Nikolić – Strategic Culture Foundation https://www.strategic-culture.org Strategic Culture Foundation provides a platform for exclusive analysis, research and policy comment on Eurasian and global affairs. We are covering political, economic, social and security issues worldwide. Mon, 11 Apr 2022 21:41:14 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.16 Russia – Serbia Relations through Prism of 70 Years https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/10/14/russia-serbia-relations-through-prism-of-70-years/ Mon, 13 Oct 2014 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2014/10/14/russia-serbia-relations-through-prism-of-70-years/ Russian President Vladimir Putin is to visit Serbia on October 16. This is an event of outstanding importance for finally defining the pattern of the bilateral relationship. The visit should emphasize the strategic level of cooperation and doom the attempts of some Western circles to distance Serbia from Russia. The activities aimed at making the both countries distant from each other are becoming more insistent, the fact admitted by top Serbian officials. In particular, Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic told journalists that during the recent 7-8 months he has heard speculations about bringing pressure on Serbia to make it change the Russian policy in favor of getting closer to the European Union. 

Evidently, the issue does not boil down to «speculations» only. Johannes Hahn, the EU's Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations Commissioner-designate, says Serbia needs to carefully consider its refusal to support EU sanctions against Russia if Belgrade hopes to join the European Union. He made the remarks to the European Parliament during a September 30 hearing on whether to confirm his appointment as Enlargement Commissioner. Mr.Hahn told the European lawmakers that if Belgrade «is moving towards accession, the signal will have to be the right one» on sanctions against Russia meaning Serbia is to be devoid of the very possibility to maneuver between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia. Actually the statement emasculated the appearingly politically correct formula put forward by Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic who said that, «Serbia is trusted by both East and West». The words hit the point only if talking about the European Union and its priorities. But the United States has unleashed a new round of geopolitical game where Serbia, as well as the European Union, has no independent role to play. That’s what Belgrade has to take into consideration. 

The fact is corroborated by US preparation for the Russian President’s upcoming visit to Serbia. US Ambassador to Serbia Michael Kirby put into doubt the current and past relationship between the two states. «It is not yet certain whether Putin will come, but if it happens – why is he coming?», the American Ambassador was quoted as saying during an interview for the Belgrade-based Večernje Novosti daily, and adding: «For the celebration of the anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade? Belgrade was also liberated by the Third Ukrainian Army (group of armies from the Third Ukrainian Front), as part of the Red Army». The phrase proves the Ambassador is an illiterate person (let’s forgive him, he’s an American) trying to spread the effect of the ongoing conflict tearing Ukraine apart on the whole of Europe. 

Michael Kirby was not stopped by the fact that the Third Ukrainian Front (not «the Third Ukrainian Army») was called Ukrainian because of the direction of the offensive launched by Soviet troops and had very conditional relation to Ukraine. Ambassadors never speak for themselves. It’s not simply the case of arrogance displayed by the US diplomat but a reflection of the myth formally presented by Washington. It says Ukrainians, not Russians, liberated Belgrade. Serbia owes its freedom to Ukrainians. Joining the EU anti-Russia sanctions by Serbia is kind of paying back to «Ukrainian liberators». 

The US Ambassador displayed his discontent with the fact that the leaders of Russia and China were invited to take part in the festivities to be held in Belgrade on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of liberation from fascist Germany. And he immediately made a stab at Russia. «You can have good relations with Russia and China, and with the United States. But our position on visits of Chinese and Russian officials is different. The Chinese almost never attacked anyone, while the Russians have. That is something to bear in mind», the diplomat was quoted as saying. Keeping in mind that the Soviet Union and China were attacked by fascist states during the Second World War, the Kirby’s words sound as blasphemy and disrespect towards the victims of fascism and mockery over the feelings of those who remained alive. He said it at the time when new fascism from Ukraine is coming to the fore. 

Does Serbia realize to what extent the geopolitical stand-off has exacerbated as a result of West’s policy aimed at making Ukraine the center of ongoing conflict? Vucic will provide an answer in the coming days. That’s what’s going to define the agenda of Belgrade-held talks. The Russian President’s press-service emphasizes the concrete historic background of the visit and the current state of things. It says, «The President of Russia will take part in celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade from Nazi occupation». Besides, «Talks with Tomislav Nikolic and conversations with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic are to focus on key issues of bilateral cooperation, primarily in trade and the economy», Putin’s office said. These are not the best times for Serbia, but Russia has something to offer. The JSC Gasprom Neft board of directors agreed to take 30 billion rubles two-year credit from Rossekhozbank to implement its investment program in 2015. Among other things it plans to increase investments into oil production at Serbian NIS sites. Perhaps other offers will be discussed during the visit of Russian President to Belgrade. 

Russia is willing and ready to closely cooperate with Serbia, its historic and strategic ally. Is Serbia ready to meet Russia halfway? 

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Strategic Leap Forward or Ordinary Pretense? https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/06/04/strategic-leap-forward-or-ordinary-pretense/ Sun, 03 Jun 2012 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2012/06/04/strategic-leap-forward-or-ordinary-pretense/ Political tensions in Serbia show no signs of subsiding now that the electoral race is over and T. Nikolic's presidency is an accomplished fact. The country has reached a bifurcation point and is currently presented with a unique opportunity to switch to a new model of development, but the recently elected Serbian leader must pick up an unprecedented challenge to enable the change.

Oddly enough, so far Serbia's dilemma of choosing between the West and the East continues to exist in a latent form. Back under the generally pro-Western B. Tadic, Belgrade still signed a serious economic package with Russia, and Moscow is waiting for Serbia to take convincing steps towards the implementation of the already formulated energy and infrastructure projects such as the construction of the South Stream pipeline, the upgrade of the Banatski Dvor underground gas depot, the modernization of the Serbian petroleum facilities and railroad network, etc. If the whole array of ambitious plans materializes, Serbia will likely emerge as Russia's key partner in Europe. It must be noted that the cooperation which currently revolves mostly around energy has an appreciable potential to drive projects in other sectors. It grabbed the headlines that V. Putin reaffirmed Russia's commitment to working with Serbia during his recent talks with T. Nikolic. The new Serbian president is fully aware that, on top of economic regards, Russia's motivation stems from the traditional deep affinity for Serbs and a sense of solidarity with Belgrade over its struggle for the territorial integrity of Serbia.

Respect for the agreements sealed with Russia being a permanent component of T. Nikolic's stated program, the influence of the EU on whose doors Serbia is persistently knocking cannot be discounted. Brussels is pressing its own, in some aspects energy-related, agenda vis-a-vis Belgrade which, as a result, risks to eventually have to weigh the benefits of energy security based on strong ties with Russia against its chronically shelved Eurointegration bid. The reality is that EU countries are allowed minimal independence in energy affairs and must conform to countless policies prescribed by Brussels. Under a negative scenario, the EU opposition to Serbia's involvement with Russia may, in the long run, bring about a chill in the relations between Belgrade and Moscow. No doubt, Serbia's price to pay in the case would be a blown chance to set its economy straight by taking a role in the supply of energy to Europe. At this pivotal point, it will mainly depend on T. Nikolic's political will whether or not the above is what the future holds.

At the moment, former Serbian president B. Tadic seems to be outplaying Nikolic over today's main political issue in Serbia, which is the formation of the new government. A new parliament which took charge in Serbia on May 31, with the mandates of the 250 legislators confirmed, had Nikolic sworn in, but, in the meantime, Tadic who apears to be a premier hopeful secured full support from I. Dacic and his coalition and now has as many as three options to put together a majority faction without sending out invitations to Nikolic's Serbian Progressive Party currently chaired by A. Vucic. The combinations are (1) Tadic's Democratic Party (67 seats) + Dacic's Socialist Party coalition (Party of United Pensioners of Serbia – United Serbia, a total of 44 seats) + The United Regions of Serbia (16 seats) + minority parties (9 seats) = 136 seats against 126 required; (2) Tadic's Democratic Party (67 seats) + Socialist Party coalition (44 seats) + C. Jovanovic's Liberal Democratic Party (19 seats) = 130 seats; (3) a combination of (1) and (2) leading to an exceptionally broad coalition: the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party, and The United Regions of Serbia plus, hypothetically, the minority parties would altogether have 145-153 seats (1).

Tadic is known not to tolerate dissent in the ranks of his partners least it puts his supporters' unity in jeopardy. He launched a brisk counterattack in the wake of the defeat in the presidential elections, rejects any kind of transactions with the Progressive Party, and threatens that he would refuse to chair the Democratic Party if anybody from within it says a word about forming a majority coalition based on a deal with the progressives (2).

Tadic enjoyed monopoly on charting Serbia's course since 2008 and obviously hopes to recoup much of what he has lost. Under any of the above scenarios, the situation in the Serbian parliament will remain essentially the same as it used to be before the presidential poll: the Progressive Party will, in practice, be fighting back as if still being in opposition while Tadic's democrats will dictate resolutions on the legislative level. Moreover, totally absent from the post-election parliament is the unquestionably patriotic Serbian Radical Party.

Speaking of the regional dimension of Serbian politics, serious concerns arise in connection with the geopolitical transformation sweeping across the southern part of the Balkan region under pressure from NATO, the US, and myriads of pro-Western NGOs. Nikolic barely made it to skim through the congratulatory messages when he was confronted with the West's fresh ultimatum on Kosovo. The resolutions of the NATO summit which convened in Chicago urged Belgrade to carry on with talks over the issue, and Sweden's political heavyweight Carl Bildt timely expressed the view that Serbia is yet to demonstrate its allegiance to European norms. The implementation of the first phase of the Ahtisaari plan is almost complete as Pristina is passing the final round of legislative acts meant to perpetuate the Kosovo standalone state. Starting June 1, 2012, Serbs in Kosovo will face the requirement to carry IDs issued by the Albanian administration sitting in Pristina. The International Steering Group will meet in Vienna on July 2 to stamp the verdict on the completion of the period of the supervised independence of Kosovo, which will be followed by the province's irreversible independence from Belgrade.

Reports indicate that the Pristina administration is building muscles, the current focus being on the strengthening of the police and the customs service. As a gesture intended to draw attention internationally, not long ago Kosovo popped up a visa regime for Russian and Chinese nationals. EULEX – the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo – recently took plenty of hammering over perceived poor performance from the European Parliament which has no problem with the Albanian organized crime groups running world-level drug operations but is allergic to the remnants of the Serbian self-government which, in the north of Kosovo, continue to preserve a shadow of Serbian statehood and provide the only available protection to Serbs. In the nearest future, EULEX will limit its functions to judicial procedures and will leave everything else to Pristina “institutions”. Last May, the European Commission, EULEX, and Pristina opened negotiations over Europe's assistance to Kosovo in puling off “a reform” with the goal of subduing the Serbs of northern Kosovo, but since it is clear that they are not going to give up resistance, so far Brussels calls for addressing the situation politically (3). In contrast, Washington believes in force – news started coming on June 1 that NATO's KFOR dispatched heavy vehicles to tear down barricades in Rudare, near Zvecan in northern Kosovo, and blocked the roads in the area, with a number of people injured in the clashes.

Nikolic, therefore, has no time to waste as the West's pressure and blackmail over Kosovo mount. He will need to rely on solid foundations to defend Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and in this regard the pro-Russian orientation of the majority in the Progressive Party largely staffed by former Seselj's radicals is a valuable resource. Mobilizing the society, wrestling influence from the pro-Western media which are trying to bring up a generation of “Euroserbs” with no trace of national self-awareness are the objectives to be accomplished to lift Serbia out of its current de facto protectorate condition. Inability to say No, to brush off unfair demands, and to safeguard Serbian national interests would doom Belgrade to an endless replay of past mistakes. Serbia's concessions tend to be suicidal as they further fuel the appetites of its foes. Nikolic cannot suffice with half-measures under the pressing circumstances that mark the opening of his presidency – nothing will change unless Serbia urgently adopts a completely new course. If Serbia's policies are dominated by pro-Western inertia and by the clumsy pursuit of membership in the crisis-ridden EU, Serbia will slide towards economic depression and support for the new rule among its population will rapidly evaporate. Certainly, such developments would indirectly hurt Russia's interests. Widening economic and political cooperation with Russia – in the form of new projects and interactions between the countries' parliaments – are clearly a part of the reasonable solution. The new Serbian president should be mindful that a failure to entrain Russia would alienate his own nation which is outraged by the looming loss of Kosovo. The province's final escape would inflict on the Serbian society a wound from which it is going to be virtually impossible to recover, and forever ruin the reputations of the politicians responsible for the debacle.

Nikolic's epic choice is to either boldly put Serbia's policies on new tracks or to leave the country drifting down Tadic's course, which the majority of Serbs condemned at the polling booths in May, 2012. It must be realized that the cost of the issue is the existence of Serbia.

(1) http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1055239
(2) http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1055239
(3) http://www.rts.rs
 

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Greece, Serbia Defy New World Order (II) https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/06/03/greece-serbia-defy-new-world-order-ii/ Sat, 02 Jun 2012 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2012/06/03/greece-serbia-defy-new-world-order-ii/ Part I

The triumph of T. Nikolic in the runoff in Serbia left in a state of shock those who were convinced that the electoral intrigue in the country had evaporated during the first round. The defeat of B. Tadic, who originally polled 16% ahead of his rival according to the vast majority of public opinion surveys but eventually lost by a 2% margin, deserves a place in history as a vivid illustration of the risky character of electoral estimates as such. Germany’s DPA outlet, for example, cited CECID analyst Dorde Vukovic, who has a lengthy record of monitoring elections in Serbia, as saying that Tadic would garner 58% of the vote and Nikolic – only 42. Slobodan Antonic, another Serbia watcher, had to admit when the dust settled down that the outcome of the elections was best described as an “earthquake”.

In the wake of the ballot count, several Serbian commentators floated the hypothesis that the turn of the electoral tide in Serbia – along with the outpouring of dubious projections, etc. – could be elements of a wider geopolitical scenario, with the West’s consent to an alternative to Tadic being given to avoid a probe into the abuses by which the first round was evidently marred. Indeed, the inescapable conclusion stemming from the comparison between the number of eligible voters on the eve of the first round of the elections in Serbia (7,026,579) and its total population as of 2011 (7,120,666) seems to be that the country is almost exclusively inhabited by adults. Moreover, since the previous presidential race the number of voters in Serbia somehow grew by 40,000 a year against the background of the annual population contraction which is estimated at 30,000.

Arguments in favor of the above theory were seriously reinforced by the unusual gesture attributed to European Council president Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission president José Manuel Barroso who posted congratulations to Nikolic on the web three hours before polling stations closed in Serbia, thus allowing the world to get a glimpse of the political fever that must have been raging at the time in Brussels. The bizarre statement disappeared from the European Commission site shortly to resurface at a reasonable time, in the morning of May 21. When the number of eligible voters dropped to 6,771,479 as the runoff drew closer, suspicion sneaked in that a belated attempt to avert a scandal by making the official figures look real had been made.

In any case, at present the world – and Russia in particular – are getting acquainted with the new Serbian president. Considering that over the past several years Mr. Nikolic has built a reputation for chronic lack of coherence in his statements on key issues like the relations between Belgrade and Moscow or Serbia’s Eurointegration bid, it may be a good idea at the moment to stop savoring the campaign slogans of the former activist of the loudly anti-Western Serbian Radical Party and to subject to scrutiny his actual first steps in office. Topping the list of those was Nikolic’s May 26 visit to Moscow where he attended the congress of the pro-presidential United Russia bloc with which Serbia’s progressives had signed a number of agreements on inter-party cooperation. No doubt, the tour marked the opening of a new phase in it, especially as Nikolic met with Russian president V. Putin. Shortly before Nikolic’s arrival to Moscow, United Russia envoy to interparliamentary union A. Babakov stressed in an interview that he long knew the Serbian leader as an unwaivering proponent of a stronger partnership with Russia and expected him to uphold the same principles upon inauguration. Babakov added that Russia and Serbia can jointly unlock exceptional opportunities, especially in connection with the South Stream gas pipeline project which will see the start of construction in late 2012. Nikolic, it must be noted, told Russia’s ITAR-TASS media agency a while before the run in Serbia that the relations between Belgrade and Moscow would get a boost if he takes charge.

Speaking of Nikolic’ visit to Moscow, it did not flow below the radars of Balkan policy watchers that – in contrast to Putin’s crisp formulations – his assessments of the relations between Serbia and Russia were loaded with restraint. Putin mentioned that Russia had provided an initial $200m credit to Serbia in 2010 and was ready to make available the $800m follow-up, but said the money should go to infrastructural projects and urged Nikolic to send Serbia’s administrative machine a clear message that Russia was waiting for down-to-earth feasibility studies. Nikolic’s response sounded diluted – he pledged to do whatever it takes to make sure that Serbia offers Russia quality projects to put the money to work, but made no references to South Stream or other projects which had been given stamps of approval on the intergovernmental level.

It must be noted that Nikolic touched upon the issue of Kosovo, a problem central to the current state of the Serbian statehood, with even greater caution. He thanked Putin for Moscow’s support for Belgrade on Kosovo and Metohija, but immediately indicated that he did not believe the negotiations between Serbia and the EU were interwoven with the Kosovo theme. Nikolic explained he would be building Serbia in line with the EU norms but said he had never heard of having to recognize the independence of Kosovo and Metohija as some sort of a prerequisite. It is common knowledge that Germany and other EU heavyweights would never subscribe to the view, but Nikolic promised the Russian media that full clarity would be achieved during his June 13 visit to Brussels. Nikolic, on the one hand, asserted that, as the the Serbian constitution dictates, any take at the independence of Kosovo and Metohija is out of question without a prior referendum, but, on the other, said it was equally true that Belgrade was no longer able to rule in Pristina and Pristina – in Kosovska Mitrovica. The phrase read as a thinly disguised “yes” to the partition of Kosovo, a province over which Serbia has absolute right to exercise sovereignty, and appeared to be a definitive departure from the position Nikolic used to campaign on.

Though, contrary to previously announced plans, Nikolic chose to pay his fist presidential visit not to Berlin but to Moscow, as of today his pledges that cultivating the strategic partnership with Russia would top the Serbian agenda do not seem to be materializing. Rather, Nikolic is trying to sense a point of balance between the roles to be given to Russia and the EU, with Eurointegration still an unchallenged priority. Nikolic’s quotations of the popular will concerning the territorial integrity of Serbia mix with professed allegiance to EU norms, but it is an open secret that in Brussels the norm for Serbia is regionalization, a policy which, in the long run, promises exit tickets to Presevo Valley, Vojvodina, and Sanjak rather than just to Kosovo and Metohija.

Thinking of the new Serbian president’s Moscow tour, one starts to feel that, paradoxically, Putin may be in many regards more Serbian than Nikolic, the latter still having to prove that his opposition to the humiliating Western scenarios for Serbia is not a myth. If he fails to do so and, to the delight of Washington and Brussels, Belgrade’s policies under the presidency of Nikolic slide to become a continuation of those pursued under Tadic, a bitter disappointment awaits the Serbian constituency which, on May 20, issued to the new leader an absolutely clear list of “dos” and “don’ts”.

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