And the cheers from the crowds seeing off the expelled French ambassador must be seen for what Europeans are.

The chicken or the egg? Did the Mali military junta’s decision to bring in Russian military contractors create the inertia for Emmanuel Macron to reduce his own troops’ presence there and initiate EU sanctions – or did his earlier decision to reduce troop numbers push the regime to take the measure to bring in around 400 Wagner mercenaries to keep it in power?

Regional buffs might mull this at length, but in many ways it doesn’t matter. What is important is that Macron’s childish reaction to the Russians coming shows the world so much about him and the French and their outdated and unrealistic views about themselves. The apparent lack of gratitude for being the big brother in Mali with originally 5000 troops and supporting the regime is the real issue. For the junta to turn to Russia, it was showing not only a lack of gratitude but also a lack of respect. It was, in a nutshell, saying ‘we can’t take Paris seriously’ and even in the best scenario, can’t imagine the French helping the generals stay in power if the brown stuff hits the propellers.

The reality is that the regime saw through the flawed narrative and could see why Macron had the troops there in the first place. On paper, it was all about fighting terrorism as Mali is at a crossroads of Islamic terrorism to plague the Sahel and terror groups there could take control. What this means for Macron is simply huge migrant flows to France which is just another headache for him battling to take a second term as serving President and aiming at lapping up the far-right votes with his stand on nailing immigration. And if that wasn’t bad enough, France has huge investments in Mali as French multinationals operate there, staffed by French expats who need protecting in the event of another attempted coup.

The tenuous link which kept Macron happy and kept the troop numbers high was the promise recently by the generals in Bamako of elections which would usher in a civilian government, but when the junta announced that these would be rescheduled to a new date in five years time, Macron’s patience waned. How much longer could he juggle the awkward scenario that he was, in effect, propping up a military regime which didn’t even have the decency to tug its forelock and show reverence to France as the only world power which mattered?

Last year in October, he announced that France would reduce its numbers in Mali starting with its presence in Timbuktu. We can assume that the regime decided that this was the time to turn to the Russians for help to fill the void.

What the Mali regime probably didn’t count on though was the reaction from Macron. Within days, literally, of the news emerging of the Russian presence Macron had not only raised a flag signaling his anger and disappointment with the junta but also managed to stir up similar discontent in Brussels which wasted no time in slapping sanctions on Mali.

Red in tooth and claw

The move though makes the EU look weak and France even weaker. So, when France can’t sustain the respect from former colonies in Africa who are required to play a certain role to keep the French happy then the Elysee turns to the EU to stick the knife in the back? And what does this say about the European Union as a whole? Ready and willing to keep the French dream alive in Africa and even happier for its own so-called foreign policy to be hijacked by a French President red in tooth and claw from a ruse based on revenge and score settling?

The signal to the whole of Africa is far worse though. As we are witnessing in the Middle East with Gulf Arab countries welcoming Syria’s Assad back into their pack following Russia’s intervention, the Mali move will be watched keenly by a number of failed francophone states in Africa. Either accept full hegemony and all that it entails and more or less stay a colony – and don’t seek any geo military support from anyone else – or face the petulant wrath of the EU and France in one almighty blow which will more or less push you in the arms of the Russians anyway.

For those countries who don’t think they have a good deal from France and the EU anyway, their regimes might well consider working more closely with the Russians in either case as Wagner mercenaries will at least go the extra length in keeping a junta in power with no conditions or silly EU human rights handbook.

What Macron has done is signal to African countries and to Russia itself that there is rich pickings for Putin there as all he has to do to expand his empire is send in the Wagner boys and clean up. With one swift move, armies of EU countries scarper once they even hear the word ‘Wagner’ and any remnants of trade with the EU is wiped clean. The clean slate is the perfect basis for Moscow to step in with its partners China, Iran and others to offer a new deal – to be part of a new bloc which sticks two fingers up to western sanctions and backs up the security component with real soldiers prepared to do real fighting. The talks recently between Nicaragua and Iran where the latter proposed a new trade bloc made up of countries sanctioned by the US is a glimpse of the future, which may well include African countries like Mali who now stand tall as the Russian model for others to consider replicating.

The recent bizarre meeting in Paris between Macron and Ursual Von Der Leyen, the European Commission president where both harp on about the need for a new defence strategy for EU countries (probably within NATO) was a desperate move by both the French President and his EU concubine. Macron was clinging on to an informal arrangement in Mali where other EU countries as well as the UK show support to his disingenuous stand against Islamic terrorism in the Sahel. But he is clearly afraid that countries like Germany, which has 800 troops there will be asking themselves just how far this farcical situation can sustain itself all in the name of keeping the Elysee fantasy alive of still being the only relevant power in francophone Africa. After all, if the EU has imposed sanctions and France is pulling out its own troops, then why should others keep theirs there? Mali now knows that the blurred lines of diplo talk with Macron’s people who might have suggested that France would help keep the junta in power have now been made clearer. The UN mission there now can only be there to keep Islamic fighters at bay but not to keep a junta in power. If others follow Macron, then isn’t this a clear sign that western powers are more interested in their own geopolitical goals and hegemony over fighting terrorism? Just look how the Europeans run like chickens when the Russians turn up. And the cheers from the crowds seeing off the expelled French ambassador must be seen for what they are. A landmark between the West and Russia, just as the current talks are between EU leaders and Putin. The times really are a-changin’.

The hypocrisy is both stunning and comical. Mali has been in the news in the last couple of years for having a military coup in 2020 which installed a junta and then again in 2021 when the temporary civilian leader experiment was annulled by the military who took full control.

During this period, France has also been in the news for helping Mali with its fight against terrorism as the country stands at a pivotal point in the Sahel where Islamic terror groups operate and which, we are led to believe, were threatening the stability of this West African country and former colony of France.

Macron’s perceived position at the beginning was to send 5000 French troops there are a vanguard to a UN mission to keep the extremists at a distance and install France’s supremacy. The troops sent a message to the world and to the West in particular that showing a force against Islamic extremist groups operating in Mali and neighbouring countries was the right thing to do.

Critics of Macron both in Bamako and Paris point out however that there is a hidden agenda to Macron’s Mali policy, which is to serve France’s interests as an investor in the country and to stop any impending immigration flows to Paris. The French soldiers are also there to protect French nationals working for French companies.

But the relationship between the junta and France was always a fragile one. In early January, that relationship reached a breaking point as Macron threw the lever which set those relations to ‘reset’.

The official line from France’s foreign minister is that a recent move by Mali’s military to reschedule elections in five years has exhausted the patience of Paris.

The real reason however which prompted Macron to rapidly respond to his demands to sanction the regime in Mali is Russia.

In recent days it has emerged that around 400 Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group have arrived in Mali to support the regime.

This, and only this, is what has caused the fuse to jump. This is the ‘klack’ which has overloaded the circuit and got Macron in a state, to such a point that analysts in France have suggested that his decision to reduce French soldiers there since a year ago will now be accelerated following the Wagner presence.

Many will wrangle over the question whether it the reduction of French soldiers itself which prompted Russia to fill the vacuum. Or whether intelligence which got to France months ago that the regime was about to make such a move prompted Macron’s withdrawal.

In either case, it doesn’t show France and the EU to be very convincing powers in the region. France’s attitude was always a paternalistic one as it expected the regime to fall into line with the Elysee’s folly of democratising in the same way it has attempted to do in Lebanon. But the decision to turn to Russia for help was salt in the wound for Macron and his delusional views of France holding onto the hegemony in this failed state. The fact that Mali’s regime can’t take Macron seriously or rather sees through its veiled objectives and has turned to Russia is hardly surprising. In the region, Russia is playing a role more in line with what the West aspires to, but cannot pull off: regional super power hitting terror groups hard and building states. What Moscow has achieved in Syria is practically a geopolitical miracle which has won the praise and respect of former enemies in the Middle East who are now lining up in Washington to harangue the Biden administration to bring Assad in from the cold.

In Africa, both France and the EU have big ideas. The EU showed this week, by supporting Macron’s demands to hit it with sanctions, that it will support Macron’s absurd ideas about Paris being the big brother of its francophone former colonies. It’s about keeping a dream alive as, with France still playing such a paternalistic role, the EU is then afforded the opportunity to pump aid money into such countries and claim them as theirs, rather than America’s or Russia’s.

But the Mali debacle is showing the whole world how the EU model of hegemony, arm in arm with Paris, is failing. If Macron is so upset by the regime’s move that he is prepared to resort to such shameful vitriol against the regime, then France should forget about its African wet dreams and accept a new reality in the world, a new world order which we can see on our TV screens every day, which is that Russia, China and Iran are taking more power in Africa and the Middle East and are delivering on their side, when it comes to giving sovereign states what they want in return. The news just this week that China was developing new relations with Morocco is proof of that, or indeed that Beijing is helping Saudi Arabia with its ballistic missiles program. What happened in Mali is just another example of how the West’s model on hegemony is both outdated and fatally flawed. Macron is so obsessed with his media coverage and taking every opportunity to swipe at Brexit Britain’s economic success that he probably hasn’t time to read the memos from his advisors. This week France became almost a minor EU member state, turning to Nanny Brussels for help in its role as bully in the playground. Pathetic on so many levels. Just like Macron being scared that Russian mercenaries will intimidate French soldiers as part of a power struggle between Russia and the West which the latter is losing time after time in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan Belarus and even Poland. Mali has fallen, but others will follow and no new “EU pillar” in NATO would have ever prevented it.

Russian private military contractors propping up a military junta which France originally supported has now led even France to pull its own troops out. So what the hell are British soldiers doing there risking their lives?

The deployment of British soldiers in the West African country of Mali has reached a new farcical level, prompting the question why did Boris Johnson send them there in the first place?

In theory at least, 300 British troops of two regiments were sent there in February of last year to boost a UN operation fighting international terrorism. But in reality, they there to give tacit support to the French who have vital business interests in their former colony and need help in both preventing Islamic terrorists from harming those operations and protecting French nationals working for them.

But if that wasn’t farcical enough, in recent days, it has been revealed by the French press that Macron is actually withdrawing French troops from the UN operation, which initially had 5000 French soldiers leading it.

His reason? The presence of Russian private military contractors in Mali, believed to be there to support the military junta which took power in a coup in 2020 followed by a second one last year to oust a civilian government. In fact, Macron has been quietly reducing his own troops from Mali since June of last year but this initiative is expected to be accelerated when the news of around 400 Wagner private military contractors had been hired by the Mali junta.

In recent days, the tension has reached fever pitch. A senior French diplomat said that alleged Wagner-group activity in Mali was still being assessed.

“It is still unacceptable for Wagner to deploy to Mali,” the diplomat said, adding that the group’s presence creates security risks.

“The problem we have in Mali is first of all a political problem,” he said.

“There is a junta which has staged a coup, which exercises power illegitimately and which, to save itself, resorts to Wagner’s services.”

And so, if you’re struggling to grasp how or why 300 British squaddies are fighting Islamic terrorists there to ostensibly keep the status quo in the country which helps France and its investment, you might be wondering what the hell Boris is doing now keeping them there given recent announcements from the Elysee. As France speeds up a massive withdrawal of its own troops from its former colony is Britain expected to deal with terrorists having the edge now? And what about the Russian private military contractors? Will British soldiers have to accept them as a dominant military power on the ground?

Clearly Boris Johnson, who is facing a political revolt from his own backbenchers, would be wise to take a second look at the Mali situation and Britain’s relations with France given Macron’s pugnacious attitude towards Brexit Britain. Many will argue that enough is enough from Macron who has deliberately allowed record numbers of migrants in France to make the crossing into UK. France’s own navy won’t hold illegal immigrants on flimsy dinghies from making the channel crossing – which puts a strain on housing resources, leaving some Brits out in the cold – let alone exasperating tensions within the cabinet as Priti Patel looks increasingly useless at dealing with the crisis.

So what links Britain’s own migrant crisis from France’s shores and British squaddies in Mali? In fact, they’re both two sides of the same coin. Unwanted asylum seekers.

Is the British military is expected to help France with its own potential immigration problem if Mali sinks into the abyss and thousands of its citizens head to France for asylum? This is the heart of the matter. Macron cannot afford politically new immigration flows from Mali and so begged the international community for help there to boost the UN mission.

But the hypocrisy is stunning.

Many will surely argue that given our all-time record low relations with Macron, that the abusive nature of the relationship has now reached new level of travesty and that British troops really shouldn’t be helping keep terrorists at arms length from the military regime in Bamako when even France itself no longer wants to prop it up.

The reality is that aside from the press on both sides of the channel bashing one another’s governments, Boris and Macron have a bold vision of teaming up on playing the world’s policemen in the troubled hotspots, with a garnish of peace keeping and humanitarian work thrown in to keep the PR boys happy. This is the real reason why Boris made the decision to help Macron in Mali and why he is so servile to the French president.

But we may well be at breaking point.

Heaven forbid the day a British soldier is seriously wounded or killed and it transpires that the incident was as a result of a vacuum left by France’s retreat. Does Britain have to keep law and order in Mali just so France can cling to the absurd idea that it is still the colonial power there?

The leader of the opposition and Johnson’s own backbenchers now need to be asking questions in the Commons as to the wisdom of the decision to send British troops to Mali. This madness has to come to an end. Or are they hoping for the draped coffins at Britain’s RAF base Brize Norton which would be the final nail in Boris’s coffin?

In the coming weeks and months Boris has a number of major hurdles to jump, namely a massive tax rise and local elections in spring. If he can survive the present debacle over office parties, most of the main hacks in Westminster are betting on these two events being his downfall. But it may well be long before that, when Russians in Mali become a huge news story and Boris struggles once again to give a coherent answer to why British soldiers are there. Cue ‘This is the End’ by The Doors and watch the murky water rise.

Roughly, 8-11 thousand jihadi fighters come from Maghreb countries. The numbers vary according to different estimates. Some of the militants will lose lives on the battlefield, some will lay down their arms, but a large part will continue the efforts to reach the coveted goal of establishing a caliphate. With the battle experience received in Syria and Iraq, these seasoned fighters will pose a great threat to the stability of their respective homelands.

It has already started. Algeria faces a security challenge. The war against jihadism has turned Algeria into one of Africa’s top military powerhouses. In the past 20 years, Algeria has spent more on its military than all three of its immediate neighbors — Mo­rocco, Libya and Tunisia — com­bined.

Algeria is a country with a 1,200 km coastline. If waves of asylum seekers hit Europe from there, the Old Continent will be in real trouble. Besides, the country is a key supplier of oil and gas to the West. The implications of internal conflict in Algeria could be a real nightmare. Russia helps to prevent it and, thus, save Western Europe.

At least 6 thousand of IS fighters are Tunisians. Some of them hold prominent positions in the IS and the Nusra Front (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) in Syria. Many Tunisian extremists are affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is active in a half-dozen countries across North Africa. Tunisia is at odds over what to do if and when they come home. These fighters would have the capabilities and cultural familiarity to potentially create a formidable and sustained destabilizing force in Tunisia. Meanwhile, Tunisian security forces break up one IS recruiting cell after another.

Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco face threats from the East as well as from the South, where they have to counter the emerging «Sahara-Sahel Front». Islamists from Mali, Niger and Mauritania are regrouping to expand the zone of influence. For instance, Al-Qaeda militants have recently attacked a Malian army post near the border of Burkina Faso.

In North and West Africa, Al Qaeda is on the rise again. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has withstood the chokehold of the Algerian security services, US drones, and the French-led intervention in Mali, to launch a range of attacks in recent years, whether storming a beach resort in Ivory Coast or conducting a low-level insurgency in northern Mali.

A number of terrorist groups operating in Mali and neighboring areas – Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, the Massina Brigades, the Sahara Emirate – united this February into one organization called Nusrat-ul-Islam. The newly formed group pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah, al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the leader of al-Qaida's North African franchise Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are challenged by the IS. In November 2016, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara was formed, led by Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.

The IS militants may regroup in the war-torn Libya. This country is probably the weakest link among Maghreb states. Defense officials have said the hardline Sunni Muslim militants are considering moving their headquarters to that country. A US military intervention is an option. According to Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, head of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, «The instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant near-term threat to U.S. and allies’ interests on the continent». Russia has been asked to intervene by Libyan political and military leaders.

The armed forces of Maghreb countries are getting prepared. The Moroccan military has just held exercises Flintlock-2017 with the US. Weapons systems, like, for instance, Russian Mi-28N Night Hunter attack helicopters, are procured to make the counterterrorist operations more effective. On March 15th, 2016, King Mohamed VI visited Moscow to sign several important agreements, including the agreement on mutual protection of classified information on military and military-technical matters and the declaration on the fight against international terrorism. Morocco is interested in strengthening its military capabilities with Russian weapons.

Last year, Russia provided Algerian and Tunisian authorities with intelligence and military aid to strengthen counterterrorism efforts. The package included Russian high-resolution satellite imagery of key Algerian border crossings with Tunisia, Libya, Chad and Mali. The imagery has enabled Algerian authorities to thwart several attempts by terrorists and insurgents to infiltrate Algerian borders. Algeria has shared this data with Tunisia.

Russia has close military cooperation with the states of the region. A country with a significant Muslim minority, about 10% of its popula­tion, it has been battling jihadists in the Caucasus for a number of years. It understands the problem and has vast experience to share. Unlike the US and other Western powers, Russia does not accompany its aid with lectures about human rights or political demands pushing for «democra­tic reforms». As Rus­sian armaments have proven themselves on the battlefield, it seems likely that Maghreb governments under terrorist threat will increasingly turn towards Moscow.

Today, Islamists of all kinds, especially the IS, are emerging as a very serious threat for the United States, its NATO allies and Russia. Despite the existing differences on Ukraine and a host of other issues where Russia and the West are on opposite side of the barricades, cooperation on fighting the threat is possible and necessary. After all, the enemy is common and its deadly activities go far beyond the scope of a regional threat.

Russia and the West could coordinate activities in Libya. Sharing intelligence and cooperating in joint special operations against key targets could be a start of a broader process. Russia and the US-led West could launch preliminary talks on the wording of a hypothetical UN Security Council resolution to make it approved if an international effort will be required to keep the region from abyss.

North Africa should not become a divisive issue to complicate the relations between Russia and the West. The situation calls for cooperation and dialogue. The IS will soon become a thing of the past if Russia and the West set aside what divides them and concentrate on what brings them together. This approach will benefit all. 

The armed conflict in Mali is still going on, where, at the start of 2015, the number of attacks on national and international security force personnel, most notably those working with Mali’s armed forces and the UN peacekeeping mission, rose sharply. The start of the new year was also marked by new attacks on towns and villages, as well as on local leaders who support the peace process, by terrorist groups. The Malian army, the local population and UN peacekeepers are all suffering serious losses. All in all, the UN Mission in Mali has, over the last six months, become the bloodiest UN mission currently in operation. On the eve of the new year, UN bases were even subjected to rocket attacks (1). Several days ago, UN armed forces took part in an offensive involving air strikes on certain settlements for the first time. The operation drastically altered the attitudes of those living in the north, who are now demanding the immediately withdrawal of UN troops from the country (2). 

Towards the end of 2014, an uprising took place in the Republic of Burkina Faso resulting in the resignation of President Blaise Compaoré. The UN Secretary General, however, formally recognised the revolt as a “popular uprising”, and no sanctions were imposed on the new authorities. Officially, the popular uprising was triggered by the attempts of Compaoré (3), who had ruled the country for 27 years, to change the constitution so that he could run for office for a third term. Mass protests began on 28 October and lasted for four days, during which time 30 people were killed and more than 600 were injured. On 31 October, Compaoré stepped down and fled the country. 

It is interesting that the internal political instability in a number of countries in West Africa is specifically linked to heads of state seeking third terms. Following the overthrow of Burkina Faso’s president, the political situation escalated in Benin, where President Yayi Boni also submitted an amendment to parliament in order to be able to run for president for a third term. In November, there were mass demonstrations in Togo, where President Faure Gnassingbé put himself forward for the elections taking place in March 2015 for a third time. Although the constitution of Togo does not prohibit such a nomination, it should be borne in mind that the current president is the son of General Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who ruled the country for 38 years (4). Mass demonstrations also took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-January, during which dozens of people were killed. These demonstrations were also caused by the desire of the current president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, to run for a third term.

A political crisis arose in Niger after the country’s head of parliament, Hama Amadou, was accused of child trafficking. Although a warrant for his arrest was issued immediately after parliament lifted his immunity, the arrest did not take place since the suspect had by then already fled the country. 

There is also still an ongoing crisis in Nigeria. Terrorist attacks by Boko Haram (BH), as well as violence and shelling, have become more frequent of late, especially in north-eastern Nigeria (5), and BH is also attacking military and security facilities with increasing frequency. The victims of these terrorist attacks are not just ‘infidels’, but also Muslims, BH militants are not just setting fire to Christian churches, but also mosques, and Muslim theologians are also being attacked. It seems that the increased terrorist activity in Nigeria is also being motivated by the upcoming elections (the country’s general elections are set to take place in February). Presidential candidates, including Muslims, are being attacked (former president Muhammadu Buhari, for example, who ruled the country from 1983 to 1985). The authorities are trying to fight Boko Haram, but their hands are tied by the constant hints resounding from the UN and, most importantly, the International Criminal Court, as well as warnings against the violation of human rights during anti-terrorist operations (6).

In recent months, BH militants have noticeably increased the size of the territory under their control. Recently captured towns include Buni Yadi (in Yobe State), Gamboru Ngala, Dikwa, Bama, Malam Fatori (in Borno State), and Maiha (in Adamawa State). A new system of government is being developed in the areas under BH control, and Sharia law is being established. In November 2014, the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, announced the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Its borders extend far beyond the boundaries of Nigeria into both Cameroon and Niger. The biggest terrorist attack in the whole bloody history of BH took place on 3 January 2015, when more than 200 people were slaughtered in the town of Baga.

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa has resulted in the virtual isolation of entire countries. Land and sea borders have been closed, and flights to and from these countries have been stopped. This area of total isolation includes Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Moreover, the victims of Ebola are not just those infected with the virus. Several dozen people have died as a result of clashes between police and demonstrators in various cities in both Liberia (including the capital Monrovia) and Sierra Leone. There is a state of emergency in place in all three of these countries, and elections in both Guinea and Liberia have been cancelled. At the same time, the Liberian parliament has refused to grant the country’s president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, additional emergency powers to help fight Ebola. 

All the old problems still remain, including transnational crime. The amount of drugs being seized by police is increasing, but this says more about the rise in their illegal transit than about the country’s success in combating drug trafficking. Attempts to save Guinea Bissau from the fate of becoming a channel for drug trafficking have not yet met with success. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is also flourishing…

The West Africa of today has become a major testing ground where a new model of global governance is being developed. A number of zones stand out that could later be extended into other territories. These include a zone for the West’s direct control over natural resources, which the jurisdiction of national governments does not cover; a zone for the safe transit of drugs; a zone for sea piracy (international racketeering as part of international trade); a zone for large-scale medical experiments; and a zone for all-out terror (for the purposes of intimidation, for example). As an alternative, there is the zone of new and relatively peaceful neo-colonialism, where direct foreign control will be offered in exchange for the protection of a territory from all of the above… It goes without saying that this system is not only being developed for Africa.

______________

French troops managed to carry out several successful operations and kill a few leaders of Islamist groups, but, on the whole, not a single group has been defeated. On the contrary, what is happening in Mali today suggests that the strength of the Islamists has not been undermined; they are capable of carrying out serious military operations and gain the upper hand.

It seems Paris planned this exact course of events. On the one hand, France has established a reputation for itself as the ‘saviour’ of Mali (the curious offensive by Islamists in the country’s capital in January 2013 was stopped), while on the other, the conflict needs to be long and viscous so as to justify a permanent French presence in Mali. French troops have no plans to leave the country, while NGOs report that the situation «remains troubled». The formula is well known…

In the middle of May 2014, following a relative lull, the situation deteriorated sharply. Over the course of a week, battles took place between the Malian army and fighters from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), as well as other related groups. On 21 May, the Malian army stormed the town of Kidal (a key town to the north-east of the country) using heavy artillery, but terrorists fought off the attack and pushed back government troops who fled, suffering heavy losses. (2)

At the end of May, attacks began not just against peaceful towns and villages, but against UN peacekeeping forces. On 20 June, a bomb exploded near the town of Timbuktu, killing one peacekeeper and wounding six others. On 16 August, there was a new attack on peacekeepers in which two were killed and seven wounded. 

You will recall that in April 2013, the UN set up a new peacekeeping mission in Mali. Among other things, the mission’s mandate included the stabilisation of key population centres and support for the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country, especially in the north of Mali (see UN Security Council Resolution 2100). On 25 June, the mandate of the UN operation was extended for one year (see UN Security Council Resolution 2164), and an extremely significant addition was made to the mission’s mandate: now, UN troops needed to «take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas». In other words, the troops can stay there for as long as al-Qaeda and any other terrorist groups exist, including Tuareg rebels.

The internal political situation in the country remains tense. There is no unity either within the ranks of the terrorists (3) or within government. At the beginning of April, the country’s president removed Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly from his post and replaced him with Moussa Mara, a controversial step to say the least considering that Mara is a member of a small opposition party. The party has just one seat in parliament, and Mara himself received 1.5 per cent of the vote in the presidential elections. However, this has not stopped Mara from changing the makeup of the government almost completely. 

Incidentally, the fighting that took place in Kidal in May was provoked by the new prime minister, who had gone there for a visit. The riots that ended with the capture of soldiers from the Malian army and government officials began on the back of protest demonstrations against the visit. Several people in the town’s administration building were killed. Prime Minister Mara himself was successfully evacuated in a helicopter belonging to the UN Mission.

The humanitarian situation also remains extremely grave. Nearly three and a half million people are still at risk of what the UN classifies as «food insecurity». Almost one and a half million people are simply malnourished; experts expect that in 2-3 months, the number of malnourished will be closer to two million. There are nearly 140,000 internally displaced persons in the country, and almost 200,000 refugees beyond its borders (the population of Mali is nearly 14 million people).

All this is happening against the backdrop of attempts by the new government to conduct the trial of members of the military junta that overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré in April 2012. At long last, the leader of the military coup, Amadou Sanogo, who for a long time they were too afraid to touch despite the obvious criminality of his actions, has also been arrested. Among other things, the junta is accused of the disappearance of 25 Malian soldiers on the day of the coup. Perhaps it will be established that Sanogo’s April coup was not so bloodless after all. 

The UN Mission is also facing problems. Despite the fact that it should include 11,200 military personnel and 1,400 police, by March 2014 the mission was only 55 per cent staffed. Thus for a whole year, the Organization of United Nations managed to complete just half of its mission! The reasons for this state of affairs are not being reported. However, given the unusual correlation between the actions of Islamists and the infiltration of Mali by foreign countries, this no longer seems strange. Foreign troops have gone to Mali for the long haul, and there is no use hurrying them. Especially as the mission is being financed rather generously. While the mission’s annual budget amounted to more than $600 million in 2013, in 2014 this sum was nearer $1 billion!

Operation Serval should be considered in the overall context of French policy towards its former colonies. In recent years, this policy has started to acquire increasingly rigid forms. Thus, in April 2011, French soldiers taking part in a UN peacekeeping mission carried out a military coup in the Ivory Coast and overthrew the country’s legitimate president Laurent Gbagbo, later transferring him to the International Criminal Court. (4) Unlike the situation in the Ivory Coast, the status of French troops in Mali is completely autonomous. Moreover, they received some legitimacy from the UN Security Council, which authorised French troops «to use all necessary means to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General». You will recall that al-Qaeda’s offensive in the capital in January 2013 took place after the decision was made to establish an inter-African military mission, which was to help the Malian army fight terrorists who at that time had been hiding in the sands of the Sahara for more than ten years and had never come out. The creation of the inter-African military mission was a clear signal that the Africans should not even try to solve their own problems themselves – they should only act through the UN, where the main role belongs to their former colonial power. 

Some of the Libyan equipment ended up in the hands of Saharan-based insurgent groups such as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mali-based Ansar Dine. There is a real possibility that anti-aircraft weapons that fell into the hands of U.S.-supported Libyan guerrillas and were subsequently transferred to Saharan-based rebels were used to attack Air Algerie 5017, which was flying over Mali from Burkina Faso to Algeria in what the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration refers to as a «high-risk flight zone.»

Attacks on civilian aircraft using missiles procured from post-Qaddafi Libya were predicted by intelligence and defense specialists. It now appears that those predictions were well-founded with the crash of Air Algerie 5017.

The jihadist group Al-Mourabitoun, formed in 2013 after the merging of the Mulathameen brigade and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), both AQIM affiliates, may be behind the crash of Air Algerie 5017. The Mulathameen Brigade was led by the one-eyed Al Qaeda terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a veteran of the CIA-led Afghan war against the Soviet Union, who claimed responsibility for a mid-July suicide bombing north of Gao that killed a French soldier. Belmokhtar said Al-Mourabitoun would be led by a younger generation of jihadists, who all swore allegiance to Al Qaeda's leader Dr. Ayman Zawahiri.

With the crash near Gao, Mali of Air Algerie Flight 5017, with 110 passengers and crew of six Spanish nationals, and which was en route from Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, to Algiers, the possibility that BUK missiles from Libya were used in attacking the aircraft cannot be ruled out. Ansar Dine and AQIM have been found in possession of weapons seized from Libyan warehouses and armories to carry out attacks on Malian and Algerian targets, including the 2013 terrorist attack by AQIM on the Ain Amena natural gas plant in the Algerian Sahara. That attack was carried out by Belmokhtar's forces. The jihadists killed 40 Western and Algerian hostages.

In May 2013, Belmokhtar’s forces attacked a Nigerien military barracks in Agadez and a uranium mine in Arlit in the Republic of Niger. A Belmokhtar ally, Seif Allah Ibn Hussein, alias «Abu Ayadh al-Tunis», used weapons stolen from Libya to attack Western targets in Tunisia. Abu Ayadh leads Ansar al Sharia – Tunisia – AAS-T, the Tunisian branch of the Benghazi-based Ansar al Sharia that was supported by the CIA and NATO during the Libyan uprising against Qaddafi.

Fifty one of the 110 passengers on board Air Algerie 5017 were French nationals. Also on the passengers' manifest were 27 Burkinabe, 8 Lebanese, 6 Algerians, 2 Luxembourgers, 5 Canadians, 4 Germans, 1 Cameroonian, 1 Belgian, 1 Egyptian, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Swiss, 1 Nigerian and 1 Malian. Malians near the city of Kidal said they heard a loud explosion around the same time that contact with the MD-83 aircraft. The plane crashed in the foothills of the remote Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains that are known to be hideouts for Belmokhtar’s forces. 

The MD-83 was owned by the Spanish company Swiftair but leased to Air Algerie.

Thirteen minutes after its 9:17 departure from Ouagadougou airport, the Air Algerie pilot requested permission from air traffic control in Niger to divert its course to avoid another "aircraft" in the area. The other "aircraft" may have been a ground-launched missile picked up by the MD-83's weather radar. The United States operates a Top Secret program codenamed CREEK SAND from the military side of Ouagadougou Airport. From the airport, the U.S. Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency dispatches unmanned drones to fly over Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Visibility for Air Algerie 5017 was hampered by heavy rain clouds along the flight route. There was no contact with the aircraft some 50 minutes after it took off from Ouagadougou.

Obama's and Hillary Clinton's support for Ansar al-Sharia and other Libyan jihadist groups in the overthrow of Qaddafi led to the proliferation of Soviet-made and other weapons throughout the Sahara region. Sufian Ben Qhumu, alias Abu Faris, a former Guantanamo detainee, was released and then permitted by the CIA to form Ansar al-Sharia to battle against Qaddafi’s government. His fellow Guantanamo detainee is Abu Ayadh al-Tunis, the leader of Ansar al-Sharia-Tunisia.

Obama, Mrs. Clinton, and other members of the Obama administration bear full responsibility for the distribution of anti-aircraft weapons to radical groups like Ansar al Sharia, Ansar Dine, and in the Sahara region. These weapons include some 480 SA-24 "Grinch" shoulder-launched missiles, as well as the BUK missile system. On September 22, 2011, a senior intelligence official told The Daily Telegraph, "If the SA-24 missiles fall into the wrong hands then no civilian aircraft in the region will be safe from attack." 

Direct U.S. and NATO military support to Ansar al-Sharia turned the pan-Sahel region into a dangerous region for civilian aircraft. With the suspicious crash of Air Algerie 5017, the world must isolate and penalize the terrorist-supporting regime in Washington, DC. Governments around the world should issue visa bans against Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and other supporters of the Libyan terrorists. Assets of the Clinton Foundation held in foreign banks should be frozen and actions should be taken against U.S. defense companies, with asset freezes and travel bans issued against the corporate accounts and private accounts of officials of U.S. defense contractors involved in support for the Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, Harris Corporation, Boeing, and other companies involved in operations in support of the rebellion against Qaddafi in Libya. Particularly effective sanctions should be imposed on the most well-known French supporter of Libyan terrorists, Bernard-Henri Levy.

After the imposition of a sharia law Islamic state in Benghazi in 2012, Western observers and diplomats, according to The New York Times, were stunned to see the advanced weaponry on display by Ansar al Sharia forces. Much of it had been stolen from Libyan armories and warehouses. SA-7 portable shoulder-launched missiles from Libyan warehouses were found by Algerian authorities to be in the hands of jihadist insurgents operating in the Sahara region. Libyan anti-aircraft missiles have also made their way to Syrian rebels under the watchful eye of NATO. On September 14, 2012, The Times of London reported «a Libyan ship carrying the largest consignment of weapons for Syria since the uprising began has docked in Turkey and most of its cargo is making its way to rebels on the front lines.» The cargo included «SAM-7 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).»

Obama and the U.S. military-intelligence establishment must be taught a lesson that military equipment provided to terrorists that is subsequently used to attack civilian airliners, killing innocent passengers and crew members must be at a cost to those who allow terrorists and insurgents to be armed. The blood of innocent French, Burkinabe, Algerian, Canadian, German, and the citizens of other nations is now on Obama’s and Mrs. Clinton’s hands. They must be called to account before the courts of justice and world public opinion.

Where Francois Hollande looks weak and beleaguered on the national stage, registering as the most unpopular French president ever, his fortunes seem to rise abroad with a strident interventionist foreign policy. We saw that in September when the French president unseated the British as America’s «special friend» by declaring his country’s readiness to join Washington in a military assault on Syria. 

Elysée Palace may have subsequently regretted that particular gung-ho gambit after US President Barack Obama got cold feet and eventually backed away from military action in Syria, leaving Paris looking like a tin soldier. 

Nevertheless, we saw in Hollande’s Syria stance a man who appears more decisive and confident when it comes to an overseas matter, compared with his evident puny appearance at home assailed on different political fronts. 

This French activist tendency on foreign matters was on display again over the recent P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. Hollande and his foreign minister Laurent Fabius appointed themselves as the «defenders of Israel» and indulged in taking a «tough stand» during the three rounds of talks in Geneva. 

France’s old colonial stomping ground in Africa is also providing the Hollande government with a convenient counterfoil to domestic woes… The surprise military intervention in Mali last year benefited Hollande in the polls, with resurgence in French national pride from having successfully – superficially at least – defeated a secessionist Islamist movement in the West Africa country. 

The French intervention in Mali with 3,000 troops may yet come back to haunt Hollande as the putative «defeat» of rebels in the northern part of the country seems far from complete, with French soldiers coming under a spate of recent attacks even in the supposedly safe Francophile southern capital, Bamako. 

Also, France’s military intervention in Mali is placing thousands of French expatriate workers in several African countries at risk of kidnapping or reprisal killings as we saw with the murder of two journalists in the northern town of Kidal earlier this month. 

However, the cost-benefit analysis from French intervention in Africa seems to be in Hollande’s favor – so far. The French leader has, up to now, gained more purposefulness and profile among his population and internationally by his foreign policy posture. 

In this posture, Hollande is seen to be leading international interventions under the remit of humanitarian concern, restoring order in fractious states and defending French and even global security interests against assorted terrorist networks, particularly of the Islamist brand. Variations of this narrative have been invoked for recent French military action in Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Somalia. 

Of course, this cynical maneuver of foreign forays has long been used by many other political leaders trying to elude domestic duress, including Hollande’s predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy when the latter intervened with French military in Cote D’Ivoire in 2010 and as part of the NATO regime-change operation in Libya during 2011 – the year before Hollande was elected. 

This is the context for dramatic French claims last week that the Central African Republic is «on the verge of genocide». Hollande’s government is pushing for the United Nations Security Council to authorize a peacekeeping mission next month in that former French colony. Significantly, the mission being sought will involve French troops deployed along with an African Union force. 

Speaking on the state of affairs in the CAR, French foreign minister Laurent Fabius told France 2 TV last week: «It's total disorder… we need to act quickly.» He added: «You have seven surgeons for a population of five million, an infant mortality rate of 25 per cent in some areas, and 1.5 million people who have nothing, not even food, and armed gangs, bandits roaming around.»

The security situation in the Central African Republic is indeed of international concern. Since the coup against President Francois Bozizé in March earlier this year, the country no longer appears to have a functioning central government outside of the capital, Bangui. The new self-declared president, Michel Djotodia, has reportedly lost control of the rebel factions of the Seleka movement that brought him to power. This has led to a climate of lawlessness with reports of killings, looting and other violations. 

There is also renewed fighting between the rebel groups and remnant CAR forces loyal to the ousted president. Bozizé is reportedly living in exile in France. 

However, the French government’s dire assessment and the ulterior motives behind it are questionable. Due to lack of communications in remote parts of CAR, the exact security conditions are not known or verifiable. Reported deaths from violent clashes in recent weeks are in the dozens, not hundreds or thousands, as the French government’s alarmism would portend. 

Also when France’s Fabius was pressed on how many French soldiers would be dispatched to CAR under a UN peacekeeping operation, the foreign minister appeared to contradict his initial dramatic concern of «genocide». He said: «This intervention will be different from that in Mali», adding: "It will not be so massive nor as long [as in Mali].»

That is a curious anomaly in the official French rationale. Mali was reportedly threatened by a secessionist movement, whereupon France mounted Operation Serval with 3,000 troops in January 2013, backed up by helicopter gunships and state-of-the-art Rafale fighter jets. 

Yet, in the Central African Republic, which Hollande’s government is claiming is in much greater danger of disintegration – «on the verge of genocide» – the French foreign minister says that 600-700 troops will be sent there – less than a quarter dispatched to Mali, and with no back-up from helicopters or fighter jets. 

This contradiction suggests that Paris is playing disingenuous politics, and deliberately talking up a crisis in Central Africa.

For what reason, it may be asked? As mentioned, President Francois Hollande is finding foreign policy a welcome distraction and relief from angry French taxpayers, legions of unemployed, striking farmers and an ascendant far-right political wave that is galvanizing discontent over immigrants, poverty and general societal decay. In short, Hollande is on the political ropes and has been ever since his May 2012 election.

Where Hollande appears a pusillanimous figure at home, his government has salvaged some credibility with a muscular foreign policy.

We have seen this with regard to pugnacious French policy on Syria, Iran and Mali, among others, and now it would seem the Central African Republic is similarly being brought into play for what may be deemed implicit cynical reasons. 

There are other boons for French intervention in CAR. For a start, by soliciting a UN Security Council mandate, the French get important political cover from accusations that they are acting as neo-imperialists. Also, the financial cost of any such involvement will probably be borne by the «international community» rather than by Paris. In other words, French intervention in Central Africa under the Socialist Hollande would be, appropriately it might be said, subsidized, under the auspices of the UN.

Such a move is a tad cheeky, given that many lucrative advantages would reward renewed French presence in its former colony. With a population of only 4.6 million (seven per cent of France’s), the CAR is hugely endowed with natural resources. Diamonds, gold, copper, oil, prime agricultural land, timber and virgin forests, as well as vast hydropower potential owing to two major rivers that flow north into Chad and southwards to the Congo.

Of strategic importance are abundant reserves of uranium – the primary nuclear fuel. These reserves have so far been largely untapped in the CAR. France, which is heavily dependent on nuclear power for its electricity generation, is reportedly setting up a major new mining plant in the CAR to process uranium ore.  

The strategic value of uranium cannot be overstated as a vital national interest for France. This resource is common to other former French colonies in Africa, including Mali and Niger, where France has also been displaying much greater interventionist policies of late. 

The cruel irony is that the CAR is one of the poorest countries in Africa, ranked in the bottom 10 out of some 55 nations. With its tiny population and profuse natural resources, the CAR should be one of the most developed. The truth is that, the CAR is wracked with appalling poverty and underdevelopment because of decades of relentless French exploitation of its resources and finances, first as a colony up to 1960, and subsequently as a pseudo-independent country dominated by the Paris-controlled Franc Afrique monetary system.

As with all former French colonies in Africa, the CAR is compelled under the Franc Afrique system to deposit its foreign-exchange earnings in the National Treasury in Paris. France permits itself to earn financial interest on these deposits and to lend the money back to African countries also at interest. It is no wonder that these countries have remained in abject poverty and underdevelopment nearly five decades after so-called independence, or as French foreign minister Fabius lamented in the case of the CAR that it only has «seven surgeons» for the entire population. 

But the bitter irony runs even deeper. The CAR is described as a «failed state in permanent crisis». It has never known stable government because of incessant coups and counter-coups. French commandos have been involved in orchestrating some of these coup d’etats in the CAR, as in many other former French African colonies. 

In 1979, France lost patience with its long-time tyrant and mass-murderer in the Central African Republic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, and kicked him out. Again in 2003, French military intervened to install Francois Bozizé. Ten years later, the French puppet Bozizé was himself deposed by the Seleka rebels amid accusations of rampant corruption. 

So, the undoubted instability, chaos and poverty afflicting the Central African Republic can be traced directly to the ongoing legacy of French colonial interference in the internal affairs of that country. Paradoxically, France now appears to be emphasizing the outward symptoms of its mischievous covert meddling in the CAR in order to justify even more French intervention – an intervention that has got little to do with assisting the long-suffering people of that country and lot more to do with securing French selfish strategic interests, as well as giving a political bail-out to beleaguered President Hollande and his floundering government. 

As ever, as the case of the Central African Republic illustrates, impoverished Africa is performing the historic role assigned to it by French colonialism – propping up France and French politicians. The crying needs of African people – real independence and control of their resources – are a much-relegated concern.

First, yet another change of power has taken place, this time legally. The first round of voting for the presidential election in the Republic of Mali took place on July 28; 27 candidates took part. None of the candidates received an absolute majority of the votes, but voters mainly preferred former Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who received 40% of the votes, and former Minister of Finance Soumaïla Cissé (about 20% of the votes). The second round of voting took place August 11; Keïta won with 77% of the votes.

Although there are a number of factors which could be a basis for questioning the legality of these elections (holding the elections in wartime conditions, (1) lawsuits brought by some candidates in the country's Constitutional Court, and Soumaïla Cissé's conceding only after meeting with a representative of the Secretary General of the UN), observers pronounced the elections «free, transparent and credible».

The new president of Mali, 68-year-old Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, can justifiably be considered the patriarch of the Malian political arena. Unlike previous presidents, who had close ties with the socialist community (Amadou Toumani Touré studied and worked in the USSR, and Alpha Oumar Konaré studied and worked in the People's Republic of Poland), Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta has strong ties with the West. He graduated from several institutions of learning in France, including the Sorbonne, and has worked in European humanitarian organizations. From 1990 to 2001 he was the leader of the Alliance for Democracy party in Mali. From 1994 through 2000 he was the prime minister of Mali, and from 2001 through 2007 he was the chairman of the National Assembly (parliament). At the next to last presidential elections Keïta lost to Amadou Toumani Touré (who was overthrown in March 2012) with a result of 19% versus 71%. Now Keïta has won, but in a situation where his main rival has been overthrown and is unable to participate in political life…

Among the new president's first steps were ones intended to reinforce his power. In late October Keïta removed Amadou Sanogo, the organizer of the military coup of March 2012 (after the coup this captain was promoted to lieutenant general), from his post as the head of the military committee for monitoring the reform of the army and then arrested him. Furthermore, the government signed important agreements with several rebel groups and reestablished the Ministry of Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Development for northern Mali.

Second, one must make note of the military victories of the Malian army and the Franco-UN troops, which in turn has led to serious regroupings in the camp of the opposition and terrorist forces. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa, Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have sustained great losses, and their operational capabilities have been substantially undermined. These groups have disintegrated into smaller ones, and their fighters have mixed with the local population, fled to neighboring countries or joined other groups. New groups have formed, including the Islamic Movement for Azawad, the Azawad Supreme Council and the Arab Movement of Azawad. The first two groups consist mainly of fighters from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and Ansar Dine, and the Islamic Movement for Azawad later became part of the Azawad Supreme Council. As for the Arab Movement of Azawad, it is made up mainly of fighters of Arab origin. In late August the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa announced that it had merged with a splinter group from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb headed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar and formed a new group called Al-Mourabitoun.

Clashes between various opposition forces continue. For example, summer saw clashes between the Arab Movement of Azawad (AMA) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in Lerneb, west of Timbuktu, and near Lake Faguibine, to the north of Timbuktu. At the same time the AMA threatened to attack In Khalil, a post near the Algerian border in the Kidal region, from its position in In Afarak. On August 13 in Bordj Badji Mokhtar, which is in southern Algeria near the border with Mali, shooting between Arab and Tuareg groups broke out. It has been reported that as a result of these clashes dozens of people have been killed. There was a clash at In Khalid on August 14, presumably in connection with the incidents in Bordj Badji Mokhtar. 

Three and a half million people are currently suffering from a food shortage in Mali, and one and a half million are in need of emergency aid. (2)

Despite the media's almost complete neglect of the French invasion of Mali, Operation Serval continues. According to the Secretary General of the UN, there have been no major clashes recently, but significant quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives have been captured, and facilities for producing improvised explosive devices were uncovered. A total of thirteen tons of weapons and ammunition have been discovered. (3) According to the French government, no active military operations are currently being undertaken as part of Operation Serval. However, in the period since July 1, 2013 French military units participating in Operation Serval and the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) conducted around fifteen joint operations. (4)

On November 5 French Foreign Minister L. Fabius stated that French troops will remain in Mali until early 2014, when their planned withdrawal is due to begin. Now there are approximately 3,000 French troops in Mali. (5) Conducting operations is made difficult for MINUSMA and the French invasion forces not only by the military situation, but by the climate as well. 65% of Mali's territory (which is twice the size of France) is desert or semi-desert. The temperature in Timbuktu (the sector-west headquarters of MINUSMA) regularly reaches 50 degrees Celsius and higher. At such temperatures many military instruments simply melt. (6)

In evaluating the course of events in Mali after the French invasion in January 2013, it must be emphasized that the main result of this period was the replacement of the African Union peacekeeping operation (AFISMA) with a UN peacekeeping operation. Over 6,000 AFISMA personnel have been attached to MINUSMA.

Africans' fight with the «international community» for the right to solve its own problems independently is in an active phase and is progressing with intermittent success. The Africans were able to repel an attack from Belgium, which demanded the extradition of the former president of Chad Hissène Habré through the UN International Court of Justice (a special African tribunal was created for the proceedings), but they have not been able to stop the criminal prosecution of the president and deputy president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, in the International Criminal Court. Several days ago the member states of the African Union addressed the UN Security Council seeking a decision to defer proceedings on the Kenyatta-Ruto case in the ICC. (7) The fight for the right of Africans to conduct peacekeeping operations with their own forces has also been lost. The «international community» does not plan to leave Africa; a real solution to security issues on the African continent would threaten its control of African resources…

Hollande and other senior French government figures were at Charles de Gaulle airport, Paris, to pay respects as the coffins of the two journalists arrived amid a somber mood of national mourning. 

Ghislaine DuPont (57) and her 55-year-old colleague Claude Verlon were senior correspondents for national broadcaster Radio France Internationale (RFI). They were kidnapped last Saturday by armed men while on assignment in the northern Malian town of Kidal. Their bodies were later recovered that same day with multiple-bullet wounds, only 12 kilometers from they were first abducted. 

France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said grimly that the pair had been «assassinated in cold blood».

The attendance of Hollande and his ministers at the solemn repatriation of the two journalists’ remains contrasted with joyous scenes only last week when the French president greeted the arrival in Paris of four French former hostages. The four had been released after nearly three years held in captivity in Niger, which borders Mali to the east – both countries are former French colonies. 

The French government denies that it paid a ransom of $26 million to secure the release of the hostages. But there are strong suspicions that the French authorities did indeed facilitate a secret payment for the men’s freedom, along with their employer, the French nuclear energy company, Areva… 

There is no evidence that the kidnappers of the two journalists in Mali were trying to capitalize on a similar ransom deal. The rapid way in which they were murdered suggests not. 

But the linkage is that Hollande’s government is deeply worried about the political repercussions of its military intervention in Africa, adding to his already floundering record on domestic economic concerns… 

Recent opinion polls show that the Socialist Party president has the lowest popularity among any modern French leader, even outperforming his predecessor, the impish Nicolas Sarkozy, for incurring the public’s wrath. «France unites against Hollande,» said a recent headline in Britain’s Daily Telegraph. 

Hollande came to power in 2012, promising to fix the economy and languishing unemployment. On all scores he has failed miserably, with French economic and social conditions deteriorating even further since he came to office in May 2012. 

Hollande’s dramatic intervention in Mali in January this year to «defeat terrorism» looked like the hapless leader’s only policy success. The dispatch of 3,000 French troops to the former colony to shore up the Francophile government in the capital, Bamako, while suppressing a separatist challenge in the northern half of the country appeared to be a rare foreign policy achievement.

French ministers made gung-ho statements about how they would clear Mali of terrorists and restore order. Fulsome French media coverage celebrated the «liberation» of northern Mali from «radical Islamists» who had imposed draconian Sharia on the local population. There were hearty stories about how the local people came out to greet French soldiers with cries of «Vive La France!». For a while it seemed as if France was back as a world power, banishing memories of disastrous colonial-era defeats and more contemporary disgruntlement at home. French pride was soaring again, thanks to «noble, selfless endeavor» in Africa. 

In July, the French government hastily oversaw the convening of national elections in the impoverished African country for a new president. The exercise smacked of France trying to contrive an image of normality restored, despite the fact that out of the country’s 16 million population some two million are reckoned to not have regular access to food and up to one million people have been displaced largely by the recent conflict. Yet, absurdly, ahead of the presidential poll, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius vowed that special voting centers were being set up to enable even displaced Malians to cast their ballots. So much for democracy-in-action, French-style!

The election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keito was not without controversy, with some candidates who were critical of French intervention in their country, such as Oumar Mariko, protesting that their campaigns were stymied by the Francophile establishment in Bamako. 

Nevertheless, the election of Keito was trumpeted as «a success» by the French media and Western media generally. France also convened an international donors’ conference in Brussels that promised some $4 billion in foreign aid to Mali, and Paris said it would soon be handing over «peacekeeping duties» to a UN force comprising 12,000 troops from neighboring African countries. 

However, with 3,000 French military personnel still in Mali and a UN contingency nowhere near the promised numbers, it is a moot point that the order and national sovereignty exhorted by French politicians have been restored.

Indeed, the abduction and murder of two French journalists in broad daylight under the noses of French, UN and Malian army troops in the town of Kidal illustrates that, far from normality and order being restored, anarchy is reigning in large areas of northern Mali. 

The brutal deaths indicate that earlier French pride in «salvaging» democracy and rule of law in Mali was an illusion. And that is bound to worry Hollande and his ministers greatly.

Following the deaths, a resident of Kidal told France 24: «This is not surprising. The town is not secure, anyone can get in and out and do anything – these kinds of things happen every day».

A UN commander, Abdoulaye Bathily, from Senegal, added: "The truth is that in Kidal now there is no rule of law. Armed groups have not disarmed, despite a UN resolution requiring them to».

French broadcaster RFI, for which the two deceased journalists worked, made this telling report on the security situation prevailing in northern Mali. «Ansar Dine [Islamist] fighters have come back in the past few weeks, with total impunity. This is the context of anarchy in which terrorists murdered two journalists on Saturday».

Given the lawlessness of northern Mali, despite earlier French government claims to the contrary, it seems likely that Hollande and his ministers made special effort to secure the release of the four French hostages that were being held in Niger. The ransom figure of $26 million was reported by French newspaper Le Monde. 

While the four men were abducted by militants back in September 2010 their continuing captivity did not reflect well on Hollande’s supposed defeat of «Islamist terrorists» in Mali. If anything, the safety of the men appeared to be put more at risk, precisely because of the French president’s military interventionism. 

The Areva uranium processing plant near Arlit in Niger was bombed in May this year, causing several fatalities. That attack was claimed by jihadist group, the Movement for Unity and Justice in West Africa, as retribution for French military involvement in neighboring Mali. It is believed that the militants in Niger and Mali operate across borders – borders that, to them, are merely a neo-colonial construct bearing no relation to ancient common tribal heritage.

In the context of worsening security across northern Mali and mounting domestic woes, the Hollande government no doubt felt compelled to create a good news story by securing the release of the four hostages in Niger. 

Only in the space of one week, that feel-good factor sought by Hollande has been shattered by the tragic deaths of two French journalists, murdered while reporting in supposedly French-liberated northern Mali. 

But the anxiety for Hollande surely is that the angry French public are making the connection between the two events. Both are driven by blowback from Hollande’s meddling in African internal affairs – meddling that itself was driven by mendacious claims of supporting democracy and rule of law in former French colonies. 

The reality is that the French intervention was always about ulterior motives of trying to boost popularity in the polls and securing French commercial interests in North-West Africa. Some 80 per cent of France’s national energy is derived from nuclear power, delivered by companies like Areva, the second biggest uranium producer in the world. About one-third of France’s total uranium supply required for its 59 nuclear power plants is sourced from Niger and Mali. 

That is the real background to French neo-imperialism in Mali earlier this year under the guise of «defending democracy» – a policy that is now rebounding with the deaths of French nationals and the danger of more kidnappings. 

All in all, there is an ominous feeling that even more bad news is on the way for the hapless Hollande, both at home and abroad.