McFaul – Strategic Culture Foundation https://www.strategic-culture.org Strategic Culture Foundation provides a platform for exclusive analysis, research and policy comment on Eurasian and global affairs. We are covering political, economic, social and security issues worldwide. Sun, 10 Apr 2022 20:53:47 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.16 The Case for Neutrality to Defuse Crisis With Russia https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2022/01/14/the-case-for-neutrality-to-defuse-crisis-with-russia/ Fri, 14 Jan 2022 15:24:24 +0000 https://www.strategic-culture.org/?post_type=article&p=777133 Faced with the certainty of the destruction of their country, most Ukrainians would settle for peace through neutrality, writes Scott Ritter.

By Scott RITTER

According to Axios, Jake Sullivan, national security advisor for President Joe Biden, convened a Zoom conference of erstwhile Russian experts to sound out possible policy options going into this week’s triple round of talks with Russia on European security. “By soliciting advice from the hawkish pockets in the foreign policy establishment,” Axios noted, “including those who served under former President Trump, the Biden administration is considering all options while weighing how to discourage Russian President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine—and punish him if he does.”

How the solicitation of advice from “hawkish pockets in the foreign policy establishment” translates into “considering all options” is a matter for another time. The point here is that the Biden administration, rather than searching for a potential compromise position which could avert conflict in Europe while attaining legitimate national security goals and objectives for the United States, sought out a literal echo chamber of nonsensical advice from like-minded individuals who have spent the past two decades wallowing in their hate and disdain for Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin.

Michael McFaul, the former Obama administration Russian expert who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Russia from 2012-2014, and who has famously clashed with Putin’s Russia over time, noted the wisdom of Sullivan seeking “to engage with outsiders…including those who may disagree with him,” while declining to say whether he himself participated in the call.

A Hawk’s Demands

While McFaul has opted to remain silent on any advice he may have imparted if he had, in fact, been a part of that call, one doesn’t have to delve too far into the realm of speculation to get a feel for both the tenor and content of what such advice might have looked like. In a recent tweet responding to a statement made last year by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov that Russia was demanding a “ironclad” guarantee that “Ukraine and Georgia will never ever become a member of NATO,” McFaul responded with a tweet of his own, declaring:

“And I want a ‘waterproof’ ‘ironclad’ ‘bulletproof’ guarantee Russia will end its occupation of Ukrainian and Georgian territories, will never invade Ukraine or Georgia again and will stop its efforts to undermine democracy in Ukraine & Georgia.”

McFaul’s tweet was reflective of an overall policy position which sought the reversal of what he viewed as Russian usurpation of the territory of three European states—Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. After the Russian government published the text of a draft treaty calling for a guarantee that the United States would not seek to establish military bases “in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” or “use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them”, McFaul proposed additional articles to the draft treaty in which:

  • Russia agrees to withdraw its forces from Moldova and restore full sovereignty to this European country;
  • Russia agrees to withdraw its forces from Georgia, renounce recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries and restore the full sovereignty of Georgia; and
  • Russia agrees to withdraw its forces from Ukraine, return Crimea to Ukraine, stop supporting separatist forces in Ukraine, and restore the full sovereignty of this European country.

McFaul in 2016. (Rod Searcey/Wikimedia Commons)

While there is little doubt that McFaul, who has been loath to find any common ground with Putin’s Russia, was seeking to counter what he viewed as a non-sensical Russian proposal with a non-sensical response, the fact is that if one departs for a moment from a world where the concept of genuine cooperation based upon a willingness to compromise (i.e., real diplomacy) governed as a matter of course, the former U.S. ambassador to Russia may have actually hit upon a formula that could allow the U.S. and NATO to sustain their no-compromise stance on NATO’s “open door” policy while respecting Russia’s insistence on a NATO-free presence in non-NATO former Soviet Republics.

The notion that Russia would agree to withdraw assets from Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova on its own volition is, of course, a non-starter. This is especially true if NATO was considering allowing any of these three states membership. However, if one is to accept the premise that it is the sovereign right of any nation to freely associate with whom it chooses (the cornerstone of NATO’s “open door” policy”), then the opposite is true as well—it is the sovereign right of any nation to choose neutrality.

A Proposed Deal

This is the missing ingredient in McFaul’s tongue-in-cheek formulation—that in exchange for a binding commitment by Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia to permanently opt out of joining any military alliance, while retaining the sovereign right to interact with the community of nations politically and economically as they best see fit, Russia would undertake measures designed to further the sovereignty of those states, to include the following:

  • The withdrawal of all troops from the territory of the Republic of Georgia, inclusive of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a rescindment of Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and Russian diplomatic assistance in facilitating both South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Georgian sovereign control;
  • The withdrawal of all troops from Transnistria (Moldova), and the rescindment of any recognition of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, and Russian diplomatic assistance in facilitating the return of Transnistria to Moldovan sovereign control; and
  • Full Russian support for the cessation of hostilities in Donbas and Lugansk, and an agreement on the recognition of Ukrainian interest in Crimea that does not infringe on Russian security or sovereignty.

McFaul and his ilk would never agree to such a trade-off, for the obvious reasons. But the people of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine might. First and foremost, so long as there are outstanding disputes involving the territorial integrity of a nation, NATO rules preclude any notion of full membership, if for no other reason that NATO does not want Article 5 to be invoked on day one of a nation joining NATO.

Russian peacekeepers at border crossing between Transnistria and Moldova, 2014. (Clay Gilliland/Wikimedia Commons)

As such, until which time Russia changes its posture on Transnistria, Georgia, and Ukraine, NATO membership is an impossibility. In short, those Moldavans, Georgians, and Ukrainians who believe that the future well-being of their respective nation hinges on NATO membership are cutting their own throats.

For Georgians especially, the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a rowing domestic political problem. If given a choice between being able to return to their homes and live in peace as a neutral nation, or to die far away from home because your government pursued the false hope of salvation through NATO membership, I’m certain most Georgians would choose home and neutrality.

A Resolution in Ukraine

For Ukraine, the choice is even starker—their government’s pursuit of NATO membership will almost certainly result in the destruction of their nation. NATO has already said it will not intervene to prevent this destruction, and Russia is almost certain to make an example out of Ukraine to intimidate the rest of Europe. Faced with the certainty of the destruction of their country, most Ukrainians would settle for peace and some sort of face-saving measure on Crimea.

The idea of a neutral Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine does not in any way compel NATO to rescind its “open door” policy toward membership—the thing about an “open door” is that nations are free not to walk through it. By offering real solutions to real problems, Russia and the U.S./NATO could resolve the current impasse regarding European security.

And the establishment of a neutral bloc could lead to further de-escalation, including the reduction of military forces along the NATO-Russian frontier, the end of provocative military exercises in the Black Sea and NATO-Russia periphery, and a ban on weapons systems, such as missile defense and intermediate-range missiles, deemed to be destabilizing.

Unfortunately, this kind of compromise is virtually impossible to consider today. I would bet a dime to a dollar that not a single one of the Russian experts approached by Jake Sullivan for guidance regarding the recently completed round of negotiations with Russia would endorse such a policy line, if for no other reason that it would end the raison d’etre for NATO’s continued existence in the post-Cold War era, and it would solidify Russian President Putin as a rational actor, something the anti-Putin crowd—McFaul included—could never tolerate, as it would diminish their own niche relevance.

The U.S. and NATO are hell-bent on containing and rolling back Russian influence and power, at the cost of the very security they claim to be promoting and defending. The nations that will bear the brunt of the cost of this hubris-laced adventurism—Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine—are but an afterthought to NATO, little more than useful pawns in a greater game of geopolitical dominance.

If offered the choice between peace and war, if the cost was neutrality, I am certain where most Moldovans, Georgians, and Ukrainians would vote. This is, of course, why the U.S. and NATO will never give them such an option.

consortiumnews.com

]]>
The Worse the Better – How Twitter Views Kazakhstan https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2022/01/09/the-worse-the-better-how-twitter-views-kazakhstan/ Sun, 09 Jan 2022 17:00:53 +0000 https://www.strategic-culture.org/?post_type=article&p=777048 By Paul ROBINSON

Various commentators have suggested that I write something about recent events in Kazakhstan. I’ve been loath to do so since my knowledge of the country is very limited, but there are some interesting things to say about what others have been writing on the topic, particularly concerning how it all relates to Russia. Notably, a certain part of the online commentariat has been keen to express indignation that Russia has “invaded” Kazakhstan to suppress a “democratic revolution”.

The rapid spread of violence in Kazakhstan generated hopes in some circles that the mob would topple the “regime” and install a new government that would somehow or other distance the country from Russia. Alternatively, the hope was that “democracy” would arrive in Kazakhstan. With this, another brick in the wall of authoritarianism would collapse, bringing closer the day when it would collapse in Russia too.

All this was somewhat unspoken, but once the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Russia, announced that it would send troops to help restore order in Kazakhstan, and once Kazakh forces took the offensive and began clearing away anti-government protestors, all these hopes were dashed. The Kazakh government isn’t out of the woods yet. Protests continue in several cities, and things could still go horribly wrong. But at the moment it’s looking like the regime will survive. The internet’s keyboard warriors and online regime changers are seriously annoyed and looking for someone to blame. The guilty party is obvious – Russia.

However, despite the headlines in today’s newspapers about Russia sending troops to “quell” the uprising, the Kazakh state’s survial has little to do with the Russians or the CSTO. It seems as if the CSTO contingent in Kazakhstan will amount to no more than about 2,500 troops, which for a country that size is a tiny quantity. The role of the CSTO is largely symbolic – it sends a message to protestors and Kazakh security forces alike that the government isn’t backing down and has powerful external support. That should deter some of the former while putting a bit of steel in the spines of the latter. Perceptions of strength matter in situations like this, and thus the CSTO’s support perhaps makes a slight difference. But the hard work of restoring order belongs largely to the Kazakhs themselves. Whatever the press tells you, “Russia” isn’t “putting down” the uprising.

Nor can it be said that Russia has “invaded” Kazakhstan, as so many have liked to claim this past week on Twitter. Take for instance all these Tweets from the likes of one-time US Ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul and former Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves

Various themes repeat themselves in all these: invasion, occupation, the “crushing” of democracy, and comparisons of Russia with Nazi Germany. It is, to be frank, more than a little over the top. You can’t invade, let alone occupy, a country the size of Kazakhstan with only 2,500 troops. Furthermore, the troops are there at the invitation of the internationally recognized government – recognized by us in the West as well as by everybody else. That’s hardly an invasion.

Maybe it’s because I’m a total reactionary, but I’m not too fond of the mob, and I’ve never understood why street protest (accompanied by looting and burning) is associated with democracy. The thing is that all those complaining about the efforts to restore order in Kazakhstan aren’t too fond of the mob either, at least when it starts attacking things that they like. A year ago, McFaul and others were complaining loudly about the crowd that assaulted the Capitol building in Washington DC. And none of those whose Tweets I copied above were to be seen complaining when the Ukrainian military responded to protests in Donbass by firing rockets from aircraft and shells from multiple launch rocket systems.

Somehow, though, people are rather inclined to like the mob when it attacks somebody or something they don’t like. If it’s anti-American, that’s bad. But if rioting and looting damages Russian interests – they’re all for it.

But here’s what really gets me. Do the McFauls and Ilveses truly believe that it would be better for Kazakhstan if the Russians and CSTO didn’t help restore order and the state collapsed? There’s a very real danger of at best anarchy and at worst civil war. How would that help anybody? We’ve seen this scenario before. In Ukraine, revolution led to counter-revolution and bloody violence. In Syria, likewise. And so on. It tends not to turn out well.

But it seems like people don’t care. The attitude appears to be “The worse the better”, as long as the chaos is not at home but on Russia’s borders. Let Kazakhstan descend into anarchy – that’s to be preferred to an order backed by the Russians. Suffice it to say, I don’t agree.

irrussianality.wordpress.com

]]>
Washington’s Clueless Ambassadors: Damaging American Interests Is Their Legacy https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2021/08/12/washington-clueless-ambassadors-damaging-american-interests-is-their-legacy/ Thu, 12 Aug 2021 20:18:06 +0000 https://www.strategic-culture.org/?post_type=article&p=747681 Part of the problem is that many U.S. ambassadors do not know what their job consists of, Phil Giraldi writes.

Whenever one gets into discussions about the decline of America’s ability to positively influence developments around the world a number of issues tend to surface. First is the hubristic claim by successive presidents that the United States is somehow “exceptional” as a polity while also serving as the world’s only superpower and also the anointed Leader of the Free World, whatever that is supposed to mean. Some critics of the status quo also have been willing to look a bit deeper, recognizing that it is the policies being pursued by the White House and Congress that are out of sync with what is actually happening in Asia, Africa and Latin America, being more driven by establishing acceptable narratives than by genuine interests.

The problem starts at the top. One can hardly have a great deal of respect for presidents who appointed neocon or neoliberal ideologues Condoleezza Rice, Madeleine Albright, Hillary Clinton, Mike Pompeo or current incumbent Tony Blinken as Secretaries of State, but when all is said and done the area where the U.S. fails is most egregiously is in the personnel it actually sends overseas. It has far more non-professional ambassadors than any other country in the world. Does the American public know, for example, that fully 44% of American Ambassadors sent overseas under Donald Trump were political appointees, whose sole distinction in many cases is that they contributed large sums of money to the Republican National Committee? Though such individuals can sometimes turn out to be surprisingly effective, many frequently know nothing of the country that they have been assigned to and do not speak the local language. To cite my own experience, in my 21 years as an intelligence officer spent mostly in Europe I did not once work for an ambassador who was a Foreign Service Officer career diplomat and few of the political appointees I knew never bothered to learn the local language.

Part of the problem is that many U.S. ambassadors do not know what their job consists of. Ambassadors have existed since the time of the ancient Greeks. They were from the beginning granted a special immunity which enabled them to talk to enemy spokesmen to attempt to resolve issues without resort to arms. In the modern context, Ambassadors are sent to reside in foreign capitals to provide some measure of protection for traveling citizens and also to defend other perceived national interests. Ambassadors are not soldiers, nor are they necessarily the parties of government that ultimately make decisions on what to do when dealing with a foreign nation. They are there to provide a mechanism for exchanging views to create a dialogue while at the same time working with foreign governments to avoid conflict, whether over trade or politics. They should be bridge-builders who explain how American politics function, how the American government works, and at the same time educate Americans on how the country they are based in sees the United States.

By all these metrics, the U.S. diplomatic effort has been a failure and, at the end of the day, the United States taxpayer spends astonishing sums of money to support its global representational and security structures that provide little in return, rarely experiencing any notable successes and watching the reputation of the U.S. decline due to sheer ineptness. In my experience, the worst U.S. Ambassadors tend to be academics, which brings us to Michael McFaul, who served as Ambassador to Russia under Barack Obama from 2012-2014.

To be sure, viewing Russia as an enemy is a bipartisan impulse among the Washington political class. The neoconservatives and their neoliberal allies have both long been dreaming of regime change for Moscow, either because it is perceived as a threat or as an unacceptable autocracy. Given that, the appointment of Stanford Academic and Russia expert McFaul as Ambassador was intended to “reset” the bilateral relationship while also pushing the democracy promotion agenda and confronting various aspects of the domestic policies of the Vladimir Putin government that were considered unacceptable, to include the treatment of homosexuals. Pursuing that end, McFaul made a point of openly meeting with the political opposition in Russia. He thereby antagonized the officials in the government that he should have been working with to bring about acceptable change to such an extent that his term of office became untenable and he was an embarrassing failure.

But now McFaul has turned the usual Washington trick, converting failure into personal success. He is a regular go-to guy when Democrats either in Congress or in the White House need expert testimony on Russia and he is reliably a passionate supporter of the largely unsustainable Russiagate tale and all that implies. He is again a tenured professor at Stanford, where another top government failure Condi Rice, she of “mushroom cloud” fame, serves as Director of the Hoover Institution.

McFaul was recently bothered by what he described as an anonymous presumed “Russian troll” attack on twitter which had referred to his failure as Ambassador to Russia. This is how he responded: “I have a job for life at the best university in the world. I live in a giant house in paradise. I make close to a million dollars a year. I have adoring fans on tv and half a million followers on twitter 99% who also admire me. I’m doing just fine without a damn visa from Russia. And I am not afraid to tweet under my own name. I feel sorry for people like you who aren’t brave enough to do so.”

Not surprisingly, McFaul’s message, which was replayed in a number of places on the internet, struck many as a bit over the top, dripping with entitlement and self-esteem coming from someone who had been given an important government job and had only succeeded in making matters worse. He responded to the criticism by tweeting an addendum: “I wrote than message in a private channel. I did not expect it to be published. But it was still a mistake, I apologize. It was arrogant and idiotic. A swarm of Russian trolls was accusing me of failure, and I responded in a most unprofessional way. Explanation, not excuse.”

Well, it’s nice to hear an apology for a change from anyone associated with the United States government, but the point is that McFaul is symptomatic of much of what is wrong in terms of how the White House makes policy impulsively and appoints poorly informed ideologues to implement what has been decided. McFaul is not unique. President Donald Trump certainly set a precedent in providing a whole group of incompetents to support the clueless Mike Pompeo at State, to include Nikki Haley at the United Nations, Rick Grenell in Germany, David Friedman in Israel, and the ubiquitous John Bolton at the National Security Council. It is almost as if in the area of foreign policy, the United States government as it is currently configured is designed to fail.

The solution is obvious. The United States desperately needs a foreign policy that is based on genuine national interests. It needs to stop rewarding political donors and needs also to send people as Ambassadors who are sensitive to the culture and red lines existing in the countries where they are posted. That doesn’t mean approving what others do, but it does mean listening to what they have to say. If one wants to restore America’s credibility and its reputation, examining the McFaul experience in Russia should be an excellent learning tool and taking steps so as not to repeat that failure would be a good place to start.

]]>
Naming the Top Anti-Russian Advocates https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/10/23/naming-top-anti-russian-advocates/ Tue, 23 Oct 2018 07:55:00 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2018/10/23/naming-top-anti-russian-advocates/ As is true with RT's listing of top Russophobes for 2017, I take issue with some of its choices for that grouping in 2018.

When compared to the leading hardcore Russophobes, Michael McFaul comes across more as being a diva, seeking to maintain a niche within the anti-Russian leaning US establishment. McFaul is on record for saying that he doesn't accept the notion that Russia is inherently prone to negative attributes and bad relations with the West. Given that view and the existing status quo of folks out there, he's arguably not a top ten Russophobe.

Bill Browder is considered a Russophobe by a twist of fate. Prior to his falling out of favor with the Russian authorities, Browder was characterized by some anti-Russian leaning elements as a Kremlin shill. Browder's main focus of criticism is the Russian president and government at large. As is true of McFaul, the available choices indicate that Browder is arguably not a top ten Russophobe.

Several names come to mind that IMO should make a top ten Russophobe list for 2018. Granted, the difficulty in choosing people for such, as there're numerous individuals worthy of consideration.

Whether in 2017 or this year, it's surprising that the outgoing Trump administration UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, didn't get a top Russophobe ranking by RT. During her time as UN ambassador, Haley has spoken about the need to slap Russia, adding that the US and Russia can never be friends.  

An acquaintance describes the Washington Examiner's Tom Rogan, as exhibiting the worst Anglo-American ignorance and arrogance against Russia. Rogan's often enough, unchallenged, Russia related commentary at some leading American media venues, is a tell all sign of US mass media shortcomings – when it comes to having a reasonably balanced presentation of views.

Rogan called for the Kiev regime to bomb the bridge linking Crimea with the rest of Russia. That advocacy of his received attention in Russia.

Rogan recently wrote a very inept piece on the situation with Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine. Whether he likes it or not, a noticeable number of people in the former Ukrainian SSR, don't oppose the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is loosely affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC-MP). That established Ukrainian Orthodox Church (also known as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, UOC-MP) didn't ask for the Kiev regime and/or the Constantinople (in Istanbul) Patriarchate to get involved with its matters. Note that the Washington Examiner appears to be otherwise prone to support the desire for a separation between church and state.

In conjunction with the Kiev regime, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (formed in 1992) that sought autocephaly approval from the Constantinople Patriarchate, is headed by Filaret Denisenko, who for decades supported the Moscow Patriarchate's ties with the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. He changed course after not getting a promotion within the Moscow Patriarchate. A noticeable number of individuals in Kiev regime controlled Ukraine support Denisenko's changed position. That aspect doesn't deny the noticeable existence of those in that territory who support the UOC-MP.

The Constantinople Patriarchate doesn't have the same centralized authority as the Vatican. There's good reason to believe that some form of payola might be at play between the corrupt nationalist Kiev regime and the Constantinople Patriarchate. One is hard pressed to find any of the national Orthodox churches (recognized by the Constantinople Patriarchate) supporting the Constantinople Patriarchate's decision to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. If anything, there's a near unanimous to complete agreement of these national Orthodox churches, favoring the position of the UOC-MP and ROC-MP, to not have the Constantinople Patriarchate grant an autocephaly status to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Among the UOC-MP and ROC-MP faithful (as well as some others), there's a reasonable concern that the Kiev regime and Denisenko's church will use the Constantinople Patriarchate's decision as a basis to seize UOC-MP property. Further complicating matters is the existence of a third and smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church, known as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

Contrary to Rogan, the ROC-MP and Russian government aren't nationalistically interwoven with each other, in the way that he so very inaccurately suggests. Despite the Kremlin's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, the ROC-MP recognizes Orthodox Christian property in these areas as being with the Georgian Orthodox Church. Likewise, the UOC-MP continues to maintain jurisdiction over Orthodox Christian property in Crimea, which is now part of Russia.

As I noted, the sports world has experienced a good deal of overtly anti-Russian advocacy. This situation leads to three individuals with top ten anti-Russian credentials.

Travis Tygart is a US legal sports politico, who has repeatedly sought a collective ban on all Russian athletes – something he has never collectively advocated against any other national group of athletes.

Sebastian Coe heads the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), that still has a ban on Russia, unlike the International Olympic Committee. In 2016, Coe actively sought to have Russian drug cheat turned "whistleblower", Yulia Stepanova compete in the Rio Summer Olympics, unlike the clean medal contending Russian track and field athletes, who were unfairly banned from that competition. Coe apparently approves of Stepanova uncritically participating in a German aired propaganda film, that made a broad unproven claim against Russia's top track and field athletes.

Rune Andersen serves under Coe at the IAAF. Andersen suggested the possibility of banning clean Russian track and field athletes from competing as neutrals, if the Russian sports authorities don't acknowledge all of the core claims made in the quite faulty McLaren report.

Photo: flickr

]]>
An Unhealthy Trump-Putin Summit Fallout https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/07/29/an-unhealthy-trump-putin-summit-fallout/ Sun, 29 Jul 2018 08:55:00 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2018/07/29/an-unhealthy-trump-putin-summit-fallout/ Past summit locations suggest that the US could host the next summit between the Russian and American leaders. Such meetings have alternated between their two countries and some others. As I correctly surmised, the aftermath of the last Putin-Trump meeting in Helsinki, saw top heavy anti-Russian and anti-Putin theatrics, which stand in the way of improved relations. That mindset will be even more evident at a US hosted Putin-Trump summit, that (via media) was presented by the US president for this coming autumn.

It comes as no surprise that Trump has walked back his call to host that meeting. Since the announcement of that proposed summit, there've been a series of heavy handed measures taken against Putin and Russia by the US political establishment. From his vantage point, Putin has no good reason to encourage an ensuing freak show against his country and himself. Following the back and forth on a US based Putin-Trump summit, the Russian president has offered to host a meeting between him and his American counterpart.

Meantime, Trump's excessively obnoxious (if not bigoted) UN ambassador Nikki Haley, carries on with singling out Russia as a country that the US can never be friends with – never minding that:

– Germany and Britain each fought two major wars against the US  

– with Japan having carried out the surprise Pearl Harbor attack.

In contrast, US-Russian relations have had better instances throughout the course of history. All this gets downplayed by a US mass media, which continues to subconsciously influence many Americans to have a negatively misguided view about Russia. With other interests to consider, most Americans don't go the extra yard to fully get hold of and ponder the counter views aired by such non-mainstream media sources like the Real News Network, where the likes of Michael Isikoff get challenged, much unlike his US mass media puff appearances.

Following the Trump proposed US venue for the next US-Russia summit, the heads of the US Senate and House of Representatives (both Republicans) went out of their way to say that Putin wouldn't be welcome. For his part, Trump said that Russia will be pushing for the Democrats in the upcoming fall midterm election. Russia continues to be a convenient punching bag for the US political elites.

One of the absurdities involves the coverage of Putin's proposal to cooperate with the John Mueller led FBI investigation on the supposed Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential election. At the Helsinki press conference, Putin reasonably offered a reciprocal arrangement wherein US authorities could question the 12 indicted (by Mueller) Russians in Russia (Russian law prohibits that country from turning them over to a foreign country), with the Russian government having a similar arrangement with Michael McFaul and Bill Browder.  

The US mass media coverage of Browder has been appallingly lame. Likewise, McFaul has inaccurately presented Putin's proposal, with US mass media support. A July 19 aired CNN segment highlighted a McFaul tweet, saying that the Stalin era Soviet government had never attempted to arrest Americans – something that I later found to be untrue. The obvious intent of that communication was to cast the otherwise erroneous image of the Stalin era USSR with contemporary Russia.

Can anyone imagine the USSR of that period hosting a major event like the World Cup, with rave reviews from thousands of attending foreigners? Did Stalin, ever face the kind of live critical questioning which Putin has faced? As a follow-up to that rhetorical question, McFaul and the US mass media hosts who deal with him are regularly shielded from high profile constructive criticism, much unlike Putin.   

Does McFaul have something to hide? The Russian government hasn't indicted him, while indicating a willingness to question the Stanford academic in the US.

]]>
US ambassador confirms Obama to visit Moscow in September https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/07/09/us-ambassador-confirms-obama-to-visit-moscow-in-september/ Tue, 09 Jul 2013 02:07:27 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2013/07/09/us-ambassador-confirms-obama-to-visit-moscow-in-september/ U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul said he is busy preparing President Barack Obama’s upcoming visit to Moscow and St. Petersburg in September.

“I’m busy preparing President Obama’s trip to Moscow and St. Petersburg in September. I am very much looking forward to it,” McFaul said on his Twitter account on Monday, July 8.

The ambassador thus denied Kommersant’s article that quoted a source in the U.S. Department of State as saying that Obama might cancel his visit to Moscow in September if former CIA agent Edward Snowden is still in Russia by that time.

The Kremlin responded by saying that it was unaware of any such plans on the part of the U.S. administration.

“We are completely unaware of this,” presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told ITAR-TASS earlier in the day. “The visit is being prepared,” he added.

A Russian expert believes that Venezuela would be the best asylum for Snowden.

“Asylum for Snowden in Venezuela would be the best solution,” State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Alexei Pushkov wrote on his Twitter account. “That country is in acute conflict with the United States and this can’t make things worse.”

“In fact, he can’t live at Sheremetyevo [Airport in Moscow],” he added.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro offered “humanitarian asylum” to Snowden in order “to protect him from prosecution of the world’s most powerful governments.”

Maduro made the offer on Friday, July 5, addressing a military parade marking the 202nd anniversary of the country’s independence.

In his opinion, Snowden “did nothing but say the truth” and got prosecuted “by the most powerful empire in the world”.

The Kremlin said Obama’s visit to Russia scheduled for this autumn may begin in Moscow and continue in St. Petersburg where a G20 summit is to be held on September 5-6.

“We proposed a full-scale visit [by Obama], the invitation was handed over last year and we will now be working on concrete parameters of this visit,” presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said earlier.

“We would prefer it [the visit] to take place in Moscow and then the two presidents could continue working at the G20 in St. Petersburg,” he said.

At the same time, the aide said the programme of the visit “is not fully agreed yet.”

“This is routine diplomatic work. There will be a meeting of the two presidents in Northern Ireland first [at the G8 summit on June 17-18],” Ushakov said.

Itar-Tass

]]>
«US Duel Track Engagement Policy» Towards Russia https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/01/21/us-duel-track-engagement-policy-towards-russia/ Sat, 21 Jan 2012 07:17:28 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2012/01/21/us-duel-track-engagement-policy-towards-russia/ January 16 – 20 was the first working week of Michael McFaul, the new US ambassador to Russia.  He had a whole series of formal and informal meetings. His get together behind close doors with Russia’s «non-systematic» opposition, emotionally inadequate speech at the Gaidar’s forum called «Russia and World: 2012-2020», as well as social networks statements made literally the very first days he took office gave rise to  unconcealed outrage and even indignation in Moscow’s social and political circles.  

What mission the new fledged ambassador is going to perform? Who’s interests it’s going to serve? What’s the purpose of his coming to Russia? And actually is he really an ambassador if he ignores once traditional professional diplomatic functions, one of them is by and large the same in all the countries: to strengthen relations between the country of accreditation and the one of your own. What do the representatives of «non-systematic» opposition have to do in the US Moscow Embassy in anticipation of presidential election? Money? Moral support? Paid US trips? 

Fighting authorities in Russia for US money is a lucrative business. That’s the conclusion one may come to looking at the wealth of Boris Nemtsov, the most well known guest in Spaso House, the US ambassadors residence in Moscow, said one of Russia’s bloggers. The long duration meeting with McFaul showed who’s side the representatives of «non-systematic» opposition are on, said another known Russia’s blogosphere interlocutor.  

The former Stanford professor he went up the state career ladder thanks to anti Russian materials and recommendations.  With strong support from the State Department even after critical remarks made upon him here he plans to go on with his disgraceful activities.  «The most important part of my job will be to foster more contacts between the people of the United States and the people of Russia. I’m interested in meeting not only government officials, but people from other political parties and movements, businessmen, civil society activists and regular Russians», – said the head of US diplomatic Moscow office in his video blog. It will be all done under the pretext of fostering contacts with «fighters for democracy», the democracy of the US brand that, as many Americans testify, is far from ideal, to put it mildly. The ambassador even called such meetings «a duel track policy». «Duel track» on the way to where? Overt and, at the same time, covert diplomacy under the pretext of «fostering contacts»?  

Many Russian observers and bloggers think the Michael McFaul’s mission, that started in such a strange way, is to destabilize internal situation in Russia, incite wide scale anti government protests, introduce new pro-Western activists into Russian power structures, as well influence the Russian information space in the negative way.     

«I’m very excited to be here in Russia in this new job to continue and strengthen the reset.», – the ambassador wrote on the US Embassy in Moscow website. But will his actions strengthen it?   Do really the adventurist actions mentioned above serve the purpose of «reset» in the US-Russian relations? 

To the contrary, they rather make see that the current US administration intends to continue tough pressure on Russia. It’s not  military actions only, like deploying missile defense elements and tactical nuclear weapons near its borders, but simultaneous strong information political pressing as well. In fact, it’s not «reset» of bilateral relations, but rather their «overcharge», the word written in Russian on the symbolic button presented by State Secretary Hillary Clinton to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Geneva a few years ago.  So it happens that the new US ambassador to Moscow, the one who has the reputation of founding father of the «reset» of the US policy towards Kremlin, is in reality a driving force of  «overcharge» of the US – Russian relations, that, even without it, are stagnated in practically all core aspects (with rare exception)  of broad arms control agenda.    

That’s why it can be said with good reason that his Gaidar’s forum statement about the improvement of relations between Moscow and Washington being the core goal of his tenure in Russia is a tirade to distract attention, the way the Russian proverb puts it «honey is sweet but the bee stings».   

Here it’s hard to disagree with William Miller, former US ambassador to Ukraine, who, talking to the Voice of America Russian service,  gave advise to Michael McFaul to work closely exclusively with the Russian government. He said the Michael McFaul’s mission was to promote further integration of new Russia and the West, the process that doesn’t have a long history – only twenty years. So whatever is to be done further exceeds by far what has been achieved before, – as the American diplomat put it.    

But the grandiose amount of work lying ahead for US-Russia relations development could never be done by meeting those who don’t determine neither foreign nor internal Russian policy. Including by Michael McFaul. So it’s doubtful he will justify the high trust of President Barack Obama. That’s something to think about. 

]]>
Ambassador with diploma in «color revolution» https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/01/08/ambassador-with-diploma-in-color-revolution/ Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:00:05 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2012/01/08/ambassador-with-diploma-in-color-revolution/ US National Security Senior Director of Russian and Eurasian Affairs until recently, Michael McFaul, a 48 year old Stanford University professor, was appointed US ambassador to Russia at the end of last year. He’s widely known as someone who initiated the “reset” Russian policy but not only.

A long time Russia scholar, he has written about 20 books and many articles about Russian internal politics. At he same time, the newly fledged ambassador has rich experience in organizing color revolution in the post Soviet space.

It is confirmed by his monographs like: Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000, Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Рostcommunist World and Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can, as well as his own admissions during public appearances and US Congress special hearings. It was Michael McFaul who was the author of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) final report on specifics of working with Ukrainian electorate before the 2004 Ukraine elections, when Victor Yushchenko snatched victory that was widely noted by the US establishment.

A fluent Russian speaker, the new Washington envoy has already been to Russia and Ukraine many a time to study all walks of life voters opinions in order to find ways to influence them. He also took the most active part in working out and bringing into life political election technologies in the post Soviet space.

As he confessed publicly American non-government organizations spent totally $ 18,3 million to support Victor Yushchenko in the Ukraine presidential election in 2004. Though a history now, it’s curious to see how the US dollars were spent before and during the vote.

As the new US ambassador to Moscow recalls, the money came mainly through USAID channels and was spent along five directions for propaganda and information to be distributed among the voters, as well as among the electoral committees. As Michael McFaul said the money defined the outcome of the Ukrainian 2004 elections that was greeted so enthusiastically in Washington.

Upon his recommendation in the capacity of chief funds distributor, the major part of all these financial flows, $ 12,45 million or 68% of the total sum to be exact, was spent on the elections monitoring and spurring efforts of various political parties to come out in support of Victor Yushchenko.

The money went to support the mission of 250 US observers working for the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) that organized the work of all political parties and leaders and analyzed the pre-election process.

Some funds went to “district coordination centers” destined to survey the pre – election campaign and convey the corresponding information to the “central election observation group”. Partly the money went to the Committee of Voters of Ukraine through the US National Democratic Institute (NDI). The Committee surveyed the Ukrainian media outlets, organization of civil local monitoring groups and regional election observers training.

Aided by NDI and International Republican Institute (IRI), the US Freedom House allocated funds for civil society monitors training, ensuring voters turnout, distribution of pre-election propaganda posters and materials, the mission of international NGOs 1000 monitoring specialists, including “activists” from Georgia, Poland, Serbia and Slovakia. The IRI funded training of specialists in formation of interparty coalitions, pre-election planning, special activities among women and children and opinion study for all the parties supporting Yushchenko.

Simultaneously the NDI allocated money to ensure unity among pro Yushchenko parties supporters and to improve cooperation among election districts at local and regional levels. Some funds went to training the parties members, who selected specialists who would work with voters, as well as experts in electoral process analysis, relations with media, and exit polls counting.

The United States Association of Former Members of Congress aided by the US – Ukraine Foundation funded training in monitoring internal situation before and at the time of election. Some activities took place among the Ukraine security service officers. The goal was to cause a split among them along political lines and prevention of their participation in dispersals of voters protests.

$ 2,62 million came through American Association for Development to organize round tables with participation of Rada members, representatives of state structures and leaders of Ukrainian NGOs. A lot of attention was paid to professional improvement of heads of election committees. Special grants were received by civil groups standing for the Ukraine’s electoral legislation reform. In parallel the American Association for Development allocated money for training pro Yushchenko election committees personnel, parties members and lawyers. The methods to detect violations and rigging were a priority in the training course.

$ 1,13 million went to pro Yushchenko media, partly spent on training journalists of print and internet media to enhance their special skills in covering pre election campaign and election as a whole. A special foundation (Media Development Foundation) was opened at the US Kiev embassy to encourage individual journalists and NGO staffers, as well as individual media outlets. Michael McFaul admits special “grants” for the same purposes were provided by “some other Western embassies” in Ukraine.

Part of US funds for working with Ukrainian media was allocated through the OSCE channels.

$ 1,12 million went for the research in the field of presidential election and potential voters high turnout studies. It was also spent on local media pre-election agitation, public opinion surveys by research bodies, training election observers and civil society vote tellers enhancing their skills to survey exit polls.

The Institute for Sustainable Communities, National Endowment for Democracy, Ukrainian Eurasia foundation, and Committee on Democracy specially established at the US embassy in Kiev (it gave money to Ukrainian NGOs, including dissemination of election information) coordinated the funds distribution.

Special attention was paid to the strategy of disruption of first round election, that didn’t end in Victor Yushchenko’s favor, by spreading information about so called “significant violations occurred during the voting”. The information was prepared and spread by about 10 thousand people, mainly members of “The Committee of Voters of Ukraine”.

At last, $ 985 thousand was allocated through the American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) to hone electors, lawyers, party members and NGOs skills for the purpose of complete monitoring of pre-election campaign.

It’s worth to mention Michael McFaul saying the Victor Yushchenko’s victory in 2004 was mainly ensured by intensive cooperation with Ukrainian young people made possible thanks to the US money.

Afterwards Michael McFaul used this “experience” of manipulating Ukrainian voters extensively at the time the State Duma and presidential elections in Russia were organized and held in 2007-2008.

The US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs held special hearings on May 17, 2007. A decision was made to work out an adequate conceptual analytical study before the Russia’s would be pre-election campaigns start defining ways and methods to conduct corresponding activities.

The leading US analysts and Russia scholars were involved, including Michael McFaul. At the hearings he presented concrete recommendations and practical proposals that were accepted for implementation.

Right now the US experts prepare recommendations for the administration on rendering substantial financial, political and moral support to the opposition parties and individual Russian media outlets before the 2012 presidential election. The worked out strategy envisions to purposefully influence the Russian citizens working in state structures, employed in private business and elected into the State Duma. Remembering the Michael McFaul‘s statements in 2011, as head of US embassy in Moscow he has an intention to establish the structures for dialogue on human rights, media freedom, fight against corruption in Russia. While expressing his views to Radio Liberty in June 2011, McFaul said he had an intention to make the “reset” concept an instrument of involvement of the Russian government into democracy and human rights discussions.

It is suggested to support the individuals who possess the makings of leaders, no matter their views may be murky, during the elections. Special importance is attached to intensive propaganda activities among the citizens expressing their discontent with the incumbent regime’s policy, as well as with the young people who, as sociological centers studies show, make 60% of protesters gathered for the Academician Sakharov avenue for a meeting held on 24 December 2011.

Coming to Moscow in his new capacity, the former director of Stanford University Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is to establish close contacts with the Russian “non-systematic” opposition hoping to prevent Vladimir Putin’s election victory at the coming presidential election, no matter Putin enjoys wide support among voters, as sociological surveys say. In Washington they would like to see someone else to win the race, someone with sympathy for the West and who’s plans do not include the defense of the Russian state interests. Michael McFaul thinks “some dictatorships” simply are not able to achieve progress in the development of democracy and should be assisted, as The New York Times wrote on February 24, 2011 in an article “Seizing Up Revolutions in Waiting”.
Larry Diamond, one of Stanford University professors, who knows him closely having worked together, said, it’s McFaul who, once in Russia, would be sticking to the policy of enhancing American values and principles, and he would also be trying to support and involve various social and political forces in Russia into his activities. That’s what The Stanford Daily reported on September 26, 2011.

All these activities will be coordinated by the new US ambassador to Russia, who never had any particular sympathy for the country. For instance, many a time he has openly expressed negative attitude towards Vladimir Putin, the head of the Russian Government. That’s what the New York Times (May 29, 2011) said and Michael McFaul himself wrote in the Foreign Affairs magazine (January-February 2008) as well as in his other numerous publications.

It was on his initiative the leading US newspapers started a series of publications aimed at the Vladimir Putin’s defeat or, at least the minimization of his victory, at the presidential elections in March 2012. They are not making a secret of the alternative goal: to weaken Vladimir Putin’s authority in case he wins the election, to undermine the Government’s policy aimed at solving the pressing socials and economic problems and to weaken the Moscow’s international standing in general.

The newly assigned US ambassador’s political portrait should be added by the following: going back to history he is the second head of the embassy who’s not a career diplomat. He supported the August 2008 Georgian aggression against South Ossetia. Not long ago he exerted efforts to exclude Russia from the process of defining the Libya’s future after Muammar Gaddafi’s overthrow in October 2011.

He also stands against legally binding obligations by the USA not to use missile defense against Russian strategic nuclear forces and achieving an agreement with Moscow on joint European missile defense on the basis of mutual acceptance and equality.

Finally. By the end of 2011 the US Congress confirmed $50 million for anti Russia propaganda before the Russian presidential election. It’s twice as much as the sum allocated for the very same purpose back in 2008.

This and the fact Michael McFaul is coming to Russia at the time between parliamentary and presidential elections gives much food for thought about non-terminating efforts on the part of Washington to make an open and multidimensional interference into Russian internal affairs. That’s what in substance is meant by the “reset” policy in US-Russian relations. The one, as some US experts say, had been elaborated by the very same Michael McFaul.
 

]]>