By Gabriel HONRADA

Australia has announced plans to accelerate its missile procurement program years ahead of schedule due to perceived threats from China. According to a statement made by Australian Defense Minister Peter Dutton on Tuesday (April 5), the accelerated program will cost US$2.6 billion and increase Australia’s deterrent capabilities.

Under the revised timeline, Australia’s F/A-18F Super Hornet jets will be armed with improved US-made missiles by 2024, three years earlier than planned. The missiles would likely be the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, a stealthy cruise missile with a range of 900 kilometers.

Australia’s Anzac-class frigates and Hobart-class frigates will be equipped with Norwegian-made Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles by 2024, five years earlier than scheduled, and would effectively double the warships’ strike range.

This comes as a follow-on to the Australian government’s promise last year to invest US$761 million to build guided missiles in the country.

Australia, the US and UK have also announced that they will be working together to develop hypersonic missiles. According to a statement released this month, the three countries will commence trilateral cooperation on hypersonics, counter-hypersonics and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as expand information-sharing and deepen cooperation on defense innovation.

This development comes after Australia-based firm Hypersonix presented its 3D-printed hydrogen-powered hypersonic scramjet engine to US officials last month, and entered into a partnership with US-based firm Kratos to launch the DART AE, a multi-mission, hypersonic vehicle powered by a hydrogen-fueled scramjet engine. Hypersonix says that the DART AE is designed to a reusable space launch platform that emits no CO2 for clean spaceflight.

This spate of hypersonic and other missile developments have no doubt been triggered by Australia’s growing concern over China’s creeping presence near its territories and perceived sphere of influence.

The announcements also mark a certain reversal of policy in Canberra, which came under pressure during the previous Donald Trump administration in 2019 to position US ground-based missiles in Darwin in northern Australia, a proposal that was refused at the time.

Then-US secretary of state Mike Pompeo said at the time a request to base American missiles in Australia would take into account the “mutual benefit” to both countries. Local Australian reports at the time noted that if the US deployed missiles with a range of 5,500 kilometers at Darwin, southern China would be comfortably within range.

The US proposal, which was declined at the time despite moves to boost America’s military presence at Darwin, was made before Australia-China diplomatic and economic relations went into a tailspin over Canberra’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, an investigation Beijing sees as anathema.

Last month the Solomon Islands announced that it has “initialed” elements of a proposed security deal with China, to be signed at a later date, that would potentially give China temporary stationing rights for its naval vessels and allowance for a Chinese police presence. The deal is still undergoing revision and awaiting the signatures of both countries’ foreign ministers.

The China-Solomon Islands pact was leaked last month by opponents of the deal, and verified as authentic by the Australian government. While still in draft form that cites the need for restoring social order to send in Chinese forces, a Chinese base in the Solomon Islands would immediately undermine Australia and New Zealand’s security.

A Chinese naval presence in the Solomons could cut off Australia and New Zealand from critical sea lines of communication from the US, forcing both countries to rely on their own defense capabilities. The Solomon Islands’ strategic location made it a key battleground during World War II.

Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison stated that “there are others who may seek to pretend to influence and may seek to get some sort of hold in the region,” and New Zealand raised concerns over the militarization of the Pacific.

The Solomon Islands is a point of increasing geopolitical tension between the US and China in the Pacific. Last year, protests erupted in the capital Honiara over allegations that Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare was accused of using money from a national development fund that comes from China.

Other factors leading to last year’s protests in the Solomon Islands were unequal distribution of resources, the lack of economic support, poor government services, corruption, and a controversial decision in 2019 to drop diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of China.

In February the US announced plans to reopen its embassy in the Solomon Islands, which has been closed since 1993, in a bid to counter China’s growing presence.

In 2019, China attempted to lease Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, which has a natural deep-water harbor suitable for a naval base. However, the Solomon Islands government later vetoed China’s attempt to lease Tulagi, saying that the provincial government did not have the authority for such negotiations.

asiatimes.com

Steve and Joe were at the bar one night when things became heated between them, as they often do.

“Oh no, not again with you two,” yelled the bartender when a stool got knocked over. “Take it outside!”

The two men took their exit accompanied by other patrons. Steve looked at a third man named Bill, then threw a punch at Joe.

Before Joe could strike back, Bill snuck up behind him and pinned his arms to his side with a bear hug. Onlookers yelled out in protest as Steve punched Joe in the face while he struggled to free himself from Bill’s grasp.

“Why are you yelling at me??” said Bill. “This is a defensive maneuver. I’m helping to defend Steve from getting punched by Joe.”

Only in the warped mind of a radical, who would be thrilled with wiping Israel off the map, would support for Iron Dome (an entirely defensive system that protects innocent civilians from enemy attack) be equated with supporting war crimes, human rights abuses and violence. pic.twitter.com/wsgSHEbDkV

— Lee Zeldin (@RepLeeZeldin) September 23, 2021

“But you’re not letting me fight back! Ow!” said Joe as Steve cracked him again.

“Yeah Bill, let him go!” said someone in the crowd. “You’re just helping Steve tee off on Joe!”

“Why do you guys hate Steve so much?” asked Bill while straining to keep Joe’s limbs pinned to his body. “Is it because he’s Jewish??”

“What?? No! You’re helping Steve attack Joe, that’s the problem!”

“Steve has a right to defend himself!” said Bill over the sound of Steve’s fists smashing into Joe’s face. “I don’t understand how anyone can have a problem with a completely defensive maneuver. Look at Steve’s face, there’s not a mark on him! That means my defensive system is effective. What the hell is wrong with you that you’d want Steve to get beat up? Are you some kind of psychopath?”

“I am present!” interjected a woman in the crowd before bursting into tears.

“It’s okay Alexandria,” her friend consoled her.

After all of yesterday’s noise about how “Iron Dome is purely defensive!” today’s supplemental contains an endorsement of the Israeli bombing campaign. https://t.co/Y7M3qZFbbB pic.twitter.com/6sXFT1VAB4

— Matt Duss (@mattduss) September 22, 2021

“But look, Joe’s all banged up,” said someone in the crowd. “If you care about defense then why are you defending Steve but not Joe?”

“Yeah, where’s Joe’s defense?” said someone else. “Steve’s able to just throw punches as hard as he can without any fear of getting hit back! You’re not just helping Steve defensively, you’re helping him offensively too!”

“I bet Steve wouldn’t have even picked this fight if he didn’t know Joe would be unable to fight back!” another onlooker added.

“Aaagh!” yelled Steve as Joe landed a kick to his groin.

“Hmm, I guess our defense system might not be as perfect as advertised,” said Bill.

What people don’t understand when they call Iron Dome a “defense” system, is that there’s nothing defensive about occupying another people for 73 yrs, holding on to their land via war crimes, then using a multibillion dollar anti-missile system to try to nullify their resistance.

— Hadas Thier (@HadasThier) September 24, 2021

“Steve’s always picking on Joe and Bill always helps him,” someone said. “They’re a coupla bullying thugs.”

“We are not!” Steve shouted while landing successive blows to Joe’s bloody face until the man went limp.

“You guys just hate safety and peace,” said Bill as he let Joe fall fall to the floor. “If it were up to you, Joe would be terrorizing us all and we wouldn’t even be allowed to protect ourselves.”

“If Joe wants to protect himself he needs to stop trying to fight back when I hit him,” said Steve. “I have a right to exist, after all.”

caityjohnstone.medium.com

If we go back to 2017 there was one moment when Donald Trump truly “became President of the United States” according to Fareed Zakaria. On April 7^th, to Mainstream Media delight, Trump greenlit the launch of 59 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles at various targets in Syria. This was a rare act of true blunt aggression by Trump, but what was even more unusual was that there was no follow up strike, there was not step two on a roadmap, there was just nothing. After this strike there was no follow up of any relevance. The only thing American forces in Syria seem to have accomplished is playing chicken with the Russians out of boredom.

Image: This unassuming weapon could be an international game changer.

Perhaps the logic of a single large missile strike was to convince Assad to surrender like the Japanese after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Washington often follows its own logic but it is hard to imagine that any analysts would expect this type of strategy to pay off.

An alternative explanation for the missile launch was put forward by Gordon Duff of Veterans Today, who believed the strike was mostly done to test the capabilities of the Russian S-400 anti-missile/air systems in Syrian possession. Duff wrote the following…

“Veterans Today contacted the Syrian Ministry of Information regarding the bizarre news that 34 Tomahawk cruise missiles had simply vanished. VT had even surmised that some may well have been used against other targets, even going as far as to suggest a possible conspiracy to hit Palmyra to aid the ISIS attack there.

A possible confirmation is simply the number fired, 59. This is what would be required to overwhelm the Russian air defense system based on the number of launchers, both S300 and S400 and other “cruise-capable” systems out there…”

The theory that this was some kind of test seems much more reasonable than Trump expecting to one-punch knockout the Syrians through a show of force, or any other shot-in-the-dark answer. The S-400 systems have created a lot more news over recent years than most if not all other weapons systems. The Russians have a new main battle tank (the T-14 Armata) modernized the AK yet again (with too many versions to mention) and the “near future” COD-style Ratnik gear that is being issued to all their soldiers, but all of these only make the news inside of Russia. Besides military hardware fanboys nothing seems to be even close to the S-400 in terms of perking Washington’s ears. In fact, any nation considering buying these devices risks full blown sanctions from the United States. Interestingly enough a few countries have called Washington’s bluff and purchased the anti-air/missile systems anyways. Unnamed CNBC sources said the reason for the furor to get a hold of the S-400 system is that “No other U.S. system can match the S-400′s ability to protect large swathes of airspace at such long ranges” i.e. the Russians have created an affordable anti NATO intervention box.

Image: The Trump missile strike on Syria was a failed experiment.

So perhaps when Trump tested the waters in Syria the results came back negative, due to this affordable Russian anti-missile/air system. If 34 out of 59 Tomahawk missiles “vanished” that means there is a 57% fail rate due to the quality of the missiles themselves, their operators on the warships that launched them and/or the S-400s on the Syrian mainland knocked them out. That last factor is probably the most important.

In terms of the U.S. military budget, 59 missiles is chump change but perhaps this experiment proved that trying to dominate the air over countries like Iraq and Libya may become much more difficult and risk-heavy than it was 10+ years ago. The “wars of convenience” of the Post Cold War period were successful with extremely low American/NATO casualties due to total air dominance, which thanks to the Russians could be over, at least for the foreseeable future.

If the infamy of the S-400 systems inside the Beltway is deserved, then we should actually thank Trump for experimenting first rather than sending countless numbers of airmen to their deaths over Damascus. Throughout history various militaries have tried to fight their “grandfather’s war” and have paid the price for it. Unlike the French who marched into WWI in bright red pants expecting to be firing in tight rank-and-file formations, someone (possibly Trump) was able to see the potential of these missile systems in a real war and decided to pull back and rethink their strategy before it is too late.

Image: What exactly are limited U.S. forces accomplishing in Syria? Without total air dominance – not that much.

At the end of the day Trump was either an exceptionally peaceful U.S. President because he saw it as good for America, wanted to keep his campaign promises or the Syrian missile experiment proved that for now war is too costly. Regardless of which version of history has more truth, the usage of S-400 systems in nations that are the targets of Washington’s hunger could prove to be a game changer. Weaker nations are willing to risk crushing sanctions to get this means of self-defense, some of whom still have U.S. troops all over their country. The big question is that if air-superiority is now out the window, how will this affect American foreign policy going forward? This will either create a peace due to an unfavorable cost/benefit result for Washington or force the U.S. to fight wars with much higher human cost on their side.

As of September 29, the Azerbaijani advance in the Nagorno-Karabakh region struck the Armenian defense and Azerbaijani forces were not able to achieve any military breakthroughs. Armenian troops withdrew from several positions in the Talish area and east of Fuzuli.

The Azerbaijani military has been successfully employing combat drones and artillery to destroy positions and military equipment of Armenia, but Azerbaijani mechanized infantry was unable to develop its momentum any further.

While both sides claim that they eliminated multiple enemy fighters and made notable gains, the real situation on the ground remains more or less stable with minor gains achieved by Azerbaijani troops. Armenian sources say that 370 Azerbaijani troops were killed and over 1,000 injured. The number of killed Armenian fighters, according to Azerbaijani sources, is over 1,000. Armenian sources also note the notable role of Turkey in the developing conflict.

Armenian President Armen Sarkissian said that Turkey has been assisting Azerbaijan in its war against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with advisers, mercenaries and even F-16 fighter jets. He added that the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still possible through dialogue. However, the President emphasized that the Armenian nation cannot allow a return to the past.

“105 years ago, the Ottoman Empire carried out the genocide of the Armenians. In no case can we allow this genocide to be repeated,” Sarkissian said.

Armenia threatens to use Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems obtained from Russia against Azerbaijani targets if Turkish F-16 warplanes are employed on the battlefield.

Meanwhile, Armenian Ambassador to Russia Vardan Toganyan said that members of Turkish-backed Syrian militant groups have been already participating in the conflict. He said that recently about 4,000 Turkish-backed militants were deployed to Azerbaijan. In turn, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan said that “people who have arrived from Syria and other countries of the Middle East” are fighting on the side of Armenia. Earlier, pro-Turkish sources claimed that Armenia was transporting fighters from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Thus, the sides are not only claiming that they are gaining an upper hand in the war, but also accuse each other of using foreign mercenaries and terrorists.

On the evening of September 28, the Defense Ministry of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic confirmed that 84 of its troops were killed in the recent escalation. The Armenian side also claimed that its forces had shot down an Azerbaijani aircraft. However, this claim was denied by the Azerbaijani military. Baku continues insisting that all Armenian claims about the Azerbaijani casualties in the war are fake news.

On September 29, the Armenian side continued reporting about Azerbaijani helicopters being shot down, and declaring that they repelled Azerbaijani attacks. Nonetheless, the scale and intensity of the strikes by the Azerbaijani side did not demonstrate any decrease. On top of this, the Armenian Defense Ministry said that a Turkish Air Force F-16 fighter jet shot down an Armenian Su-25 warplane. The F-16 fighter jet allegedly took off from the Ganja Airbase in Azerbaijan and was providing air cover to combat UAVs, which were striking targets in Armenia’s Vardenis, Mec Marik and Sotk. Azerbaijan and Turkey denied Armenian claims that a Turkish F-16 shot down the Su-25.

So far, no side has achieved a strategic advantage in the ongoing conflict. However, the Azerbaijani military, which receives extensive support from Turkey, is expected to have better chances in the prolonged conflict with Armenia, if Erevan does not receive direct military support from Russia.

southfront.org

In 2006, the mega-strategy of Nuclear Primacy was announced in America’s two most influential journals of international relations: Foreign Affairs, from the Council on Foreign Relations, and International Security, from the Belfer Center at the John F. Kennedy School of Goverment at Harvard University. This meta-strategy is a replacement of the long-standing “Mutually Assured Destruction” or “MAD” meta-strategy that the concept of “nuclear deterrence” was based upon. Nuclear Primacy aims for victory, not for peace. It was presented in both journals as being not only a realistic goal but a desirable goal, though the authors did acknowledge that this meta-strategy would require bold American leadership in order to culminate (i.e., to conquer Russia and subsequently control the entire world without any possibility of resistance).

Japan’s reversal of its commitment to be part of this plan is significant, and not only because Japan’s cancellation would negatively affect decisions of America’s other allies to stay with the U.S. in its plan to conquer Russia, but also because Japan actually has more reason to protect itself against North Korea than to protect itself against Russia. In fact, if the United States nuclear-blitzes Russia, then both North Korea and China might be very unpredictable, and maybe Japan would be safer as a neutral nation.

Furthermore, on 1 March 2017, three of America’s leading physicists and experts on nuclear weapons, Hans Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie, and Theodore Postol, published a study in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which concluded that.

This vast increase in US nuclear targeting capability, which has largely been concealed from the general public, has serious implications for strategic stability and perceptions of US nuclear strategy and intentions.

Russian planners will almost surely see the advance in fuzing capability as empowering an increasingly feasible US preemptive nuclear strike capability — a capability that would require Russia to undertake countermeasures that would further increase the already dangerously high readiness of Russian nuclear forces. … [And this technological capability that the U.S. has] creates exactly what one would expect to see, if a nuclear-armed state were planning to have the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war by disarming enemies with a surprise first strike.

What was remarkable is that this statement came from America’s experts, not from Russia’s.

Moreover, since that time, America has unilaterally terminated almost every nuclear arms control agreement it had had with Russia and its predecessor Soviet Union. This too is consistent with America’s objective being to develop a crushing nuclear advantage against Russia so as to place itself in a position to dictate terms of surrender.

The Breaking Defense article noted that, “The $2.1 billion program had been sputtering even before Kono’s announcement, after Tokyo said last month it would scrap the Akita [Prefecture] system in the wake of sustained local protests against it,” and stated that two other planned sites for the Aegis Ashore systems, the ones in Poland and Romania, were running behind schedule and over budget.

America’s adoption of the Nuclear Primacy meta-strategy (aiming for nuclear-weapons victory) replacing its prior MAD meta-strategy (aiming for nuclear-weapons balance and international peace) might even be an extension of America’s actual meta-strategic intention regarding nuclear weapons during the pre-1991 overt and ‘ideological’ (communism versus capitalism) Cold War against the Soviet Union. For example, an indication of this intention was America’s public refusal to accept as being anything other than ‘communist tricks’ the repeated efforts by the Soviets to restore the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint national-security cooperation that had existed when Franklin Delano Roosevelt was America’s President. America’s responses during the post-World-War-II period were insults, instead of to welcom the Soviet proposals and work behind the scenes with them to obtain progress toward the type of world order, global cooperation, that FDR had intended — a world order which he intended would be policed by the United Nations, not by the United States. For example, on 19 September 1959 at the U.N. General Assembly, the Soviet Representative headlined “Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament” and presented a series of proposals including:

https://undocs.org/A/4219

“Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament”

September 19, 1959

P. 14:

The Soviet Government proposes that the programme of general and complete disarmament should be carried out within as short a time-limit as possible — within a period of four years.

The following measures are proposed for the first stage:

The reduction, under appropriate control, of the strength of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China to the level of 1.7 million men, and of the United Kingdom and France to the level of 650,000 men;

The reduction of the armed forces of other states to levels to be agreed upon at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament;

The reduction of the armaments and military equipment at the disposal of the armed forces of States to the extent necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments corresponds to the level fixed for the armed forces.

The following is proposed for the second stage:

The completion of the disbandment of the armed forces retained by States;

The elimination of all military bases in the territories of foreign States; troops and military personnel shall be withdrawn from the territories of foreign States to within their own national frontiers and shall be disbanded.

The following is for the third stage:

The destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles;

The destruction of air force equipment;

The entry into force of the prohibition on the production, possession and storage of means of chemical and biological weapons in the possession of States shall be removed and destroyed under international supervision;

Scientific research for military purposes and the development of weapons and military equipment shall be prohibited;

War ministries, general staffs and all military and paramilitary establishments and organizations shall be abolished;

All military courses and training shall be terminated. States shall prohibit by law the military education of young people.

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, States shall enact legislation abolishing military service in all of its forms — compulsory, voluntary, by recruitment, and so forth. …

(4) Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw Treaty;

The U.S. response came a few months later at the “Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament”:

https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/documents/library/conf/TNCD-PV6.pdf

“Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament”

22 March 1960

Final Verbatim Record of the Sixth Meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva

P. 36:

Mr.  Eaton (United States of America): I have no intention of entering into this discussion on foreign bases. I think the discussions that we have had here this morning have indicated that we shall run into political problems at the very earliest stage, problems on which earlier conferences have foundered. I would only say that the forces of my Government are only employed outside my own country and within my own country for the purpose of defending both ourselves and those of our allies who wish to be associated with us, who welcome our troopos as a part of theirs and as a part of the allied defences, and for no other reason. Whenever the time comes when these troops need not be employed, for defensive puroses only, there need be no doubt in gthe mind of anyone here that those forces will be withdrawn.

https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/documents/library/conf/TNCD-PV46.pdf

“Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament”

24 June 1960

Final Verbatim Record of the Forty-Sixth Meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva

1. 4:

Mr. Nosek (Czechoslovakia): What did Mr. Eaton propose? He proposed the introduction of control measures. … exclusively with measures of control, that is with the old and well-known requirement of the United States — the introduction of control over armaments. Apparently with a view to misleading world public opinion, which requires a concrete discussion of general and complete disarmament, the United States representatives are beginning to prefer — for tactical reasons — to call those measures not “partial measures” but “initial steps” on the road to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

https://b-ok.cc/book/5398150/073f73

“The United Nations and Space Security: Conflicting Mandates”

P. 17:

This [obfuscation and evasion by the U.S.] ultimately led to the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania not attending the 48th meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee, which signalled the end of these discussions in the Committee.

Who benefited from America’s refusal even to discuss what had been U.S. President FDR’s aim for the post-WW-II world? The beneficiaries are what Eisenhower when leaving office on 17 January 1960 called the “military industrial complex” (which he had actually served as President though he publicly condemned it in his Farewell Address) and these beneficiaries are basically America’s hundred largest military contractors, especially the owners of the largest weapons-manufacturing firms such as Lockheed.

So, America’s being controlled by its MIC might have long preceded merely 2006.

In any case, the possible withdrawal of Japan from its existing anti-Russian alliance with the U.S. could turn out to be yet another indication, beyond merely such phenomena as America’s performance regarding the coronavirus challenge and other factors, which might indicate that The American Century is in the process of ending.

Marshall Billingslea, May 2020

Billingslea is President Trump’s Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control and will presumably be in charge of Washington’s team in negotiating a new START treaty.

An outstanding example of American arrogance and ignorance, to say nothing of the implication that the only actual negotiation expected will be over how loudly the negotiatees say “Yes Master”. Hardly likely to entice anyone to the table, let alone China.

The Soviet Union went down for many reasons which can be pretty well summed up under the rubric that it had exhausted its potential. Its economy was staggering, nobody believed any more, it had no real allies, it was bogged down in an endless war. Buried in there somewhere was the expense of the arms race with the USA. Billingslea evidently believes that it was that last that was the decisive blow. Believing that, he thinks that the USA can do it again.

A snappy comeback immediately pops into mind: staggering economy, loss of self confidence, allies edging away, endless wars – who’s that sound like?

But there is a bigger problem than his arrogance and that is his ignorance. Washington likes to think that its intelligence on Russia is pretty good but actually it’s pretty bad – and the proof is that it is always surprised by what Moscow does next. Intelligence is supposed to reduce surprises, not increase them.

What Billingslea is ignorant of is the difference between the Russian Federation and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. And he probably isn’t alone in this ignorance in Washington: yes they know it’s not communist any more – some of them do anyway – but that’s just the outward difference. The USSR was an exceptionalist state. As the 1977 USSR Constitution said:

the Soviet state, a new type of state, the basic instrument for defending the gains of the revolution and for building socialism and communism. Humanity thereby began the epoch-making turn from capitalist to socialism.

There’s a heavy cost to being an exceptionalist state – everything everywhere is your business, you are obligated to interfere all over the world, in the USSR’s case, any government that called itself socialist was entitled to assistance. The Soviet Union’s military was not just for self-defence, it was for power projection, assistance to allies and it sought full-spectrum dominance. Or, if not dominance in every imaginable sphere of warfare, at least capability. If Washington or NATO did something the USSR and the Warsaw Pact had to respond – no challenge could go unanswered. You can “spend into oblivion” a country with so expansive a self-awarded mission, especially one with a flaccid economy. And Washington tried to do so and, and I agree that the arms race made some contribution to the dissolution of the USSR and its alliance.

But Moscow has learned its lesson. Being the standard-bearer of the “bright future” brought it nothing; propping up socialist governments that deserted the moment the tanks went home brought it nothing. Exceptionalism was a bust for Russia and the Russians. It won’t do it any more. And that implies a much more modest military goal: defence. And defence is always cheaper than offence.

Moscow doesn’t have to match the U.S. military; it just has to checkmate it.

Washington can interfere in Africa as much as it wants, Moscow doesn’t care – and if it should care, it’s demonstrated in Syria how effective a small competent and intelligently directed force can be. Washington can have all the aircraft carriers it wants; Moscow doesn’t care as long as they keep away – and if they don’t keep away, they have plenty of Kinzhals. Washington can build a space force (complete with cammo uniforms) if it wants to; Russia doesn’t have to – it just has to shoot down what attacks it. Checkmate in one defined area of the globe is much easier and much cheaper than “full spectrum dominance”.

Full spectrum dominance is the stated goal of the U.S. military: supremacy everywhere all the time.

The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment, which includes cyberspace, that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference.

In practice it’s unattainable; it’s like looking for the end of the rainbow: every time you get there, it’s moved somewhere else. The countermove will always be cheaper and simpler. The USA will bankrupt itself into oblivion chasing down supremacy over everything everywhere. Take, for example, China’s famous carrier killer missile. Independently manoeuvrable hypersonic powerful warhead; here’s the video. Does it exist? Does it work? Maybe it does, maybe it only works sometimes. Maybe it doesn’t work today but will tomorrow. But it certainly could work. How much would Washington have to spend to give its carrier battle groups some reasonable chance against a weapon that was fired thousands of kilometres away and is coming in at Mach 10? Certainly much less than it would cost China to fire five of them at that one carrier; only needs one hit to sink it or put it out of action. Who’s going to be spent into oblivion here?

Which brings me to the next retort to Billingslea’s silly remark. Before the U.S. spends Russia and China into oblivion, it must first spend to catch up to them. I’ve mentioned the Chinese carrier killer, Russia also has quite a number of hypersonic weapons. Take the Kinzhal, for example. Fired from an aircraft 1500 kilometres away, it will arrive at the target in quite a bit less than 10 minutes. When will its target discover that it’s coming? If it detects it 500 kilometres out (probably pushing the Aegis way past its limits) it will have three or four minutes to react. The Russian Avangard re-entry vehicle has a speed of more than Mach 20 – that’s the distance from Moscow to Washington in well under five minutes. How do you stop that? Remember that Russia actually has these weapons whereas all the U.S. has is a “super-duper missile“. Not forgetting the Burevestnik and Poseidon neither of which the U.S. has, as far as is known, even in its dreams. So, Mr Billingslea, before you get the USA to the point of spending Russia and China into oblivion, you’ve got to spend a lot to catch up to where they already are today and then, when you get to where they are today, even more to get to where they will be then and still more – much more – to block anything they can dream up in all of the numerous “spectrums”. Who’s heading for oblivion now?

In conventional war the U.S. military does not have effective air defences: this should be clear to everyone after the strikes on the Saudi oil site and the U.S. base. U.S. generals are always complaining about the hostile electronic warfare scene in Syria where the Russians reveal only a bit of what they can do. Russia and China have good air defence at every level and excellent EW capabilities. They do because they know that the U.S. military depends on air attack and easy communications. They’re not going to give them these advantages in a real war, Something else for Mr Billingslea to spend a lot of money on just to get to the start state.

The U.S. military have spent too many years bombing people who can’t shoot back, kicking in doors in the middle of the night and patrolling roads hoping there’s no IED today. Not very good practice for a real war or an arms race.

China and Russia, because they have given up exceptionalism, full spectrum dominance and all those other fantasies, only have to counter the U.S. military and only in their home neighbourhoods. That is much cheaper and much easier. What’s really expensive, because unattainable, is chasing after the exceptionalist goal of dominance in everything, everywhere, all the time. That’s a “tried and true” road to oblivion.

They’re just laughing at him in Moscow and Beijing.

In one fell swoop, China may have nullified America’s strategic nuclear deterrent, the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and U.S. missile defense capability. Through its impressive display of new weapons systems, China has underscored the reality that while the United States has spent the last two decades squandering trillions of dollars fighting insurgents in the Middle East, Beijing was singularly focused on overcoming American military superiority in the Pacific. If the capabilities of these new weapons are taken at face value, China will have succeeded on this front.

In the West, it is called RMA, short for “Revolution in Military Affairs.” The term was first coined by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov in the early 1980s. Ogarkov, who was at the time serving as the chief of the Soviet general staff, spoke of “developments in nonnuclear means of destruction [which] promise to make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness.”

Ogarkov’s work caught the attention of Andrew Marshall, who headed the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. Marshall took Ogarkov’s premise and put it into action, integrating new technology with innovative operational concepts that positioned the U.S. military to be able to prevail over a numerically superior Soviet army in a ground war in Europe. The capabilities of Marshall’s RMA were potently displayed during the Gulf War in 1991, when the U.S. led a coalition that handily defeated Saddam Hussein.

One of the nations keenly observing the impact of the American RMA in the Persian Gulf was China. Chinese military theorists studied how Marshall adapted Ogarkov’s theories into an American version of RMA, and responded with a Chinese adaptation, developing weapons specifically intended to overcome American superiority in critical areas.

These weapons became known as “shashoujian,” or “the Assassin’s Mac,” derived from the traditional Chinese way of describing a weapon of surprising power. “A shashoujian,” a contemporary Chinese military journal notes, “is a weapon that has an enormous terrifying effect on the enemy and that can produce an enormous destructive assault.” More importantly, the modern Chinese concept of shashoujianenvisions not a single weapon, but rather a system of weapons that combine to produce the desired effect.

Defeating the United States in a ground war has never been an objective of the Chinese military—the Korean War was an historical anomaly. China’s focus instead has been to develop shashoujian weapons to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity. This couldn’t be accomplished simply by mimicking the American RMA example; they needed to create a uniquely Chinese military superiority that combined Western technology with Eastern wisdom. “This,” the Chinese believe, “is our trump card for winning a 21st century war.”

For China, the three principle points of potential military friction with the U.S. are Taiwan, South Korea-Japan, and the South China Sea. Apart from South Korea and Japan, where the U.S. has significant ground and air forces already forward deployed, the main threat to China is maritime power projected by American aircraft carrier battlegroups and amphibious assault ships. The Chinese response was to develop a range of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to target American naval forces before they arrived in any potential contested waters.

Traditionally, the U.S. Navy has relied on a combination of surface warships armed with sophisticated air defense systems, submarines, and the aircraft carrier’s considerable contingent of combat aircraft to defend against hostile threats in time of war. China’s response came in the form of the DF-21D medium-range missile, dubbed the “carrier killer.” With a range of between 1,450 and 1,550 kilometers, the DF-21D employs a maneuverable warhead that can deliver a conventional high-explosive warhead with a circular error of probability (CEP) of 10 meters—more than enough to strike a carrier-sized target.

To compliment the DF-21D, China has also deployed the DF-26 intermediate-range missile, which it has dubbed the “Guam killer,” named after the American territory home to major U.S. military installations. Like the DF-21, the DF-26 has a conventionally armed variant, which is intended to be used against ships. Both missiles were featured in the 2015 military parade commemorating the founding of the PRC.

The U.S. responded to the DF-21/DF-26 threat by upgrading its anti-missile destroyers and cruisers, and forward deploying the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) surface-to-air missile system to Guam. A second THAAD system was also deployed to South Korea. From America’s perspective, these upgrades offset the Chinese advances in ballistic missile technology, restoring the maritime power projection capability that has served as the backbone of the U.S. military posture in the Pacific.

As capable as they were, however, the DF-21D and DF-26 were not the shashoujianweapons envisioned by Chinese military planners, representing as they did reciprocal capability, as opposed to a game-changing technology. The unveiling of the true shashoujian was reserved for last week’s parade, and it came in the form of the DF-100 and DF-17 missiles.

The DF-100 is a vehicle-mounted supersonic cruise missile “characterized by a long range, high precision and quick responsiveness,” according to the Chinese press. When combined with the DF-21/DF-26 threat, the DF-100 is intended to overwhelm any existing U.S. missile defense capability, turning the Navy into a virtual sitting duck. As impressive as the DF-100 is, however, it was overshadowed by the DF-17, a long-range cruise missile equipped with a hypersonic glide warhead, which maneuvers at over seven times the speed of sound—faster than any of the missiles the U.S. possesses to intercept it. Nothing in the current U.S. arsenal can defeat the DF-17—not the upgraded anti-missile ships, THAAD, or even the Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) currently based in Alaska.

In short, in the event of a naval clash between China and the U.S., the likelihood of America’s fleet being sent to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean is very high.

The potential loss of the Pacific Fleet cannot be taken lightly: it could serve as a trigger for the release of nuclear weapons in response. The threat of an American nuclear attack has always been the ace in the hole for the U.S. regarding China, given that nation’s weak strategic nuclear capability.

Since the 1980s, China has possessed a small number of obsolete liquid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles as their strategic deterrent. These missiles have a slow response time and could easily be destroyed by any concerted pre-emptive attack. China sought to upgrade its ICBM force in the late 1990s with a new road-mobile solid fuel missile, the DF-31. Over the course of the next two decades, China has upgraded the DF-31, improving its accuracy and mobility while increasing the number of warheads it carries from one to three. But even with the improved DF-31, China remained at a distinct disadvantage with the U.S. when it came to overall strategic nuclear capability.

While the likelihood that a few DF-31 missiles could be launched and their warheads reach their targets in the U.S., the DF-31 was not a “nation killing” system. In short, any strategic nuclear exchange between China and the U.S. would end with America intact and China annihilated. As such, any escalation of military force by China that could have potentially ended in an all-out nuclear war was suicidal, in effect nullifying any advantage China had gained by deploying the DF-100 and DF-17 missiles.

Enter the DF-41, China’s ultimate shashoujian weapon. A three-stage, road-mobile ICBM equipped with between six and 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, the DF-41 provides China with a nuclear deterrent capable of surviving an American nuclear first strike and delivering a nation-killing blow to the United States in retaliation. The DF-41 is a strategic game changer, allowing China to embrace the mutual assured destruction (MAD) nuclear deterrence posture previously the sole purview of the United States and Russia.

In doing so, China has gained the strategic advantage over the U.S. when it comes to competing power projection in the Pacific. Possessing a virtually unstoppable A2/AD capability, Beijing is well positioned to push back aggressively against U.S. maritime power projection in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits.

Most who watched the Chinese military parade on October 1 saw what looked to be some interesting missiles. For the informed observer, however, they were witnessing the end of an era. Previously, the United States could count on its strategic nuclear deterrence to serve as a restraint against any decisive Chinese reaction to aggressive American military maneuvers in the Pacific. Thanks to the DF-41, this capability no longer exists. Now the U.S. will be compelled to calculate how much risk it is willing to take when it comes to enforcing its sacrosanct “freedom of navigation.”

While the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s independence remains steadfast, its willingness to go to war with China over the South China Sea may not be as firm. The bottom line is that China, with a defense budget of some $250 billion, has successfully combined “Western technology with Eastern wisdom,” for which the U.S. has no response.

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Aside from the unprecedented stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction on an epic scale, a whirlwind of regional developments are now underway that foreshadow extremely unsettling consequences. First and foremost is this month’s formal announcement by the Trump administration that it would be pulling out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed into force by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan back in 1987.

With the INF consigned to the dustbin of history, the US and Russia are free to design and produce ballistic and cruise missiles within a 500-5,500 kilometer range (310-3,420 miles). Would any NATO country be so foolish as to host these American-made weapons on their territory, thereby opening itself up to a devastating first-strike attack in some worst-case scenario? Poland is one possible candidate. After all, Polish President Andrzej Duda last year offered the United States $2 billion in financing for the construction of a permanent American base on Poland’s eastern border. While the two NATO countries are still considering the idea, it is clear that the eradication of the INF Treaty promises to ratchet up tensions between Russia and its neighbors.

Washington’s pullout from the INF did not occur in a vacuum, of course. It followed in the tank tracks of George W. Bush’s disastrous decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, one of many opportunistic moves committed by the United States in the aftermath of 9/11. With the ABM out of the way, the United States was able to establish a missile defense shield in Romania, just miles from the Russian border. Washington’s overtures to Moscow that it would welcome Russian participation in the project were eventually revealed as a deceitful stalling tactic. Russian President Vladimir Putin was not fooled, however, and wasted no time researching and developing of a lethal array of new weapon systems, including a nuclear-powered cruise missile with unlimited range.

‘Listen to us now’: #Putin unveils new Russian nuclear arsenal https://t.co/Aesed9cpos pic.twitter.com/WGYJjzWGds

— RT (@RT_com) 1 марта 2018 г.

At this point in the updated ‘Great Game’ there is a temptation to say that the US and Russia have entered yet another ‘MAD’ moment, that is, ‘mutually assured destruction’ should one side or the other attempt fate with a first-strike attack. Check mate, as it were. After all, Russia has got its “unstoppable” nuclear-powered cruise missile and other fearsome hardware, while the US has its missile defense shield, as well as numerous NATO set pieces, bolted down in Europe. Everything is wonderful in the neighborhood, right? Well, not exactly.

Comparing the present standoff between the US and Russia to the Cold War realities is erroneous and dangerous for a number of reasons. First, the opportunity for some sort of mishap resulting in all-out war has never been greater. The reason is not simply due to the dizzying amount of firepower involved, but rather due to the proximity of the firepower to the Russian border.  During the Cold War standoff, Moscow, the nerve center of the Soviet empire, was well guarded by the buffer of Warsaw Pact republics. Today, that buffer has practically vanished, and NATO is not only encamped deep inside of Eastern Europe, but – in the case of the Baltic States of Estonia and Latvia – smack up against the Russian border. Although the entire concept of time, distance and space has been made somewhat redundant by the exceptional speed of modern missiles and aircraft, this has not reduced the possibility of NATO and Russia accidentally stumbling into a very bad situation.

Now with the INF Treaty out of the way there is the possibility that Washington will place intermediate-range missiles in Russia’s backyard. Such a move would flush with Washington’s revised nuclear doctrine, which not only aims for increasing its nuclear arsenal, but – in pure Dr. Strangelove fashion – lowering the threshold for which nuclear weapons may be used. To think that Russia will watch passively on the sidelines as the US disrupts the regional strategic balance in its favor would be wishful thinking.

Even as the corpse of the INF treaty was still warm, Mark T. Esper, the new US secretary of defense said he favored the deployment of new American ground-based missiles to Asia, without specifying a precise location.

“It’s fair to say, though, that we would like to deploy a capability sooner rather than later,” Esper said while en route to Australia for foreign policy meetings. “I would prefer months. I just don’t have the latest state of play on timelines.”

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is reportedly moving ahead with the development of missile systems, including a cruise missile with an expected 1,000 km range and an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a 3,000 to 4,000 km range. With the ‘shield’ of a US missile defense system already established in Eastern Europe, Russia will not sit by idly and wait for NATO’s other hand to pick up a sword.

What options are open to Russia at this point? Aside from its Russia-based defenses already mentioned, Moscow will feel very compelled to move its strike abilities closer to the United States in order to match NATO’s newfound capacity just over the Russian border.

Putin has emphasized that Russia will not deploy ballistic missiles unless the US does so first. If he were required to respond, would Russia consider a permanent missile base somewhere in Latin America, just miles from US shores, mirroring the same situation that Russia faces in Eastern Europe? Imagine a situation where ‘Trump’s Mexican Wall’ became in reality a host of Russian launch pads. Although ti would solve America’s migrant problem, it probably won’t do much to help Americans sleep better at night. Impossible to imagine, of course, yet that is the exact dire scenario Russia faces on its own border with the Baltic States.

A more likely scenario, however, is that Putin, in the event Trump ‘goes nuclear’ in Eastern Europe, will deploy round-the-clock stealth submarines armed with ballistic missiles near the American shoreline as an insurance policy. It is a dreadful new reality to consider, yet as the United States continues with its reckless treaty-trashing posture it is a reality the world will be forced to live with.

Declaring that “there is a new strategic reality out there,” President Donald Trump’s hardline national security advisor John Bolton announced during a visit to Moscow earlier this week that the United States would be withdrawing from the 31-year-old Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. “This was a Cold War bilateral ballistic missile-related treaty,” Bolton said, “in a multi-polar ballistic missile world.”

“It is the American position that Russia is in violation,” Bolton told reporters after a 90-minute meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. “Russia’s position is that they aren’t. So one has to ask how to ask the Russians to come back into compliance with something they don’t think they’re violating.”

Left unsaid by Bolton was the fact that the Russians have been asking the U.S. to provide evidence to substantiate its allegations of Russian noncompliance, something it so far has not done. “The Americans have failed to provide hard facts to substantiate their accusations,” a Kremlin spokesperson noted last December after a U.S. delegation was briefed NATO on the allegations. “They just cannot provide them, because such evidence essentially does not exist.”

Bolton’s declaration mirrored an earlier statement by Trump announcing that “I’m terminating the agreement because [the Russians] violated the agreement.” When asked if his comments were meant as a threat to Putin, Trump responded, “It’s a threat to whoever you want. And it includes China, and it includes Russia, and it includes anybody else that wants to play that game. You can’t do that. You can’t play that game on me.”

Trump appears to have surrendered to the anti-arms control philosophy of John Bolton, who views such agreements as unduly restricting American power. (Bolton was also behind the 2001 decision by President George W. Bush to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an act the Russians viewed as inherently destabilizing.) By involving China, which was not a signatory to the INF Treaty, into the mix, the president appears to be engaging in a crude negotiating gambit designed to shore up a weak case for leaving the 1987 arms control agreement by playing on previous Russian sensitivities about Chinese nuclear capabilities.

In 2007, Putin had threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty because of these reasons. “We are speaking about the plans of a number of neighboring countries developing short- and mid-range missile systems,” Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesperson, said at the time, citing China, India and Pakistan. “While our two countries [the U.S. and Russia] are bound by the provisions of the INF treaty there will be a certain imbalance in the region.”

Although unspoken, both Bolton and Trump appear to be trying to drive a wedge between Russia and China. They’re doing so as those two nations are coming together to craft a joint response to what they view as American overreach on trade and international security. While the Russian concerns over Chinese INF capabilities might have held true a decade ago, that doesn’t seem to be the case any longer.

“The Chinese missile program is not related to the INF problem,” Konstantin Sivkov, a member of the Russian Academy of Missile and Ammunition Sciences, recently observed. “China has always had medium-range missiles, because it did not enter into a bilateral treaty with the United States on medium and shorter-range missiles.” America’s speculations about Chinese missiles are “just an excuse” to withdraw from the INF Treaty, the Russian arms control expert charged.

Moreover, China doesn’t seem to be taking the bait. Yang Chengjun, a Chinese missile expert, observed that the U.S. decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty would have a “negative” impact on China’s national security, noting that Beijing “would have to push ahead with the modest development of medium-range missiles” in response. These weapons would be fielded to counter any American build-up in the region, and as such would not necessarily be seen by Russia as representing a threat.

Any student of the INF Treaty knows that the issue of Russia’s national security posture vis-à-vis China was understood fully when the then-USSR signed on to the agreement. During the negotiations surrounding INF in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets had sought to retain an INF capability in Asia as part of its Chinese deterrence posture. Indeed, the Soviet insistence on keeping such a force was one of the main reasons behind the “zero option” put forward by the U.S. in 1982, where a total ban on INF-capable weapons was proposed. The U.S. knew that the total elimination of INF systems was a poison pill that Russia simply would not swallow, thereby dooming future negotiations.

Mikhail Gorbachev turned the tables on the Americans in 1986, when he embraced the “zero option” and called upon the U.S. to enter into an agreement that banned INF-capable weapons. For the Soviet Union, eliminating the threat to its national security posed by American INF weapons based in Europe was far more important than retaining a limited nuclear deterrence option against China.

The deployment of Pershing II missiles to Europe in the fall of 1983 left the Soviet leadership concerned that the U.S. was seeking to acquire a viable nuclear first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. The Soviets increased their intelligence collection efforts against U.S. targets to be able to detect in advance any U.S./NATO first-strike attack, as well as a “launch on detection” plan to counter any such attack.

In November 1983, when the U.S. conducted a full-scale rehearsal for nuclear war in Europe, code-named Able Archer 83, Soviet intelligence interpreted the exercise preparations for the real thing. As a result, Soviet strategic nuclear forces were put on full alert, needing only an order from then-general secretary Yuri Andropov to launch.

The Soviet system had just undergone a stress test of sorts in September 1983, when malfunctioning early warning satellites indicated that the U.S. had launched five Minuteman 3 Intercontinental missiles toward the Soviet Union. Only the actions of the Soviet duty officer, who correctly identified the warning as a false alarm, prevented a possible nuclear retaliatory strike.

A similar false alarm, this time in 1995, underscored the danger of hair-trigger alert status when it comes to nuclear weapons—the launch of a Norwegian research rocket was interpreted by Russian radar technicians as being a solo U.S. nuclear missile intended to disrupt Russian defenses by means of an electromagnetic pulse generated by a nuclear air burst. Russia’s president at the time, Boris Yeltsin, ordered the Russian nuclear codes to be prepared for an immediate Russian counter-strike, and was on the verge of ordering the launch when Russian analysts determined the real purpose of the rocket, and the crisis passed.

The Europeans had initially balked at the idea of deploying American INF weapons on their territory, fearful that the weapons would be little more than targets for a Soviet nuclear attack, resulting in the destruction of Europe while the United States remained unharmed. To alleviate European concerns, the U.S. agreed to integrate its INF systems with its overall strategic nuclear deterrence posture, meaning that the employment of INF nuclear weapons would trigger an automatic strategic nuclear response. This approach was designed to increase the deterrence value of the INF weapons, since there would be no “localized” nuclear war. But it also meant that given the reduced flight times associated with European-based INF systems, each side would be on a hair-trigger alert, with little or no margin for error. It was the suicidal nature of this arrangement that helped propel Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan to sign the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987.

This history seems to be lost on both Trump and Bolton. Moreover, the recent deployment of the Mk-41 Universal Launch System, also known as Aegis Ashore, in Romania and Poland as part of a NATO ballistic missile shield only increases the danger of inadvertent conflict. Currently configured to fire the SM-3 surface-to-air missile, the Mk-41 is also capable of firing Tomahawk cruise missiles which, if launched in a ground configuration, would represent a violation of the INF Treaty. The U.S. Congress has authorized $58 billion in FY 2018 to fund development of an INF system, the leading candidate for which is a converted Tomahawk.

If the U.S. were ever to make use of the Mk-41 in an anti-missile configuration, the Russians would have seconds to decide if they were being attacked by nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Putin, in a recent speech delivered in Sochi, publicly stated that the Russian nuclear posture operated under the concept of “launch on warning,” meaning once a U.S. or NATO missile strike was detected, Russia would immediately respond with the totality of its nuclear arsenal to annihilate the attacking parties. “We would be victims of an aggression and would get to heaven as martyrs,” Putin said. Those who attacked Russia would “just die and not even have time to repent.”

“We’ll have to develop those weapons,” Trump noted when he announced his decision to leave the INF Treaty, adding “we have a tremendous amount of money to play with our military.” Nuclear deterrence isn’t a game—it is, as Putin noted, a matter of life and death, where one split second miscalculation can destroy entire nations, if not the world. One can only hope that the one-time real estate mogul turned president can figure this out before it is too late; declaring bankruptcy in nuclear conflict is not an option.

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The NDAA includes $616.9 billion for the base budget and $69 billion for overseas contingency operations. The sum of $21.9 billion for nuclear weapons programs goes to the Energy Department. Section 3111 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to develop low-yield nuclear weapons capable of more tactical use as the Nuclear Posture Report calls for.

Section 1663 seeks to accelerate programs to develop both a ground-based strategic deterrent and long-range standoff weapons. To preserve global footprint the military is working on next-generation aircraft, including and a sixth-generation fighter. The new US Air Force's new long-range stealth B-21 Raider bomber is to be fully funded. New aircraft carriers (the fourth Ford-class flattop) to preserve 10 strike groups, new surface ships (three LCS and three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers), attack (two Virginia-class submarines) and ballistic-missile submarines (a Columbia class boomer) are coming.

Non-MDAP (major defense acquisition programs), including hypervelocity drones, got a large share of the R&D funds to make the military a future-oriented force.

Active duty manpower is to grow by 24,100. The funds allocated for six icebreakers demonstrate the intent to boost military capabilities in the Arctic. The law adds $140 million to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for hypersonic defense capabilities and development of critical directed energy and space sensing projects. Funds are allocated for integrating Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems. The agency is authorized to work on space-based boost phase intercept systems. It means the arms race goes to space. If the technology is mature, live fire intercept capability is expected in FY22. The MDA will continue to work toward putting a laser on a UAV to strike missile at the initial phase of the trajectory. It’s not all. Congress is still to pass a spending bill to fund specific priorities with the military.

According to the NDAA, Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are adversaries to be countered. The National Defense Authorization Act 2019 strengthens the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is responsible for reviewing proposed foreign investments to weigh whether they threaten national security. This measure is obviously targeted at China.

The law delays the delivery of stealth warplanes to Ankara. The Secretary of Defense is directed to study whether Turkey’s planned deployment of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system will risk the security of US-made F-35 fighter jets. 

The NDAA does not authorize the use of military force against Iran but focuses on the policy to destabilize it, including identifying the countries, which cooperate with Tehran. The law does not say it openly but the countries to be affected are Russia, China and, probably, Turkey.

The NDAA pays much attention to strengthening defense and security ties with Taiwan, including military sales, to anger China. Defense assistance to Taiwan is to increase. Chinese investments are blunted as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is to be strengthened.

The document includes tough language on Russia. It says the funding goes to “cyber warfare and influence operations to counter Russian aggression, cyber, and information warfare threats.” The Open Skies Treaty (OST) is actually suspended (Section 1242). The Air Force cannot use certain funds intended to bring the United States into compliance with the OST. The NDAA (Section 3122) specifically prohibits any use of funds to enter into a contract with or provide assistance to Russia relating to atomic energy defense activities. This restriction may be waivered if the secretaries of State, Defense and Energy determine such action would be in the US national security interest. Using funds for any activity that recognizes the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea is forbidden.

The president is required (Section 1243) to provide relevant congressional committees with a determination as to whether Russia is in material breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and, as a result, whether related treaty provisions remain binding on the United States. The law says (Section 1244) Russia’s “violations” of the INF Treaty entitle the United States to suspend its operation. The president is required to inform Congress whether he has implemented certain sanctions and related measures authorized by the 2018 NDAA against individuals and entities who have contributed to Russia’s treaty violations by Nov. 1, 2018. 

The president is to report on whether he raised the issue with Russia on including its new weapon systems (alleged “strategic offensive arms”) into the New START Treaty count and “whether their position impacts the viability of that treaty or requires additional US responses.” Obviously, the systems in question include the Sarmat ICBM, the Burevestnik nuclear powered cruise missile, the Kh-101 air-to surface long range cruise missile, the Poseidon underwater drone and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.

A total of $6.3 billion goes to European Deterrence Initiative to “deter” Russia. The provocative military presence near Russia’s borders will be strengthened.

Georgia is present in the document. The NDAA includes “robust security sector assistance” for Georgia, including defensive lethal assistance, to improve its interoperability with NATO forces. Military assistance, originally provided to Ukraine in the 2016 NDAA, will continue. The $250 million in assistance goes to Kiev, of which $50 million is designated specifically for delivery of lethal weapons.

In a nutshell, the new law restricts presidential foreign policy prerogatives to complicate the negotiation process with Russia. It does not emphasize the importance of maintaining the existing arms control agreements in force and puts into doubt the need to comply with them. The document uses tough language to paint Russia as a hostile state and forbids military-to-military contacts, which are needed so much, especially at a time the relationship is at a low ebb. The military should talk despite the political fluctuations.

The NDAA encourages space militarization and arms race in different domains. The break-up of INF Treaty in combination with boosting the EDI may lead to stationing intermediate range offensive forces in the Baltic States, Poland and Romania dangerously close to Russian borders. This is unacceptable for Russia but it’s hard to negotiate the controversial issues under the NDAA terms and in the environment it creates. This is a defense budget of confrontation giving preference to pressure instead of negotiations and diplomacy.