The offensive is the latest twist from Turkey’s erratic and unpredictable leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Let’s recall that “Sultan” Erdogan was an early and active participant in what was supposed to have been a relatively easy regime change operation in Syria starting in 2011, on the pattern of NATO’s overthrow of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi that same year. Turkey, with its lengthy border with Syria, was (and to some extent still is) a major supporter of al-Qaeda-linked jihadist groups in Syria, working with Saudi Arabia and Qatar under American guidance, with Israel as a silent partner. The appearance of ISIS (Daesh, ISIL) as an outgrowth of al-Qaeda in Iraq was a direct and foreseen consequence of that effort, as the Obama Administration was warned in 2012 by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), then under the command of General Michael Flynn.

To the surprise of many, the Syrian government under President Bashar al-Assad didn’t just roll up and die but displayed an unexpected tenacity in defending that country’s secular, multi-religious society against outside efforts to impose a Wahhabist sectarian state. The clincher came with Russia’s September 2015 intervention, a distinctly unwelcome development for the “Assad must go!” crowd.

Two months later a crisis erupted between NATO-member Turkey and Russia when Turkish planes shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter (ostensibly for crossing into Turkish airspace) and ethnic Turkish (also called Turkmen) fighters murdered one of the two Russian airmen who parachuted from the plane. Perhaps Erdogan thought he could give Moscow a bloody nose and, with NATO’s backing him up, the Russians would turn tail and run. That didn’t happen, giving Erdogan reason to feel hung out to dry.

Then came the July 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan, orchestrated, he claims, by his former ally businessman, educator, and cleric Fethullah Gülen, resident in the U.S. Despite the deep freeze in Russia-Turkey ties since the Su-24 shootdown, Russian covert assistance reportedly was critical to saving Erdogan’s regime and perhaps his life. At the same time, his U.S. ally – which denies involvement in the coup attempt – still refuses to hand over Gülen, whose supporters in Turkey have been repressed in a massive purge of real or imagined opposition to Erdogan’s consolidation of power.

Internationally, the upshot of the coup’s failure was a turnaround in ties between Ankara and Moscow. In December 2016, Erdogan joined Russia and Iran, the principal supporters of the Syrian government against terrorists armed by Turkey among others, in the Astana peace process.

Erdogan, if not completely breaking with the anti-Assad coalition, at least started to hedge his bets, for example not reacting to the Syrian liberation of Aleppo from Ankara’s al-Qaeda clients. When Syrian forces relieved the ISIS siege of Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria in late 2017, and the Syrian army linked up with the Iraqi army (supported by the U.S. and Iran) at their common border, ISIS was almost finished as a territorial “caliphate.” This in turn has allowed Damascus to shift its focus elsewhere, notably to al-Qaeda-held Idlib. This wasn’t yet the end of the Syrian war but the end was coming into view.

Or so it seemed – which brings us back to U.S. policy.

In July 2017, Ankara had leaked the existence of U.S. bases in Kurdish-held northwestern Syria. Not that it matters to anyone in Washington, this presence is totally illegal under both U.S. law (there’s no Congressional authorization) and international law, which in U.S. politics counts for nothing (no UN Security Council authorization, no self-defense justification, and of course no invitation from the Syrian government). The U.S. presence with the Kurds is positioned on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, while the Russians and Syrians stay mainly on the western bank. Aside from some scary air incidents, it seems both sides seem to have been careful not to come into conflict.

If Washington had been content to leave it that, President Donald Trump – who had campaigned on a promise to “crush and destroy ISIS” – was in a great position to declare victory and get out. Keep in mind that despite ordering a demonstrative cruise missile strike on a Syrian air base in April 2017 (in reprisal for a chemical attack that almost certainly was not the work of the Syrian government), he had not indicated an appetite for digging deeper into an involvement in a conflict where he had once praised Assad, Russia, and Iran for fighting ISIS. He even reportedly cut off CIA aid to “rebels,” i.e., al-Qaeda, in July.

That was then, this is now. The U.S. is not leaving Syria. The globalists, generals, and other Swamp-monsters, plus their Israeli and Saudi pals, have won and “America First!” has lost. Recently Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced a new “way forward” in Syria, which in effect is an old way backwards the Obama policy. There are five pillars:

• Defeat of ISIS and al-Qaeda. [The first is almost finished in Syria and Iraq, and regarding the second there seems to be some confusion about whose side we’ve been on for almost seven years];

• Assad must go [Seriously; the fact that regime change in Syria would mean curtains for the Christians evidently is of no concern in Washington];

• Block the Iranians [The “Shiite crescent” bogeyman is now a “northern arch”];

• Return of refugees to their homes [Is that why the U.S. and the EU maintain sanctions on government-held areas?]; and

• No weapons of mass destruction [Someone seems to have picked up by mistake the old talking points regarding Iraq, circa 2002].

The linchpin of this concept, if it can be called that, is using the Kurds as America’s boots on the ground. (It should be noted that when CIA assistance to its al-Qaeda clients was stopped last year, the Pentagon’s support for the Kurdish YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, “People’s Protection Units”) was maintained or stepped up; at the time the move seemed largely a bureaucratic tiff between Langley and DoD. Now however there are rumblings that the CIA aid spigot may be turned back on.) But for Erdogan, the icing on the cake was U.S. announcement of plans to create a 30,000 “Border Security Force.” For Turkey, this amounts to U.S. sponsorship, perhaps with partition of Syria in mind, of a Kurdish quasi-state comparable to Iraqi Kurdistan, in league with the Kurdish PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, “Kurdistan Workers Party”) – designated a terrorist group by the U.S., Turkey, and NATO. Hence Erdogan’s claim he is acting against a U.S.-armed “terror army,” which he vows to “strangle … before it's even born.”

Perhaps U.S. officials thought they could manage Ankara’s response, or that the bombastic Erdogan was just bluffing. If so, they were mistaken. It now remains to be seen how far the Turks plan, or are able, to advance in Afrin. There is also speculation whether an assault may also be directed toward Manbij in the main, eastern Kurdish-held area known as Rojava, where some 2,000 or more American troops are present. In addition, Erdogan, who has progressively dismantled the Kemalist secular order in Turkey seems bent on whipping the offensive up as an Islamic ideological jihad in 90,000 mosques across the country.

Afrin, with its rough terrain, is a tough nut to crack. Manbij might be even harder and risk confrontation with the U.S. In either case the Kurds are fighting on their home turf against the Turkish army with their local Turkmen militia and al-Qaeda allies. Damascus reportedly has allowed Kurds from the main Rojava area they hold further east to cross government-held territory to reinforce Afrin. Meanwhile, the expectation of some Kurds that the United States would create a “no-fly zone” to defend them from America’s own NATO ally was comically unrealistic.

While it’s hard to say in the short term if the Turks or Kurds will come out ahead, there’s no doubt that strategically the big loser is the U.S. – and it’s a totally self-inflicted wound. If Trump had stuck to his original goal of just defeating ISIS, he could take credit for the efforts of the Syrian army and Russian air force and soon truthfully proclaim “Mission Accomplished” (in contrast to George W. Bush’s notorious Iraq declaration in 2003). But now, with the foolish adventure into which his generals (National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, Defense Secretary James “Mad Dog” Mattis, and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly) have led him, with Tillerson’s agreement or acquiescence, he now has on his hands a conflict between our de jure NATO ally Turkey and our de facto ally, the Kurds.

If the Kurds win, Turkey is in effect lost to NATO – we’re close to that already. If Turkey wins, the misguided U.S. plan to stay in Syria is finished – a likely outcome anyway.

As far as the impact within Syria, the Kurds are about to find out, as did the Iraqi Kurds following their abortive independence declaration last year, that they likewise have pressed their luck too far and were foolish to count on “friends” in Washington, for whom they are disposable. In the end, the Turkish attack is likely to accelerate the Kurds’ outreach to Damascus, with whom they have never entirely burned their bridges.

The British first used the Kurdish tribes as part of their own struggle against Germany’s ally, the Turkish Empire, but afterward, having safeguarded their own colonial interests, they used military force to quash the Kurds’ desire for independence. The second time, those same British, together with the Americans, pressed the Kurds to fight the Nazis’ infiltration into Iran and Iraq, but after the Third Reich was defeated they helped the governments of those countries to suppress Kurdish proto-state polities (for example, the Republic of Mahabad.) And so history repeats itself. Again the Anglo-Saxons (primarily the Americans this time) are using the Kurds as a tool to promote their own geopolitical interests in the Middle East. And there is no guarantee that the Kurds, despite their sad historical experience, will not once again fall into the trap.

Because the Kurds are such a close-knit group, the two million of them who live in Syria have ended up front and center in that civil war. They have liberated vast swaths in the north of the country and along the Euphrates River from the Islamic State (IS) and they have proclaimed Rojava to be a Kurdish autonomous region.

The Turks have noted uneasily that all three major dams across the Euphrates are under Kurdish control, and thus, consequently, are Syria’s energy supplies, water resources, and most fertile arable land.

The Kurds in Syria and Turkey are extremely close, both ethnically and politically, which explains Ankara's special antipathy toward and fierce resistance to the idea of any sort of independence for that nation in Syria. The leading Kurdish political force in Syria – the Democratic Union Party (PYD) led by Saleh Muslim – has close ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey has labeled a terrorist organization. The Americans agree, yet still cooperate with the PKK.

Naturally the Kurds have not forgotten how the Anglo-Saxons treated them in the past, but somehow seem to feel that this time will be different. Perhaps it is the memory of how the West helped to establish the independent Albanian state of Kosovo atop the remains of Yugoslavia that they find so appealing. The SDF’s American advisers are probably taking advantage of the «Kosovo precedent» to convince the Kurds that they can count on the US and thus make them willing to fight for American interests. This is hardly a complete analogy, however – there are far more differences. In Kosovo, the Americans’ only military adversary was Serbia, which had been weakened by sanctions, but now they must contend with resistance from at least four states – Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

There is no situation that is truly analogous to that of Iraqi Kurdistan. Much could change there by Sept. 25 – the date for the referendum on Iraqi Kurdistan – because by then the Iraqi army could be at its borders, and thanks to its experience battling IS, that fighting force has already been mobilized and trained to maneuver in unison. It is even more likely that the Islamic State in Iraq could be completely decimated and wiped from the map not by the end of 2018, as has been claimed, but within two to three months. The sizable territory held by IS forces in Syria and Iraq is far from homogeneous. Three-quarters of it is desert inhabited by Bedouin tribes who have merely sworn allegiance to IS, without fully integrating themselves into it. The Bedouins will have no problems shifting their loyalties, as if offering a "baksheesh" to the new bosses when they arrive. IS doesn’t have many real areas of strength, and the ones it has are all under siege. Some of them, such as Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, will fall within a matter of days; and others, such as Tal Afar in Iraq and al-Sukhnah, Deir ez-Zor, and Uqayribat in Syria, will be taken within weeks. This will have a domino effect.

One cannot help but feel sympathetic about the sad fate of the Kurdish attempts to win legal recognition for their nation, but it makes no sense to step on the same rake three times in a row. Neither Washington nor London has offered nor will offer any guarantees about the creation of an independent Kurdish polity in Syria or an independent state in Iraq. Nor are such obligations found in any of the cooperation agreements signed with such fanfare over the course of decades between the Pentagon and the Peshmerga. All that other stuff is just hot air. Recent decades have offered plenty of examples of the US flouting even legally binding treaties, not to mention its verbal promises offered by «somebody somewhere».

It should be noted that throughout the entire Syrian war, Russia has been the one reliably standing up for the interests of local Kurds. Moscow, for example, has tried to ensure that the Kurds have been represented at every international forum for resolving the Syrian issue, including in Geneva, while the West has not lifted a finger. Only Russia was able to halt the implementation of Turkey’s plans to decimate the Kurds as part of their Operation Euphrates Shield. Kurdish rights are explicitly included in the draft of the Syrian constitution that was drawn up by Russian advisers and proposed to Damascus. A few days ago Bashar al-Assad announced an administrative reform in the country, proposing that the Kurds truly take their rightful place in all of Syria’s public and state institutions and be permitted to realize their national and cultural aspirations. And this represents a real, tangible «bird in the hand». Until recently, the leadership of the PYD, led by Saleh Muslim, both recognized this and greatly valued Russian assistance.

But unfortunately, the Kurds have recently been pushed to choose unwisely between this «bird in the hand» vs. the Americans’ offer of «two in the bush». This became especially noticeable after the failure of the Pentagon’s May attempts to ensure that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) units it controls hold full sway throughout southern Syria. Disappointed in the FSA’s fighting skills and seeking at all costs to «topple Assad», the US «advisors» have shifted the focus of their attention to the northeast and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which consist primarily of Kurds. The government SU-22 shot down by Americans near Raqqa (the plane was allegedly planning to bomb SDF positions, although in fact it had been tasked with hitting IS targets) marked a turning point. Washington has demonstrated that it considers the fight against Damascus to be more important than defeating IS and that it is prepared, or so they say, to defend Kurdish interests with all its military might. And unfortunately many of the commanders of the Kurdish forces believed this, although in the long term this threatens the Kurds with a new national catastrophe. This is especially true if they continue their short-sighted refusal to allow the government army to pass through to the territories they occupy.

But in reality the Americans have no intention of throwing the kind of military muscle at Syria that they deployed against Serbia back when they were helping to carve out Kosovo. Even in their worst nightmares they did not imagine battling the standing armies of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and their own ally – Turkey, in order to win independence for the Kurds. And such a prospect is by no means a fantasy, because these states see Kurdish independence as by far their greatest threat. For Turkey, for example, this threat will always dwarf its obligations under any alliance, including NATO.

ARANews, the semi-official press service of the Syrian Kurds, even quotes former US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford’s claim that in the final phase of the war the US «will not defend the Kurds against Assad’s forces». Ford asserted that «What we’re [the Americans – D.M.] doing with the Kurds is not only politically stupid, but immoral. Syrian Kurds are making their biggest mistake in trusting the Americans». ARANews disagrees and cites other analysts as well, but to no avail: you will not find a more respected expert on the Syrian crisis than Robert Ford, who was present for its inception. 

Nor will the huge amount of land the SDF holds in Syria (as much as 45,000 sq. km.) keep the Kurds out of harm’s way. The Kurdish forces are extremely thin on the ground in those regions (only 30,000 fighters), and their communication lines are stretched out. If there's a showdown, the regular Syrian army will have no problems breaking up the area held by the SDF. Two-thirds of the terrain occupied by the Kurds (which they want to keep) consists of Arab lands, and the Kurds have no resources for forging any kind of normal life there. Between Damascus and the pro-Turkish forces, they’ll have no trouble galvanizing the Arab settlements there to rise up, should things escalate, and the Kurds would look like the «cruel oppressors». Then they’d be entirely out of options for finding international support.

According to recent reports, Turkey has already marshaled massive numbers of troops on the borders of the Kurdish cantons in Syria and is waiting for the go-ahead from Moscow and Damascus. And why, one might ask, would those countries continue to hold the Turks in check, if the Kurds themselves are turning their backs on Damascus and Moscow?

The leaders of the Syrian Kurds must now grapple with the enormous responsibility of making a fateful decision for their people. They can either refrain from throwing obstacles in Damascus’s way, helping to build a new version of the state in which they will have far more rights than they used to have in Syria, or they can choose the opposite path, doing the bidding of what Robert Ford has called the «immoral» foreign politicians and embark on adventures that will end with them losing everything they have gained.

The move is supported by lawmakers. «To me, it’s the only viable solution right now», Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, R-Tenn., told reporters on Capitol Hill. «And obviously the Kurds have got to have the weaponry to be successful. So I’m glad they’re finally following through on what they’ve known for some time: This is the only course that appears to be feasible relative to Raqqa». «That’s a really tricky dance. And ultimately you may be inviting more problems than you’re solving by pushing the Turks off to the side and making them antagonists to a future reconciliation process inside Syria», Senate Foreign Relations member Chris Murphy, D-Conn., told Al-Monitor. «There are no good options in Syria. But generally giving people arms creates more problems than it solves».

The US support for the Syrian Kurds, in particular the YPG, has driven a wedge between Washington and Ankara. Turkey sees the YPG militia as the Syrian extension of the Kurdish PKK militant group, which has fought an insurgency in southeastern Turkey since 1984. Turkey had long argued that the United States should switch support for the planned assault on Raqqa from the Kurdish YPG militia to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other Syrian rebels supported by Ankara. Washington sees the 50,000-strong SDF as the most effective force fighting the IS in Syria and has already armed the non-Kurdish Arab elements of that group. Syrian Kurds make up slightly over than half of the SDF.

The Kurdish issue turned into a problem in the American-Turkish relations after Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, invading the northern part of Syria. One of the goals was to prevent the Kurds from uniting Afrin and Kobani – the regions in the west and east under their control. The operation Euphrates Shield was launched about two weeks after US-backed SDF liberated Manbij in the east of Aleppo province.

In August 2016, the US urged Kurds to leave Manbij and retreat to the east of Euphrates. However, those demands were largely ignored. In March 2017, America announced that Manbij was transferred under control of its anti-IS coalition, making it play against Turkey.

US military and YPG fighters have been patrolling the Turkey-Syrian border since late April after the Turkish Air Force delivered a strike on Kurdish positions. The announcement of the decision comes just a few days before the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with President Trump in Washington scheduled on May 16.

Turkish top officials have spoken out against the move, saying the US decision is a “crisis” between the two NATO allies. It strikes an eye that President Trump has decided to travel to Israel and Saudi Arabia – and not Turkey – on his first international visit starting on May 19. The president may be looking for the two countries to provide financial and political support for the idea of creating a Kurdish state.

«There have been bad episodes in the relationship between the United States and Turkey, but this one is serious because it gets to the heart of Turkish security priorities», said Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. «You’ve now got a question mark over the US-Turkish security relationship that is pretty serious», Aliriza added.

With American weapons going to the Syrian Kurds, at least a temporary arrangement should be found to soothe Turkey’s concerns. YPG units and Turkish military could be effectively divided by neutral forces taking positions between them. It’s important to prevent possible clashes.

Tentative talks between Turkey and the Kurds could be launched with Russia – the party Turkey and the Kurds trust – acting as a mediator. This is the time to meet the Moscow’s initiative to make the Syrian Kurds part of the Astana peace process. The forum could be used as a platform for contacts to bring together Russia, Turkey, the Kurds and the US. With all the contradictions to divide them, Ankara and the YPG must talk, not fight to make IS terrorists happy.

With Raqqa liberated from the IS militants, the question will arise as to who and under what authority will govern the city and what to do next. Some international presence is inevitable. The establishment of the offices of the UN, the Arab League and other international organizations would be a logical step to take. Turkey should be represented across the political spectrum as part of the Sunni Muslims’ camp. It is a neighboring state with Syria and its legitimate security concerns must be taken into account and respected. Those concerns should be one way or another reconciled with the objectives pursued by the Syrian Kurds. Otherwise, no conflict management in Syria will be possible.

In the longer run, the arms supplies to the YPG are unacceptable to Ankara. It will most certainly put an end to the “strategic partnership’. The parties will not immediately break ties and Turkey will not leave NATO in protest, but it will shift from the US and the West to Russia and the SCO. The decision taken before the US-Turkish summit is an offense not to be easily forgotten or forgiven.

This is the time for intensive mediation and also changes in the Middle East political landscape as the United States has made a decision to support the Kurds. With this choice made by the Trump administration, it’s easy to predict the US-Turkey relationship will never be the same again.

There should be no doubt that President Donald Trump’s approval of a plan to directly arm Kurdish forces in Syria is a severe, devastating blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s obstinate efforts to undermine the relationship of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party and the People's Protection Units (YPG) with Washington.

The decision is an additional inflammatory step in the already strained US-Turkey relations emanating from divergences over Syria. The relationship between the two NATO allies was dislocated during President Barack Obama's administration, primarily due to divergences on Washington’s approach to the Kurds in Syria. Yet even Obama had not gone the extra mile to anger Erdogan (or the Turks) by giving approval to directly arm the YPG. In mid-October 2014, when the United States provided air support to the besieged Kurds in Kobani, the move was recorded as a milestone in the problematic relations between the United States, Turkey and the Kurds.

From the official Turkish viewpoint, that air support was seen — and not wrongly — as a “political statement,” as much as military and humanitarian assistance to thousands of people desperately struggling to survive under Islamic State (IS) siege following the capture of Mosul and Raqqa. The air support had made Turkey’s ally — the United States — strange bedfellows with the alleged branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Syria, the PYD/YPG.

Since then, rifts have developed between Ankara and Washington that culminated in Erdogan’s courting Trump, hoping that with him the prospects of Turkish-American relations on Syria — mainly on the issue of Syrian Kurds — would be different than those of the Obama era.

The Turkish side insists on saying that Washington should cooperate with Turkey instead of the Syrian Kurds for the ultimate Raqqa operation against IS.

Turkey detected positive signals from Washington and interpreted them to mean that Erdogan’s ostensibly pro-Trump attitude would be rewarded in the upcoming operation to liberate Raqqa. Despite the protestation in Washington's political milieu, Trump called Erdogan to congratulate him on the April 16 referendum results even as they were being contested inside and outside of Turkey — thereby legitimizing the alleged fraud.

Erdogan is to meet Trump on May 16, a much-heralded event on the Turkish side over the past couple of weeks. Prior to this visit, Erdogan dispatched his top confidants on security issues, including head of Turkish Intelligence Hakan Fidan, Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag, Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and — as if a “political commissar” — his own spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin, to Washington to meet with the American authorities to pave the way for a successful outcome of the two presidents' encounter.

The main purpose of the Turks' visits to Washington was to dissuade the American side from supporting the Syrian Kurds for the Raqqa operation that aims to recapture the “Syrian capital” of IS. The main interlocutor of the highest-level Turkish delegation in Washington was Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Trump’s national security adviser.

The Turkish officials were informed of Trump’s decision to approve the delivery of direct arms to the Kurds in Syria by McMaster himself when they visited the White House on May 8. It is clear that the decision to arm the Syrian Kurds had been made knowing how it would anger the Turkish side and that the purpose of the Turkish officials' visit would be strictly about this matter.

While the Pentagon on May 9 publicized its decision that had shocked Turkish officials the day before, chief Pentagon spokeswoman Dana W. White said the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are "the only force on the ground that can successfully seize Raqqa in the near future." To many, the SDF is synonymous with its main component, the YPG. Aware of this and thus trying to assuage Turkish resentment, she added, "We are keenly aware of the security concerns of our coalition partner, Turkey. We want to reassure the people and government of Turkey that the United States is committed to preventing additional security risks and protecting our NATO ally."

The same day, hours before the official disclosure of Trump’s decision to directly arm the Syrian Kurds, Reuters quoted Secretary of Defense James Mattis as saying, "Our intent is to work with the Turks, alongside one another, to take Raqqa down — and we're going to sort it out, and we'll figure out how we're going to do it."

The Turkish reaction was unexpectedly low-key, given — in terms of the timing and the substance of the matter — the heavy blow inflicted upon Turkish-American relations and its ramifications in Turkey. The decision, beyond any doubt, looks to have a very strong negative bearing on the future.

Prime Minister Binali Yildirim invited the United States to make a choice — as if it has not already done so — and said, “It is impossible for Turkey to accept the initiatives that would mean supporting the PKK directly or indirectly."

A similar statement was made by Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, who emphasized that all of these issues will be addressed during the meeting between Erdogan and Trump.

Erdogan, at a joint press conference with the president of Sierra Leone, touched on the issue but did not even go as far as his prime minister and foreign minister. He limited his reaction and said that he "will convey" his "concern” on the matter to Trump during their meeting. Erdogan expressed his “hope that there could be a reversal of the mistake committed.”

Well-known for his fiery speeches — and taking into consideration how sensitive the issue of arming the Syrian Kurds is and that it has been the mainstay of his resentment against Washington in Syria — Erdogan’s remarks were incredibly weak.

There will no reversal of "mistakes committed," and Erdogan knows it very well. Turks were aware that the Pentagon — the lead agency of the American administration — was calling the shots in Syria and determined to go with the SDF and the YPG for the liberation of Raqqa. For the Pentagon, the issue was not whether to replace the Kurds with Turkey. It was how to keep Turkey on board.

Since Trump endorsed the Pentagon’s decision before meeting with Erdogan — and while a high-level delegation dispatched by Erdogan was still in Washington — it is quite certain that America took the step after long consideration and calculation.

What motivated this decision?

• Apart from the American reliance on the Syrian Kurds’ proved capability in fighting IS and the high chances of retaking Raqqa, Washington seemingly decided that the PYD and the YPG should not be left to be merely Iranian pawns in the larger framework of the regional game. Similarly, the the administration in Baghdad, despite its Shiite identity, has not been left by Washington to the exclusive influence of Tehran.

• The American decision, particularly in terms of its timing, is Washington’s answer to Turkey’s flirtation with Russia and Iran in the Astana process. The new trilateral accord agreed upon by Russia, Turkey and Iran on May 4 regarding the de-escalation of the Syrian conflict has been announced with apparent symbolism after a meeting between Erdogan and Putin in the Russian city of Sochi. The Turkish president boasted that the agreement reached will solve half of the conflict, which means the other half is Turkey’s problem — with the Kurds — and leaves his hands free to deal with it.

Therefore, Trump’s decision to directly arm the Syrian Kurds automatically restrains Turkey’s freewheeling in dealing with Syrian Kurds and also sent an implicit message to Turkey that Washington is unlikely to endorse Turkey’s flirtation with Moscow and Tehran in the Middle East.

From the unusually muted attitude of Erdogan, it seems the Turkish side received the message in the way the American side wanted it to be received.

al-monitor.com

At the upcoming May 16-17 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his Turkish counterpart, and the May 25 Nato summit, serious issues relating to the status of Nato will need to be addressed — namely defense expenditures reform, clarification of the alliance’s approach to new security threats, and the status of Turkey’s membership.

Unconventional security threats challenge Nato

As a legacy Cold War institution, Nato retains a built-in bias against Russia and is focused on conventional warfare. However, in an era in which the mission defines the coalition and not the other way around, Nato’s coalition of collective security against a conventional threat is ill-equipped to address new security challenges such as terrorism, refugee crises, and conflict prevention and resolution.

Moreover, the US is no longer the wealthy nation it once was; it can no longer provide defense welfare to support Europe’s post-war reconstruction. It is also unfair for many wealthy European states to continue placing a heavy burden on struggling American taxpayers to underwrite 75% of Nato’s budget, while the US economy is flailing with its own $21 trillion debt burden.

‘Alliances should be a means to an end rather than an end in themselves, and in this case, that end should be to increase US security’

As Doug Bandow argued in a September 2016 Foreign Affairs article, “Alliances should be a means to an end rather than an end in themselves, and in this case, that end should be to increase US security.”  Unfortunately, over the past number of years, it seems US allies have actually been decreasing US security – especially Nato member Turkey.

Turkey and the erosion of Nato as a “value-based” alliance

Despite repeated mantras from the US and other Nato members that Turkey is a reliable ally, since 2003, Turkey under Erdogan and AKP has been transforming into an Islamist and totalitarian country that stands in opposition to Nato’s professed values of democracy, human rights and rule of law.

It has also betrayed the US and supported America’s enemies. As confirmed by a German intelligence report and another by Columbia University, Ankara has been acting as an umbilical cord for Al Qaeda and ISIS, feeding them a steady stream of foreign fighters and weapons, as well as providing a market for their oil. Indeed, that is what provoked Erdogan’s regime to ban Wikipedia back in April – it refused to remove contents regarding Turkey’s role in promoting jihad in Syria.

Thus, despite recent Nato’s assurances to Trump that the military alliance will begin to reorient its mission on counterterrorism, there remains skepticism – it is problematic to declare that the alliance is countering terrorism when one of its members has been complicit in fomenting terrorism in Syria.

Turkey has been sabotaging US anti-ISIS efforts in Syria and Iraq, and repeatedly bombing Kurds who serve as the spearhead force for the coalition, sparking outrage among pundits and US lawmakers. The Pentagon also slammed recent Turkish airstrikes that risked the lives of American troops working with the Syrian Kurds (YPG) battling ISIS. Now, there is a halt to the momentum on the Raqqa offensive as US troops are deployed to the Syria-Turkey border to stop Turkish attacks, with Russian troops doing the same in Efrin.

Meanwhile, Erdogan is steadily populating northern Syria with Turkey-trained “rebel” security forces. Chanting and hailing Allah, Erdogan and Turkey, a batch of 450 troops deployed to Jarablus in January 2017, the first of some 5,000 security forces Ankara is training to occupy northern Syria as part of Operation Euphrates Shield launched in August 2016.

Coordinated with pro-Turkish Syrian rebel jihadi groups, including the Turkmen Sultan Murad Brigades, and taken together with coverage by pro-AKP newspapers such as Takvim that featured a map of Aleppo, Idlib and the north of Latakia as an eventual 82nd province, the August operation in Jarablus appears to be part of Ankara’s larger plan to annex northern Syria.

Pro-AKP daily's jingoistic & irredentist agitation for the annexation of #Aleppo as the 82nd province of #Turkey

Nato is clearly in a state of disarray: Washington has to confront a Nato member to stop it from attacking US allies, while Turkey has threatened to attack American soldiers in Syria. This, in turn, has some observers wondering if Washington and Ankara might invoke Article 5 against each other. Article 5 commits each member country to treat an armed attack against one member as an act of aggression against all members.

It also begs the question of whether American taxpayers should continue to underwrite an organization that no longer seems to be enhancing American security – with internal bickering, an alliance structure not equipped to address new unconventional threats, and the failure of most members to meet their 2% GDP defense expenditures.

As such European security seems likely to shift from a “collective defense” concept to an East Asian hub-and-spoke model, centered on bilateral security guarantees with individual countries such as South Korea and Japan. In this “East Asianization” of Europe, Hans Kundnani from the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Academy observed that given the context of Trump’s demand that Nato members fulfill their defense spending pledges, and the deployment of Nato troops to the Baltic states and Poland, “What may be emerging is a system of implicit bilateral security guarantees between Nato countries, centered on the United States.”

Indeed, in January, 4,000 US troops arrived in Poland – a NATO member that spends more that 2% of its GDP on defense – while in Latvia and Lithuania, which spend roughly 1.5% of GDP on defense, non-US troops from NATO will be deployed. Kundnani noted the extent to which a Nato member can rely on US security guarantees may now depend on its defense spending and whether American troops are stationed on its soil.

He assessed the “transformation of collective security into a system of bilateral security guarantees may mean the de facto end of Nato as a collective security organization.” However, in the absence of Nato reform and in light of a new security environment, rebalancing European security with a hub-and-spoke model may perhaps turn out to be a blessing in disguise.

atimes.com

The statement is of great importance. It is made at a time clashes between Turkey-backed Syrian rebel groups and the government forces have been reported to take place near the town of Al-Bab in the northern part of Syria. The position of Turkish government provides a chance to prevent the worst.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the next phase of Turkey's Euphrates Shield military campaign in northern Syria would target the Kurdish-controlled Manbij and called on the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) to leave the city.

It was reported on March 4 that Ahrar al-Sham Syrian rebel group had claimed to have brought down a MiG-23 with anti-aircraft fire over the Idlib governorate before it crashed near Turkey's Hatay province. The jet of this type can be shot by anti-aircraft artillery fire. The question is which exactly fraction of the group hit the plane and what the aircraft was doing in this area? The Ahrar al-Sham Syrian is indirectly represented at the Astana talks. There should be no hostilities in the territory it controls.

As the Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield started the group got split. A part of it moved to the buffer zone. Then it was actually divided into two camps: one is close to Jabhat al Nusra (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) terror extremist group; the other gravitates toward the Turkey-supported Free Syrian Army (FSA). This event did not attract much media attention. The fraction affiliated with the FSA is deployed near the Turkish border. The split excludes direct participation in the Astana process but the group is still a part of the negotiations and sticks to the agreements reached.

The incident with the plane could have been a provocation. There are elements who wish the Astana process were stymied. It would be too naïve to believe they would not try to stage all kinds of provocative actions. The Astana peace process is not to everyone’s liking. The shooting could also be accidental. Everyone makes mistakes from time to time. It happens.

What really matters is that Turkish search and rescue operations units found the pilot and offered him medical aid. He was not imprisoned. It indicates the attitude – Turkey does not consider the Syrian government forces as enemy. If the aircraft were hit by Turkish military or a rebel group under Turkey’s control, the events would have developed differently.

Besides, Moscow and Ankara clearly see the benefits of cooperation. It made possible the establishment of Russia-supported Syrian government forces’ control over the eastern part of Aleppo. The inclusion of Ankara into the peace making process paves the way for bringing in actors representing Sunni-dominated countries. The Russia-Turkey cooperation is a crucial factor for gradual transfer from armed conflict to political settlement, post-war reconstruction, decentralization of the country and finding a solution to the problem of refugees.

The Operation Euphrates Shield was coordinated with Moscow. The Russian aviation supported the Turkish troops in the battle for Al-Bab. With Russia mediation, it was agreed that the M4 motorway served as a dividing between Syrian troops and the forces loyal to Turkey. The incidents between pro-Turkish forces and the Kurds do not grow into conflicts thanks to Russian and US mediation efforts.

The events have certain background. Ankara cut ties with Syria after an uprising erupted in 2011. Throughout the five-year-old war, it has sided with armed groups fighting the Syrian government. It had insisted until recently that Assad’s departure was a prerequisite for the crisis management to hinder cooperation with Russia. Now the stance is being gradually reversed.

The current events make spring to mind a statement made last summer by Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. «I am sure that we will return (our) ties with Syria to normal. We need it», he said in a televised address. According to him, ««It is our greatest and irrevocable goal: Developing good relations with Syria and Iraq, and all our neighbors that surround the Mediterranean and the Black Sea».

The PM also admitted that there was a need for policy change as Turkey needed to «increase its friends and decrease its enemies». «There are not many reasons for us to fight with Iraq, Syria, Egypt and countries in all regions. But there are many reasons to carry relations forward…» the Prime Minister said at a meeting of his Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) in the capital Ankara on July 11.

This turn of events gives sense to the discussions about establishing safe zones in the northern part of Syria. It also makes realistic the US plans to launch an offensive to retake Raqqa. According to the Washington Post, a Pentagon plan for the coming assault on Raqqa, the Islamic State capital in Syria, calls for significant US military participation, including increased Special Operations forces, attack helicopters and artillery, and arms supplies to the main Syrian Kurdish and Arab fighting force on the ground.

Before it would have led to a major military conflict. Now it could be otherwise if the Syrian government gives its consent. Moreover, the sides could agree on areas of responsibility and coordination of efforts once a joint offensive starts. A joint military action coordinated between the Syrian government forces, Russia, Turkey, the Kurds and US-supported SDF units could become a turning point in the conflict, paving the way to the final defeat of the IS and a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

If it happens, Russia and Turkey will get credit for what they have done against all the odds. 

After capturing the nearby IS stronghold of Dabiq in October, Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) militias, Ankara’s main proxy in Syria, have been unable to muster a serious attack against al-Bab. The situation grew militarily complicated for Turkey after its jets began striking YPG targets in the area — resulting in the United States withdrawing air support for FSA and Turkish forces — and after Russia and Syrian regime forces made serious headway against the FSA in Aleppo, to which al-Bab provides access.

Turkey had launched Operation Euphrates Shield into northern Syria on Aug. 24, proclaiming that its mission was to defeat IS, push YPG fighters east of the Euphrates River and establish a 45-kilometer-deep (28 miles) “safe zone” on the Syrian side of the border. Ankara moved to establish a safe zone on its own after failing to secure international support for one. It claims such an area will provide protection for civilians uprooted by the war and also prevent illegal crossings into and out of Turkey by members and recruits of IS and similar groups.

It is no secret, however, that Turkey’s major reason for the proposed zone is to prevent Syrian Kurds from establishing a contiguous region along the Turkish border. The zone would include the yet-to-be liberated al-Bab to the south, and if Ankara has its way, Manbij, just west of the Euphrates, as well.

On Nov. 22 at the conference “Turkey’s New Security Concept,” Erdogan claimed the FSA was at the gates of al-Bab and implied that victory was imminent. “But that won’t be enough,” he said. “From there, we will move on to Manbij. The PYD and YPG are in Manbij. … We want them to leave.”

A few days after these remarks, Erdogan had a rude awakening, when on Nov. 24 an apparent airstrike hit Turkish special forces accompanying FSA fighters near al-Bab. Four Turkish soldiers were killed and nine injured. Some believe the attack was actually an IS suicide bombing, but the Turkish military said on the day of the incident that the evidence pointed to a Syrian jet.

Adding to Ankara’s shock was that the strike occurred on the first anniversary of the downing of a Russian warplane by Turkey after it strayed into Turkish airspace. Although Turkey and Russia reconciled over the event earlier this year, after Erdogan apologized to Russian President Vladimir Putin, it did not temper the widespread belief that Moscow had indirectly supported the attack on Turkish forces to avenge the downing of the jet. It is common knowledge that Syrian airspace is controlled by Russian-provided and -manned advance radar systems.

Clearly uneasy about the timing of the attack, Erdogan held two hasty phone conversations with Putin, Nov. 25 and 26. The semiofficial Anadolu Agency reported that the matter had been discussed, but gave no details. Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus then told reporters Nov. 28 that Russia had denied involvement in the incident. The Syrian regime has remained silent about the affair, further compounding the mystery.

Mete Yarar, a former red beret commando who comments on security issues, argued after the strike, “[Turkey’s] rivals are carrying out the requirements of their proxy war [in Syria] just as [Turkey’s] independent operation against al-Bab is on the verge of succeeding.” Yarar did not spell out who “Turkey’s rivals” are, but his reference to Turkey’s “independent operation” is telling, revealing an attempt by pro-government commentators to deflect attention away from Russia and toward the United States.

Serkan Demirtas, a foreign policy commentator for Hurriyet Daily News, recalled that Col. John Dorrian, a spokesman for the US-led coalition against IS, had said Nov. 17 that the coalition was not supporting the Turkish operation in al-Bab because Turkey had launched it “independent” of the coalition. Demirtas argued, “The key word in the spokesman’s statement is ‘independent,’ which could be interpreted as meaning that Ankara and Washington can no longer coordinate their respective moves in Syria and have totally different objectives.”

Erdogan’s supporters are keen to present relations with Russia as a counterbalance to Turkey’s increasingly hostile ties with the United States and Europe. Ankara’s response to the attack on its forces was surprisingly low key. Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said Turkey would retaliate, but other than this remark, Ankara has remained largely mute about the incident. Many take this as an indication that Ankara also suspects Russian involvement.

As Demirtas pointed out, Turkey is not in tune with Russia in Syria despite its reconciliation with Moscow. Syrian airspace was closed to Turkish jets after an airstrike Oct. 22 against YPG targets that Ankara said killed “150 terrorists” (and the YPG said resulted in 10 deaths).

After that strike, Syria, clearly with Russian blessing, said that it would respond militarily to further violations of its airspace. The restriction was lifted after Gen. Hulusi Akar, chief of the Turkish General Staff, went to Moscow for talks. Turkish jets resumed operations in Syria Nov. 12, notably concentrating on IS targets only.

The restriction was reportedly reinstated for a while, after Turkey targeted YPG positions with artillery fire. Russia, like the United States, evidently wants Turkey to stick to targeting IS.

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naim Baburoglu considers the claim ludicrous that Russia was unaware of the airstrike against Turkish forces near al-Bab. He told Al-Monitor that Moscow does not want the FSA, or the YPG for that matter, in al-Bab because the town is a gateway to Aleppo, where the Syrian regime has recently secured major gains against the FSA.

“It is unthinkable that any jet in northern Syria, especially one belonging to the regime, can fly there without Russia’s knowledge or approval,” Baburoglu said. “What Russia and Syria are telling Turkey is simple: ‘Stop advancing on al-Bab.’”

He also believes the date of the strike on Turkish forces was indeed significant. “Putin is known to wait patiently for his moment,” Baburoglu said. “Moscow denies involvement in this strike, but the significance of its date was clearly not lost on Russians.”

That Russia wants Turkey to steer clear of al-Bab, and the United States wants it to stay away from Manbij, poses a major problem for Ankara’s military plans in Syria, Baburoglu observed. The bottom line is that Turkey not only faces IS and the YPG in Syria, but Russia and the United States as well. Given this, many argue that Erdogan is unaware of what he is up against as he tries to please his supporters with promises he will most likely not be able to keep.

al-monitor.com

Now that the Turks have invaded Syria, there is no more talk of granting the Kurds the status of a separate federal region within a new Syrian state – something the Kurds very much want – much less the independence for which many of them have secretly dreamed.

It is already clear that Ankara’s primary goal is not to fight IS, but to neutralize the Kurds. The Kurdish plan to unilaterally proclaim the establishment of a federal system in early October looks belated and out of touch with reality. Their hopes of seamlessly linking together all the Kurdish cantons across northern Syria now also look illusory. However the real problem is not Turkey, but the fact that the Kurds’ former patrons in Washington have decisively quashed all their aspirations.

The Kurds have once again been cynically used and left with nothing. The duplicity and poor choices of their allies are a curse that has plagued Kurdish history, possibly dating back to the era of the legendary Kurdish military commander Saladin (Salah ad-Din), who vanquished the Crusaders.

A prominent columnist for the Washington Post, David Ignatius, in an article with the indicative title, «The U.S.’s Syria Policy Rests on a Treacherous Fault Line» reminds us that until quite recently the US military consistently claimed that the Syrian Kurds were «the strongest force against the Islamic State.»

During the relentless fighting of 2014-2015, that force liberated vast territories, including the major cities of Al-Shaddadah and Manbij, strategically encircling the capital of IS, Raqqa, from the distant outskirts. Ignatius writes that he personally visited US training camps in northern Syria, where American instructors praised the courage and daring of the Kurdish fighters, viewing them as the backbone of the attack on Raqqa.

For a time, the Turks, although hostile to the Kurds, accepted this alliance. But all that changed after the failed military coup in Turkey. The «allies by proxy», trained by the Americans and hailing from various Syrian factions, now found themselves on opposite front lines. That was when US Vice President Joe Biden came to Ankara to lend his support to the steps taken by the Turkish government and demanded that the Kurds withdraw from Manbij and pull back across the Euphrates.

It goes without saying that this was a true breach of faith – something that has become an ignominious tradition. Ignatius writes that «Western powers over the past century have used Kurdish fighters when it suited their purposes, and then abandoned them when neighboring powers objected.» That is what happened after 1918, when the allies of the Entente ignored US President Woodrow Wilson’s promises to create a national home for the Kurds. In 1947, the British allowed Iran to wipe out a Kurdish republic that had been established within its own borders.

 In 1975, despite promises to support Iraq’s Kurds, the Americans, along with the Shah of Iran, allowed Saddam Hussein to savagely crush their rise. But not long before that, in 1973, the leader of the Iraqi Kurds at that time, Mustafa Barzani – the father of the current president of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani – pinned his hopes on American decency and stated, «America is too great a power to betray a small people like the Kurds.» But according to Ignatius that was a serious mistake.

One would hope that today’s Kurdish leaders would not repeat the errors of their fathers. One need only remember how, speaking about the deception of the Kurds in 1975, Henry Kissinger stated bluntly, «Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.» And aren’t all the current actions by the US administration in the Middle East in line with this extremely utilitarian recommendation?

Der Spiegel also believes that the Kurds have been the biggest losers from the new turn of events in Syria. Until recently, the Kurds seemed to be the «canniest players» in the Syrian game, with more victories than anyone else, but in the end they risked too much. The US, instead of acting as an intermediary between the warring Turks and Kurds, found itself in the schizophrenic position of being an ally to both sides. Sooner or later they would have to choose whom they preferred, and it seems they have now chosen the more powerful and geopolitically significant Turkey.

The Kurds’ relationship with the United States is rapidly deteriorating. Although, to be frank, they never really had a relationship. The US never regarded the Kurds as a partner, instead seeing them as something to be used and thrown away, despite any assurances to the contrary that Washington may have issued to the Kurdish leaders. This is yet another lesson, not only for the Kurds but to everyone throughout the Middle East. It is not the Americans, but others there who understand what it means to honor their commitments in the region.

Also noteworthy are the sophisticated tactics the Americans are using in their efforts to dump their Kurdish allies. At first they tried to cause a permanent rift between the Kurds and Bashar al-Assad. Those calculations were apparently based on the theory that, once they were left entirely on their own, the Kurds would be forced to swallow even more of their pride and continue to take orders from the Americans, even with the understanding that they were being shamelessly deceived.

The August clashes between the Kurds and Syrian government forces in Al-Hasakah – the capital of the province of the same name – which preceded the Turkish invasion of Jarabulus, could not have occurred without the knowledge and encouragement of the American advisers. Talal Silo, the official spokesman for the Syrian Democratic Forces, which primarily consist of Kurdish militias, acknowledged that «We are US & coalition partners. They make decisions. Of course, we are free, but we can not attack if there is no signal from the Americans.» He also stated that the Americans prohibit their protégés the Kurds from making any contact with the Russians in Syria («in case communication with Russians you’re lose all our support» [sic].)

What was especially painful for Damascus, in addition to being driven out of Al-Hasakah, was the fact that Kurds from the neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsood in Aleppo at the same time blocked the Castello Road supply route used to provision the government forces in the western part of the city that had already been cut off by a sudden breakthrough by jihadists from the south (which has now been rectified).

For the first time in all the years of the war, the Syrian air force has bombed the Kurds. It’s no surprise that these actions were also approved for the first time in Ankara. There was even talk there about the acceptability of keeping Bashar al-Assad in power during the transition period, and they immediately seized upon a favorable moment for a long-prepared invasion. That meant that for the Kurds, their localized success in Al-Hasakah turned out to have negative consequences in a strategic sense. They have been thrown under the bus. And it is difficult to believe that the Americans were unaware of Turkey’s intentions. In Ankara, US Vice President Biden did not seem at all to have been taken by surprise, and his statements of approval did not sound in the least off-the-cuff.

Meanwhile, the latest turn of events is not bringing a resolution of the Syrian conflict any closer. The commanders of the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) have already informed the Pentagon that «if the Turks don’t get out», the Kurds might not take part in the planned Raqqa offensive. And there is simply no other force in the country that is capable of clearing out the «terrorist capital» anytime soon.

The agreement reached between the Americans and the Turks during the G20 summit in Hangzhou to jointly attack Raqqa is hardly feasible without the Kurds. Without them, that operation would require many Turkish and American ground forces to plunge deeply into Syrian territory. And that might not only bring many casualties, but would also likely face serious opposition in the United States and Turkey, as well as from other countries, including Russia and Iran.

Damascus, which still retains its seat at the UN, would also oppose it. Ankara might repeat the mistake made by the Kurds and set off down the «treacherously dangerous path» laid out for them. One can only hope that the Turks will not allow themselves to be coaxed into once again undermining the partnership with Moscow that required so much work to repair.

Yet the Kurds could salvage their situation, if they are able to make the right choice in the final stage of the war, by renouncing their fraudulent dependencies and alliances that promise them nothing but a copious «tribute of blood.» It seems more obvious that their natural ally – and essentially their only one – not only in warfare but also in achieving national self-determination in a post-war version of Syria, is Bashar al-Assad’s secular regime in Damascus.

No other opposition force, not the Americans and certainly not the Turks, give the slightest thought to any sort of national rights for the Syrian Kurds. Their current partners all see them as merely «along for the ride.» But Assad has an objective interest in reaching a permanent accord with the Kurds, because the support of ethnic and religious minorities will always be needed in order to stand up to Sunni fundamentalism. And no genuine alliance will be possible unless they are allowed to realize their aspirations.

In late August, Turkey launched an unprecedented military operation to clear the border area of the Islamic State (IS) group, as well as halt the westward advance of Kurdish armed formations complicating Washington's strategy to defeat the militants. Syrian rebels backed by the Turkish military clashed with Kurdish fighters.

The Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) is part of a broader US-backed coalition in Syria, called the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Washington has supported the group in its battle against the IS but Ankara sees it as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the outlawed Kurdish militant group in Turkey.

The Turkey-Kurdish fight is yet another complication in the tangled civil war as Turkey and the United States seek to rout the IS by supporting different proxy groups. Now Washington is in a bind being torn over its support for the YPG in Syria, one of the most effective forces in the war, and Ankara’s fears that Syrian Kurds will build a proto-state on its southern border and fuel discontent among Turkey’s own restive Kurdish population. Washington is facing an awkward choice. Neither signing up with Turkey, nor breaking up with it in favor of Kurds serves US interests. And the appearance of unity between Washington and Ankara did not even last a week.

Supportive of the operation in its initial stages of the operation, the White House openly expressed its displeasure with Turkey's targeting of Kurdish forces and urged Ankara to focus its attacks on the IS instead.

But Turkey's president vowed to press ahead with the military operation until the IS and Kurdish Syrian fighters no longer pose a security threat to Ankara. Senior Turkish officials said US, British, French and other citizens fighting alongside the YPG would be treated as «terrorists… regardless of whether they are members of allied countries».

«No one has the right to tell Turkey which terrorist organization it can fight», said Omer Celik, Turkey's minister for European Union affairs.

Evidently, the United States’ attempts to bring together the Syrian opposition, Turkey and the Kurds to tackle the so-called Islamic State in Syria are unraveling.

It’s worth to note that Turkey had warned that the Euphrates was a red line for the Kurds not to cross. The Kurdish fighters crossed it with US backing to capture Manbij from the IS earlier in August. Now the Kurdish forces, called a stalwart ally by American officials, are attacked by Turkey, a US NATO ally. The United States reaps what it sowed. The situation is a result of its yet another foreign policy gaffe.

The Ankara's operation against the Kurds in the northern part of Syria aims to prevent the militia joining up with a Kurdish-held area to the west of the Euphrates, which Turkey fears would lead to the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria and bolster separatists on the Turkish side of the border. Turkey sticks to the goal of establishing a «safe zone» in Syria – the idea which had not received the backing of other world powers. Moreover, the situation risks getting out of US control with different forces fighting each other without looking back at Washington anymore. The goal of seizing Raqqa – the IS informal capital – by US- supported forces before the US presidential election now seems to be a pipe dream.

As the events unfold, cracks appear inside the US-led international coalition. According to French President Francois Hollande, Turkey's military push against Kurds in northern Syria risks escalating the conflict. He said «multiple, contradictory interventions carry risks of a general flare-up».

Hollande, who has special forces operating in Syria alongside Kurdish and Arab forces as part of an international coalition fighting the militant group, said it was a matter of absolute urgency to stop the bloodshed. An intervention the US initially welcomed now seems to benefit IS by setting the members of US-led coalition against each other. The French President emphasized his intent to discuss these issues with Russian President Vladimir Putin when he visits Paris in October.

In its turn, Russia has expressed concern over Turkey’s activities in Syria, saying it raises the risk of civilian casualties and the worsening of ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs.

Neither the Syrian government, nor Turkey, nor the so-called «moderate» Syrian opposition is ready to accept the idea of autonomy for Syrian Kurdistan. Opposing the Kurds will have grave implications and weaken the anti-IS alliance. After all, the Kurdish self-defense formations are the main force on the ground to strike the IS. The only way to prevent the worst is to tackle the Kurdish conundrum by initiating an inclusive dialogue with all sides involved in the conflict.

Russia is a major actor positioned to the role of mediator. It enjoys good working relations with the US, Turkey the Syrian Kurds and the Syria’s government in Damascus and it takes no sides. Moscow has always said the Syrian crisis can be resolved only on the basis of international law through dialogue involving all ethnic groups, including the Kurds. The Russia-US talks on coordination activities in Syria could be broadened to include the situation in the northern part of Syria. As Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan put it, «Without Russia’s participation it’s impossible to find a solution to the Syrian problem. Only in partnership with Russia will we be able to settle the crisis in Syria».