Without doubt, Washington feels emboldened to move up the human rights issue from the backburner now that the US is no longer beholden to the “Stans” to provide the Northern Distribution Network for supplying the American and NATO troops in Afghanistan.

All the same, Washington’s focus on the human rights issue at the present juncture is intriguing when the regional security is in great flux and Central Asia is gearing up to face the spill over from Afghanistan. The Tajik President Imomali Rahmon warned only last week that the “Stans” are facing their biggest ever security challenge since they emerged as independent states.

Unsurprisingly, the Kyrgyz government lost no time to condemn the US state department’s move as “creating a threat to civil peace and stability in society”. Furthermore, Bishkek signaled that it might be compelled to renounce the 1993 bilateral treaty between Kyrgyzstan and the US (which grants diplomatic immunity to all American aid workers deployed in Kyrgyzstan.)

Washington promptly warned that any move to abrogate the 1993 treaty could threaten the US-funded aid programs in Kyrgyzstan. An impression becomes unavoidable that Washington and Bishkek are acting and reacting according to some script.

From what one can make out, the Kyrgyz authorities probably suspect that the US aid workers are involved in some sort of covert activities and want them to leave and Washington would have got wind of it in advance.

Curiously, on July 16, Kyrgyz security forces killed six alleged Islamic State [IS] terrorists and detained five others in two shootouts in the capital city of Bishkek. Four Kyrgyz security personnel were wounded in the encounter, which lasted for over an hour. The Kyrgyz authorities have since said in a statement that the terrorists were planning to attack the Russian military base in Kant.

The Bishkek bazaar is full of rumors that the IS has made its appearance in the steppes as the geopolitical tool of the US in the great game in Central Asia.

But then, why would Kyrgyzstan become eligible as a “frontline state” in the great game in Central Asia? One reason could be that the country genuinely qualifies to be a battleground for influence for the big powers. Kyrgyzstan was once in the US orbit (following the “Tulip revolution” and the regime change in 2005), and although it is now regarded as an ally of Russia and has joined the Eurasia Economic Union [EEU], there are still enduring pockets of US influence in that country among the so-called “civil society” and the NGOs, which makes it also the weakest link within the EEU (and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.)

Of course, Kyrgyzstan’s geography is highly strategic. It extends into the Ferghana Valley, which is a hotbed of radical Islamist ideology, and it also shares a border with China’s Xinjiang province. In fact, there is a sizeable Uighur diaspora living in Kyrgyzstan.

To be sure, the loss of influence in Central Asia in the recent decade has prompted Washington to reset the compass of US diplomacy towards the region. In Central Asia, there is no crowbar more lethal than the human rights issue to put pressure on the authoritarian regimes in the region.

The human rights issue has popular resonance, and by championing it, the US can project itself to be on “the right side of history – unlike Russia or China.

The first signs of this tactical shift in the US’ Central Asia diplomacy became available in a speech made by Robert Berschinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the US State Department. Speaking at the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in Washington a month ago in a testimony titled as “Civil and Political Rights in Uzbekistan and Central Asia”, Berschinski gave a gloomy picture of the human rights record of the Central Asian regimes, going to the extraordinary extent of casting doubt on the legitimacy of the re-election recently of the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Nurusultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov.

Berschinski brought in a compelling argument that the human rights situation in Central Asia impacts international security insofar as the absence of religious freedom and a democratic opposition actually engender the rise of extremist groups in the region.

Berschinski later fleshed out this idea in another speech titled “The Role of Youth, Women, Religious Groups, and Civil Society in Preventing Violent Extremism”, which he delivered at the Central Asia and South Asia Regional Conference on Countering Violent Extremism at Astana, Kazakhstan, on June 30, just a fortnight before the announcement of the State Department’s 2014 Human Rights Defender Award.

M.K. BHADRAKUMAR, atimes.com

The anonymous sources don’t make precise which state is going to host the drones, but the specifications make Tajikistan and the southern part of Uzbekistan potential home bases. Based there the vehicles will be located near the targets, the primary unmanned aircraft MQ-1 Predator’s range is 675 mi or 1,100 km. According to US experts, in January Maj. Gen. Michael K. Nagata, commander of U.S. special operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, visited Tajikistan, which abuts Afghanistan's northern border, for talks on «issues of bilateral security cooperation» and «continued military cooperation», according to a US embassy’s statement in Dushanbe, the capital. Analysts believe there is a small chance Tajikistan will agree to allow US presence because it will risk deterioration of relations with its ally – Russia, which is providing large-scale aid aimed at modernization of Tajik Armed Forces.

Washington may have more success with Uzbekistan. Before leaving Khanabad, the US had used the base for drone operations. Today Uzbekistan is the main US ally in the region. Upon withdrawal from Afghanistan the US plans to leave part of its weapons and equipment in this country. In February 2013 US State Department said the US planned to supply Uzbekistan with unmanned aerial vehicles.

Since 2007-2008 the Pentagon started to get MQ-9 Reapers into its inventory. In comparison with Predator, the drone has a more powerful turbo-prop power plant, can carry a variety of weaponry to give it strike capability comparable to that of an Apache helicopter gunship, the extended range is up to 3700 km. It can strike targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan from Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan).

Officially Turkmenistan opposes any plans to use its territory for foreign bases, but it can strike a deal with Washington informally (for instance, it opened its airspace for US Air Force in 2003). Iran, the Ashgabat’s main economic partner, will strongly object. In December 2011 Iranians got hold of US secret stealth drone RQ-170 Sentinel. It was revealed then that Washington actively used unmanned vehicles for gathering intelligence on Iran. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have recently ratified the December 20, 2011 protocol of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which makes it impossible for any individual country in the group to host a foreign military base on its territory without the full consent of all other members of the organization.

It makes Uzbekistan the most likely candidate no matter some mutual distrust remains after the events in Andijan, when public unrest was quelled. The agreement with the United States would negatively affect the Uzbekistan’s international image against the background of growing protests around the world against the use of drones without any legal limitations. According to UK Bureau of Investigative Journalism, only in the period of 2004-2012 at least 880 civilians, including children, were killed in Pakistan as a result of drone strikes. Growing numbers of drones’ victims made the United Nations launch an investigation in 2013.

Drones deployment will inevitably exacerbate the relations with Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan, as well as with neighboring states of Central Asia. For instance, it can make tenser the relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which already express concern over the Uzbekistan’s air superiority and apply efforts to enhance their air defense capability with the help of Russia. Kazakhstan is also concerned; an unidentified drone coming from Uzbekistan violated its air space and flew over two border posts in the vicinity of Beineu.

The US drones will operations will be strictly classified being conducted by the CIA. There will be no national or international control whatsoever.

It’s the CIA, not the Pentagon, who is responsible for drones operations in Pakistan. Islamabad would not give permission for military operations conducted by the Defense Department which require the approval of its government. The drone operations could encompass other states of Central Asia without their governments’ consent. Drones are normally used for intelligence gathering, radiation monitoring and delivering strikes against ground targets, including political leaders fallen out of Washington’s favor or hired killings.

Deploying drones will require extensive infrastructure, including personnel for maintaining aerial vehicles and installment of sophisticated equipment for different missions. It’ll be difficult enough to make precise what the equipment is destined for. Drone operations require personnel on the ground for guidance and the availability of piloted aircraft to provide support in emergencies.

In future the site could expand to become a full-fledged Air Force base. The US is studying the possibility of using drones for transporting troops, getting assault units to the places of destination and refueling in air. New types of unmanned combat air vehicles are in works to use them against air targets. Avenger is a prototype going through testing.

Totally, the number of drones in the US Air Force inventory has grown from 167 in 2002 to 7, 1 thousand in 2012. The expenditure has grown from 284 million dollars in 2000 to 6, 6 billion in 2013. According to Teal Group, the US will spend 11, 4 billion dollars (or 62 percent of global expenditure for the purpose) on unmanned aerial vehicles in 2022.

The implementation of United States plans to deploy drones in Central Asia will expand the US military presence in the region and create conditions for conducting secret operations using unmanned aerial vehicles while negatively affecting the regional balance of forces.

Washington does not exclude that the repetition of Syria scenario caused by NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan may result in strategic advantage to meet its interests. Controlled chaos is a tried and true method. A would-be war in Afghanistan will enable the Americans to control the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, maintain instability in the vicinity of Iranian borders and exacerbate the relations between India and Pakistan. Finally, the United States will maintain a springboard to exert pressure on Central Asia. Since 2014 Afghanistan is to become a major security problem for Russia… 

Along with the allies – the members Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Russia is urgently planning emergency measures that actually should have been taken long before. By the end of September a CSTO summit was held in Sochi ahead of the schedule with Russia becoming the chairman of the organization before time as well. The leaders of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan talked shop with regard to planned practical steps aimed at tackling the major aspects of the security problem. Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war). 

On October 1 the lower chamber of Tajikistan ratified an agreement on the status of the Russian 201st military base. Signed on October 5, 2012 at top level, the Russian military base agreement is to be in force till 2042. Together with the Tajik forces the base will guarantee the security of Tajikistan. Russia has started to deliver a $200 million military aid package to the country. Air force equipment and other war material will be transferred to Tajik armed forces gratuitously. 

According to experts, there are urgent steps to be taken, for instance, the deployment of Russian border guards along the almost 1500 km long Afghan-Tajik border guarded by only 16 thousand Tajik servicemen. No way could the Tajik authorities tackle the problem of refugees and armed gangs alone. Eight years ago Russian border guards left the area leaving behind only a few dozen strong operational group. Since then the situation has turned for the worse. New hot beds appear along the Tajik border, the extremists gain influence, the number of training camps for militants coming from the Collective Security Treaty Organization member-states has grown. 

Addressing the Sochi Collective Security Treaty Organization summit the President of Tajikistan Emomalii Rahmon called for combined efforts to strengthen the Afghan border. Many Russian politicians and military support the idea of getting Russian border guards back to Tajikistan. Still Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, actually opposed the idea. According to him, Tajikistan needs assistance to enhance the professional level of national border forces, including mountain warfare and new equipment deliveries. 

The US-Afghanistan partnership agreement, which is in works now, is expected to leave nine United States military facilities behind maintaining the capability for emergency response and coming to aid the government forces in case the situation gets abruptly worse. The remaining military forces are to stay in Kabul, Mazari Sharif, Jalalabad, Gardez, the Bagram air base and in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Herat. The list is missing the northern city of Kunduz, the capital of Kunduz Province, situated at the Tajik border, no matter it was the first major populated area where security responsibility was transferred to Afghan forces. Some time ago the security transfer ceremony was held with the participation of German defence and foreign chiefs. Kunduz has an important place in the history of German armed forces. During ten years around 20 thousand Bundeswehr servicemen have seen service there. Nowhere else since the days of WWII has the German military suffered comparable death toll than in Kunduz. 

Russian and Kyrgyz parliaments have ratified a status agreement on Russian air-base in Kant. Russian military will stay there for at least 20 years. Russia is going to upgrade the facility transforming it into a real outpost of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Central Asia, the presence to count with. Today the base is home to Su-24 fighter bombers, SU-25 attack planes, SU-27 SM air superiority fighters and an air group of rotary wing aircraft. Air and ground forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan kicked off military exercises the very next day the summit was over on September 24. 

Facing the expected threats from terrorist and extremist activities to intensify in Afghanistan, it is expedient to remember the events of the Uzbekistan’s Fergana valley where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU) conducted subversive activities from the territory of Kyrgyzstan. It should be admitted that Kyrgyz authorities face growing difficulties while exercising control over the south-western part of the country predominantly populated by Uzbeks. Militants are still recruited among local population to fill the IDU ranks. The Afghan drug flows get to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from Tajikistan and mainly from Kyrgyzstan. 

Kazakhstan stands for strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border and boosting military presence in Kyrgyzstan, the government believes the measures taken are vitally important for the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Of course, Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, is situated far from Afghanistan, still there is concern over the possibility of destabilization affecting Central Asia. Kazakhstan supports assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan because it meets its own national security interests. It also stands for collective defense of Central Asian air space, enhancement of Collective Forces capabilities, spurring the fight against drug trafficking. There have been no bloody conflicts on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan while Uzbekistan, which left the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s membership some time ago, has become the prime target for terrorists. The country is a party to a strategic partnership agreement with Astana. But Kazakhstan is a CSTO member, while Uzbekistan applies efforts to boost the relationship with the United States. 

Some time ago the relationship between Uzbekistan and the United States appeared to be worsened for good. The White House condemned the government for quelling the Andijan protests in 2005. The final break up seemed to be inevitable. Now Washington has restored the relationship with Islam Karimov considering an option of leaving on Uzbekistan soil some forces withdrawn from Afghanistan. Much talked about democratic values, human rights and the persecution of dissent in Uzbekistan pale in importance before the Washington’s desire to preserve military presence in Central Asia. 

It’s Uzbekistan the Unites States relies on to maintain a springboard for exerting influence of Afghanistan and stymie the process of Russia and Central Asia integration. In any event Tashkent is to be compensated by US guarantees and Western arms supplies as a reward for keeping away from the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan is under West European and US arms supplies embargo, but it does not confuse its leadership. The Uzbek government has approached NATO with a request to bring in the equipment and weapons used in Afghanistan and leave it in the country. Tashkent hopes the United States will support its desire to enjoy a privileged position in the northern part of Afghanistan where the ethnic Uzbeks are a majority. Uzbekistan has experience of being a «key ally» of the United States in Central Asia; it’s hard to predict how long the friendship will last this time, the same way it is hard to predict if the United States would leave Afghanistan without leaving some presence behind. 

The insinuations about NATO pulling out before the «combat season» in the spring of 2014 is a probe to see the outside reaction, including the response of Russia. The Russian Federation preferred not to wait till the ISAF withdraws; the probing raids from the territory of Afghanistan could be expected in the upcoming months. For instance, Kenya, where militants perpetrated a blood slaughter, is not an isolated incident, it’s a tendency. The United States military intervention under the pretext of «fight against international terrorism» has not resulted in peace; Afghanistan today is one of the most vulnerable states in the world. Over and over again we reap the fruits of US military domination. Under the circumstances, Russia has to take on a global mission and use the southern approaches to counter the US-sponsored scenario which envisions the «transition of the Middle East from the axis of instability to the axis of freedom». 

The SCO foreign ministers concluded a meeting on July 13 pledging to expand cooperation under the regional framework. They lauded Kyrgyzstan's preparations for the upcoming SCO summit in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The final statement said the SCO members «hold the same or similar positions on major global and regional issues, which is conducive to the development of their partnership». The foreign policy chiefs pledged concerted efforts to fight terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as transnational crime, drug-trafficking, illegal arms trade and other subversive activities. Other areas for increased cooperation also include trade, investment, finance, transportation, communications, agriculture and innovation, science, technology, culture, health, tourism and disaster relief.

The meeting’s international agenda encompassed the situation in West Asia and North Africa. The participants reaffirmed their support for using universally recognized international norms as the basis to achieve regional stability.. According to Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) press-release «The substantial exchange of opinions on topical international and regional problems confirmed the matching or the proximity of foreign policy approaches of SCO member states, in particular, to the state of affairs in Afghanistan, Syria, in the Middle East, the situation around the Nuclear Program of Iran. The SCO advocates for building of an independent, neutral, peaceful state in Afghanistan and supports the coordinator’s role of the UN in international efforts on Afghan peace process and provision of assistance of Afghans in restoring their country». (1)

As Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, reported at a press briefing, SCO member-states Ministries of Foreign Affairs together with officials of the Secretariat and Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) discussed the summit's agenda and a set of documents expected to be signed. One of them is a draft action program for 2013-2017 to implement the provisions of the Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. There will be one more important document submitted for approval – the Bishkek Declaration, which makes precise six key principles constituting a common basis for tackling international problems.

The SCO also contemplates expanding membership when the summit comes. The ministers agreed to continue working on the procedures for interested parties to join the SCO and become full-fledged SCO members. Adding India, Iran and Pakistan as full-fledged members will greatly increase the group’s international clout. Currently there are six members: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, four nations which have the status of observers: India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Iran and Afghanistan, and three dialogue partners including Sri Lanka, Belarus and Turkey. The heads of delegations instructed to continue work on the draft of the Procedure (the Rules) on Provision of the Status of the SCO Member State and the new version of the Model Memorandum on Obligations of Applicant State for Obtaining of SCO Member State Status. 

The heads of delegations pointed out that the stability in the region depends on the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in 2014. As experts say, the most troublesome scenario envisions the rapid mobilization of radical groups in the northern part of the country. A rising number of ethnic insurgent groups of Central Asian and North Caucasian origin are currently gathering in the Afghan part of Badakhshan, a geographical region divided between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In case their activities continue to intensify, the Central Asian states and Russia may face a direct threat of growing extremism not only in Afghanistan, but also at home. According to the UN 2012 Drug Report, Afghanistan accounts for over 60% of global opium poppy cultivation and remains the leading producer of opium in the world. A constant rise of the drug production since 2001 is currently acquiring new geographical dimension. The SCO wants Afghanistan to be an independent and thriving state free of terrorism and drug-related crime.

While dealing with Afghanistan, the expanded SCO will have much more weight while addressing the issue. The would-be members have stakes in this country. Pakistan and Iran share borders with Afghanistan. India has emerged as one of the most important assistance providers. A joint concerted regional effort for the Afghan settlement will certainly benefit all these states. Their SCO entry promotes a more comprehensive strategy to address the issue. It will also allow them to address the existing bilateral differences within the broader framework of the organization. 

The participants confirmed the intent to further strengthen cooperation in international and regional affairs with the UN and other international and regional bodies. 

SCO: organization with teeth

Just a month before the foreign policy chiefs meeting, the SCO Council of Defense Ministers got together and pledged to enhance coordination in maintaining regional peace and fighting terrorism and organized crime during a meeting on June 26 in Bishkek. The top military leaders exchanged views over major international and regional security issues. They agreed to boost effectiveness in crushing separatism, extremism, drug-trafficking and terrorist activities. To enhance the capabilities, the SCO members agreed to establish a special center which could work in close contact with the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS). The goal is to make the organization a viable tool for fending off regional security threats. The defense ministers also approved a cooperation plan for the SCO defense ministries between the year 2014 and 2015, and talked over preparations for a joint military exercise next year in China. 

It’s not about meetings, plans and discussions only. The SCO is becoming an organization with teeth. This summer Russia and China hold joint military exercises. The first, Naval Interaction 2013, was held in the Sea of Japan between July 5 and 12, and the other, Peace Mission 2013, is about to start in the Russia’s Urals region July 27 through August 15. The training events are arranged to hone interoperability. The Peace Mission 2013 drill will involve 600 personnel from each country. Russia and China have held several joint military exercises since 2005 under the framework of SCO.

The tenth joint counter terrorism SCO drill was held in Kazakhstan by member countries this June. According to the scenario, terrorists invaded Kazakhstan using helicopters and vehicles, hijacked hostages in a bordering village and attempted to stage terrorist acts. The mission for SCO joint ground and aerial components was to eliminate the invasion force and rescue hostages. 

Analysts say the SCO has achieved tangible results enhancing combat interaction. Although joint exercises have made progress in terms of scale, complexity and effectiveness, it does not mean that the SCO will turn into a military alliance. It is emphasized that the drills are never directed at any third party in particular.

SCO: Russian dimension

On May 8 President Vladimir Putin said Russia must beef up its defenses in the south and work with Central Asian allies to protect itself and neighbors against the threat of extremist violence emerging from Afghanistan. (2) The President told a meeting of his Security Council that «We need to strengthen the security system in the strategic southern area, including its military component». Russia, he said, must work with fellow members of regional security alliances, including the SCO. «There is every reason to believe that in the near future we may face a worsening of the situation. International terrorist and radical groups do not hide their plans to export instability»,said Putin. The head of state went further saying «international forces have done practically nothing to root out drug production in Afghanistan» and ignored Russian proposals to eradicate crops of poppies used to make heroin. Putin said Russia, which is separated geographically from Afghanistan by the ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, should step up migration controls on its southern border and «exponentially increase the effectiveness of work to stem drug trafficking». Putin said the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be involved in efforts to improve security.

* * *

With NATO gone from Afghanistan, the Taliban exercising control over large portions of the country against the backdrop of raging civil war is quite a probable scenario. The US has actually lost the war and failed to gain peace, so it is holding talks with Taliban on what some call «surrender terms». No matter unimaginably high military expenditure, the US fails to win, no matter what military adventure it gets involved in. Iraq and Afghanistan are the examples to corroborate the fact. But Afghanistan just cannot be left alone. The SCO has an important role to play here by gradually involving the war-torn country into the international cooperation process. No matter NATO rejects the very idea of dealing with the SCO, the time is ripe for the countries involved to get united and address the regional security agenda, there is not much time left till 2014. The SCO is doing the right thing by standing up to the challenge. No wasting time, it takes the bull by the horns. The forthcoming summit in Bishkek in September 2013 will be an occurrence of great importance taking decisions of not only regional, but rather global dimension, the events mentioned in the piece show the organization is working hard to stand up to the task for the benefit of all. 

Endnotes: 

The persisting speculations regarding political succession in Uzbekistan, the incipient trends of unrest in Azerbaijan in recent months as the country lurches toward a crucial presidential election, growing volatility of the situation in Afghanistan – what surges to the mind is the great Middle Eastern upheaval known as the «Arab Spring.» Are we nearing a «tipping point» in Central Asia? 

The «Arab Spring» has already become a loaded expression laden with heavy political overtones. Although it is still in its early stages, in the two years since it appeared on the political landscape of the Middle East, it has ceased to be a regional movement. Different patterns of regime change have appeared. The indigenous content is also evaporating fast while external content is being injected to give new dynamics and direction to it. The «Arab Spring» is at times perilously close to being discredited as a geopolitical stunt. 

It had a peaceful run – and probably untethered run – in Tunisia two years ago. It became quite a bit rowdyish and muscular by the time it appeared in Egypt and it wasn’t an entirely «Egyptian» spring, either. Some called it a «revolution’ although the jury is still out an year later. On the other hand, Libya was a contrived regime change forced through brutal western military intervention, where the spontaneity that was associated with «Arab Spring» was almost entirely lacking. Again, Syria closely follows the Libyan model with some added features. 

Could the Arab Spring appear in the Central Asian region? There are indeed similarities between the two regions but, equally, there are striking differences too. The human rights organizations and western governments have been critical of the Central Asian regimes, much as they tick off occasionally their Middle Eastern allies for their nasty habits of running authoritarian oligarchic regimes. The rebuke is comparatively uncharitable when it comes to Central Asia, considering that these are new states whereas authoritarianism has an established history in the Middle East. Again, comparisons can be drawn between the two regions with regard to the socio-economic challenges they face – poverty and inequality, corruption and nepotism, unemployment or scant opportunities for the youth, a lack of freedom of the media, authoritarianism, rigged elections and lack of democratic opposition, and so on. Thus, scholars and experts of the region became inquisitive through the past two-year period whether the uprisings in the Middle East would spread to the Central Asian region. 

However, the ground reality is that there have been no major signs of popular discontent in the Central Asian region during these two years since the Arab Spring appeared. The pundits seem to have reached a wary assessment that the historical circumstances and prevailing conditions in Central Asia and the Middle East could be significantly different and the possibility of revolutionary stirrings appearing in the steppes is very remote. Overall, the prevailing opinion of scholars can be summarized in three or four segments. First, most experts agree that it is unlikely that events similar to the Arab Spring would take place in Central Asia. However, they also add the caveat that nonetheless conditions do exist which could create potential for unrest such as poverty, unemployment, corruption, and authoritarian rule. 

Again, there is a point of view – howsoever contentious it might seem in the light of the fall of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak – that the Central Asian regimes have drawn lessons from the events in the Middle East and have prepared counterstrategies to deal with any protests that may erupt. Put differently, the regimes in the region have put in place the instruments of repression that would swing into violent, coercive action if popular protests erupted. Finally, there is a somewhat optimistic view that the «big powers» are just not interested in promoting unrest in the Central Asian region and are instead focusing on the pursuit of compelling economic interests such as energy, which outweigh human rights concerns.

In the light of the above, it is tempting to conclude that the Central Asian regimes have successfully thwarted the advent of a spring season in their midst. It almost seems that when we compare the Middle East and Central Asia, it becomes a comparison between the apple and an orange. Indeed, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in April last year in a speech at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University in Bishkek that there is no scope «to view the Central Asian region through the prism of [the Arab Spring]». 

The Tahrir Square in Cairo was witnessing the revolution even as Lavrov spoke and it seemed he aimed his words at the West, and, interestingly, he was speaking while on a visit to Bishkek. Lavrov made it clear that Russia would take a dim view of Middle-East style upheavals appearing in the post-Soviet space. He strongly hinted that the Arab Spring was not spontaneous. 

He said: "We very much do not want the Arab Spring events, in which less and less attention is being paid to the rule of international law and the tune is more and more being called by unilateral geopolitical interests, to become a tradition and especially do not want anyone to view the Central Asian region through the prism of these processes." 

Learning the bitter lesson

Lavrov spoke as an experienced statesman. But his remarks are also of analytical relevance. So, let us proceed to examine the empirical reasons why the Arab Spring has not spread to Central Asia. First, the undeniable ground reality is that the Central Asian region has made significant recovery from the chaos of the disbandment of the former Soviet Union unilaterally by Boris Yeltsin. Any outsider who traversed the region would know the colossal disruption of the material supply system and the resultant economic dislocation whereby overnight renowned professors steeped in the fields of scholarship had to step out to eke out living as gate keepers, or geologists turned into gardeners, or doctors switched profession to become taxi drivers. No doubt, compared to that dark period, many people in Central Asia today are better off than they were in the past, and the general standard of living is going up, and, most important, there is even hope that the future could be promising. 

Second, it could also be argued that the Central Asians’ apparent apathy is rooted in the Soviet past. The plain truth is that the more things seemed to change in the Central Asian states, the more they remained the same. Alas, the Central Asian societies – unlike Russia which could make the painful democratic transition – played virtually no role in the formative period in the early 1990s in shaping their future. Rather, their future was decided on their behalf by elements who did not represent them, never bothered to consult them and in whom, in turn, they could never think of reposing trust. Put differently, the transition process itself was simply appropriated by Soviet Central Asia’s political elites, who of course had at their command the powerful intelligence and security apparatus and a command economy that exercised total control over the management of resources. Thus, the essence of their past 20-year history turns out to be that the Central Asian societies simply resigned themselves to their current conditions, bereft of any real choices in the matter. 

Again, apart from the Soviet heritage, the Central Asian countries lack a genuinely free media culture – except, perhaps, in Kyrgyzstan to an extent – or any strong opposition movements. Ironically, Russian media provided their window to the outside world but then, it also was disinterested to play the role of a catalyst of change. Indeed, the media remains controlled in most countries of Central Asia. Social media sites, opposition Web sites, and foreign news outlets have been specially targeted and free Internet access is unavailable. The World Press Freedom Index currently ranks Turkmenistan 177, and Uzbekistan 164 out of 179 countries. To be sure, even the most authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes fare better in comparison. This becomes important, ironically, because the social networks, Internet and television did play a major role in stoking the fires of protest in Egypt. 

Yet another factor is that the international criticism of Central Asian governments has probably diminished in the most recent years. The United States and other western countries have strategic and economic interests in the region and their main priority is that the region remains stable and secure so that cooperation is not impeded. Besides, the searing experience of imposing an embargo on Uzbekistan in 2005 following the Andizhan uprising and the subsequent unceremonious backtracking a few years down the road have taught the western countries the bitter lesson that it does not pay to preach human rights to the Central Asian region and such intrusive approaches could even be counter-productive. 

Above all, the war in Afghanistan necessitated the creation of a Northern Distribution Network as an alternative to the two transit routes via Pakistan for moving supplies in and out of Afghanistan. The deterioration of the US-Pakistan strategic partnership and an year-long closure of the two transit routes via Pakistani territory for the ferrying of supplies for the American troops deployed in Afghanistan compelled the Pentagon to depend heavily on the Central Asian region as an alternative access route. 

Arguably, everything else became of secondary importance in the US’ geo-strategies toward the region to the all-important needs of the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the wheel has come full circle and Uzbekistan, which evicted the US military from the K2 [Karshi-Khanabad] air base as recently as in July 2005, happens to be Washington’s closest partner country today in the Central Asian region – although much ambivalence shrouds that complex and unpredictable relationship. 

(To be continued)

In essence, the US plan codenamed The Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI) amounts to forming, with the funding from Washington and under its oversight, special drug enforcement units with extensive powers including access to the operational materials and databases of the police and security agencies of the host republics. All of the five Central Asian republics were invited to join the program which also had to be endorsed by the US, Russia and Afghanistan. Support for CACI was supposed to be expressed in Vienna on 16 February at the Third Ministerial Conference of the Paris Pact Partners on Combating Illicit Traffic in Opiates Originating in Afghanistan in the form of a collective resolution, but passing it proved impossible due to the resistance mounted by Russia. 

Serious suspicions arise in connection with Washington's bid to tap, in the framework of the program, into the bulk of classified data maintained by the law-enforcement agencies of the host republics, as the information can easily be invoked to exert pressure on Central Asian administrations. Moscow cited the argument to convince its Collective Security Treaty Organization partners – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – to refrain from signing the statement drafted by the US. 

The US agenda behind the initiative is to gain stronger political and military positions in Central Asia, while Washington actually lacks the resolve to take practical steps towards suppressing Afghan drug production and trafficking. The US tendency to cultivate relations with Central Asian republics on a bilateral basis and to route around Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization is seen in Moscow as evidence of the above, and the explanations like the one offered by US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs William R. Brownfield – that the US is neither a member of the group nor even an observer in it – indeed sound unconvincing as it remains unclear why the circumstance should hinder multilateral cooperation in countering the drug threat. 

Drug production in Afghanistan has reached ominous proportions and is known to be swelling. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the country's narcotics output rose by 61% in 2011 compared to 2010 – from 3,600 to 5,800 tons. Notably, over the time the area used for drug cropping expanded only by 7% and most of the output increase is attributable to bumper harvest across the drug plantations. A circumstance not to be overlooked in the context is that the opium prices are rising continuously and added 133% in 2011, meaning that demand for drugs is currently outpacing supply. In 2010, opium price growth was driven by supply contraction as a fairly mysterious fungal decease wiped out a large part of opium poppy crops. Drug production did start to climb in 2011 in the regions where the epidemic had taken place, even in Kapisa, Baghlan, Faryab provinces formerly reported to have completely dropped out of the game. 

Overall, drug production has become the key sector of the Afghan economy over the period of the US occupation, and the fact by all means merits deeper analysis. The UN currently estimates the 2011 revenues of Afghan poppy farmers to top $1.4b, which is equivalent to 9% of Afghanistan's GDP. 

Deploying US special forces in Central Asian republics is a recurrent theme on Washington's foreign policy agenda. In 2009, for example, the US declared dispatching to all the five of them commando units charged with the mission of keeping secure NATO's Northern Supply Route To Afghanistan. The White House went public with a plan to construct security infrastructures in Central Asia in August, 2010. Specifically, US Central Command's counter-narcotics fund intended to pour over $40m into building training compounds in Kyrgyzstan's Osh and Tajikistan's Karatog plus a canine training facility and helicopter hangar near Almaty in Kazakhstan, and into an upgrade of a number of border-crossing checkpoints in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In the majority of cases, the installations are strategically located – for instance, a facelift awaited Turkmenistan's Sarahs checkpoint sited on the Turkmen-Iranian border and Kyrgyzstan's checkpoint in the proximity of Batkent, a position key to the Fergana Valley. 

The US interest in Kyrgyzstan drew ample media coverage. Talk began years ago that a US military base was about to pop up in the southern part of the republic which is traversed by a major drug-trafficking route. The June, 2010 outbreak of ferocious inter-ethnic fighting in the Osh and Jalalabat provinces of Kyrgyzstan is oftentimes blamed on the drug mafia. Ousted Kyrgyz president K. Bakiyev, by the way, was markedly unenthusiastic about admitting to the republic a Russian military base or one to be ran by the Collective Security Treaty Organization but seemed open to the idea of a training center functioning under the US control.

Speaking of the cooperation under the umbrella of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, its drug enforcement coordination must be credited with steadily improving efficiency. The Kanal-2001 raid jointly launched by the group's members last December led to the seizure of 16 tons of drugs including 500 kg of heroin, over 2 tons of hashish, 9 tons of opium, and around 130 kg of cocaine. In concert, the Treaty partners' law-enforcement agencies opened over 21,000 criminal cases, 3,400 of them being related to illicit drug circulation. It is indicative of the progress being made that the grab in a similar 2010 stint was modest in comparison, totaling just 7 tons of drugs, while the number of agents involved was several times higher. Moscow's bilateral ties with Central Asian republics in the drug enforcement sphere also help – thanks to the Russian assistance, Kyrgyz border guards managed to boost the amounts of confiscated narcotics by a factor of 23 over just one year. 

The US push for the creation and operation under its control of an alternative Central Asian drug enforcement architecture is naturally seen apprehensively against the background, especially considering that Washington rejects on a wholesale basis the initiatives targeting drug production within Afghanistan. Russia floated a series of proposals at the aforementioned Vienna conference such as compiling an interactive real-time map of drug crops in Afghanistan to guide eradication raids, using satellite surveillance to detect drug trafficking, equipping border guard outposts with advanced technologies, etc., but neither of the ideas resonated with the US. As before, Washington opposes eradication on the pretext that it would leave Afghan farmers unable to fare for themselves, and, moreover, shuns Russia's initiative to subject to strict control the precursors to heroin and other complex opiates. Precursor codification could make it possible to track their origins and, eventually, to radically cap hard drug production, but it seems that this would not be the result to the US Administration's liking. 

The inescapable conclusion stemming from the analysis of the US position vis-a-vis Afghanistan's drug problem, attempts to perpetuate in some form its military presence in the country, and efforts to make inroads into Central Asia is that the intensifying flow of drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and across it to Europe is regarded as an at least acceptable phenomenon in Washington.

Overall, the pertinent scenario includes the incitement of public unrest, civilian fatalities, international condemnations of repressions against protesters, the passing of a UN resolution partially authorizing the use of force against the regime with the goal of protecting the civilian population, and a massive military intervention boldly overstepping the limits set by the UN resolution. Covert operations launched by NATO special forces disguised as a local militia and a media campaign with shows of imitated atrocities allegedly committed by the regime which therefore should deserve being displaced were also named as elements of the hypothetic plan.

In addition to media hyperactivity, the difference between the color revolutions that shook Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine in the past decade and the potential Libya-style coups is that the latter would culminate in military interventions against the targeted regimes and the UN would take an important role in the process. The implementation of the design in Libya was facilitated by the archaic tribal structure of the country's society such that the intervening powers were able to entrain some of the tribes in offensives against others.

Even a sketchy analysis shows that Central Asia is a region vulnerable to revolts based on the Libyan scenario. Kinship and tribalism are endemic in Central Asian elites. The dominant groups are the Great jüz in Kazakhstan, the Teke in Turkmenistan, the Tashkent-Samarkand clan in Uzbekistan, and the Kulob clan in Tajikistan. Minor inclusions of other groups – as the Little jüz in Kazakhstan – do maintain a presence in the local elites, but they have minimal impact on overall situations in the republics. Escalations occur in Central Asian republics whenever alternative clans attempt to win stronger positions in the administrations, and the accompanying unrest can easily be used as pretexts for foreign interventions ostensibly meant to ensure the security of civilian populations.

Kyrgyzstanprovides a vivid example of potential consequences of conflicts between clans and dominant regional groups in Central Asia. Since the collapse of the USSR, leadership was seized fist by the northern clan led by Askar Akayev in 1991-2005, then by the southern one headed by Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010). The fall of Bakiyev's regime in 2010 opened a period of lingering political and economic instability in the republic. At the moment the Kyrgyz administration is mostly in the hands of the northerners including president Roza Otunbayeva and premier Almazbek Atambayev, and the administration's grip on southern regions of Kyrgyzsatan which were severely hurt during the June, 2010 clashes remains week. It is fair to say that over the past year Kyrgyzstan started to face the threat of disintegration and statehood decline. No doubt, the crumbling of Kyrgyzstan would trigger a chain reaction across Central Asia.

Another circumstance inviting the analogy with Libya is the existence in Central Asia of radical Islamist groups ready for wage wars against the current regimes or to launch terrorist attacks. In Libya, Al Qaeda militants formerly trained in Afghanistan and Iraq contributed vastly to the breaking of the Gadhafi regime. In this regard, Central Asia with its porous borders and geographic proximity to Afghanistan may prove defenseless even to a greater extent than Libya. The region's top-powerful Islamist group is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, but occasionally other groups with loud names like the Islamic Jihad Union which claimed responsibility for the 2009 terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan move to the front stage. In 2011, Central Asia was confronted with a new phenomenon – an extensive terrorist network was discovered in the seemingly peaceful western part of Kazakhstan.

Similarly to Libya where mostly Western companies gained control over Libya's oil in the wake of the anti-Gadhafi revolt, Central Asia sits on impressive energy reserves. Oil and gas deposits are located in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, all of which happen to be in Central Asia's risk zone. It should be noted as well that Kazakhstan owns some of the world's biggest deposits of uranium and Kyrgyzstan – considerable precious metal deposits.

It factors into the situation that geographically Central Asia is isolated from the West and can be accessed only via Russia, China, or Afghanistan and Pakistan. The relations of the latter two with the US soured recently. Moscow and Beijing would surely shut down access to Central Asian republics if their own interest are put in jeopardy. An alternative route traverses Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea which are also crossed by the TRACECA transit corridor (Europe – the Caucasus – Asia). The US already has strong positions in Georgia but would have to secure a foothold in Azerbaijan, a republic so far staying outside of the US sphere of influence, to fully use the corridor to their own ends.

Lack of direct access to Central Asia from the traditional NATO responsibility zone would put serious obstacles in the way of an intervention comparable to the one recently launched against Libya. At the moment the transit routes used to supply NATO bases in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan are entirely dependent on Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan… Still, the immediate military roles in the case of an intervention in Central Asia can be taken by Islamist groups, especially since the control on the border with Afghanistan is nonexistent. Under the plan, US military bases can serve as coordination and supply centers. In August, 2008, an arsenal of firearms was found in Bishkek in a private residence rented out to the US, and it is hitherto unclear what the purpose of amassing the weapons could have been.

The possibility of the materialization of the Libyan scenario in Central Asia already came under scrutiny in the region's republics. On September 15, Kazakh Respublika outlet published a paper by R. Rysmambetov titled “The Libyan Scenario for Kazakhstan: Myth or Reality?” listing such risk factors as the availability of the region's lucrative natural resources, deeply entrenched tribalism, activities of radical Islamic groups, and the openness to external control of the local administrations whose senior officials own accounts in Western banks and have children studying in Western universities. Notably, Rysmambetov projects that Russia or China would not enter the game if outbreaks of unrest take place in Central Asian republics.

For the first time in Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet history, the elections which are due in the fall of 2011 present the republic with a chance to name a new country leader at the polling booths rather than at the peak of public unrest. Its previous two regime changes which culminated in the unseating of Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev resulted from the violent 2005 and 2010 coups. However, the widespread impression at the moment is that even the coming legitimate regime change is unlikely to bring the much-needed stability to the republic…

Uncertainty around the elections persisted until recently. It took Kyrgyzstan's legislature and interim president Roza Otunbayeva suspiciously long to reach an agreement on the elections date which was set to October 30, 2011 only on the closing day of the parliament's spring session. Even after sealing the deal, the parliament had to convene out of schedule to confirm the membership of the central electoral commission, thus finally enabling the actual preparations for the vote.

The central electoral commission unveiled a schedule of election activities on July 11. According to the plan, presidential hopefuls are to be nominated between June 30 and August 16. As the next step, candidates must prove their fluency in the Kyrgyz language. The official registration deadline is September 25 which is also the starting date for the presidential campaigns which are to close in the morning of October 29. The deadline for ballot counting is November 20, with an extra month left for a possible runoff. The election final result must be announced by December 31, 2011, the date Otunbayeva's term expires.

The race over presidency in Kyrgyzstan is going to be serious. At the moment, there is no runner in the game with strong support in both south and north of the regionally divided republic, meaning that widening the regional connections will be critical to the success of every campaigner. According to Kyrgyz commentator Sergei Masaulov, the optimal strategy for candidates would be to build convincing partnerships outside of their home regions: southerners would have to seek out allies in the north and vice versa.

Nationalism is expected to factor significantly into the presidential campaign considering that – with memories of last year's Osh massacre still vivid – some of the contenders will be selling their candidacies as those of defenders of the Kyrgyz nation and its traditional values. Combined with nationalist appeals, the emotionally loaded competition can easily escalate into a new round of inter-ethnic clashes which would further widen the gap between the north and the south of Kyrgyzstan.

It has to be taken into account that the key element of the election's intrigue is perhaps not who prevails in the race but how the winner will be trying to rebuild the presidential authority in Kyrgyzstan. All the Kyrgyz constitution in its present shape leaves to the president is the control over the foreign policy and the law-enforcement plus the army conglomerate. In today's Kyrgyzstan, the president has no authority to disband the government or to redirect the economic policies. With neither of the current presidential hopefuls willing to accept the limitations, a new phase of wrestling for power instigated by the new president appears imminent by the early 2012.

At the moment over a dozen Kyrgyz politicians appear to be ready to stake election bids, and the majority of Kyrgyz political parties have held campaign-opening congresses. Ata-Zhurt, the champion of the past parliamentary elections, announced that its leader Kamchybek Tashiev would run for president, though a month ago a question mark hung over his candidacy due to criminal charges pressed for beating up a party colleague Bakhadyr Sulaimanov. Tashiev had to publicly apologize to Sulaimanov to remove the obstacle to joining the presidential race.

Banker Marat Sultanov, also from Ata-Zhurt, plans to run on his own regardless of the party's undivided support for Tashiev. Another Ata-Zhurt member, the party's speaker Akhmatbek Keldibekov, used to be seen as a potential front-runner but seems determined to keep his current post at the cost of presidential ambitions.

The Ar-Namys party held primaries in which its leader and former Kyrgyz prime minister Felix Kulov stayed out of the list. The rivals were Anarbek Kalmatov and Akylbek Zhaparov. The former prevailed, but the Ar-Namys political council decided to postpone the nomination. The Ata-Meken party similarly remains undecided over its nominee and plans to announce its candidate this August, with the shortlist comprising party leader Omurbek Tekebayev and two former Kyrgyz attorney generals Kubatbek Baibolov and Rovshan Zheenbekov.

The Butun Kyrgyzstan party which suffered a crushing defeat in the last parliamentary elections is campaigning energetically in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan and hopes to stage a comeback as its leader Adakhan Madumarov intends to storm the Kyrgyz presidency.

Almazbek Atambayev, the Kyrgyz premier, a highly popular figure in Kyrgyzstan, and a clear potential favorite in the presidential race, says he will decide this August whether to enter the presidential race. Tentatively unsure of his prospects, Atambayev intends to wait till the finishing touches are put on the list of contenders and to assess his own chances based on what transpires.

Along with high-profile figures, several politicians evidently having no hope to make it to Kyrgyzstan's presidential office do plan to run in order to end their bids with endorsing the luckier peers and earn posts in the new government as a reward.

The candidate who emerges from the presidential race in Kyrgyzstan – whoever the individual eventually happens to be – will face a challenging legacy. The Kyrgyz economy is in bad shape will hardly get any healthier in the coming two or three years. A group led by economist Azamat Dikambayev, which surveys on a regular basis Kyrgyzstan's socioeconomic condition, says by the end of 2011 the budget deficit currently estimated at 22-24 bn soms will likely shrink to 14 bn, but 2012-2014 will put the republic under a difficult test. The budget will come under additional pressure as a result of the government's decision to up teachers' and medical doctors' pay. It is unclear how Kyrgyzstan is going to handle its problems related to the borders with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, plus the volumes of re-export of Chinese products to CIS via Kyrgyzstan, a critical source of revenue for the Kyrgyz economy, are on a downward trend. Notably, the customs union – a joint enterprise of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the tree countries accounting for over 50% of Kyrgyzstan's foreign trade – could offer the republic a viable solution to a portion of its pressing problems.

The governments in Central Asia have taken urgent measures to prevent a rise in food prices so that people had no grounds for outrage. In Tajikistan they decided to put a share of the strategic food reserve on sale in order to send food prices down. Flour prices in the Republic increased almost by 80% last year, while tea, sugar and milk prices grew by one quarter. A new surge in prices was registered last month following a growth in flour prices in neighboring Kazakhstan. High flour prices is a serious problem for Tajik families with many children, where homemade bread is the core of daily menu.

There is also a surge in prices for feed grain, which sends the cost of diary and meat products up as well. Practically all products Tajikistan imports from abroad, which does not allow to develop the mechanism of price regulation at home. This all means that the majority of Tajik population may face a serious food shortage. To keep up the prices the government decided to put flour, rice and sugar reserves on sale every week. However, it is yet unclear whether this will help in the regulation of home market. But if the prices are not kept up, people with low income will turn out to have consumed all seeds required for spring sowing.

The situation is much alike in Kazakhstan, although living standards are much higher there, and the Kazakh government has a wider range of possibilities to influence consuming market at home. Food prices in Kazakhstan have also grown much since the beginning of the year. According to the state statistics agency, a 3% rise was registered in January. But if we analyze the dynamics of the most frequently consumed products, we`ll see that prices for many of them have gone up by tens of percent. The authorities have resorted to all mechanisms of price regulation, including direct food supplies to various retail outlets and anti-monopoly surveys, but these measures have not proved very effective. But it is especially important to keep up prices ahead of the early presidential elections in Kazakhstan scheduled for the 3d of April.

But protests are already in the air in some districts of Central Asia. Tajik people staged several rallies demanding the authorities to handle the most pressing issues immediately. 140 residents of the village of Chimkurgan in Sogdyi area came to the local administration building protesting against poor housing policy and little effort to prevent a surge in prices for essential goods. Fifty elderly people gathered in Rudakyi area demanding their pensions paid off which they had not received since last October. Workers at 'Hydrostroy' who were involved in the construction of the Sangtuda-1 hydro power plant demanded that the authorities paid off their wages (the total sum of the debt was $1.4 mln). Of course, these gatherings do not look as violent as those in the Arab countries but still this indicates that social problems are also very acute in Central Asia.

There is no tradition of public protests in Central Asian republics, probably except for Kyrgyzstan. However, the memory of fights with Islamist opposition is still alive in people of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The 1992-1997 civil war in Tajikistan and the 2005 Andijan uprising are the events that come up to mind at once. Kyrgyzstan is notorious for its outbreaks of ethnic violence.

Since Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan see a stable inflow of oil-and-gas money into their budgets, the local governments could improve the living standards by introducing some programs aimed to increase pension payments and unemployment benefits. But the situation is much more difficult in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan: in the worst-case scenario, mass violent protests like in Tunisia and in Libya are very likely there. Kyrgyzstan now lives in anticipation of spring escalation of tensions, and this time things may go much worse, with the country splitting into north south for ever. New militant gangs emerge in Tajikistan – like it was during the civil war. In the meantime, the situation seems to be stable in Uzbekistan where reprisals against any form of opposition are strong, but who knows what will happen there in case of power shift.

Taking into account geographical location of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Xinjiang autonomous district of China and other hotbeds of instability, as well as geopolitics of the Central Asian region which has common borders with Russia, China, India and Iran, the consequences of possible unrest will do the former Soviet republics more harm than to Libya.

On February 21, the General Director of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolai Bordyuzha said that before April revolution “some of the security agencies, subordinate to President Bakiyev controlled drug trafficking through the south of Kyrgyzstan”. Considering that the south of Kyrgyzstan is the region through which most of the Afghan drugs are trafficked we can conclude that drug trafficking occurrs almost on the state level. 

Since the overthrowing of Bakiyev for about a year ago the situation with drug trafficking has only worsened.  Numerous small criminal groups which were divided on the ethnic or family principle are being replaced by several well-organized drug cartels with a clear hierarchy and links in other countries. The number of confiscated drug consignments has reduced while the volumes of drug smuggling are growing.

If we take thestatistics on anti-drug operations in Kyrgyzstan it looks like police confiscates only occasional small consignments smuggled by private individuals for personal purposes, while big volumes of drugs reach consumers without any obstacles.

According to one of the recent reports of the department on fighting illegal drug trafficking under the Interior Ministry of Kyrgyzstan, on January 25, the police detained a native of the Kem district of the Chuisk region with 13 kg of marihuana.

On February 2, a resident of Sokuluksy district, who had a criminal record, was detained with 4.5 kg of opium.

On February 4, in the town of Kara-Balta a local resident was detained with 10.5 kg of marihuana.

On February 22, during a joint operation by security agencies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan about 3 kg of hashish were found in the car of one of the citizens of Lyalak district of the Batken region.

All these reports on the confiscation of big consignments of drugs cannot even be compared with the real volumes of drug trafficking measured in hundreds kg of heroin. The estimated annual volume of drug trafficking through the south of Kyrgyzstan is 20,000 kg.

The reports on the drugs confiscated from Kyrgyz drug dealers in Russia and Kazakhstan look the same. A typical situation: in November 2010, the policemen found 400 g of hashish in the luggage of a 25-year old Kyrgyz woman who was going to Russia on the train “Almaty – Yekaterinburg”. In February, at the “Semey” station in Kazakhstan a Kyrgyz woman was detained with about 1.9 kg of heroin in her luggage.  According to the Federal Security Service of Russia, on the Russian-Kazakh border the custom officers intercept only 30 % of all smuggled drugs while the rest reaches consumers in Russia and the EU.

The scale of the Afghan drugs trafficking through Kyrgyzstan threatens the existence of the Kyrgyz state as such. Speaking at a meeting of the Defense Committee the Kyrgyz president Rosa Otunbayeva focused mainly on the threats, caused by drug trafficking and the measures on fighting them. In 2010, the Kyrgyz authorities confiscated more than eight tons of drugs, she said. However in southern regions with its well-developed drug trafficking network, “for some unclear reasons drug confiscation volumes have reduced: in the city of Osh from 133 kg to 64 kg, the same decline is marked in the Osh and Jalalabad regions in the Batken region it has fallen from 80 kg to 22 kg”.

The reduction of volumes of confiscated drugs has very negative impact on security in the country while incomes from drug sales according to Otunbayeva, “make a powerful source for financing terrorist, extremist and separatist groups”. The problem is especially urgent in the regions of Osh and Jalalabad, where the organized crime is turning intro “a smoothly running system criminal communities, formed on ethnic basis” which have begun to divide the spheres of control in the economic and financial sectors as well to promote their representatives into the administrative institutions”. The criminal groups have already spread their influence over security agencies, which can be proved by the recent detention of the Interior Ministry’s officer with 40kg of heroin.

According to the analysts with Chatham House, drug trafficking through Kyrgyzstan has increased after the intervention of the US forces in Afghanistan in 2001, where the drug production reached the record level. The rivalry between drug trafficking cartels became one of the reasons of interethnic clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Before the April revolution the family of the former Kyrgyz president had benefits from illegal activities.  According to Chatham House, the western officials “did more than $480 million a year on drug sales”. After the fall of Bakiyev’s regime the balance of interests in this sphere was disturbed. On June 7, a notorious drug trader Aibek Mirsidikov, who ensured the drug smuggling through Osh controlled by Baliyev, was killed and after that several clashes between local criminal gangs took place. Several days after that interethnic clashes broke out in Osh, in which more than 2,000 people were killed.

Drug trafficking offense from Afghanistan controlled by Americans threatens Kyrgyzstan the loss of its southern territories.