossed aside in 2001 under the pretext of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.* Karzai has actually demanded that the peace negotiations with the Taliban take place directly with the Afghan government itself. The American response has been to effectively refuse to allow direct peace negotiations between Karzai and the Taliban forces. As a result, in June 2013, Karzai suspended the bilateral negotiations on the security treaty that Washington wants with Afghanistan. Karzai also announced that the Afghan government would take steps to take its security into its own hands and later to say that he would eventually sign the treaty if revisions were made and after the presidential elections in 2014. Washington’s response was to threaten to pull out all of its troops in Afghanistan, which would force Karzai’s fledgling military forces to face-off against the Taliban. Susan Rice would also demand that the Karzai sign the treaty before April 2014, which is the date that he suggested.

There is an added dimension to this narrative. Even though the US has committed itself to preparing and equipping Afghanistan’s military and security forces, it has been takening very contradictory steps the whole time. In an unprecedented move, the US has been destroying approximately seven billion dollars (US) worth of military equipment as it reduces its military presence in NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan. Instead of helping to strengthen the Afghan military by handing over the Pentagon’s old military equipment to it, the US government has opted to do the opposite by destroying its military equipment.

Afghanistan is the Pentagon’s Base in the War for Eurasia

America needs Afghanistan to challenge Russia, China, and Iran. Obama’s threats to pullout from NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan are part of a bluff designed to intimidate Kabul. The Pentagon wants to beef up its infrastructure in Central Asia and not to reduce it. Afghanistan is viewed as a means of entry for the US and NATO into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Caspian Sea. It is also a doorway into the Indian sub-continent The Pentagon would never surrender its military bases in such a strategically important geographic location that borders Iran, China, Pakistan, and the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, the Pentagon’s troop reduction is also being compensated by private battalions of security contractors or, in plain language, mercenaries that will allow the US to bypass many legalities and international liabilities by utilizing private armies.

Washington wants to stay in Afghanistan without fighting the Taliban. This is the Pentagon’s real objective. It is with this objective in mind that Obama is trying to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban while he is also trying to secure a bilateral security treaty with a scared Karzai who is worried about his own skin. Karzai rightly suspects that the US could be willing to let him collapse if a deal with the Taliban is reached. These are the reasons why Afghan officials have refused to cooperate with Obama by signing the Pentagon’s bilateral treaty. As a means of intimidating Karzai into signing the security treaty, this is what has forced Obama to use the threat of withdrawing all US troops as leverage. What a total US withdrawal would mean for Afghanistan’s government is that Kabul would come under siege by the Taliban and others in a battle for power.

In spite of everything, these games between Hamid Karzai and the US government are not new. Washington and Karzai have put pressure on one another whenever there have been differences between the two sides. US officials put pressure on Karzai in 2009 when there were arguments about the Afghan elections and the political configuration of the Afghan government. Ahmed Wali Karzai, President Karzai’s brother, was exposed in the crossfire as a CIA operative and drug dealer by US officials. Karzai’s response came by way of General Khodadad, Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics minister, who revealed to IRNA in a tit-for-tat statement that the drugs in Afghanistan are mostly “stockpiled in two provinces controlled by troops from the US, the UK, and Canada” which “NATO forces are taxing” as accomplices in the international narcotics trade.

The US strategy in NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan may seek to pit the different Afghan factions as counter-weights to one another as a means of ensuring the continuation of US influence. Washington could tilt the balance of power to one side when another side gets out of line and refuses to comply with Washington’s edicts and desires. Nevertheless, it is not skeptical whatsoever to speculate that in the process of making peace with the Taliban that Washington may hand over much of Afghanistan back to them. It is in this context that the Russian government has warned in June 2013 that peace talks require direct consultations between Afghan officials and the Taliban whereas visiting Afghan officials led by Ershad Ahmadi, Karzai’s deputy foreign minister, have been warned in Tehran not to trust the US with their fate.

NOTE

* The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US were no committed by the Taliban or any Afghan citizens. The Taliban leadership even originally offered to hand Osama bin Ladin if the US government provided evidence of his involvement in the event. After the US began the war, the Taliban even offered to surrender Osama bin Ladin to the United States.
 

The return of Taliban to Kabul is a matter of special concern for Russia and the neighboring CIS (the Community of Independent Nations) states. President Karzai believes Afghanistan is a sovereign country and has a right to determine its own fate, including the involvement of Taliban into the political process. He is self-assured and not concerned a bit about the fact that with ISAF gone the Taliban can come back to the political scene and share power. Those who took the reins after the Soviet forces withdrawal let the movement turn Afghanistan into the springboard of international terrorism. They were self-assured too. Those who headed the country back then had no political will to make the gained independence work for the benefit of Afghan people. 

Now Karzai is on the verge of repeating the same mistake, he goes on insisting his government is ready to take on full responsibility for the future of the country. Actually the incumbent Afghan government is siding with the United States and NATO getting the country embroiled into the mess with consequences hard to predict… The US-led NATO readiness to retain its presence within the framework of Resolute Support mission aimed at security transfer to Afghan forces should not mislead. The same way, according to NATO, Kabul is already responsible for 90% of combat operations inside the country, but it does not mean the puppet regime is strong enough. NATO evidently exaggerates saying the government forces enjoy the support of major part of population. The affirmations of the West that the Taliban enjoys only minor public support after the 12-year war, that brought about no tangible results, look more like an awkward propaganda maneuvering to cover up the fact that the US-led operation is a failure. 

Will ISAF leave fully or let some forces stay as part of the Resolute Support? It all depends on the US and the Karzai-led government; will they let the Taliban return to the country? 

The moment of truth has come. The US and NATO are to report to the international community on the results of their 12-year presence in Afghanistan. It’s not serious when they say the 100 thousand strong force has eliminated the Al Qaeda’s infrastructure and it’s the major achievement of the West. Afghanistan faces the prospect of becoming a Taliban dominated state once again. 

The movement is supported by Pakistan – its homeland. For Islamabad the friendly Taliban-controlled Kabul is a strategic advantage. Let me remember that during five years of the Taliban rule, the movement failed to spread its control throughout the entire country with all the leverage they had holding the reins of state power, and it was the failure for Pakistan too. Those days the Taliban got very limited international support from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, the countries that have not changed their stance as yet. The money flows coming from the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (more commonly known as Inter-Services Intelligence or simply by its initials ISI), never stopped, sometimes the process even ran out of government control. The Taliban is the only means of leverage Islamabad can use to influence the Afghan politics; the Pakistani elite will never sever ties with it. Pakistan will do its best to make the Taliban return as a result of reconciliation process under «the predominant role of Afghan people» meaning the possibility of making a choice thanks to elections at various levels. 

The logic of Pakistani approach is based on the fact the Pashtun are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. The fact that it dominates the Taliban is hushed up. The calculations show the Taliban candidate has a chance to win at the election of 2014. In any event the new presidential election may become the main political event for Afghanistan. The incumbent head of state Hamid Karzai does not exclude the possibility the next presidential hopeful may come from the Taliban ranks. It could be the Taliban founder Muhammad Omar. Karzai is ready to cooperate with him on the condition the Taliban refuses armed struggle. It had been reported earlier the Taliban started to hold secret talks with the government. The place is not any foreign country but Kabul. It means the US supports the process. The position of Mullah Omar before the withdrawal is getting stronger; he knows the incumbent government is weak. So the Taliban leaders have not refused to take the power in Afghanistan into their hands again to revive the Islamic Emirate. No doubt the Taliban is intent to resort to forceful methods to the political management process. 

The group has not said openly it intends to take part in the election though many forecast that Mullah Omar would hold a sweeping victory if he had an opportunity to run. The Taliban has many faithful supporters among the voters. At that, there are other options, the choice is not limited by the Taliban and the supporters of incumbent President Karzai, other Islamist political forces have emerged which are not that close to Islamabad and appear to be less radical in comparison with the Mullah Omar supporters. 

Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf has registered at the offices of Kabul's Independent Election Commission. He is a Pashtun from Paghman valley and an hereditary theologian. Sayyaf is one of the most influential Islamist politicians of the country, for many years he led the Mujahedin faction Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan fighting against the Soviet Union. In February 1989 he was elected the first Prime Minister of Mujahedin transitional government, and then became a close associate of Afghan leaders Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Sayyaf has always been an opponent of the Taliban and fought it together with the Northern Alliance. After the American forces came into the country he took the side of US and supported Karzai at the election. 

Before the registration as a presidential hopeful, he had been a member of the lower chamber of parliament preserving the status of a conservative and respected imam. Field commander Ismail Khan agreed to become first Vice-President in the Sayyaf- led government if elected. Ismail Khan has always been influential in the western province of Herat near the Iranian border. Abdul Ahad Irfan, the chairman of parliamentary upper chamber and the leader of Afghanistan National Unity Committee, has registered too to run for the position of second Vice-President. 

These personalities that make up the triumvirate of hopefuls may challenge the Islamist Taliban at the election. It’s up to people to appreciate the reputation of Sayyaf as a religious Pashtun leader and the fact he has broad connections among the Islamist groups inside Afghanistan and outside. The voters don’t doubt his military record and his influence in the western parts of the country. The Islamic youth has sympathy for his educational level; he is a new kind of religious preacher, who does not share the Taliban ideology which requires religious rigidity in all aspects of everyday life according to the Muslim moral standards of the times of Prophet Muhammad. Let’s not forget the Taliban banned women from leaving their houses. Now over two million girls go to school, over 300 thousand Afghan children have Facebook accounts, the young people younger than 25 years old account for 70 percent of population. All these factors have weight in case the election is fair. 

If Sayyaf wins the presidential election the coalition he is going to head will cement ties with NATO as the organization that came to support Afghanistan in the times of trouble (a hint it seeks US blessing). Sayyaf promises to stick to the principle of equality in the process of national reconciliation and respect for all nationalities including: Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras which have never had real chances to have a President coming from their ranks. This time Abdullah Abdullah, former leader of Northern Alliance, runs too. He had got his registration two days before Sayyaf. It’s not excluded the both will agree on concerted actions against the Taliban which never shared his power with those who come from the north of the country. At present, as the experience of Karzai government shows, it’s impossible to talk about the Afghan unity without bringing in national and religious minorities. Under certain circumstances the Northern Alliance voters may shift to support Sayyaf, if no serious rivals appear. Minister of Foreign Affairs Zalmai Rassoul, liberal politician Ashraf Ghani, Qayum Karzai, the brother of incumbent President, – they all run and have hopes to win. The issue is defining the main sponsors, including the ones outside the country. 

(To be concluded)

* * *

The President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai has decided to suspend the security agreements talks with the United States giving rise to exasperation on the part of Washington. Barack Obama threatens him with the «zero option» meaning no US soldier will be left on the Afghan soil by the end of 2014. The Kabul’s decision to refuse a direct dialogue with the Taliban which envisions the role of intermediary for the United States causes frustration that could expedite the withdrawal of NATO-led coalition. The US military top brass suggest the pull out should take place before the yearly fighting season, leaving the country to its fate as they have already done in Iraq.

There is a real possibility the Afghan government forces will be left face to face with the Taliban in 5-6 months. The events may unfold according to Syrian scenario. As it is forecast in Moscow, terrorism may «spill over» from one country to another… The question is will the United States withdraw fully and simultaneously, or it’ll be a phased and gradual process with about 9-10 thousand men left behind.

The 100 thousand strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghanistan military are responsible for stability today; the latter is urgently expanding to about 260000 active personnel strength by 2015. With the current strength of 150000 the Afghan military seems to be a formidable force but it lacks professional skills. The US trainers admit the recruits get less combat training to increase their numbers. According to ISAF, the yearly loss is 34, 8% due to desertion, combat casualties, wound retirement and poor retainment rate.

Some areas and military facilities gradually get under Afghan forces control. By March 2014 the Afghan forces have to take over full responsibility for security, though the fighting against the Taliban never ceases. 2013 was the bloodiest year since the coalition forces moved to the country. The Taliban is becoming more active, the coalition forces shy away from combat leaving it to the Afghans who are unprepared to fight the enemy alone. Let’s have a look at the casualties. It was 13-27 per month since fighting resumed in the spring of 2013 for the coalition, while the figure was over 100 dead and around 300 wounded for the Afghan national army, national police and local self-defense units. The Afghan armed forces death toll exceeds three times the losses of coalition in 2010 and 2011, when the US casualty rate was the highest. Kabul stopped to inform about the military losses to avoid undermining morale. The ISAF military think the Afghan forces cannot hold out for long suffering the casualties at present rate.

The Afghan leadership has no confidence in the armed forces too, there is no guarantee the military will not change sides and join the Taliban. Let’s not forget there is a civil war going on, the outside aid failed to address a lot of problems. The majority of experts believe peace and stability are impossible without the Taliban becoming part of the political process. The government thinks the direct talks between Washington and the Taliban (without its participation) is a threat to the country’s sovereignty. The United States believes the direct talks are the best way to put an end to violence. It’s possible the Taliban will take part in the upcoming presidential election in April 2014. The incumbent President cannot run for the third term according to the Constitution and there is no visible successor, and, perhaps, a viable candidate may come from the Taliban ranks, you never know.

Karzai is a Pashtun and a Sunni Muslim; he does not exclude a direct (without the US participation) dialogue with the Taliban, whose members are also Pashtun and Sunni. The presence of NATO was an obstacle on the way of talks but it made him a two-term president. Now the situation is changed, Karzai is leaving in a year at the time ISAF is slated to pull out. Obama is sure a security agreement is to be reached by October, but Karzai is in no hurry to take on clearly defined responsibility till the presidential election is over. This attitude is clearly seen when he says that if the document is agreed on during his tenure, then it’ll be O.K. If not – the new leadership will step in and make the decision. Washington continues to insist the decision should be taken before the election but to no avail. As an oriental man, Karzai is not prone for hasty decisions, besides he has his own calculations. Americans need to know how many servicemen are to stay after the withdrawal but Karzai wants to know what award he is going to get for his presidential approval in case the security agreement is reached. Probably it is to be measured by billions of dollars.

Until now the American war expenditure was up to $12 million. Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann believes the sum will be defined by the size of the remaining force to go up to at least $5 billion a year aside from the embassy’s expenditure. The next year the United States and its allies will have to spend $7, 7 billion to cover up the Afghan military costs while the Kabul’s share will not exceed $2 billion.

The Karzai’s government keeps on plunging into the quagmire of corruption and squandering. According to UN report issued this February in 2012 Afghan people paid $3, 9 in bribes to Afghan state officials. Even Western companies, making their contribution into the country’s restoration process, had to give over $1 billion to grease the palm in order to win contracts. In Washington it is widely believed the expenditure was a waste. The fact that Karzai admits the graft problem makes even stronger the criticism Obama comes under. The US spent over $1 trillion for Iraq and Afghanistan operations, US taxpayers paid totally around 11million dollars an hour to finance the military operations since 2001. It’s impossible to get the American logic, so many human lives lost, so many billions of dollars wasted just to kill one terrorist! Other missions are unaccomplished. It raises questions with the Pentagon and the administration.

The further support of the Afghan government makes no sense for Washington, but it cannot stop spending. The forces pull out will probably be the most costly and complex endeavor in the history of US armed forces. The British have already called the withdrawal the most unique operation in the century though they will have to get only 9 thousand troops out of the country in comparison with the US contingent of over 60 thousand along with weapons systems and logistics. It’s much more complicated than it was in Iraq.

Afghanistan has no access to sea. There are a few alternative routes: the road to Karachi, the railroad going to Russia across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the air route for cargo aircraft flying to the Persian Gulf. The US Defense Department plans to spend around $80 billion in 2014 for the purpose. The figure is mentioned in the request for additional expenditure submitted to Congress. The 2013 fiscal year was over on September 30, the expenditure was $37 billion. It means the next year’s «zero option» may exceed the present spending twice making expedient the withdrawal postponement. But this scenario will most certainly be opposed by Afghan government and its neighbors, who look forward with fear awaiting the surge of instability in the country.

(to be continued)
 

Karzai believes or at least indicates publicly that the difficulties in advancing reconciliation have arisen because Pakistan has not cooperated. Pakistan, his spokesman says, has failed to release the Taliban prisoners Afghanistan wants specially Ghani Baradar Mullah Omar’s former No.2. Further, his spokesman alleges that at Chequers, Pakistan laid down 3 conditions for Pakistan’s cooperation. These were that Afghanistan limit its relations with India; reach a domestic consensus on peace; and immediately sign a strategic partnership with Pakistan…

After Salahuddin Rabbani’s visit to Pakistan in November last year Pakistan agreed to release Taliban prisoners it was holding and in batches, according to press reports, some 26 Taliban, many of them of high standing were released. Afghanistan complained rightly that they were not informed in advance of the Taliban release and could not therefore take advantage of the gesture. After Chequers, the Pakistanis agreed to notify the Afghans in advance according to a mechanism that had been worked out and the Pakistani Foreign Secretary sad that all Taliban prisoners Pakistan was holding would be released. Even while Afghanistan was right to complain that they had not received advance information about the release of the 26 Taliban Pakistan felt that there should have been a greater expression of gratitude by Karzai and more of an effort to sit with Pakistan and discuss the future releases that Pakistan had promised. This was unfortunately not done. And the question of further releases remains in limbo.

It is probably true that the Pakistani asked the Afghans to be sensitive to Pakistan’s concerns about the role India was seeking to play in Afghanistan. Recently after President Karzai visited India and, among other things, asked India for weapons and other military assistance the Pakistan Foreign Secretary publicly said that while Pakistan respects Afghanistan’s sovereign right to determine its relations with other countries Afghanistan should, in doing so, take account of the regional security situation. The expression of such concern however is not unique to South Asia. Every country while developing relations with one of its «neighbours» has to take account of the reactions of its other neighbours or of powers further afield. Many in Pakistan believe that Afghanistan, after having been a buffer state between two empires continues to follow a policy of playing off one regional power against the other without paying sufficient attention to the nature of the ties that geography and history dictate.

To my mind, Pakistan is needlessly apprehensive about India’s role in Afghanistan even while it is probably right in assuming that at least in part India seeks to cultivate Afghanistan to discomfit Pakistan. India is unlikely to become an arms supplier to Afghanistan nor will it, in the military field, go beyond the provision of some training facilities. But this it must be said is not a view shared by all power centres in Pakistan. There is the fear that the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan would be used to foment more difficulties in Pakistan's troubled province of Baluchistan.

Karzai is also right in saying that Pakistan has suggested that before talking to the Taliban Karzai should develop a national consensus taking on board the leaders of the ethnic groups that form part of the opposition. According to press reports Pakistani officials have suggested that as a way of kick starting the peace process, there should be a meeting attended by the Taliban and representatives from Afghanistan's multiple ethnic groups. In making this proposal Pakistan, its officials said, was not trying to exclude Karzai from the process, but rather to make sure that the Afghan president and the loyal opposition were on board for the details of the reconciliation process.

An Afghan spokesman speaking of this proposal said "Pakistan is continuing with delaying tactics in their support of the peace process by demanding a supposed intra-Afghan consensus on the peace process at a time that a national consensus to end the violence is the strongest it has ever been for the past decade," 

The truth however is that no such consensus exists. Ahmad Wali Masood, the brother of the late Ahmad Shah Masood and a recognised representative of the Tajiks and particularly of the Panjshir valley has said publicly, as I mentioned in my last article, that there is no consensus. Earlier, I was present at a Conference on Afghanistan in Berlin in January 2012 when at the insistence of the Karzai administration the Aspen Institute did not allow any of the invited Afghan «opposition representatives’ to participate in the conference. These opposition representatives then proceeded to have their own meeting with US Congressman Rohrabacher and to issue a press statement that called for, among other things, consultations between the government and the opposition to determine the modalities and details of the reconciliation process. Abdullah Abdullah, the prominent Tajik leader and the man who fought the Presidential election against Karzai in 2009, was not in Berlin for the meeting but was informed of it. He said  «Almost everyone in Afghanistan is supportive of peace talks with the Taliban. We, too, hold this opinion. But we will only support the peace process if it is transparent and inclusive to the people of Afghanistan». The statement issued by the group in Germany made the same point saying that the peace negotiations with the Taliban were «flawed» because they excluded the anti-Taliban groups. This was of course the time when the Taliban were announcing that they had reached a preliminary agreement on the opening of their office in Qatar and were eagerly anticipating talks with the Americans for an exchange of prisoners and perhaps for reconciliation.

Repeatedly since then the Karzai administration has rejected any effort to have intra-afghan talks be it the follow up meeting to the meeting in Chantilly or the proposed UN sponsored meeting in Turkmenistan or other suggestions from opposition groups for meetings in Kabul itself between the government and the opposition. Karzai apparently fears that any such meetings will result in sidelining him.

This point was driven home to Pakistani dignitaries who during visits to Kabul reached out to the opposition and were told at first hand that these groups felt excluded from the reconciliation process when their participation was essential if the peace process was to be sustained. In essence Pakistan’s proposal flowed from what its officials had learnt from opposition leaders. It would seem to be right that if Pakistan had the key role in reconciliation assigned to it by the roadmap proposed by the Afghan High Peace Council, their suggestion had to be read as helpful rather than as interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. 

On the issue of the Strategic Partnership Agreement there appear to be very different perspectives in Kabul and Islamabad. It seems that Pakistan did propose a draft of such an agreement to Karzai but at Chequers, the Pakistanis say it was the Afghans who said that this agreement should be signed. The value of such an agreement is to say the least doubtful in any case. The only issue from Pakistan’s point of view, it seems to me is that it would be anomalous if Afghanistan concluded such agreements with India and NATO countries but did not do so with its most important neighbour.

Perhaps the most dangerous development has been the sudden and unexpected Afghan allegation that Pakistan was constructing a gate along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which was in Afghan territory in the Goshta district of Nangarhar province. The charge was then enlarged to say that there were another 11 check-posts, which were built by the Americans on Afghan territory and then occupied by the Pakistanis once the Americans withdrew. From Pakistan’s perspective the area where the gate was being constructed along with the other 11 checkpoint were all on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line and had been built by Pakistan for better border control in 2003. The new gate that was being constructed had been the venue earlier in the year for a meeting of Afghan and Pakistani military delegations and no protest had been lodged at that time. 

Tempers flared and even though Pakistan agreed, as a gesture of good will, to dismantle the new gate exchange of fire took place as Afghan forces, following Karzai’s orders tried to demolish the check-posts. In the cross fire an Afghan security official was killed and quickly made into a martyr. A flood of anti-Pakistan rhetoric followed making normal diplomatic exchanges difficult. In private conversations Afghan officials conceded that the check-posts had been in existence since 2003 but pleaded that at that time Afghanistan was unaware of the correct position. 

To add fuel to the fire Karzai then went on to say that by constructing these check-posts Pakistan was trying to get the Afghans to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and vowed that Afghanistan would never do so. The fact was that Pakistan, which regards the Durand Line as a settled issue had never mentioned during this time Afghan acceptance of the Durand Line. In fact Karzai’s own complaint was based on the fact that according to the maps that the Afghans were using Pakistan had built its check-posts on the Afghan side of the Durand Line. 

The situation on the border appears to have quietened down but the war of words continues. There are now charges that in aid of the announced Taliban offensive Madrasahs in Pakistan have been closed and the students there are entering Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. This is in addition to the charge that Pakistan has been firing artillery in Kunar and Nuristan without mentioning that these are the provinces into which the Pakistani Tehrik-e-Taliban has established bases from which they conduct raids into Pakistan. 

It can be said that Karzai’s ire was prompted, at least in part, by charges levelled by Pakistani officials in an interview to Reuter in which Karzai was branded as the «main impediment to the peace process». He, it was said, was trying to act as a «saviour» and in so doing was taking «Afghanistan straight to Hell». Pakistan’s frustration was understandable but the use of such undiplomatic language certainly provided fresh fuel for Karzai’s anti-Pakistan diatribes and may thus have slowed the peace process that Pakistan was seeking to hasten. Another view however is that no matter what Pakistan did or said Karzai was intent on using the anti-Pakistan card to highlight his nationalist credentials (about which more later). 

Pakistan is not the only target of Karzai’s efforts. His principal beneficiary has also been targeted though not with the same venom as had been aimed at Pakistan. This and Karzai’s efforts to project himself as a true Afghan nationalist will be the subject of my next article.  

(To be concluded)

This is not how the relationship looked a few months ago. High level Pakistani dignitaries, including the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Army Chief of staff had visited Kabul and in meetings with leaders of all groups, particularly the representatives of the ethnic minorities, had apparently been able to convince them that Pakistan’s support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation with the Taliban and other “armed opposition groups was sincere. The head of the High Peace Council Mr. Salahuddin Rabbani had visited Pakistan and had secured the release of Taliban leaders held by Pakistan identified by the Afghans as potential interlocutors in the reconciliation process. Meetings of the representatives of the “core group”-Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USA were held regularly and seemed to be making progress. Pakistan claimed with some measure of credibility that it had facilitated the movement of Taliban representatives to Doha for setting up the office, which could be used for reconciliation. 

In February Prime Minister David Cameron hosted a trilateral summit at which their defence and intelligence chiefs accompanied the leaders of the three countries. The communiqué that emerged from this meeting sounded a very positive note. Mr Cameron said «an unprecedented level of co-operation» had been agreed between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The joint statement said all sides had agreed on the urgency of the Afghan peace process and «committed themselves to take all necessary measures to achieve the goal of a peace settlement over the next six months». President Karzai and President Zardari also «re-affirmed their commitments» to signing a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), to encourage closer ties.

Pakistan had also agreed at the Chequers summit that future releases of Taliban prisoners would be coordinated with the Afghans. This was a follow up on a commitment the Pakistan Foreign Secretary had made publicly that all Taliban prisoners held by Pakistan would be released and implicitly affirmed that this could include Abdul Ghani Baradar the former deputy to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He told the Pakistan Senate committee that a coordination mechanism had been set up for this purpose so that the Afghan High Peace Council would have advance notice of releases addressing an earlier Afghan complaint that they had not been informed of the exact dates of release when some 26 Taliban had been released by Pakistan in November in response to requests from the Afghan High Peace Council. 

These positive developments were however soon overshadowed by the abortive effort on Karzai’s part of organise a conference of Pakistani and Afghan religious scholars (Ulema) to condemn suicide bombings as unislamic and to endorse the peace process. These efforts foundered when the Pakistani Ulema insisted that the Taliban be invited to participate and subsequently by the furore created when the head of the Pakistani Ulema group, Mullah Ashrafi, was quoted as having said that suicide bombing was justified against foreign occupiers. Karzai maintained that since the Pakistan government had appointed Ashrafi his views had official endorsements. Ashrafi’s clarification that his remarks had been misinterpreted and a Pakistan embassy statement that Ashrafi’s views were personal and not official did not quell the storm. The proposal withered away but left officials and politicians on both sides with a sense of grievance.

In November 2012 Salahuddin Rabbani had come to Pakistan and had presented a document entitled “Peace Process Roadmap to 2015”. This document, many suggested had been drawn up by the Afghans working with their Pakistani counterparts while others suggested that it had emerged from meetings of the “core group”-Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USA. Whatever its origin the document did attempt perhaps unrealistically to lay out a path by which the Taliban with Pakistan’s very pro-active involvement could be persuaded to participate in peace talks in return for the promise of a share of power and for ultimate emergence as a political rather than military force competing for the support of the Afghan people. The most important elements of this road map, were that in a series of 5 steps up to 2015, the Taliban would agree to a ceasefire, renounce ties with Al-Qaeda. In return they would be given power in the areas in which they were dominant and a share of power in Kabul. Pakistan, the document makes clear, would have the key role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table to work out this arrangement. 

Writing on this subject at that time I had said, «There is much in the road map that can be regarded with scepticism or even dismissed as fantasy. There are a number of imponderables including the measure of support the road map enjoys in Afghanistan, the spoiler role of powerful drug traffickers and warlords who flourish while instability pervades the region, the political differences between Karzai and the loyal opposition and on the other side the existence of differences within Taliban ranks with many factions believing that having fought for a decade against a Super Power they are within sight of total victory». 

Such questioning is valid but given the irreversibility of the American decision to withdraw and given the signs, albeit faint, that the majority of the Taliban too realise that it would be impossible to return to the Taliban era in today’s Afghanistan, this does seem to offer some hope of a negotiated settlement provided a measure of trust can be created and provided Pakistan plays the limited cards it has with some skill. 

There is no doubt that this road map and the indications of a certain flexibility on the part of the Taliban, contained in the presentation that the Taliban representatives made at an ostensibly Track II meeting in Chantilly outside Paris in January were borne very much in mind when the optimistic conclusion of a peace settlement in 6 months was broached in Chequers. At the Chantilly Conference where all elements of the “loyal opposition, the “armed opposition and the government were strongly represented, the Taliban statement repeated what Mullah Omar had said earlier- not seeking an exclusive right to power» and wanting instead ‘an all-Afghan, inclusive government”. It offered a general amnesty to those who had fought against the Taliban, seemed to accept that the present ANSF should continue, as should the many new Afghan institutions created under NATO tutelage. It denounced the present Afghan constitution as something imposed and proposed that a new constitution be drawn up based on «the Islamic principles, national interests, social justice, and historical gains», which would «guarantee, without prejudice, equal rights for all ethnic groups». But his last point was not a s significant as it appears since most of what they want in terms of Islamic principles is part of the present constitution. 

The problem from that time onwards has been that President Karzai is not prepared to concede that the Taliban office in Doha as and when it becomes functional should be used for anything other than a dialogue with Karzai and his representatives. He has insisted that the Qatar government sign a MOU with his government prohibiting the Taliban from using the office for any other purpose. The Taliban however remain adamant on not talking to Karzai since they see him as a puppet installed by the foreign forces. They actually want to use the Qatar office to talk to the Americans about an exchange of prisoners – the one American soldier they are holding for the 5 Taliban they want released from Guantanamo. Many people believe that if this exchange proceeds the Taliban would be prepared to formally renounce ties with the Al-Qaeda or other international terrorist organisations. Many others believe that they may then also be willing to talk to Karzai on the basis of the High Peace Council Roadmap. 

The second problem is that there is no general acceptance within Afghanistan of the Roadmap. In a television programme organised jointly by an Afghan and Pakistani channel two months ago, an Afghan participant, Ahmad Wali Masood the brother of the late Ahmad Shah Masood, said clearly that there was no Afghan consensus on the Roadmap, which needed further discussion. 

It would therefore appear that before Karzai talks to the Taliban he must have internal discussions to establish that the broad parameters of his negotiating stance enjoys broad acceptance within Afghanistan. Karzai appears unwilling to move in this direction. 

In the next article I will seek to explore how Karzai seems to be intent on using Pakistan primarily and America secondarily as a means of taking the focus away from this issue of prime importance and burnishing his credentials as an Afghan nationalist. I will also talk of what I believe was the damage done by a public expression by Pakistani foreign office officials of their disillusionment with Karzai and their perception that Karzai had become the main impediment to the peace process.

(To be concluded)