The so-called ‘Iran Deal’, more formerly known by its acronym ‘JCPOA’ is, despite western media’s upbeat reporting, far from being resuscitated. In fact, in many ways, the talks in Vienna now are merely a side show or a cunning distraction as part of a process which will give Iran an even stronger hand to play in the coming months and years.

Events unfolding in Iran recently have shown us that the moderate camp which included players like Rouhani and Zarif, is more or less to be snuffed out in the presidential elections. A number of moderate leaders who presented their credentials have been rejected by Iran’s Guardian Council, which technically speaking is independent from the Supreme Leader, but in reality is an extension of his power.

What is left is five hardliners and a token representation of others who everyone knows are there to endorse the farcical process.

Joe Biden’s camp in Vienna will note this recent development for sure. But will also see that the Supreme Leader recently signed off a one-month extension for the IAEA until June 24^th, which signals quite clearly that Ayatollah Khamenei believes that a nuclear deal with sanctions lifted is not only a good move for Iran but one which can be achieved.

The problem for Biden’s team is that the thinking is flawed and only makes the talks harder, longer and more complicated. The transition to a new team led by a hardliner president will feel like more of a Mission Impossible, once the deal is presented for all to see: lift all sanctions, no conditions.

And add to that, compensate us for the Trump stunt in 2015 which had a dire effect on the economy and take the Iranian elite guard off the U.S. terrorist watch list.

Khamenei, despite being a hardliner whose entire raison d’etre is anti-American sees a great opportunity to turn the country’s economy around using Biden’s zealous need for the JCPOA to be reinstated. But his strategy is to use an infamous hardliner President to do it, rather than the current administration. However, his hardliner president will have no problem with the deal not being reached.

It makes no sense to hurry the talks through in Vienna when Khamenei has made it clear that he has allowed for the Judiciary chief Ebrahim Raisi, to be the main candidate for the hardliners.

Raisi – which in Arabic ironically sounds similar to the word president – has changed his position on the JCPOA recently, which is the most lucid signal yet where the talks are heading and, perhaps more poignantly, how much higher the stakes will be raised.

It is of no consequence now whether a deal is even struck between Biden’s people and the Iranian team in Vienna as, in reality, they are not representative of the regime but merely actors playing a role, designed to appease the world’s media that Iran is open to negotiating. Their role, like KGB-trained eastern bloc spies, is to keep the other side talking so as to see what the thinking is. Just look for Javad Zarif, who played a central role in the deal being signed in 2015. The foreign minister, who more or less took enough rope to hang himself when he was recently caught on tape complaining about the regime, has been cast into the political wilderness and has been allowed to indulge himself with a farewell tour of EU destinations. He was not even a contender for President, as many hardliners blame him for the collapse of the JCPOA and believe that the original terms were not strong enough. They see him as weak and westernised and very much part of the problem that the regime has, rather than anything resembling a solution. They believe it’s time to get tough and they will never have a better opportunity to do so, with Joe Biden in the Oval Office.

Yet no one in war-cheerleading US corporate media talks about the quadrillion derivative crisis that will gut the global economy if there’s an attack on Iran (I addressed it here.) Shutting down the Strait of Hormuz will bring down the 2.5 quadrillion world derivative market, largely wiping out the economies of all Western nations.

No one talks about the massive arsenal of Iranian anti-ship missiles, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, some in positions visible to US satellites and drones, deployed all along the northern shore of the Persian Gulf. Those include the Russian SS-NX-26 Yakhont, which travels at Mach 2.9 speed. Iranian – as well as Russian and Chinese – anti-ship missiles can knock out the entire US Aircraft Carrier Task Force before their planes are even in range.

No one talks that it would take the US at least six months to place a proper combat army in Southwest Asia; the Pentagon scenario of a possible 120,000-strong troop deployment does not even begin to cut it.

And no one talks that Tehran won’t crack even under “maximum pressure.”

Saudi tankers are “sabotaged” – and Iran is instantly blamed, evidence-free. Some Brit bureaucrat says war can break out “by accident”. Consul Pompeus Minimus scares European poodles into isolating Iran.

And no one talks about Pompeo’s real target in his flash visit to Baghdad; to apply gangster tactics. Don’t deal with Tehran – or else. Buy “our” Make America Great Again (MAGA) electricity, not Iran’s. Get rid of the People Mobilization Units (PMUs). Or else.

Take me to false flag heaven

The deal between the holy triad – US neocons, Zio-cons and Bibi Netanyahu – is that a false flag, any false flag, must be blamed on Tehran, thus forcing the Trump administration to protect and defend the “rules-based order”. Better yet, an even more elaborate false flag should induce an Iranian response – thus providing the rationale for an attack.

Trump at least is correct that it would take “a hell of a lot more” troops than 120,000 to attack Iran; more like a million troops. There’s nowhere to land them. No one – Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Pakistan – would welcome the “liberators”.

In an extremely hot scenario Tehran could even have instant access to nuclear missiles in the black market.

The bottom line: the neocon threat of war against Iran is a bluff.

Iranian Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi described it as a “theatrical” and “useless” attempt to “magnify the shadow of war.”

IRGC commander of aerospace force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizade famously said, “a US battleship with 6,000 personnel in the vicinity (Persian Gulf) with 40-50 jets onboard used to be a threat to us. Today it is a target.”

Tehran sent an unmistakable message to all its neighbors, especially the House of Saud and the Emirates; your whole infrastructure will be totally destroyed if the US uses you as a platform for a military campaign.

Then there’s the evolving drone-on-pipeline saga. The Houthis in Yemen targeted two pumping stations along the Saudi East-West pipeline – which carries oil from the Eastern province to the Red Sea. One of the stations caught fire. The hugely strategic pipeline – which allows Riyadh to bypass the Strait of Hormuz – has an enormous capacity, transporting 5 million barrels of crude a day. Operations had to be suspended.

Whether this drone attack was IRGC-directed, independent, or even a false flag is irrelevant; it provides just a taste of what might happen to the whole regional oil and gas infrastructure in case of a hot war.

Conversations with old-time Persian Gulf traders are quite enlightening. They attest, “if a pumping station is destroyed it takes two years to fill an order for a new pump. The Saudis maintain they have pumps in reserve. If all the pumps are destroyed in Saudi Arabia, no oil would flow for two years. The prime target would be Abqaiq. If this processing plant is destroyed, oil prices would soar.”

Abqaiq, with an enormous capacity of 7 million barrels a day, is the primary oil processing plant for Arabian extra light and Arabian light crude oils.

Assuming the drone attack was not a false flag, Persian Gulf traders were impressed with the accuracy of the drone at these distances for a precision hit. This would mean that Abqaiq itself is vulnerable. And there is absolutely nothing the Trump administration can do to stop the oil price from going to $200 a barrel just from Abqaiq being knocked out.

Moreover, no one is talking about insurance rates. As Persian Gulf traders insist, Vito, Trafigura, Glencore and other operators will not buy two million barrels in a tanker at $70 a barrel if there’s no insurance – or the rates go skywards.

It takes basically one single tanker going to the bottom of the Persian Gulf with two million barrels to permanently close the Strait of Hormuz – and interrupt all tanker traffic for 22 million barrels a day of crude, unless governments come in to insure the tankers even though they have no ability to protect them.

It’s all about maximum resistance.

So what does Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei want? Here it is, in his own words; “There won’t be any war. The Iranian nation has chosen the path of resistance… “We don’t seek a war, and they don’t either.”

On top of it, Tehran won’t talk to Washington – following Trump’s “call me” caper – or sign any sort of modified or post-JCPOA nuclear deal. Khamenei; “[Such] negotiations are a poison.”

If President Trump had ever read Mackinder – and there’s no evidence he did – one might assume that he’s aiming at a new anti-Eurasia integration pivot centered on the Persian Gulf. And energy would be at the heart of the pivot.

If Washington were able to control everything, including “Big Prize” Iran, it would be able to dominate all Asian economies, especially China. Trump even said were that to happen, “decisions on the GNP of China will be made in Washington.”

Needless to add, this would be the icing in the geopolitical cake of destabilizing for good the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the road map for Eurasia integration, of which Iran is a crucial node.

Now cue to President Putin musing on Iran-Russia relations; “I have repeatedly said in conversations with [our] Iranian partners that, in my opinion, it would be more rational for Iran to remain in this treaty, no matter what. Because as soon as Iran takes the first steps in response [to the US’ exit from the JCPOA], declares that it is withdrawing, tomorrow everyone will forget that the United States was the initiator of the destruction, and everything will be blamed on Iran”.

Arguably the key (invisible) takeaway of the meetings this week between Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Wang Yi, and then between Lavrov and Pompeo, is that Moscow made it quite clear that Iran will be protected by Russia in the event of an American showdown. Pompeo’s body language showed how rattled he was.

There will be much to talk about if Putin and Trump do meet at the G20 in Osaka next month. In the meantime, the dead may even die without going to war.

After a week of violent demonstrations in several large cities and small towns, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), announced that the “sedition” has been defeated. It will take some time to accurately understand the roots of this violence and how it will impact Tehran’s domestic and foreign policies.

Still, the excitement expressed by some officials, media outlets, and think tanks in the United States, Israel, and some Persian Gulf states raise two important and interrelated questions: Is a regime change in Tehran desirable? And what is the “right” approach to deal with Iran?

A close examination of Iranian policy suggests that the government has a long way to go to meet the aspirations of the socioeconomic and political needs of its large and young population. These include unemployment, gender equality, transparency, corruption and pollution, among others. The “right” way to address these challenges is a gradual reform of the system, not regime change. The experiments with regime change in the broad Middle East are not encouraging. Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen are cases-in-point. The process of regime change by definition is destabilizing. An unstable Iran would threaten key global interests:

– Rhetoric aside, the Islamic Republic, particularly the Quds force and its leader Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, has been playing a major role in the global war on terrorism. The Sunni extremist groups including Al Qaeda and ISIS perceive Shias as one of their main enemies. In June 2017 ISIS claimed responsibility for two major terrorist attacks in Tehran one on the parliament building and the other on the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. Twelve people were killed and forty-six were wounded in these attacks. ISIS would welcome a regime change in Tehran.

– A regime change in Tehran will not have an impact on the nation’s ambitious nuclear program. In the last several years the nuclear program has evolved into a national project representing a strong pride in the nation’s scientific and technological advances. Any regime in Tehran will insist on maintaining and building on these advances.

– Iran’s involvement in regional conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon is driven by national security concerns, not ideological orientation. Regional powers do intervene in their neighbors’ affairs to protect perceived national interests. Egypt’s intervention in Libya, Saudi Arabia’s in Yemen, Turkey’s in Syria, and Israel’s in Syria and Lebanon are good illustrations. Iran, under any regime, is not different from these other regional powers.

– An unstable Iran is certain to raise significant challenges to the approximately three million Afghan refugees residing in Iran. It would deal a heavy blow to the global efforts to restrain drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe and the rest of the world. Finally, Iran holds the world’s largest combined oil and natural gas proven reserves. Instability in Iran is certain to add significant uncertainties to the global energy markets and the broad global economy.

In short, encouraging regime change and instability in a major regional power with a strategic location and leverage in the Middle East and South Asia is a risky venture. The demonstrations that started in late December have ended and the authorities have been able to restore order. Top Iranian officials, including Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rouhani, have acknowledged the need to address the socioeconomic and political roots of this wave of protests. Like any country, Iran’s domestic and foreign policies will continue to reflect the perceptions and interests of different factions within the political establishment. Like it or not, the Islamic Republic is here to stay. Almost four decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian economy is growing at a higher rate than most neighboring countries and the country has a more functional and predictable government than most of its neighbors. Calling for a regime change is the wrong strategy. A better approach would be for the United States to work with its European and Asian allies to help the Iranian government to address the major socioeconomic and political aspirations of the Iranian people. Adhering to the nuclear deal, supporting foreign investment, activating cultural engagement, and promoting strategic dialogue are likely to serve the interests of all concerned parties. A stable Islamic Republic is good for the Iranian people, regional powers and the international community.

nationalinterest.org

The following is not another such analysis. Rather, this is an attempt to address the underlying assumptions of most of the sage pronouncements to which we are treated – assumptions that are as lacking in substance as they are ubiquitous. Three of these myths are noted below.

Spontaneous popular uprising – not

“Arise ye pris’ners of starvation, Arise ye wretched of the earth!” The stirring words of the socialist and communist anthem, The Internationale, encapsulate the sense most people have of revolution as the result of unbearably oppressive conditions. At some point “The People” can stand no more, and in noble wrath they rise up as one against their tormenters!

There’s just one little problem. That has never happened, it isn’t happening now, and it never will happen.

Revolts and revolutions (see below) almost always occur when things are getting better but expectations have outpaced performance. Or when things had been getting better but there’s been a setback, either economically (like in Iran today, where President Rouhani’s neoliberal economic reforms have cut consumer subsidies paid under his predecessor, Ahmadinejad) or in 1917 Russia (problems with the conduct with the war and the economy).

Even then, revolts and revolutions don’t take place unless other conditions are present. One of them is relative freedom to protest and even, in some cases, to engage in subversive activities. For example, why did revolt “spontaneously” break out in Russia in 1917 but not in the Soviet Union in 1941, when, in the latter case, the losses on the war front were far greater in terms of men and territory and the privations of the home population far more severe? Because, Tsar Nicholas did not impose all-pervasive wartime discipline on the home front or even in the army, allowing anti-war agitators to operate within the ranks. Where would that have got you with Stalin in 1941? Or in North Korea or Saudi Arabia today?

“The People” don’t all of one accord suddenly decide to shift direction like a flock of birds or a school of fish. Movements by human beings need to be planned, led, and incited. Consider the role of the Masonic lodges in revolutionary France, the Bolsheviks in Russia, the religious establishment in Iran that in 1979 brought the mullahs to power in the first place, and the Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafist groups in the so-called “Arab Spring” starting in 2011.

The Iranian government says the disorders are instigated from the outside. They would say that even if it weren’t true, but public support from President Donald Trump, Ambassador Nikki Haley, and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu adds credence to the charge. So does news of a Trump-Netanyahu “strategic work plan” to counter Iran following a December 12 White House meeting. So does the appointment earlier this year of the “Dark Prince,” “Ayatollah Mike,” the “Undertaker” and convert to Islam Michael D’Andrea to run the CIA’s Iran operation. (One Langley insider’s simple comment on the D’Andrea appointment: “All I can say is that war with Iran is in the cards.”)

“Freedom!” – but for whom?

Well-wishers of the Iranian demonstrators laud their quest for: Freedom! For most of the world, that word usually implies a set of related values: political freedom, democracy, the rule of law (versus the rule of the ayatollahs and their security services); economic freedom (Stefan Molyneux has spoken eloquently about the venerable Persian civilization whose creative potential had been stultified under the Islamic republic); and social and personal freedom (the image of the woman holding her hijab aloft, “Tiananmen-Square-style.”)

One is reminded of the idealistic, cosmopolitan, pro-“democracy” young ladies who in 1979 voluntarily donned hijab or chador in “solidarity” with Islamic protests against the “repressive, corrupt, and pro-American regime” of Reza Shah Pahlavi – and who then found themselves confined in such garb for the rest of their lives. An inconvenient truth for many advocates of “freedom” in Iran is that while in non-Islamic countries there is generally a congruency between democracy and liberal social liberties, in Muslim societies there is an inherent and underlying conflict.

Here’s the tradeoff. You can push for more “democracy” – and end up with an illiberal, Sharia-ruled state that oppresses women and non-Muslims. Or you can have an enlightened autocrat or military caste that imposes a secular order in which women can run about with uncovered hair and minorities are equal citizens. The mid-20th century saw various movements and regimes that enforced the latter: Kemalism in Turkey, Baathism in Iraq and Syria, Nasserite pan-Arabism in Egypt, military rule in a number of countries (Algeria, Pakistan (until Zia-ul-Haq’s imposition of Sharia), and Egypt today after a brief run of Islamist “democracy”).

Certainly there are many, many people in Iran who would like to see the restoration of the socially liberal state that existed under the Shah – and maybe restoration of the monarchy itself. But no one should imagine such a restoration would be particularly democratic. (Maybe some of those no-longer-young girls stuck in their hijabs for almost four decades may have reconsidered their priorities.) To survive, such a restoration, even if it commands the support of a majority of the population would have to contend with a very substantial portion of the population for whom secularism and liberalism are not just wrong but shirk (idolatry) and ridda (apostasy) – and are prepared to act accordingly. 

Revolt or Revolution?

“Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? Why, if it prosper, none dare call it treason.”The self-evident observation of John Harington (also famed as the inventor of the flush toilet) is that if a revolt succeeds, it is no longer just a revolt. Those who launched it are no longer traitors, those who opposed the revolution are.

The conversion from revolt to revolution almost never happens unless there is a split in l’ancien régime to create what Alexander Shtromas called “the second pivot,” a second source of official power. This happens not when “The People” rise up but when some part of the ruling establishment defects to the revolt and becomes the new conferrer of legitimacy. There are obvious historical examples: Parliament in the English Civil War, the Third Estate’s declaring itself the National Assembly of France, the Petrograd Soviet’s coup against the Provisional Government, Boris Yeltsin’s Russian government when Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet government was under threat of the State Committee on the State of Emergency (itself an aspiring second pivot that failed), and the communist cabals in the various Warsaw Pact countries that ousted little Brezhnevs and installed little Gorbachevs.

In Iran today, the question isn’t whether “The People” will topple “the regime.” It’s whether, when, and where a split might occur in the ruling establishment to create a rival point of authority. If that doesn’t happen, a revolt it will remain, either being suppressed or dying out on its own.

Ironically, in Iran’s 1979 revolution, the Islamic establishment itself may be regarded as having been a kind of second pivot. Keep in mind that in 1953, the Islamic clergy – most prominently Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani, friend and mentor to Ruhollah Khomeini, the future Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic – was allied with the Shah in the CIA-sponsored overthrow of the left-leaning Mohammad Mosaddegh. Without such support it’s unlikely the Shah would have succeeded.

Most of the mullahs were content to stay in their well-paid government sinecures under royal authority, even after 1963, when the Shah launched his “White Revolution” modernization program of land reform, privatization, and most controversially women’s rights and legal equality of non-Muslims. But Khomeini, forced into exile, led the denunciation that the reforms were an “an attack on Islam.” From his place of exile in Paris, Khomeini inveighed against the threat to Islam and eventually became the second pivot that brought down the Shah.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan just visited Tehran and met with President Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

That’s a major geopolitical move by any standards. Iran and Turkey are both part of the Astana negotiations aimed at effecting closure in Syria. Both are regarded by Beijing as key nodes in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both are observers – and future full members – of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both may soon be incorporated into the BRICS-Plus concept. Both are key nodes in Eurasian integration.

At the Erdogan-Rouhani joint appearance, the two seemed fully in synch.

Erdogan: “There is no country other than Israel that recognizes it. A referendum that was conducted by sitting side by side with Mossad has no legitimacy.”

Rouhani: “Turkey, Iran and Iraq have no choice but to take serious and necessary measures to protect their strategic goals in the region, and the wrong decisions made by some of the leaders of this region must be compensated for by them.”

Is that it? Not really. Remember Twin Peaks: “the owls are not what they seem.” Shadow play is very much in effect.

Move on, nothing to see here

First of all, there’s Iraq, threatened with actual amputation. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi Abadi is adamant that the KRG’s wily, unelected tribal capo Masoud Barzani must scrap the referendum. Barzani, for his part, says the drive to independence will always remain and must be factored in by Baghdad.

Hysteria apart, there won’t be an Iraqi invasion. As it stands, the realistic worst-case scenario is Baghdad custom officials stationed at the KRG’s borders with both Turkey and Iran. As for the possibility of the KRG annulling the referendum in the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, which they have de facto annexed, that would require interstellar diplomacy.

Still, in the ultra-extreme event of Baghdad being forced to intervene to recover Kirkuk, it now may factor in the possible support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

Suspicion is rife in Baghdad that the referendum would never have happened without a green light from Washington. After all, balkanization remains an extremely seductive proposition for a large swathe of the US deep state.

Washington’s game is slippery enough. The Trump administration, via Secretary Tillerson, officially called the referendum “illegitimate.” The main, but unstated, reason is that the referendum appears to strengthen (it doesn’t, necessarily) new axis-of-evil member Iran.

Barzani, meanwhile, doesn’t seem fond of disappearing – or dying, like his rival Jalal Talabani – anytime soon. So what is to be done?

Let’s start with Iran. Tehran is a historical ally of Iraqi Kurds. So rough play is a no-no, even considering that Iran’s Kurds – who are, granted, not as separatist as the KRG – might now start entertaining their own ideas.

The official position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is that so long as the whole thing is restricted to a symbolic referendum – with no practical moves towards independence – Tehran can live with it

As Asia Times has learned, there was a crucial meeting last week of the national security and foreign policy commission at the Iranian Parliament, attended by Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the powerful Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). On the agenda: non-recognition of the referendum; worries about Iraq’s territorial integrity; the nightmare of Iranian Kurdish peshmerga being instrumentalized by the CIA.

Currently, the KRG is a mess. There is no working parliament, no elected politicians in charge. Tehran is worried that in the context of such a vacuum the KRG’s usefulness as a Trojan Horse may be intensified by a US-Israel-House of Saud alliance.

Still, the last thing Tehran needs is yet another war, with the unwelcome side effect of destroying good relations with its regional Kurdish ally, Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

The official position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is that so long as the whole thing is restricted to a symbolic referendum – with no practical moves towards independence – Tehran can live with it.

Will the spiders turn on each other?

The intersection of Iran and Turkey is equally engrossing. In their face-to-face meeting, Supreme Leader Khamenei emphasized better economic relations, while Erdogan emphasized the need for a strong Iran-Turkey political alliance. How the hyper-volatile Erdogan may be taken at his word is an open question.

And that bring us to Syria’s Kurdish question. And what Turkey may be up to, both in Syria and Iraq.

Tehran and Ankara have been on viciously opposite sides during six years of war in Syria, only to somewhat converge at the Astana de-confliction negotiations chaired by Moscow.

Tehran is part of the “4+1” (Russia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, plus Hezbollah) fully supporting Shi’ite militias in Syria (as well as the Popular Mobilization Units, or PMUs, in Iraq). Turkey was allied with both Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and fully engaged in keeping borders unobstructed for both Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda) and Islamic State jihadis, seen as tools for regime change in Damascus.

And yet it’s easy to forget that even when Ankara was denouncing Tehran as a “state sponsor of terrorism”, at the height of the war in Syria, the two countries kept diplomatic relations. Moreover, the liberation of Aleppo by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) only happened with the relative speed that it did because Ankara ordered its proxies to back off.

Ankara has been forced to accept that Moscow runs the show in Syria. As much as the Turks may disagree with President Putin’s special envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, that a “moderate rebel” Syrian National Army won’t be tolerated, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim has admitted on the record that Moscow, Tehran and Ankara are jointly involved in setting up a new de-escalation zone in the crucial city of Afrin. That would make it more difficult for Syrian Kurds to advance their independence agenda, something that answers to Ankara’s interests.

As for Iraq, it’s virtually certain that Ankara won’t impose serious economic sanctions on Erbil. All bark, no bite.

So, in the end, as it stands, we have Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara reasonably aligned – not only in Syria but also in Iraq. How long this will last in the ultimate regional spider’s nest is anyone’s guess.

atimes.com

Less than two months are left till the presidential election in Iran. The presidential race formally starts on April 17 and Rouhani has a good chance to win. True, the country’s foreign policy at the strategic level is defined by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but the executive branch of the government led by president implements it. The spiritual leader does not pay visits to other countries but Russian President Vladimir Putin met him in Tehran last year – the second time in the recent 17 years.

This was Rouhani's first official visit to Russia and the first time he and Putin met within a bilateral framework. The trip took place against the background of growing partnership as both countries have become leading forces of the Astana process that made Iran, Russia and Turkey guarantors of the Syrian cease-fire.

True, the cooperation in Syria is of utmost importance but there is each and every reason to believe that Russia and Iran will have to join together in an attempt to settle the conflict in Afghanistan. As a regional superpower, Iran will gain much by coordinating activities with Russia in that country after the US withdrawal that seems to be inevitable. Such cooperation would become a game-changing factor with far-reaching consequences for the region from the Mediterranean to Pakistan.

The emerging triangle, including Russia, Iran and Turkey, becomes an alliance, could reshape the region. A ceasefire in Syria reached as a result of the Astana process led by the «big three» would reduce the clout of the US, the UK and France. Actually, their influence has already been diminished. The neighboring states will see that progress can be achieved without the «traditional players» representing the West.

Russia is the country that can debunk the myth that the Middle East is threatened by a «Shia threat» emanating from Tehran. It can use its close and friendly relations with leading Sunni states – Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and, perhaps, Saudi Arabia – to play the stabilizing role of mediator between the Shia and Sunni camps. Russia has a unique position to act as an intermediary between Iran and Israel – something nobody else can do.

It’ll take years to heal the wounds and mitigate the contradictions between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Today, the West does not enjoy the clout it once had there. The borders drawn by Western countries caused many conflicts; direct military interventions made them lose trust and support. Under the circumstances, Russia is not exactly an outside actor. Moscow needs peace and stability in the region. This goal can be achieved in tandem with Turkey and Iran. Iraq and Syria can join the trio after they overcome the devastating results of wars. It makes the cooperation with Tehran an issue of paramount importance for Russia.

The bilateral relationship is going to be strengthened by large-scale economic projects.

Despite the importance of foreign policy issues, the talks mainly focused on prospects for deepening trade, economic and investment cooperation, including under large joint projects in energy and transport infrastructure. More than ten major trade and economic agreements were signed during the visit. Russia has already pumped about one billion euros into Iran' railway network, with serious financial injections into bilateral projects yet to be implemented.

Exports to Iran stand at only around 1 percent of Russian foreign trade, but a trade surplus and the existence of a large market for Russian manufactured goods make Iran an important partner. The bilateral trade grew by 60 percent from $1.2 billion in 2015 to almost $2 billion in 2016.

The resumption of weapons deliveries and participation in infrastructure projects financed by Russian loans have led to the doubling of exports of non-energy products from Russia to Iran. The first batch of S-300 air defense systems was delivered in April 2016.

Russia has agreed to provide Iran with a loan of $2.2 billion for infrastructure projects involving Russian companies. It is planned to build a power plant and enhance generation at another in Iran in a contract worth several billion dollars. Under an agreement signed between the two sides, the Russians will improve efficiency at the Ramin power plant in Khuzestan province to 50-55% from 36% now. Another Russian company will build a 1,400-megawatt power plant in the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas in Hormuzgan province. Russian truck manufacturer Kamaz plans to export 300 trucks in 2017, GAZ signed a memorandum with the Iranian authorities for the supply of 900 buses.

Russia’s role in reaching the Iran nuclear deal, the cooperation in Syria and the allegiance to the policy of rapprochement declared by President Putin provide ample evidence of Moscow’s desire to boost the bilateral ties.

A momentous event to take place this year will provide an impetus to the development of Russia-Iran relations. Tehran is expected to become a full-fledged member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) this June. Iran also has expressed interest in signing a trade agreement with the Eurasian Union.

Russia and Iran are united by common goals and interests. The development of relations between the two great powers is a significant contribution into creating alternative poles of power to change the world for the better. 

Pepe ESCOBAR

The art of the deal, when practiced for 2500 years, does lead to the palace of wisdom. I had hardly set foot in Tehran when a diplomat broke the news: “Trump? We’re not worried. He’s a bazaari”. It’s a Persian language term meaning he is from the merchants class or, more literally, a worker from the bazaar and its use implies that a political accommodation will eventually be reached.

The Iranian government’s response to the Trump administration boils down to a Sun Tzu variant; silence, especially after the Fall of Flynn, who had “put Iran on notice” after it carried out a ballistic missile test, and had pushed the idea of an anti-Iran military alliance comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan. Tehran says the missile test did not infringe the provisions of the Iran nuclear deal and that naval drills from the Strait of Hormuz to the Indian Ocean, which began on Sunday, had been planned well in advance.

I was in Tehran as one of several hundred foreign guests, including a small group of foreign journalists , guests of the Majlis (Parliament) for an annual conference on the Palestine issue.

Not surprisingly, no one from Trump’s circle was among the gathering of parliamentarians from over 50 nations who attended the impressive opening ceremony in a crowded, round conference hall where the center of power in Iran was on display; Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani and Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani.

Khamenei proclaimed that “the existing crises in every part of the region and the Islamic ummah deserve attention”, but insisted that the key issue remains Palestine. The conference, he said, could become “a model for all Muslims and regional nations to gradually harness their differences by relying on their common points”.

Khamenei’s was an important call for Muslim unity. Few in the West know that during the rapid decolonization of the 1940s and 50s, the Muslim world was not torn apart by the vicious Sunni-Shi’ite hatred – later fomented by the Wahhabi/Salafi-jihadi axis. The Wahhabi House of Saud, incidentally, was nowhere to be seen at the conference.

Hefty discussions with Iranian analysts and diplomats revolved on the efficacy of multilateral discussions compared to advancing facts on the ground – ranging from the building of new settlements in the West Bank to the now all but dead and buried Oslo two-state myth.

On Palestine, I asked Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah about the Trump administration’s hint of a one-state solution. His answer, in French; “One state means war. Two states means peace under their conditions, which will lead us to war.”

As with most conferences, what matters are the sidelines. Leonid Savin, a Russian geopolitical analyst, claimed that Russian airspace is now all but sealed with multiple deployments of the S-500 missile defense system against anything the US might unleash. Albanian historian Olsi Jazexhi deconstructed the new Balkans powder keg. Muhammad Gul, son of the late, larger-than-life General Hamid Gul, detailed the finer points of Pakistan’s foreign policy and the drive to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Pyongyang was also in the house. The North Korean delegate produced an astonishing speech, essentially arguing that Palestine should follow their example, complete with a “credible nuclear deterrent”. Later, in the corridors I saluted the delegation, and they saluted back. No chance of a sideline chat though to go over the unclear points surrounding Kim Jong-nam’s assassination.

Blake Archer Williams, a.k.a. Arash Darya-Bandari, whose pseudonym celebrates the “tyger tyger burning bright” English master, gave me a copy of Creedal Foundations of Waliyic Islam (Lion of Najaf Publishers) – an analysis of how Shi’ite theology led to the theory of velayat-e faqih (the ruling of the jurisprudent) that lies at the heart of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Every time I’m back in Tehran I’m impressed with the surprising number of open avenues for serious intellectual discussion. I was constantly reminded of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, the son of a mullah born in poor south Tehran who later translated Sartre and Camus and wrote the seminal Westoxification (1962).

He spent the summer of 1965 at Harvard seminars organized by Henry Kissinger and “supported” by the CIA. He pivoted to Shi’ism only toward the end of his life. It was his analysis that paved the way for sociologist Ali Shariati to cross-pollinate anti-colonialism with the Shi’ite concept of resistance against injustice and produce a revolutionary ideology capable of politicizing the Iranian middle classes, leading to the Islamic Revolution.

That was the background for serious discussions on how Iran (resistance against injustice), China (remixed Confucianism) and Russia (Eurasianism) are offering post-Enlightenment alternatives that transcend Western liberal democracy.

But in the end it was all inevitably down to the overarching anti-intellectual ghost in the room; Donald Trump (and that was even before he got a letter from Ahmadinejad).

So I did what I usually do before leaving Tehran; I hit the bazaar, via a fabulous attached mosque – to get reacquainted with the art of the deal, the Persian way.

That led me to Mahmoud Asgari, lodged in the Sameyi passage of the Tajrish bazaar and a serious discussion on the finer points of pre-WWI Sistan-Baluchistan tribal rugs from Zahedan. The end result was – what else – a win-win sale, bypassing the US dollar. And then, the clincher: “When you call your friend Trump, tell him to come here and I’ll give him the best deal”.

counterpunch.org, this piece first appeared at Asia Times

One of those is corruption. Confidence in President Rouhani’s government is sliding. And although criticism is coming from all sides, the same complaints are being heard: Rouhani’s team was not prepared to jump on the opportunities that opened up for the country in this post-sanctions era. Mohammad Nahavandian, the Iranian president’s chief of staff, claims that the president’s rivals blame him for the gap between the high expectations of this new life without sanctions vs. the reality on the ground in Iran, stating that «the decision to sign and implement the agreement was made at the highest level».

When it comes to politics, the highest level in Iran means the spiritual leader of the Islamic Revolution and the head of state, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Naturally he was in favor of the nuclear agreement since that decision was one element of the Iranian leadership’s strategy. Ayatollah Khamenei thinks that it makes sense for the Islamic Republic to change its tactics, given the changing international landscape, but that the fundamental principles of the 1979 revolution must remain sacrosanct. This is the stance adopted by Iran’s leaders. Tehran will not back down a single inch in its Middle East policy under pressure from Washington. The military and political cooperation with Moscow in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is confirmation of this.

Washington continues to impose sanctions against Iran for reasons no longer related to nuclear research, specifically because of Tehran’s pursuit of its missile program. This could hamper the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which allows the UN to resurrect all the «nuclear» sanctions should Iran violate the agreement. Iran, in turn, has proclaimed its grievances against the US and UN pertaining to the partial lifting of sanctions. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has threatened to set a match to the nuclear agreement if the next US president violates it. The US-Iranian relationship remains tense.

Ayatollah Khamenei emphasizes that American scheming has gradually become more brazen, but that the US administration is still seeking to undermine Iran’s political system.

However, US strategy toward Iran is changing – today Washington relies on «soft power» that could potentially drive a wedge into Iranian society. But that is something the US has not managed to do, despite its rhetoric about human-rights violations coupled with its support for a small number of Iranian dissidents. For the US to gain the upper hand over the Islamic Republic’s internal operations would require massive public discontent. American intelligence services believe that the fastest way to do that is to take advantage of the country’s economic difficulties as well as the social stratification of the population. And due to President Rouhani’s liberal attitude toward those he has placed in leadership positions, those calculations have begun to bear fruit.

That is what the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran said at a meeting with the president and members of the government. Ayatollah Khamenei had harsh words for anyone «greedily using a high-level government title to obtain wealth or specific advantages». Officials guilty of this do not belong in Iran’s government agencies. Iran’s leader has also spoken out against the local oligarchs. Their «dizzying incomes … are an affront to the values of Iranian society». Iran has few oligarchs, but Ayatollah Khamenei has stressed that «even this small handful of people has a very negative impact, and it is absolutely necessary to take action against them».

The government had no choice but to respond. President Rouhani decided to dismiss the heads of Iran’s four largest state-owned banks (Refah, Mehr, Iran Saderat, and Mellat). Those men were receiving salaries ten times higher than that of the average Iranian. What’s more, they were also regularly given large bonuses, no-interest loans, and tax breaks. The head of Central Insurance of Iran – a state-owned company where many directors were enjoying paychecks of as much as $28,000 per month – had already been let go.

These steps had two meanings. On one hand, they helped enhance Rouhani’s reputation as an uncompromising advocate of the battle against corruption. And on the other, they prompted demands that the government take similar measures against many other civil servants. It turns out that corruption in Iran is far more widespread, and success in getting a preliminary contract with a foreign company once sanctions are lifted is often contingent upon an uptick in palm-greasing.

In other words, there have been plans to entice Iranian civil servants into illegal business relationships with representatives of foreign firms. The IRGC intelligence services are already busy investigating the possibility that civil servants may have been accepting bribes and have been tasked with looking into the most high-profile cases. Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that the stability of the Islamic system depends on resolving the problem of corruption.

In recent weeks Iran’s media have been flooded with negative information about Rouhani and his administration. The imams who lead the traditional Friday prayers, which are held across the nation, have also begun to criticize the president. The main gripe against the current chief executive is that «the nuclear agreement hasn’t done Iran any good». And it’s true, the public has seen no significant benefits from the revoked sanctions and canceled oil embargo. There was initially a surge of euphoria over the agreements with the US regarding Iran’s nuclear program, but that has passed, and the expectations of rapid change for the better have not been rewarded.

Dissatisfaction with the country’s stagnant economy is growing. And so, speaking at a joint meeting between Iran’s Cabinet of Ministers and the governors of the country’s provinces, President Rouhani asked that the public’s most urgent social and economic problems be immediately addressed. «One of the primary responsibilities of the governors, as well as the government agencies», he declared, «is to encourage optimism and harmony in society… Our enemies are trying to sow despair in our society, and we must always be on the lookout to respond to their actions».

During an Aug. 1 speech, Khamenei said that even Iran’s nuclear negotiators have conceded that the United States has made "bad pacts," created obstacles and attempted to “destroy Iran’s economic relationships with other countries.” The obstacles Khamenei referred to are likely the remaining US banking sanctions unrelated to nuclear sanctions that have made European companies hesitant to fully establish economic relations with Iran. Iranian negotiators had previously said that the United States wanted more concessions to remove the banking sanctions.

In an indirect attack on President Hassan Rouhani and others who hope for better ties with the United States, Khamenei said, “Of course it’s been some years that I have been repeating this about the lack of trust with America, but for some it was hard to accept this reality.”

According to Khamenei, in the last meeting with their American counterparts, the Iranian negotiators accused the opposing side of “breaking oaths, not acting on their commitments and creating obstacles.”

In some of his harshest criticism of the nuclear deal since its implementation, Khamenei asked, “Was it not supposed to be so that the unjust sanctions would be removed and it would have an effect on people’s lives? After six months, is there any tangible effect on the lives of the people? If not for America violating its oaths, would the administration not be able to do many things during this time?”

Khamenei continued, “Approximately two years ago we said that the nation would look at the negotiations as an experience to see what the Americans do in practice, and now it is clear that they are acting contrary to their promises and busy with conspiracies.” He added that the United States has approached Iran to negotiate on other regional issues, but recent experience has shown that negotiations with the Americans is like “a lethal poison” and there is no issue in which their word can be trusted. Khamenei said this is the reason for his “continuous opposition to negotiating with America.”

Khamenei also said that if an enemy country were committed to its word, it would be possible to negotiate with the country on certain matters, but that America has shown it is not this type of enemy country. He said that the best path for Iran is to continue its policies so “the enemy will come after us, not us go after the enemy.”

Khamenei also condemned the warming of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, calling it “treason” to the Islamic world. According to Khamenei, the United States had a role in this decision, given the Saudi reliance on it. Khamenei also accused the United States of having a hand in the coup attempt in Turkey, saying that the United States is opposed to Islamist governments.

al-monitor

“Today, the definite American policy is to fight Islam, Iran and Shias,” the Leader told a group of state officials and Muslim ambassadors in Tehran on Thursday.

In his speech on the occasion of Eid al-Mab'ath celebrating the divine revelation to Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him) to declare his Prophethood, the Leader said US leaders see Iran as a hurdle to their policies.

“Lately, the Americans have announced that Iran’s policy in the region is a cause for sanctions and confrontation, meaning ‘you, the Iranian people who are vigilant and aware; you have to back down and let us do our work’.”

“This is ignorance,” Ayatollah Khamenei said, using the word Jahilliyah or "days of ignorance" which refers to the barbaric condition in which Arabs found themselves in pre-Islamic Arabia.

US threats of sanctions, the Leader said, are rooted in Iran’s opposition to the “expansionist policies” of the Americans in the region and the “corrupt moves of the world powers.”

Ayatollah Khamenei described Iran as a “front-runner” in the fight against “the current of ignorance led by the US,” saying the most important duty for Muslim nations is to join this campaign.  

The Leader said, “The Islamic movement, which became stronger and deeper with the establishment of the Islamic system in Iran, will continue on its path and definitely achieve victory.”

“The ultimate victory of Islam and Muslims is definitive,” Ayatollah Khamenei added.

Corrupt Takfiri groups committing the worst and most heinous atrocities in the name of Islam are being supported by Western powers, the Leader said.

“The Westerners have formed an anti-Daesh coalition on the surface but they are in fact the sponsors of this current and in line with their fight on Islam, they are referring to the group as the 'Islamic State' in order to tarnish Islam’s image.”

Ayatollah Khamenei described the current world order a satanic system which is controlled by the Zionists.

“The current world situation is the result of the domination of a vast network of Zionist capitalists which has influence even over America and controls it,” the Leader said.

“And the rise to power by political parties and groups is tied to following and toadying to the Zionist current,” the Leader added.

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