One of the most resounding of President Atambayev’s remarks was in regard to the future of the U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan. «There should be no military dimension at Manas international airport», he stated. «This is my principle position, and this position has not been adopted under any pressure». According to the president of Kyrgyzstan, the American presence has had a destabilizing effect on the region… Drug production during the 11 years of war in Afghanistan has not ceased to grow. In the future, the U.S. presence at Manas can create great difficulties for Kyrgyzstan. 

The statement that the Americans should leave Manas has been made by the Kyrgyz President before. However, in reality this was not the case. Most revealing in this regard is the experience of the previous Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In February 2009, Russia promised to provide $ 150 million in free aid to Kyrgyzstan, a soft loan of $ 300 million, and another loan of $ 1.7 billion for the construction of one of the largest hydro electric power plants in the region, the Kambarata HPP-1 plant. According to analysts, one of the informal conditions of the loan was the closing of the U.S. base in Manas. However, Bishkek, having received the first two loans decided to keep U.S. military base and renamed it as a Transit Center and increased the rental by almost three times – up to $ 60 million a year. Sometime later, in April 2010, the Kurmanbek Bakiyev regime fell.

Kyrgyzstan's new leadership headed by Roza Otunbayeva, in desperate need of financial and economic assistance, chose not to force the closure of the base. In fact, the Americans reached an agreement that the base in Kyrgyzstan could continue in the future. The rent came in handy for a republic damaged by revolution. In addition, the provisional government of Kyrgyzstan, which was a coalition of disparate political forces of differing orientation, clearly did not want to spoil relations with the United States. In fact two months before the Kyrgyzstan leadership extended the contract with the U.S. for the military base in Manas, which was announced before the parliamentary election on 10th October 2010. It was announced that the contract was extended for a year, but later it became known that an agreement had already been reached on a three-year term for the U.S. base in Manas.

The new presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, held in October 2011, were won by A. Atambayev, who during the election promised to close down the base at Manas. «The agreement on the Transit Center expires in 2014», Atambayev stated on August 15th last year in an interview with Russian journalists»… in full compliance with our obligations, six months before that date we will notify the U.S. side of the termination of the contract, and from 2014 onwards there will be a major civilian international transport hub here. « The previous government of the republic, he said, had already spoiled its international reputation, in not fulfilling its obligations. And in order to remedy the situation, previous agreements needed to be fulfilled.

In Kyrgyzstan, there is often speculation about why the Kyrgyz government has not rushed to keep its promises to close down Manas. According to the leader of the «Akshumkar» party, Temir Sariyev, «the ex-president Kurmanbek Bakiyev always had a single argument – the military air base at «Manas». Some international organizations have a significant impact on the political process in Kyrgyzstan, but every time Kurmanbek Bakiyev mentioned the military base, all other issues faded into the background, including the observance of human rights. «It was no surprise that the interim president Roza Otunbayeva extended the agreement for the U.S. base. According to the Director of the Centre for Science Methodology and Social Research, Nurbek Omuraliev, for crimes against humanity committed during the ethnic clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan, members of the interim government could be brought to justice before the International Criminal Court. «But in some circles it is claimed – he said – that while Kyrgyzstan has this transit center, or base, as it is often called, our government is not threatened».

Obviously the Americans do not want to part with the base, although most of their troops should have left Afghanistan by 2014. The air base at Manas, the Americans say, is needed to provide a «limited» military presence. The date for the end of this presence is not yet clear. In late July, the U.S. Congress held hearings on the subject, in which the U.S. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Robert Blake said that the U.S. is negotiating with Kyrgyzstan to maintain the base.

The Kyrgyz leadership has already decided the order of their actions after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to President Atambayev, Bishkek has, «an agreement with Russia to support the Kyrgyzstan army». Atambayev also noted the expediency of the appearance of another Russian military base in the south of Kyrgyzstan. «I would be happy to «agree» to another backup power in southern Kyrgyzstan», he stated at a news conference. In the past the creation of a Russian base in the southern regions of the Republic was prevented, according to him, by the former Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, but, perhaps, with a new head of the defense department things will change. The question of the location of a Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan was raised in the last years of the Kurmanbek Bakiyev presidency, but then it was not resolved. However, in the present circumstances, it is probable that with the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, the need for a military base in the Fergana Valley is becoming more acute.

President Atambayev accused the former Russian Defense Minister of not resolving the question of the transfer to Russian control over the «Dastan» plant which produces rocket torpedoes for the Russian Navy. According to him, Serdyukov was strongly opposed to Russian companies coming to «Dastan». In this case, the only future for the plant is in the case of cooperation with Russia, or the plant will have to shut down, as has happened with other Kyrgyz engineering plants that were built in the Soviet period.

In fact, talks over the lease of the base in Tajikistan have long grown into a permanent process. The facility, with around 6,000 servicemen stationed in Dushanbe, Kulob, and Kurganteppa, is the biggest one Russia maintains abroad and is central to the security arrangements made by Russia and its Collective Security Treaty partners vis-a-vis Afghanistan. It appeared when former Russian president D. Medvedev visited Dushanbe in September, 2011 that a deal was finally cut with Tajik president Emomalii Rahmon to have the lease of the 201st base renewed for a term of 49 years early in 2012, but no document on the issue has been inked up to date.

In line with the 2004 agreement, Russia almost did not have to compensate Tajikistan for the stay of the 201st base. Instead, Moscow pledged to invest heavily in Tajik hydroelectric generating capacities, but a chill between Russia and Dushanbe made prospects for the plan dim. Russia did help Tajikistan finalize the Sangtuda Hydroelectric Power Plant, but a question mark currently hangs over the top-ambitious project of constructing the Rogun Dam. Recently the view started to pop up in the Tajik media that the 201st base, an extensive infrastructure obviously critical to Russia's security, need not be rented out for a token price. Moreover, the cost occasionally suggested – $300m annually – sounded completely outrageous, considering that the US pays Kyrgyzstan $60m for the Manas aerodrome, and Russia pays Ukraine $89m for the naval base in Sevastopol.

Furthermore, no agreement is in place at the moment on the basing of a Russian air force group at the Aini airport near Dushanbe. The facility has been upgraded, with India covering the costs, to reinforce the 201st base and to come into play in case an escalation occurs at the Tajik-Afghan border. Dushanbe, however, keeps its intentions concerning the lease of the Aini base to Russia under wraps, and the Tajik media claim that the US is bidding for the site as one of the potential bases in a security network it is going to build in Central Asia while pulling out of Afghanistan. Watchers suspect that the Tajik administration would rather be happy to start hosting a US military base, but the charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, of which Tajikistan is a member, requires peer approval for admitting the armed forces of countries not involved in the alliance, plus the reaction of Moscow which would hate to see a US base in a sensitive region so close to Russia's borders, still has to be taken into account.

Tensions over the 201st base surfaced late last June, practically at the time Uzbekistan staged a walkout of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russian ground forces commander Col. Gen. V. Chirkin complained on June 27 that talks over the lease stalled, Tajikistan's demands were completely unrealistic, and chances were the problem would stay unresolved. Russia being keenly interested in keeping a contingent in the region, Gen. Chirkin said that it was unclear whether the Russian forces would eventually be deployed to the site on any terms whatsoever and that Russia's defense ministry was withholding investments into the infrastructures as those could end up being a waste of money.

Chirkin's statement prompted an angry response from Tajikistan. The defense ministry of the republic decried it as “politically incorrect” and the concerns he voiced over the possibility of an armed conflict spanning the territory of the republic – as “groundless”. The Tajik military officials released no details of the talks with Russia and only announced that efforts to clarify the positions of the parties were in progress and expressed hope that, given the good will and mutual understanding, the work would be complete by the proper deadline. Commentators in Tajikistan concluded from the above exchange that Moscow was trying to arm-twist Dushanbe into a deal over the base.  
Russian general staff chief  Army Gen. N. Makarov confirmed on July 3 that the talks over the 201st base were in dire straits and that no money would be poured into the infrastructure until full clarity is reached. According to Gen. Chirkin, Tajikistan confronted Moscow with a fluid list of over 20 mostly unacceptable demands, suggested a lease first for 10, then for 20 or at most 29 years, asked to be given weapons and supplies for free, and churned out incongruous financial requirements. Gen. Chirkin therefore said the negotiating mode was unsavory and no light could be seen at the end of the tunnel. Russia's Kommersant wrote on July 12 with a reference to a well-informed source in Tajikistan that Dushanbe asked for $250m annually and that the Tajik draft of the agreement still was not on the table, meaning that Dushanbe was sounding out Moscow and playing for time.

Kyrgyzstan's defense minister Taalaybek Omuraliev told on July 11 that Bishkek would start charging Russia more for the lease of the Karakol underwater weapons testing base, a military communications center in Kara-Balta and radio-seismic laboratory Maily-Suu. The facilities – three of the four Moscow runs in the republic – are critical to Russia's security. For example, the Kara-Balta one is the  hub used to connect to the Russian fleet of strategic submarines. Moscow pays Kyrgyzstan around $4.5 annually for all of the above and trains Kyrgyz officers in Russian military schools, but Omuraliev explains that the cost should rise due to inflation. Kyrgyzstan has no plan to up the rent for the Kant base employed in the interests of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, says Omuraliev.

Clearly, it is more than just coincidence that Russia encountered problems in the military cooperation with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan almost simultaneously. The three Central Asian republics are known to be on Washington's list of destinations for a significant portion of the armaments waiting to be lifted out of Afghanistan. Russia's unyielding position on Syria could further motivate Washington to respond indirectly by causing difficulties for Moscow in Central Asia. Anyhow, Russia has at its disposal an impressive arsenal of means to influence its southern neighbors, and as of today only few of them have been put to work.

China is open about being keenly interested in Central Asian energy sector and transit projects. At the summit, Hu Jintao called the Central Asian partners to move on to the formation of an integrated network of railroad and expressway transit, telecommunications, and energy supply and pledged China's assistance in the training of 1,500 specialists from SCO countries over the next three years, along with financial support for 30,000 students and professors plus perks like scholarships for 10,000 visitors from the Confucius Institutes scattered across the SCO countries over the next five. The above list shows that the Chinese soft power is meant to reinforce Beijing's already impressive economic influence in Central Asia.  

Over the post-Soviet decades, China has built strong positions in the Central Asian energy sector. For example, as of today Chinese companies own roughly a third of the energy assets in Kazakhstan, the country known as the regional heavyweight. The biggest energy project pursued by Beijing in Central Asia is the construction of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline whose first phase having the target throughput of 40 bcm annually – with Turkmenistan contributing 30 bcm plus Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 5 bcm each – came online in December, 2009. As announced in November, 2011, the infrastructure will be upgraded to achieve the 65 bcm capacity, meaning that the volume of gas sales from Turkmenistan to China is to top the pre-crisis level of the Turkmen gas export to Russia which measured around 40bcm. No doubt, Ashgabat's international economic priorities will drift accordingly. 

A series of bilateral deals penned by China at the SCO forum were indicative of how strong Beijing feels about making inroads into Central Asia. An array of cooperation agreements – a  strategic partnership declaration, a deal on economic and technological cooperation, and a memorandum on creating a common industrial park – were signed with Tashkent. China's new agreements with Tajikistan were a lot more specific in comparison, the key projects being to put together a $600m cement plant in the Shahrtuz District of the Khatlon Province by the Tajik Aluminium Company and China's national construction materials company and to build a new co-generation plant in Dushanbe. The weight of the package endorsed during the visit of Tajik president E. Rahmon to Beijin – a total of 10 significant deals – reached $1b. 

It appears that China's economic interests in Central Asia increasingly gravitate towards transit infrastructures. Since the Soviet era, the region's transit routes traditionally have  pointed north, but the trend is changing. The number one transit project implemented with Beijing's help is the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad, the route China counts on as its future link to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East via Turkmenistan and Iran. Talks over the plan opened back in the 1990ies, but the project is just starting to take off the ground. The construction of the railroad was discussed when Kyrgyz president A. Atambayev was in Beijing this month and sources in Kyrgyzstan claim that the corresponding contract is in the making. Notably, Bishkek managed to convince Beijing to stick to the post-Soviet republics' track gauge (1520 mm) and to switch the negotiating agenda to its own proposals for the financial arrangements pertinent to the construction, the idea being either to form a concession or to launch a Chinese-Kyrgys company charged with the mission of independently attracting investments. Importantly, Uzbek president I. Karimov subscribed to the railroad project at the SCO summit. 

While in Beijing, president Atambayev also got a loan from China to construct the Datka-Kemin transmission line which should enable Kyrgyzstan to bypass Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in feeding electric power from south to north. Supposedly, the new line will be connected to Kazakhstan's generating capacities and used to supply power to Xinjiang. China is further expected to back the construction of the Kara-Balta refinery in Kyrgyzstan intended to run on oil from Kazakhstan and capable of outputting up to 800,000 light fuel annually. 

The Kyrgyz media stress that while the republic's economic ties with China are widening, its cooperation with Russia – the construction of a cascade of the  Naryn hydropower plant and of the  Kambarata hydropower plant, along with Gazprom's multiple projects which the Russian energy giant hoped would boost its share of Kyrgyzstan's energy market – visibly stagnates. The plans for massive Russian investments in Central Asian  hydro-power came into being in 2000ies but are currently on hold, in part due to Moscow's worries that its relations with downstream republics – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – might be put in jeopardy, in part – as a result of the problems Moscow is experiencing with Dushanbe and Bishkek. It is also true that a question mark hangs over the economic aspects of the initiatives. 

It does have to be taken into account that in the long run  China's unbalanced influence may become a problem for the Central Asian republics, the Kyrgyz and Tajic economies already being heavily dependent on China. Kyrgyzstan momentarily turned into a regional marketing hub for Chinese products upon joining the WTO, the business being a crucial source of income for much of the republic's population and a major obstacle on its way to the customs union instituted by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Tajikistan's reliance on China has reached a critical level as 40% of its sovereign debt of $2.1b (33.4 of the national GDP) are the money owed to the Export-Import Bank of China. With the recent deals coming through, the share of Beijing in Tajikistan's indebtedness is going to rise to 70%.

Oshmayor M. Myrzakmatov reacted negatively to the plan. He told Russia's Kommersant daily that “the deployment of the OSCE police forces in South Kyrgyzstan would be tantamount to replaying the Kosovo scenario in the Fergana Valley”, obviously meaning that in the Kosovo case a piece of the sovereign country had been torn out of it by force.Myrzakmatov said the majority of the population in Osh did not welcome foreign presence in the region and the city council rejected the idea. “We believe they are guilty of the Kosovo tragedy. We will not allow to do in the Fergana Valey what had been done in Kosovo and regard them as strangers”, said Myrzakmatov [2].

It is natural that political leaders outside of the Balkan region increasingly invoke the Kosovo case. The unilateral proclamation of independence by the province in 2008, its snap recognition by the West, and the unconvincing advisory opinion on the case issued by the International Court of Justice altogether created an atmosphere of total arbitrariness and double standards. For the first time in the post-World War II Europe a large faction of the international community greenlighted the cessation of a province of a UN-member country without its consent. At the time of the proclamation of independence, Kosovo in fact had no federative status and was run by a special mission instituted by the UN, while UN resolutions explicitly banned such unilateral steps. As a result, nationalist, separatist, or basically any other groups in any of the world's conflict zones currently can cite the Kosovo case as an argument in favor of their agendas. The Fergana Valley – a region with a history of ferocious conflicts – happens to be a potential site where a scenario similar to the Kosovo case can easily materialize. It is no coincidence that the recent events in Kyrgyzstan can to an extent be traced back to the drug mafia – the fact likely reflects attempts to build the Central Asian republic into the trans-Eurasian drug trafficking route in which the pseudo-independent Kosovo plays the role of a key link. 

The developments in Kyrgyzstan highlighted an important aspect of the activity of the OSCE and other international organizations in crisis zones: the explanation behind the inefficiency of the organizations is not their inaptness but their intention to deliberately provoke and escalate conflicts. In 1998, OSCE deployed a verification mission of 1,400 international representatives and 1,500 locals in Kosovo. In part, the mission succeeded in separating the warring sides and stabilizing the situation in the province, and for a period of time there was an impression that a political deal between Belgrade and Pristina loomed on the horizon. Obviously, this was not what mission chief, US diplomat W. Walker and the forces backing him wanted. The forces had surfaced during covert operations in Latin America in the 1980ies, and W. Walker happens to be a familiar figure in Bolivia, Brazil, Salvador (where he served as the US ambassador in 1988-1992), Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Panama, and Argentine. He made full use of his expertise in subversion in Kosovo – it was W. Walker who floated the myth about the Račak massacre in January, 1999. The actual circumstances of the drama remain obscure and the likeliest conclusion stemming from available evidence is that Albanian separatists and their Western curators dressed the corpses of killed Albanian guerrillas in civilian clothes to present them as victims of ethnic cleansing. W. Walker had serious reasons to force all independent experts and journalists to leave Račak – after that he confidently charged Belgrade with war crimes. The rest of the story – strikes on Yugoslavia and the separation of Kosovo by force – is well-known. Labor Member of the Parliament Alice Mahon amassed a bulk of documents exposing W. Walker's involvement in the scandal sparked by the supply of arms to Contras in Nicaragua and in the organization of the propaganda campaign which accompanied the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Interestingly, in November, 2008 Albanian president Bamir Topi granted to W. Walker the title of an honorary citizen of Albania, an on January 15, 2009 – on the second anniversary of the Račak incident – W. Walker was awarded the freedom medal by the president and the premier of the self-proclaimed Kosovo. The Albanian regalia do seem to weigh on the reputation of an official of an organization touting its neutrality and unbiased approach.

No doubt, quite a few people in the OSCE feel bad about the above forms of “crisis response” and settlement of interetnic conflicts, but the organization's Balkan tenure, markedly pro-Georgian position in the Caucasus, and the practice of interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries under the pretext of monitoring elections make the OSCE interest in the situation in Kyrgyzstan look suspicious. There is a high probability that  new W. Walkers are going to land in the Central Asian republic as members of the police mission and the international investigative commission.

________________________________________

[1] http://www.24.kg/community/81103-kimmo-kilyunen-mezhdunarodnoe-rassledovanie.html

[2] Kommersant, 19.08.2010.

[3] http://www.president.al/shqip/foto.asp?id=6331

____________________

Petr Iskenderov is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and an international commentator at Vremya Novstey and the Voice of Russia.