Then Trump later this week flipped (yet again), warning he would use “overwhelming force” if Iran attacked US interests. “A war with Iran wouldn’t last long,” asserted Trump, suggesting, menacingly, he was contemplating using weapons of mass destruction. What else could such overweening confidence of rapid victory suggest? Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said the aggressive, “mentally retarded” rhetoric showed Trump’s offer of talks was a lie.

Last week, the US president claimed that he called off air strikes against Iran a mere 10 minutes before their launch. “We were cocked and loaded,” he warned. That was after the Iranians shot down a US Global Hawk spy drone which they claimed violated Iran’s airspace. Tehran later provided debris evidence retrieved from its territorial waters in the Persian Gulf indicating its claim was valid. Russia has confirmed the Iranian data.

Doubling down, however, the Trump administration this week has ordered more economic and diplomatic sanctions on Iran in addition to the embargoes it re-imposed after pulling out of the international nuclear accord last year. In an unprecedented provocation, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Foreign Minister Mohamed Javad Zarif were among the sanction targets.

Iran’s foreign ministry dismissed the economic impact of the latest sanctions as meaningless. “There is nothing left to sanction,” said an Iranian government spokesman, inferring that no further economic damage could be inflicted by the US than what it already has done on Iran.

Brian Hook, the Trump administration’s point man on Iranian affairs, teased out the logic of the sanctions. He said Iran can either “come to the negotiating table or watch its economy crumble”.

The US position, by its own admission, is nothing short of “economic terrorism”. To deliberately and explicitly impose a blockade on a country’s economy with the stated intention of destroying its internal functioning is a violation of international law and the UN Charter. It is wholly indefensible, no matter what justification Washington claims.

Russia denounced the new US sanctions as “illegal” and said it would continue trading with Iran in defiance of Washington’s conduct.

Iran has consistently, verifiably abided by the nuclear accord or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) since its signing in 2015 by the US, Russia, China and European Union. It is therefore evidently flagrantly illegal for the Trump administration to reimpose bilateral sanctions on Iran just because the US side abrogated an international treaty. It is the US that is in breach of international commitments, not Iran. What’s more, Washington is demanding that the rest of the world comply with its illegal economic measures towards Iran.

Tehran has warned that it intends to lift restrictions in the coming days on the radioactive enrichment of uranium, citing clauses in the JCPOA which permit its partial withdrawal if there are disputes. Such activity does not in any way amount to Iran weaponizing its nuclear program. The country has disavowed nuclear weapons, but says it has the right to develop civilian nuclear energy in all its aspects, including the enrichment of uranium to whatever levels it wants. The JCPOA involved a self-imposed curb by Iran on lower levels, a curb which it says has become null and void given the lack of implementation of sanctions relief by other parties, the US and Europeans in particular.

The Trump administration’s policy towards Iran is incoherent, contradictory and capricious. Trump ostensibly offers talks, while his hawkish Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was this week visiting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in what seems to be an effort to drum up regional support for military action against Iran. Then we have Brian Hook warning of economic meltdown if Tehran does not roll over for talks.

It’s a mafia-style “offer you can’t refuse”. The US policy is not just economic terrorism. It is state terrorism. Period. It is dangling the “option” of talks from the barrel of a gun. Cocked and loaded, as Trump would put it.

The combination of US military force buildup on Iran’s doorstep, the menacing use of false-flag provocations such as sabotage of oil tankers and downing of spy drones, the continual ratcheting up of psychological pressure such as Pompeo’s regional visit this week, and the dire threat to destroy the country’s economy – these actions all constitute a massive terror assault by Washington on this sovereign nation. A nation which poses no credible threat to American national security or vital interests – despite the blustering allegations made by the Trump administration.

It’s gunboat diplomacy in the 21st Century with a twist of organized crime mentality thrown in for added “maximum pressure”.

And adding insult to injury, the question remains: what is the Trump administration “offering” any way?

What the offer amounts to is for Iran to come to negotiations in order to discuss false claims made by the Trump administration concerning allegations about secret development of nuclear weapons and “sponsoring terrorism” in the region. If Iranian leaders were to somehow capitulate to the “offer” they would be on a path to nothing except validating Washington’s slander and bullying.

Trump is acting like a backsliding bad loser. He feels the US didn’t get a good deal with the JCPOA under the Obama administration, and now wants to renegotiate – using the threat of massive violence as his ultimate bargaining power.

Iran is right to demand that the only possibility for talks to ease the dangerous tensions is for the US to back down from its atrocious conduct. That means reversing the economic terrorism and abiding by an international treaty – the JCPOA – which it negotiated and signed up to in 2015.

The trouble is, for that to happen, the Trump administration is going to have to eat some humble pie and admit – at least tacitly – that its allegations and bullying tactics against Iran are unfounded and futile. President Trump, the showman narcissist he is, probably wouldn’t have an iota of understanding about the need for such an enlightened correction.

The former real-estate magnate has apparently built his career on using “maximum pressure” and ultimatums on what he considers weaker parties to get his deals done. Making Iran “an offer it can’t refuse” is typical of Trump’s business model and his delusional sense of “genius”. That’s why the impasse with Iran looks like a precarious precipice with no safe way back.

As for Trump’s declared “restraint” on holding back violence against Iran, American political analyst Randy Martin says this kind of virtue-seeking is perverse. He says it’s like a psychopath looking for applause just because he calls off a plan to shoot up a crowd of people.

With the dogs of war on full alert, something extraordinary happened at the 19th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) late last week in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

Virtually unknown across the West, the SCO is the foremost Eurasian political, economic and security alliance. It’s not a Eurasian NATO. It’s not planning any humanitarian imperialist adventures. A single picture in Bishkek tells a quite significant story, as we see China’s Xi, Russia’s Putin, India’s Modi and Pakistan’s Imran Khan aligned with the leaders of four Central Asian “stans”.

These leaders represent the current eight members of the SCO. Then there are four observer states – Afghanistan, Belarus, Mongolia and, crucially, Iran – plus six dialogue partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and, crucially, Turkey.

The SCO is bound to significantly expand by 2020, with possible full membership for both Turkey and Iran. It will then feature all major players of Eurasia integration. Considering the current incandescence in the geopolitical chessboard, it’s hardly an accident a crucial protagonist in Bishkek was the ‘observer’ state Iran.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani played his cards masterfully. Rouhani speaking directly to Putin, Xi, Modi and Imran, at the same table, is something to be taken very seriously. He blasted the US under Trump as “a serious risk to stability in the region and the world”. Then he diplomatically offered preferential treatment for all companies and entrepreneurs from SCO member nations committed to investing in the Iranian market.

The Trump administration has claimed – without any hard evidence – that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which Washington brands as a “terrorist organization” – was behind the attacks on two tankers in the Gulf of Oman last week. As the SCO summit developed, the narrative had already collapsed, as Yutaka Katada, president of Japanese cargo company Kokuka Sangyo, owner of one of the tankers, said: “The crew is saying that it was hit by a flying object.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had accused the White House of “sabotage diplomacy” but that did not derail Rouhani’s actual diplomacy in Bishkek.

Xi was adamant; Beijing will keep developing ties with Tehran “no matter how the situation changes”. Iran is a key node of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It’s clear for the leadership in Tehran that the way forward is full integration into the vast, Eurasia-wide economic ecosystem. European nations that signed the nuclear deal with Tehran – France, Britain and Germany – can’t save Iran economically.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets with Kyrgyz President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, right, in Bishkek at the SCO summit on June 14. Photo: Nezir Aliyev / Anadolu / AFP

The Indian hedge

But then Modi canceled a bilateral with Rouhani at the last minute, with the lame excuse of “scheduling issues”.

That’s not exactly a clever diplomatic gambit. India was Iran’s second largest oil customer before the Trump administration dumped the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, over a year ago. Modi and Rouhani have discussed the possibility of India paying for Iranian oil in rupees, bypassing the US dollar and US sanctions.

Yet unlike Beijing and Moscow, New Delhi refuses to unconditionally support Tehran in its do-or-die fight against the Trump administration’s economic war and de facto blockade.

Modi faces a stark existential choice. He’s tempted to channel his visceral anti-Belt-and-Road stance into the siren call of a fuzzy, US-concocted Indo-Pacific alliance – a de facto containment mechanism against “China, China, China” as the Pentagon leadership openly admits it.

Or he could dig deeper into a SCO/RIC (Russia-India-China) alliance focused on Eurasia integration and multipolarity.

Aware of the high stakes, a concerted charm offensive by the leading BRICS and SCO duo is in effect. Putin invited Modi to be the main guest of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in early September. And Xi Jinping told Modi in their bilateral get together he’s aiming at a “closer partnership”, from investment and industrial capacity to pick up speed on the stalled Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, another BRI stalwart.

Imran Khan, for his part, seems to be very much aware how Pakistan may profit from becoming the ultimate Eurasia pivot – as Islamabad offers a privileged gateway to the Arabian Sea, side by side with SCO observer Iran. Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea is the key hub of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), much better positioned than Chabahar in Iran, which is being developed as the key hub of India’s mini-New Silk Road version to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

On the Russian front, a charm offensive on Pakistan is paying dividends, with Imran openly acknowledging Pakistan is moving “closer” to Russia in a “changing” world, and has expressed keen interest in buying Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and Mi-35M attack helicopters.

Iran is at the heart of the BRI-SCO-EAEU integration road map – the nuts and bolts of Eurasian integration. Russia and China cannot allow Iran to be strangled. Iran boasts fabulous energy reserves, a huge internal market, and is a frontline state fighting complex networks of opium, weapons and jihadi smuggling – all key concerns for SCO member states.

There’s no question that in southwest Asia, Russia and Iran have interests that clash. What matters most for Moscow is to prevent jihadis from migrating to the Caucasus and Central Asia to plot attacks against the Russian Federation; to keep their navy and air force bases in Syria; and to keep oil and gas trading in full flow.

Tehran, for its part, cannot possibly support the sort of informal agreement Moscow established with Tel Aviv in Syria – where alleged Hezbollah and IRGC targets are bombed by Israel, but never Russian assets.

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani smiles during a meeting with his Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Bishkek on June 14, 2019. Photo: Alexey Druzhinin / Sputnik / AFP

But still, there are margins of maneuver for bilateral diplomacy, even if they now seem not that wide. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has issued the new rules of the game; reduce imports to a minimum; aim for less reliance on oil and gas exports; ease domestic political pressure (after all everyone agrees Iranians must unite to face a mortal threat); and stick to the notion that Iran has no established all-weather friends, even Russia and China.

St Petersburg, Bishkek, Dushanbe

Iran is under a state of siege. Internal regimentation must be the priority. But that does not preclude abandoning the drive towards Eurasian integration.

The pan-Eurasian interconnection became even more glaring at what immediately happened after Bishkek; the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

Bishkek and Dushanbe expanded what had already been extensively discussed at the St Petersburg forum, as I previously reported. Putin himself stressed that all vectors should be integrated: BRI, EAEU, SCO, CICA and ASEAN.

The Bishkek Declaration, adopted by SCO members, may not have been a headline-grabbing document, but it emphasized the security guarantees of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, the “unacceptability of attempts to ensure one country’s security at the expense of other countries’ security, and condemning “the unilateral and unlimited buildup of missile defense systems by certain countries or groups of states”.

Yet the document is a faithful product of the drive towards a multilateral, multipolar world.

Among 21 signed agreements, the SCO also advanced a road map for the crucial SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, driving deeper the Russia-China strategic partnership’s imperative that the Afghan drama must be decided by Eurasian powers.

And what Putin, Xi and Modi discussed in detail, in private in Bishkek will be developed by their mini-BRICS gathering, the RIC (Russia-India-China) in the upcoming G20 summit in Osaka in late June.

Meanwhile, the US industrial-military-security complex will continue to be obsessed with Russia as a “revitalized malign actor” (in Pentagonese) alongside the all-encompassing China “threat”.

The US Navy is obsessed with the asymmetrical know-how of “our Russian, Chinese and Iranian rivals” in “contested waterways” from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf.

With US conservatives ratcheting up “maximum pressure” trying to frame the alleged weak node of Eurasia integration, which is already under total economic war because, among other issues, is bypassing the US dollar, no one can predict how the chessboard will look like when the 2020 SCO and BRICS summits take place in Russia.

asiatimes.com

Iranian “regime change” is not the publicly stated goal of the Trump Administration’s policy. But it is hard to see how US demands on Tehran don’t amount to exactly that, with Pompeo comparing the Iranian “regime” (a term used dozens of times to imply illegitimacy) to a “mafia.” He asserted that Iran’s behavior is “at root in the revolutionary nature of the regime itself.” What can change its “root” or “nature” without ceasing to be itself?

Pompeo demanded not just a total change in policy from Tehran but a different mode of governance amounting to Iran’s ceasing to be an independent regional power. The Reagan venue’s analogy to the collapse of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe echoed in the Secretary’s heavy emphasis on “a new 24/7 Farsi-language TV channel” spanning “not only television, but radio, digital, and social media format, so that the ordinary Iranians inside of Iran and around the globe can know that America stands with them.”

The US position on Iran is that it is solely a question of removing a layer of malign governance, after which democracy, tolerance, peace, and general niceness will spontaneously break forth, and justice will roll down like water and righteousness like a mighty stream. Just like happened in Iraq after 2003. Just like in Libya.

Never mind that Iran isn’t North America or Europe. Never mind that American and European ideas of social and personal liberty would be anathema to an unknown but significant percentage of Iran’s population. Never mind that the replacement for the Ayatollahs envisioned by many Administration big shots, the cultish People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (Mojahedin-e Khalq, MEK), may not be particularly democratic or popular with Iranians. Don’t bother us with details – the neo-Bolshevik myth of a spontaneous uprising by the oppressed masses (with a little help from outside, like the Kaiser’s generals were kind enough to provide Lenin) is alive and well in Washington.

One is reminded of “true believer” Condoleezza Rice in 2006 denouncing as – you guessed it! – racist any objections to militant democracy promotion in the Middle East, specifically in Iraq:

‘“Well, growing up in the South and having people underestimate you because one of the reasons for segregation, one of the reasons for the separation of the races was supposedly, the inferiority of one race to the other,” she explains. “And so when I look around the world and I hear people say, ‘Well, you know, they're just not ready for democracy,’ it really does resonate. I hear echoes of, well, you know, blacks are kind of childlike. They really can't handle the vote. Or they really can't take care of themselves. It really does roil me. It makes me so angry because I think there are those echoes of what people once thought about black Americans.”’

Pompeo heavily emphasized Iran’s internal problems, such as political repression, corruption, economic distress, many of which are no doubt are quite real. Still, it was hard to listen to the Secretary without mentally comparing how the identical litany of abuses would apply to Washington’s perennial darling of the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia, which in every particular is far, far worse than Iran. But nobody is talking about what amounts to regime change in Riyadh or even any sanctions against them. Accusations of Iranian state support for terrorism would be risible if arming myriad Sunni jihadist groups by the US and our various partners, the Saudis chief among them, were a laughing matter.

Pompeo’s speech triggered a rebuke by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani that “peace with Iran is the mother of all peace, and war with Iran is the mother of all wars” – an unfortunate choice of words given how Saddam Hussein’s “mother of all battles” turned out. Trump immediately shot back with a tweet threatening that Iran could “SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE.” Predictably, Trump’s ubiquitous critics focused as much on the all capital letters as on the substance of the exchange.

No one knows where any of this is leading. The memory immediately triggered was that of harsh verbal exchanges between North Korea’s “Little Rocket man” Kim Jong-un and the “mentally deranged US dotard” Trump prior to their love fest in Singapore. Justin Raimondo of Antiwar.com was succinct in his optimism: “This means he’ll be scheduling a Rouhani summit in a few months.”

On the other hand, instead of Singapore 2018 we could be seeing a repeat of the lead-up to Iraq 2003. So many of the same people who were beating the drums for the war with Iraq under President George W. Bush are playing the same tune now with respect to Iran. It is significant that whereas with respect to North Korea our foremost regional partner, South Korea, is pushing hardest for a peaceful outcome, Israel and Saudi Arabia, the two foreign states that exercise almost total control over the political class in Washington, are itching for the US to take care of their Iran problem for them. The hare-brained “Arab NATO” idea has been revived.

Defense Secretary James “Mad Dog” Mattis has denied a report that the US was identifying targets in Iran to be struck as early as next month and disowned regime change. For what it is worth (probably not much) a recent poll shows that Americans are against war with Iran by a better than two-to-one margin. But, as Raimondo observes, “there are plenty of warmongers in Washington who just can’t wait for the shooting to start in the Middle East again, and they have targeted Iran as their next victim. … [S]uch a war would destroy Trump’s presidency precisely because his base would oppose it. And yet, … despite the fact that the President’s advisors are pushing war with Iran, Trump routinely ignores them and does exactly as he pleases: that’s why we had the Singapore summit and the Helsinki meeting with Putin.”

We can hope that Trump will decide on his next steps with regard to Iran based on much broader international considerations that impact his domestic goals. Taken most optimistically, that could mean a concept that some of us have been suggesting for almost two years: a new “Big Three” understanding among Trump, Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Indeed, Professor Michael T. Klare, writing in TomDispatch.com, claims this is Trump’s conscious intention:

‘An examination of his campaign speeches and his actions since entering the Oval Office — including his appearance with Putin — reflect his adherence to a core strategic concept: the urge to establish a tripolar world order, one that was, curiously enough, first envisioned by Russian and Chinese leaders in 1997 and one that they have relentlessly pursued ever since.

‘Such a tripolar order — in which Russia, China, and the U.S. would each assume responsibility for maintaining stability within their own respective spheres of influence while cooperating to resolve disputes wherever those spheres overlap — breaks radically with the end-of-the-Cold-War paradigm. During those heady years, the United States was the dominant world power and lorded it over most of the rest of the planet with the aid of its loyal NATO allies.

‘For Russian and Chinese leaders, such a “unipolar” system was considered anathema. After all, it granted the United States a hegemonic role in world affairs while denying them what they considered their rightful place as America’s equals. Not surprisingly, destroying such a system and replacing it with a tripolar one has been their strategic objective since the late 1990s — and now an American president has zealously embraced that disruptive project as his own. [ . . . ]

‘The big question in all this, of course, is: Why? Why would an American president seek to demolish a global order in which the United States was the dominant player and enjoyed the support of so many loyal and wealthy allies? Why would he want to replace it with one in which it would be but one of three regional heavyweights? [ . . . ]

‘In the Trumpian mindset, this country had become weak and overextended because of its uncritical adherence to the governing precepts of the liberal international order, which called for the U.S. to assume the task of policing the world while granting its allies economic and trade advantages in return for their loyalty. Such an assessment, whether accurate or not, certainly jibes well with the narrative of victimization that so transfixed his core constituency in rustbelt areas of Middle America. It also suggests that an inherited burden could now be discarded, allowing for the emergence of a less-encumbered, stronger America — much as a stronger Russia has emerged in this century from the wreckage of the Soviet Union and a stronger China from the wreckage of Maoism. This reinvigorated country would still, of course, have to compete with those other two powers, but from a far stronger position, being able to devote all its resources to economic growth and self-protection without the obligation of defending half of the rest of the world.

‘Listen to Trump’s speeches, read through his interviews, and you’ll find just this proposition lurking behind virtually everything he has to say on foreign policy and national security. “You know… there is going to be a point at which we just can’t do this anymore,” he told Haberman and Sanger in 2016, speaking of America’s commitments to allies. “You know, when we did those deals, we were a rich country… We were a rich country with a very strong military and tremendous capability in so many ways. We’re not anymore.”

‘The only acceptable response, he made clear, was to jettison such overseas commitments and focus instead on “restoring” the country’s self-defense capabilities through a massive buildup of its combat forces. (The fact that the United States already possesses far more capable weaponry than any of its rivals and outspends them by a significant margin when it comes to the acquisition of additional munitions doesn’t seem to have any impact on Trump’s calculations.)’

If such is indeed Trump’s calculation, his likelihood of attacking Iran is very low.

Conversely, the forces benefitting from the status quo Trump would dismantle cannot be expected to accept such a future with equanimity: the Pentagon and NATO military establishments, the intelligence community, the hordes of contractors and think tank denizens, and others. Perhaps even worse, Trump’s domestic critics face the terrifying prospect that he could emerge as the greatest peacemaker in modern history, as well as restorer of America’s economic might.

We can thus expect an added zeal born of desperation from former “CIA director John Brennan, FBI director James Comey, Robert Mueller, James Clapper, Andrew McCabe, Peter Strzok, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, and the Democratic National Committee,” who, Paul Craig Roberts aptly says, are “engaged in high treason against the American people and the President of the United States and are actively engaged in a plot to overthrow the President of the United States.” Just in recent weeks the intensity of this campaign prevented Trump from agreeing to anything of substance with Putin in Helsinki, forced him to tap-dance around what he did or didn’t say at the post-summit press conference, and postpone according to Grand Inquisitor Mueller’s convenience a follow-up US-Russia summit (no doubt to the delight of his own appointees no less than to his enemies’).

We can expect that between now the November 2018 Congressional elections Mueller will come out with several indictments against Trump associates with the hope of tipping the House of Representatives to the Democrats. If that happens, despite an anticipated GOP retention of the Senate, Trump will be removed or forced to resign in 2019, with a substantial percentage of Republicans ready to jump at the prospect of putting Mike Pence into the Oval Office, with current UN Ambassador Nikki Haley a virtual shoo-in as Vice President.

Such a development would prompt an anguished but futile outburst from Trump’s base. But with l’ancien régime back in power, the guardians of the neoliberal, unipolar order the interloper had imperiled will move quickly to repudiate any understandings he might have had with Moscow and Beijing. The slide toward a catastrophe of literally unimaginable proportions, which Trump had sought to arrest, will become for all intents and purposes irreversible.

At that point Iran will be the least of our worries.

This would hardly be out-of-character for the current US President. Trump is a far-right, neoconservative, leader, which means that he supports America’s continuing to serve the interests of the fundamentalist-Sunni trillionaire Saud family who own Saudi Arabia, and of the Jewish billionaires who control Israel; and both of those aristocracies hate Shia, and especially hate the leading Shia nation, which is Iran, and intend to take it over. Regime-change for Iran has been the US aristocracy’s policy ever since 1979, and the billionaire liar Donald Trump won the White House by denying that he was a neoconservative — even his fellow-neoconservatives believed his lies about that and came out publicly backing the unashamed neoconservative Hillary Clinton (which helped to convince many of America’s non-fascists to vote for Trump). Only few Americans are neoconservatives, but the few who are, are virtually all either American aristocrats or else lobbyists or other agents for same. Neoconservatism is the American aristocracy’s foreign policy, and long has been. Trump’s public statements against neoconservatives and their polices, were a major part of the appeal he had to voters, and helped to fool many people to think he cared about people other than himself and his narrow tribe.

In 1953, the US Government overthrew the democratically elected progressive secular Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, and replaced him with the (likewise secular, but unelected and tyrant, no progressive at all) Pahlavi Shah, whose torture chambers became famous; and Iranians finally overthrew him twenty-six years later, in 1979, while imprisoning for 444 days the US Embassy personnel in Tehran who had controlled their country through him; and, ever since 1979, the US Government has been trying to re-impose its proxy-rule there, through some stooge whose identity hasn’t yet been decided. That’s what America’s ‘democracy’ (which is approved by 37% of Americans) is trying to do to Iran’s ‘dictatorship’ (which is approved by 62% of Iranians): it’s trying to (re-)impose an American dictatorship there. Obviously, lots of military muscles would be needed in order to achieve that, and Trump’s ‘Defense’ Secretary, James Mattis, was chosen as the point-person to manage that job.

Israel is allied with the royal family of Saudi Arabia, the Sauds, who hate all Shia and consider them an “existential threat.” Because fundamentalist Jews have a far better reputation amongst the American people than do fundamentalist Muslims (of either the Sunni or Shia type), the Sauds wisely decided to use the Israel lobby in Washington to push their own — and the Israeli Government’s — Middle Eastern agenda: a Middle East where only Jews (in Israel) and fundamentalist Sunnis (everywhere else there) control the governments. But the US aristocracy want Iran not only because the Sauds and Israelis do, but because America’s aristocrats hate Russia (ours always wanted to control the world’s largest land-mass and all of its natural resources) and because Russia is allied with Shia and seculars, just as America is allied with the opposite: fundamentalists of three types: Christian, Jewish, and Sunni — but not Shia.

In 2002, the US aristocracy wanted regime-change in Iraq, but now they want regime-change in Iran, and also in Syria (which is ruled by Bashar al-Assad, who is both a Shia and a proponent of separation between church and state).

Trump’s Secretary of State Rex Tillerson phrased the matter this way on October 26th: “As we’ve said many times before, the United States wants a whole and unified Syria with no role for Bashar al-Assad in the government. The United States remains committed to providing leadership in every region of the world.” That evidently includes in Syria (regime-change there), and not only in Iran (and, in fact, the US especially wants to rule in Russia) — but Syria today, Iran tomorrow, and then Russia afterwards, not all-at-once, is clearly the plan. After the Sauds caused 9/11, we invaded first Afghanistan, then Iraq, then Libya, then Syria, and Trump clearly has Iran and North Korea in America’s gun-sights right now.

The US, with the world’s highest incarceration-rate (percentage of its people in prison) (except for the tiny island of Seychelles) at 693 per 100,000, calls Iran a ‘dictatorship’ which has 287 per 100,000, and calls Russia a ‘dictatorship’ which has 450 per 100,000, and calls China a ‘dictatorship’ which has 164 per 100,000, and calls Syria a ‘dictatorship’ which has 60 per 100,000. Who is the US regime, to call other nations ‘dictatorships’, and to ‘justify’ in this manner, invading them, or even imposing economic sanctions against them? What kind of hypocrisy is that? It’s a kind that’s filled with psychopathy and bloodlust but that leads America, from the very top, regardless of what the American public, below that aristocracy-of-wealth, actually want.

On October 21st, Gareth Porter headlined at Consortium News, “Trump Bows to Neocons — Netanyahu”, and he wrote:

Netanyahu has continued to demand that Trump either withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) [Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran] or make far-reaching changes that he knows are impossible to achieve. In Netanyahu’s Sept. 19 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Netanyahu declared, “Israel’s policy toward the nuclear deal with Iran is very simple: Change it or cancel it.” And he made no secret of what that meant: If Trump doesn’t “cancel” the deal, he must get rid of its “sunset clause” and demand that Iran end its advanced centrifuges and long-range missile program, among other fundamentally unattainable objectives.

Trump’s statement on Oct. 13 managed to include both of the either/or choices that Netanyahu had given him.

When the Sauds or Israel’s Prime Minister (or especially both, as in “Bomb, bomb, bomb Iran!”) make a demand upon the American Government, the US leadership adhere to it — not necessarily right away, but the record does show, they adhere to it, sooner or later; and, even after Israel invaded America in 1967, and even after the Sauds invaded America (in an inside job with White House complicity) in 2001, the US leadership continue to do what Israel and the Sauds want. 

Afghans didn’t do 9/11. Iraqis didn’t do 9/11. Syrians didn’t do 9/11. Libyans didn’t do 9/11. And, above all (since Al Qaeda doesn’t even allow Shia members), Iran didn’t do 9/11. Russia certainly didn’t do 9/11, either, and was opposed to jihadists even back in 1979 when the US leadership conspired with the Sauds to introduce jihadists into first Afghanistan and then into Russia itself (Chechnya etc.). But, the US aristocracy — the US Government — fined Iran $10.5 billion for having perpetrated 9/11, without a shred of evidence that Iran was even involved in financing or in carrying out, or in any other way, the attacks. And, for Trump, and for the Kushners, and for the Adelsons, and for AIPAC, etc., even that’s not bad enough injustice against Iran, to satisfy them. They want Iranian blood, and they need the ‘news’media to ‘justify’ it, like the ‘news’media ‘justified’ the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for America’s aristocracy.

No wonder why the heads-of-state in Syria, and in Iran, and in Russia, and in China, have higher polled job-approval ratings from their citizenry, than does the head-of-state in America. The American public are being grossly misinformed by ‘our’ ‘news’media, about such things as were, in previous occasions, ‘Saddam’s WMD’, and ‘the tyrant Gaddafi’, and ‘Russia’s dictatorship’, and ‘Syria’s brutal dictator’, and ‘America’s ally Israel’; but, yet, we know enough to be able to figure out that the US Government is profoundly hypocritical and corrupt and violent, and that it doesn’t represent the American people, but instead pretends to, while it actually represents America’s actual enemies, and masters: the billionaires who control America and who control America’s ‘allies’. We’re beginning to figure it out. After the past 27 years of nonstop lies, we’re beginning to understand, that it’s nonstop lies.

In the perennial electoral battle between principlists (conservatives) and reformists, Iranian reformists have once again won handsomely.

Iran’s President Hasan Rouhani was reelected in a landslide on Saturday – with at least 56.88 percent of the votes according to the latest count at time of publishing and a projected vote share of 20 million votes (he got 18.6 million in 2013).

History will also register that Iran – a complex mix of theocracy and democracy – went to the polls and once again chose a reformist, open to the world, exactly as President Trump started his first foreign trip, in the Muslim world, by visiting a totalitarian theocracy, Saudi Arabia, that is obsessed with fomenting a Sunni-Shi’ite divide.

Follow the leader

The rector of the sanctuary of the 8th Shi’ite imam Reza in Mashhad, conservative Hojatoleslam Ebrahim Raisi – a possible candidate to succeed Ayatollah Khamenei as Supreme Leader – was simply no match for Rouhani.

The Supreme Leader’s own wishes have, in fact, been a mystery all along. Khamenei did not explicitly endorse Raisi, on the record. But he did attack Team Rouhani on many recent occasions.

Raisi is a hardliner who has been carefully groomed by the IRGC (the Revolutionary Guards) as a future Supreme Leader. This major loss in the presidential race does not exactly enhance his CV.

Rouhani, for his part, never backed down. During the campaign he went after not only the IRGC but even Raisi’s judicial credentials.

When Rouhani was first elected, in 2103, the country’s economic crisis – mostly caused by UN and US sanctions – was acute and there was no nuclear deal on the horizon. Rouhani and his team – led by his extremely able foreign minister, Javad Zarif – delivered the deal on July 2015 in Vienna, despite Khamenei repeated warnings about the impossibility of trusting any promise from Washington.

Team Rouhani was unable to deliver on the economy – after all, the post-deal benefits in terms of global trade and investment will take a long time to bear fruit.

His administration remains dependent on at least US$140 billion in foreign investment flowing in to modernize the country’s energy industry, transportation and telecoms, with most of that investment coming from Asia. According to the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, only US$13 billion materialized in 2016.

Iran is, de facto, once again doing deals with the West, yet it remains under threat from US banking/financial sanctions, which block crucial foreign investment necessary to stimulate the kind of economic activity that lifts the more than 700,000 young people who enter the country’s labor force every year along with it. It does not help that the Trump administration’s rhetoric is unmistakably anti-Iran.

Everything is not totally bleak, though. Unemployment, at 12.1% in 2012, was relatively stable at 12.45% last year (although youth unemployment remains at a high 30%). And inflation – at 27.3% in 2012 – was reduced to 8.5% in 2016.

Reform, not revolution

It’s always enlightening to remember Michel Foucault visiting Iran in late 1978, when the Shah was in the doldrums, and extolling the rise of “spiritual politics”. Iranian politics is shadow play; nothing is exactly what it seems.

Misinformed Western analysts tended to portray the encounter between Rouhani and Raisi as a sort of referendum between an autarchic “Russia-style” authoritarianism and a “Chinese-style” economic liberalism, without questioning the regime itself.

The reality is way more complex. In a nutshell, the principlists’ program was about the “resistance economy”, nominal egalitarianism, variations of “Death to America” and a promise of five million jobs and a deluge of handouts. Voters saw though it.

Rouhani for his part promises that Iran will eventually benefit from the fruits of an “inclusive globalization” (copyright Xi Jinping). It takes time to promote trade and investment, and to boost the middle class while promoting equality. That entails some key reforms inside the system – details of which he prefers to keep secret, for the moment (“I need a vote well over 50% to enact some stuff I have in mind.”) And it entails questioning some key fundamentals of the system as well.

Iranian voters are a fairly sophisticated bunch. Political elites must deliver – otherwise they’re kicked back to obscurity. It’s a delicate balance: even as a sizable majority wants serious, gradually evolving reforms, it also does not want more upheaval. Not after you have endured an Islamic revolution and its turbulent aftermath; the horrendous 8-year Iran-Iraq war; those somersault Ahmadinejad years; and, last but not least, the most draconian sanctions regime in the history of humanity, imposed by the West.

Team Rouhani, and its reformist allies in the Assembly of Experts, will now have a vast sway over who becomes the next Supreme Leader if Khamenei, now 77, dies in office during the new presidential term.

That, in itself, would signal transcendental change. For now, the task is to slowly but surely remodel the system from the inside, and develop Iran as a key node of the coming New Silk Roads Eurasian integration.

atimes.com

The president is the second-most powerful figure within Iran's political system that oversees a vast state bureaucracy employing more than 2 million people. He is charged with naming Cabinet members and other officials to key posts and plays a significant role in shaping both domestic and foreign policy. The president has important sway over domestic affairs and serves as the face of Iran to the world but is subordinate to the supreme leader chosen by a clerical panel. As supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei remains the ultimate arbiter in the political system, and approves any significant decisions and changes sought by the executive power.

Rouhani has been a stalwart of the Islamic Republic since the Shah regime was overthrown. He has held a number of top positions in the armed forces and was deputy war commander during the eight-year Iran-Iraq conflict, and was secretary of the Supreme National Security Council for 16 years.

The May 19 vote was largely a referendum on the president’s relatively moderate policies, which paved the way for the landmark 2015 nuclear deal that won Iran relief from some sanctions in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program. Rouhani will now have a bigger mandate to push through his reforms, to put an end to extremism, to build bridges with the outside world, and to get the economy back on track. He campaigned on the promise of a more open, prosperous and internationally integrated economic model, openly criticizing hardliners and Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard – the message supported Iran’s young and increasingly urban population.

The second term to-do list includes fixing the banking system crippled by bad property loans, expanding the private sector and formalizing human rights and freedom of information.

The Russian-Iranian relationship has been flourishing since President Rouhani was elected in 2013. Moscow and Tehran managed to expand military cooperation and agreed on further development of the North–South Transport Corridor (NSTC). Diplomatic exchanges between Russia and Iran have been steadily on the rise. Tehran and Moscow were instrumental in the creation of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which now boasts a status similar to that of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries as it tries to coordinate efforts between gas-producing states.

At the international level, Iran and Russia have similar views on many important issues. They have common geopolitical interests, both in the Middle East and in the Russian Commonwealth (CIS). Tehran is interested in regional security in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 

Iran and Russia are strategic allies and form an axis in the Caucasus alongside Armenia. Western economic sanctions on Iran have made Russia Iran’s key trading partner, especially in regard to the former's excess oil reserves. Militarily, Iran is the only country in Western Asia that has been invited to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moscow is promoting Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran currently remains a key partner of the Eurasian Economic Union – the organization it has expressed willingness to join and has a free trade agreement with.

President Rouhani’s visit to Russia in late March was a memorable high-profile event during which he and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed numerous issues, ranging from international conflicts to culture. The leaders signed 16 cooperation agreements and declared an unprecedented increase in bilateral trade as the pivotal indicator of their successful relations. «We are moving to strategic relations», Rouhani said about the results of the visit when the two leaders met for the eighth time in four years.

The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea is almost ready, and the absolute majority of provisions have been agreed upon. The document of fundamental importance is going to be signed later this year.

Since Russia's military operation in Syria started in September 2015, both countries have worked as a military coalition, sharing the management of the fighting on the ground. According to the Astana accords, Iran, alongside Turkey and with Russian leadership, is a guarantor of the ceasefire. It explains why Russia sees Iran as an important component in any future settlement in the war-torn country.

On May 4, Russia and Iran signed a memorandum on the plan to create safe zones in Syria aimed at bolstering the fragile truce. The move has ushered in a new and more solid phase of the Iran-Russia partnership with the two countries joining efforts to devise a road map for their future steps in Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin is planning to visit Iran soon.

No doubt, the victory of Hassan Rouhani in the election will spur further development of the bilateral ties. After the results of the election became known, the Russian president sent a telegram to the president-elect to congratulate him on the victory. The message expressed confidence in further progress in developing the mutually beneficial relationship.

But the relations are yet to reach the level of strategic partnership, which has been their stated mutual intention for some time.

Simply put, a dynamic bilateral relationship, undoubtedly of mutual benefit to both countries, is playing out against a highly volatile regional and international environment whose trajectory is difficult to predict, where Russia and Iran, each in its respective way, are stakeholders too.

President Vladimir Putin succinctly described Iran as Russia’s «good neighbour and reliable and stable partner». During the Moscow trip, Rouhani took pains more than once to caution that the Iran-Russia relationship is not directed against any third country.

The accent is on the bilateral relationship on the economic side, where a take-off can be expected at long last if the current expectations are fulfilled, especially in the all-important field of energy. Moscow and Tehran have refrained from making unrealistic demands on each other, giving space to the other side to pursue national interests.

Putin said the talks with Rouhani showed that «the positions of the two countries are quite close on many issues of international politics». Indeed, «quite close» is not quite the same as «identical» or «similar». But then, Russia and Iran have their own specific interests to pursue in any given situation regionally and internationally while they would have common concerns where they strive to cooperate.

Importantly, there are no serious contradictions.

Rouhani said that the «ultimate goal» of Iran-Russia cooperation is the strengthening of peace and stability in the region». The two countries may not have arrived at the destination yet to proclaim that Iran-Russia cooperation is a factor of regional security and stability – and there is no knowing when that might happen – but it is nonetheless significant that Rouhani has articulated the hope.

No doubt, both countries see the fight against terrorism as a crucial template of their cooperation. Rouhani estimated that the two countries have «accumulated considerable experience in the joint fight against terrorism». While saying this, Rouhani couldn’t have been unaware that in the Middle Eastern politics, the fight against terrorism also assumes geopolitical overtones.

The heart of the matter is that both Russian and Iran are diversifying their relationships in the region. Several tracks have opened but which one(s) will outstrip the others is hard to tell as of now. To add to the complexity, some of them at least are criss-crossing each other.

Thus, Russia has a flourishing bilateral relationship with Israel, which is carefully sequesters from its regional strategies. On the other hand, Russia has been taking pains to give ballast to the ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council states also.

On the contrary, Iran is in a hostile mode vis-à-vis Israel and normalization seems highly improbable in a conceivable future. With the GCC states too, Iran’s relations are on the whole problematic and may remain so for the present.

Having said that, it must be noted that Russia has successfully brokered an oil production freeze deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is potentially the stuff of strategic congruence. Interestingly, one major outcome of Rouhani’s visit to Moscow is that Russia and Iran will continue on this track of fostering cooperation between the OPEC and non-OPEC countries for purposes of global energy market stabilization as well as to continue «meaningful interaction within the framework of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum aimed at forming a fair balance of interests of gas producers and consumers».  

Quite obviously, aside the fight against terrorism where Russia and Iran are virtually aligned, each pursues own interests and objectives in Iraq and Syria. Iran and Iraq are bound together by geography, common history and civilizational bonds apart from the shared interests in regard of security and regional stability.

The democratization of Iraq and the Shi’ite empowerment in that country profoundly impacted Iran’s interests. Again, Syria’s unique importance to the so-called «axis of resistance»; the criticality of the accord reached in Lebanon putting Hezbollah in a commanding position; the stalemate in the war in Yemen threatening to be a bleeding wound for Saudi Arabia, the popular demand for Shi’ite empowerment in Bahrain – in all of these Iran has high stakes, which Russia may not share.

However, there is a significant level of convergence of interests too, as the joint statement issued after Rouhani’s Moscow visit underscores. From the Iranian viewpoint, perhaps, it does not enjoy a similar convergence to such an extent with any other big power today. The following excerpts of the joint statement alone brings out this salience:

«Russia and Iran support preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity, stand for lifting the blockade on Yemen, positively assess the Lebanon political process and express the hope for the fair settlement of the Palestinian problem».

There has been some talk lately by geopolitical analysts regarding a «Eurasian triangle» involving Russia, China and Iran. However, there is no evidence – and little likelihood – of any of these three countries harbouring any such «bloc mentality».

All three are genuinely interested in a constructive engagement with the «West» – United States, in particular. And this is where much uncertainty lies today.

Iran is exercising strategic restraint vis-à-vis the US despite the belligerent rhetoric by the Trump administration and the tightening of the sanctions. Iran takes note that Trump has backtracked from the earlier threat to tear up the nuclear deal.

Iran hopes to leverage its new post-sanctions market conditions to engage western companies. The latest $3 billion deal with Boeing Company on purchase of civilian aircraft signals that Trump administration may turn out to be pragmatic in its approach when American business interests are involved.

Equally, it is noteworthy that although there are hardly 8 weeks remaining for the crucial presidential elections in Iran, there is no sign of an American interference in Iran’s domestic politics, which has been traditionally a major cause of friction in the troubled relationship. 

However, there is still the «unknown unknown» as regards the final outcome of the civil war between the two rival camps of President Donald Trump and his detractors who are unwilling to reconcile with his presidency. There could be any of three outcomes possible – Trump assertively establishing his authority and presidential prerogatives; Trump capitulating in sackcloth and ashes; or, a divided America that refuses to reconcile through the period of the Trump presidency.

The last prospect seems increasingly likely, given the acuteness of the fratricidal strife. The implications are serious for both Russia and Iran. A disoriented American presidency may engender inconsistent regional policies, which can complicate Middle East security. There is every likelihood, therefore, that the interdependency between Russia and Iran may only increase in the near term. 

Less than two months are left till the presidential election in Iran. The presidential race formally starts on April 17 and Rouhani has a good chance to win. True, the country’s foreign policy at the strategic level is defined by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but the executive branch of the government led by president implements it. The spiritual leader does not pay visits to other countries but Russian President Vladimir Putin met him in Tehran last year – the second time in the recent 17 years.

This was Rouhani's first official visit to Russia and the first time he and Putin met within a bilateral framework. The trip took place against the background of growing partnership as both countries have become leading forces of the Astana process that made Iran, Russia and Turkey guarantors of the Syrian cease-fire.

True, the cooperation in Syria is of utmost importance but there is each and every reason to believe that Russia and Iran will have to join together in an attempt to settle the conflict in Afghanistan. As a regional superpower, Iran will gain much by coordinating activities with Russia in that country after the US withdrawal that seems to be inevitable. Such cooperation would become a game-changing factor with far-reaching consequences for the region from the Mediterranean to Pakistan.

The emerging triangle, including Russia, Iran and Turkey, becomes an alliance, could reshape the region. A ceasefire in Syria reached as a result of the Astana process led by the «big three» would reduce the clout of the US, the UK and France. Actually, their influence has already been diminished. The neighboring states will see that progress can be achieved without the «traditional players» representing the West.

Russia is the country that can debunk the myth that the Middle East is threatened by a «Shia threat» emanating from Tehran. It can use its close and friendly relations with leading Sunni states – Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and, perhaps, Saudi Arabia – to play the stabilizing role of mediator between the Shia and Sunni camps. Russia has a unique position to act as an intermediary between Iran and Israel – something nobody else can do.

It’ll take years to heal the wounds and mitigate the contradictions between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Today, the West does not enjoy the clout it once had there. The borders drawn by Western countries caused many conflicts; direct military interventions made them lose trust and support. Under the circumstances, Russia is not exactly an outside actor. Moscow needs peace and stability in the region. This goal can be achieved in tandem with Turkey and Iran. Iraq and Syria can join the trio after they overcome the devastating results of wars. It makes the cooperation with Tehran an issue of paramount importance for Russia.

The bilateral relationship is going to be strengthened by large-scale economic projects.

Despite the importance of foreign policy issues, the talks mainly focused on prospects for deepening trade, economic and investment cooperation, including under large joint projects in energy and transport infrastructure. More than ten major trade and economic agreements were signed during the visit. Russia has already pumped about one billion euros into Iran' railway network, with serious financial injections into bilateral projects yet to be implemented.

Exports to Iran stand at only around 1 percent of Russian foreign trade, but a trade surplus and the existence of a large market for Russian manufactured goods make Iran an important partner. The bilateral trade grew by 60 percent from $1.2 billion in 2015 to almost $2 billion in 2016.

The resumption of weapons deliveries and participation in infrastructure projects financed by Russian loans have led to the doubling of exports of non-energy products from Russia to Iran. The first batch of S-300 air defense systems was delivered in April 2016.

Russia has agreed to provide Iran with a loan of $2.2 billion for infrastructure projects involving Russian companies. It is planned to build a power plant and enhance generation at another in Iran in a contract worth several billion dollars. Under an agreement signed between the two sides, the Russians will improve efficiency at the Ramin power plant in Khuzestan province to 50-55% from 36% now. Another Russian company will build a 1,400-megawatt power plant in the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas in Hormuzgan province. Russian truck manufacturer Kamaz plans to export 300 trucks in 2017, GAZ signed a memorandum with the Iranian authorities for the supply of 900 buses.

Russia’s role in reaching the Iran nuclear deal, the cooperation in Syria and the allegiance to the policy of rapprochement declared by President Putin provide ample evidence of Moscow’s desire to boost the bilateral ties.

A momentous event to take place this year will provide an impetus to the development of Russia-Iran relations. Tehran is expected to become a full-fledged member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) this June. Iran also has expressed interest in signing a trade agreement with the Eurasian Union.

Russia and Iran are united by common goals and interests. The development of relations between the two great powers is a significant contribution into creating alternative poles of power to change the world for the better. 

One of those is corruption. Confidence in President Rouhani’s government is sliding. And although criticism is coming from all sides, the same complaints are being heard: Rouhani’s team was not prepared to jump on the opportunities that opened up for the country in this post-sanctions era. Mohammad Nahavandian, the Iranian president’s chief of staff, claims that the president’s rivals blame him for the gap between the high expectations of this new life without sanctions vs. the reality on the ground in Iran, stating that «the decision to sign and implement the agreement was made at the highest level».

When it comes to politics, the highest level in Iran means the spiritual leader of the Islamic Revolution and the head of state, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Naturally he was in favor of the nuclear agreement since that decision was one element of the Iranian leadership’s strategy. Ayatollah Khamenei thinks that it makes sense for the Islamic Republic to change its tactics, given the changing international landscape, but that the fundamental principles of the 1979 revolution must remain sacrosanct. This is the stance adopted by Iran’s leaders. Tehran will not back down a single inch in its Middle East policy under pressure from Washington. The military and political cooperation with Moscow in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is confirmation of this.

Washington continues to impose sanctions against Iran for reasons no longer related to nuclear research, specifically because of Tehran’s pursuit of its missile program. This could hamper the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which allows the UN to resurrect all the «nuclear» sanctions should Iran violate the agreement. Iran, in turn, has proclaimed its grievances against the US and UN pertaining to the partial lifting of sanctions. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has threatened to set a match to the nuclear agreement if the next US president violates it. The US-Iranian relationship remains tense.

Ayatollah Khamenei emphasizes that American scheming has gradually become more brazen, but that the US administration is still seeking to undermine Iran’s political system.

However, US strategy toward Iran is changing – today Washington relies on «soft power» that could potentially drive a wedge into Iranian society. But that is something the US has not managed to do, despite its rhetoric about human-rights violations coupled with its support for a small number of Iranian dissidents. For the US to gain the upper hand over the Islamic Republic’s internal operations would require massive public discontent. American intelligence services believe that the fastest way to do that is to take advantage of the country’s economic difficulties as well as the social stratification of the population. And due to President Rouhani’s liberal attitude toward those he has placed in leadership positions, those calculations have begun to bear fruit.

That is what the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran said at a meeting with the president and members of the government. Ayatollah Khamenei had harsh words for anyone «greedily using a high-level government title to obtain wealth or specific advantages». Officials guilty of this do not belong in Iran’s government agencies. Iran’s leader has also spoken out against the local oligarchs. Their «dizzying incomes … are an affront to the values of Iranian society». Iran has few oligarchs, but Ayatollah Khamenei has stressed that «even this small handful of people has a very negative impact, and it is absolutely necessary to take action against them».

The government had no choice but to respond. President Rouhani decided to dismiss the heads of Iran’s four largest state-owned banks (Refah, Mehr, Iran Saderat, and Mellat). Those men were receiving salaries ten times higher than that of the average Iranian. What’s more, they were also regularly given large bonuses, no-interest loans, and tax breaks. The head of Central Insurance of Iran – a state-owned company where many directors were enjoying paychecks of as much as $28,000 per month – had already been let go.

These steps had two meanings. On one hand, they helped enhance Rouhani’s reputation as an uncompromising advocate of the battle against corruption. And on the other, they prompted demands that the government take similar measures against many other civil servants. It turns out that corruption in Iran is far more widespread, and success in getting a preliminary contract with a foreign company once sanctions are lifted is often contingent upon an uptick in palm-greasing.

In other words, there have been plans to entice Iranian civil servants into illegal business relationships with representatives of foreign firms. The IRGC intelligence services are already busy investigating the possibility that civil servants may have been accepting bribes and have been tasked with looking into the most high-profile cases. Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that the stability of the Islamic system depends on resolving the problem of corruption.

In recent weeks Iran’s media have been flooded with negative information about Rouhani and his administration. The imams who lead the traditional Friday prayers, which are held across the nation, have also begun to criticize the president. The main gripe against the current chief executive is that «the nuclear agreement hasn’t done Iran any good». And it’s true, the public has seen no significant benefits from the revoked sanctions and canceled oil embargo. There was initially a surge of euphoria over the agreements with the US regarding Iran’s nuclear program, but that has passed, and the expectations of rapid change for the better have not been rewarded.

Dissatisfaction with the country’s stagnant economy is growing. And so, speaking at a joint meeting between Iran’s Cabinet of Ministers and the governors of the country’s provinces, President Rouhani asked that the public’s most urgent social and economic problems be immediately addressed. «One of the primary responsibilities of the governors, as well as the government agencies», he declared, «is to encourage optimism and harmony in society… Our enemies are trying to sow despair in our society, and we must always be on the lookout to respond to their actions».

* * *

In the summer of 2013 Rouhani was up against serious problems in almost every key sector of the Iranian economy.

Inflation hit a high of 40%, while the value of the Iranian rial dropped by over 60%, sharply lowering the purchasing power of ordinary people. Unemployment in Iran topped 13%, with almost a third of Iranian youth (27%) unable to find work. Hundreds of highly educated professionals left the country. During that period the Iranian public was confronted by what might have been the nation’s most severe socio-economic problems since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The country was desperately short of financial resources, but the negative economic impact of the Western sanctions was not solely to blame.

President Rouhani has publicly acknowledged that many of Iran’s economic problems stemmed from poor governance as well as a lack of societal confidence in state institutions. Mismanagement, corruption, and ambiguous moves by government institutions paralyzed the business operations of Iranian entrepreneurs. As a result, the country was starved for investment and unable to create new jobs.

Rouhani’s team immediately took steps to enforce the Law for the Continuous Improvement of the Business Environment, which had already been approved by Iran’s Majlis, but never invoked by the previous government. Afterward, the state began to take a smaller role in the economy, relatively speaking, plus rights and opportunities were expanded for the private sector and investment guarantees were offered with an eye toward restoring investor confidence.

Nor did the new president forget about the importance of Iran’s integration into the global economy. One of the main tasks of Rouhani’s government was to normalize relations with the West and free the Iranian economy from the regime of international sanctions. Rouhani decided that it was necessary to rein in the American hegemony that was standing in the way of Iran’s economic progress. Rouhani explained that this did not mean abandoning principles, but did require a change in methods. In just a few months, Iranian diplomats led by Minister Javad Zarif had sent out more signals to potential partners in the international arena than had their predecessors over the course of an entire decade. Thanks to Tehran’s efforts, the grievances against Iran’s nuclear program were withdrawn and the resulting deals were formalized by means of a corresponding agreement that was approved by the UN. Finally, the economic sanctions were lifted.

* * *

The Iranian government, with Rouhani at its helm, is working on the nation’s future transformation into a highly developed industrial country. Iran is forging a new economic strategy, moving from an «embattled economy» to an «empowered economy».

The economic picture is incomparably better today than it was three years ago. Inflation has declined from 40 to 10%, and the rial’s exchange rate has stabilized at its level from the year President Rouhani was elected. In June the rate of inflation fell to 9.7% – a record low for the last quarter century!

Iranian business now has room to maneuver and a choice of international partners. Today, Iran is seeking the most favorable terms for its economic cooperation with the outside world.

The country’s main natural resources – oil and gas – remain under state control. When Iran signs contracts allowing foreign companies to explore and develop its oil fields, there is an emphasis on obtaining an increased share for the Iranian side in the bargain (at least 50%). And Iran is now open to foreign participation in 52 projects to explore and develop gas fields, plus another 18 projects at combined (oil and gas) fields.

When it comes to the development of hydrocarbon fields, the Iranians have indicated that they are only willing to work with foreign companies that are able to ensure Iran’s guaranteed right to obtain advanced technology as part of that company’s investment plans. This requirement applies to all partners. For Russia – like for China – no exceptions are being made. Beijing grasped this and has responded quickly and convincingly.

For example, the Chinese have agreed to create a joint oil terminal on the Iranian island of Qeshm in the southern part of the Persian Gulf. Because of the construction of the terminal, the island will become a center for the production and storage of oil. The future terminal will be able to accommodate tankers and store approximately 30 million barrels of oil. This is one of the biggest deals for Iran’s post-sanctions oil industry. China, for its part, also wants to increase the amount of oil it buys from Iran. In June of this year China boosted its oil imports from Iran to a historic high, although in February Saudi Arabia took top honors as China’s biggest oil import partner, with Angola and Russia taking second and third place.

Prior to the introduction of the last sanctions in 2012, Iran exported approximately 600,000 barrels of crude oil to the EU each day. Italy, Spain, and Greece were the biggest customers of Iranian oil. By May, Tehran had regained more than half its level of its pre-sanctions sales to the European Union, shipping over 350,000 barrels per day. At that pace, analysts assumed that Iran would soon regain its lost sales positions in the Old World, but over the first three weeks of June exports did not exceed 280,000 barrels per day.

In Iran’s export strategy its main customers are still Asian – China, India, and South Korea. For example, India imported as much as 505,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day in March, which is 290,000 barrels more than during the previous month. Plus, New Delhi is investing $20 billion in the modernization of the Iranian port of Chabahar the Gulf of Oman.

Attracting foreign investment is a top priority of Iran’s economic policy.

The pragmatism of Rouhani’s government in matters of international economic cooperation is such that Tehran’s foreign policy sympathies – or antipathies – take second stage. For example, Iran has entered into an agreement with the US company Boeing to purchase 100 civilian aircraft. In January, Iran signed a major deal worth $27 billion with Airbus to buy 118 airplanes. The revival of the Iranian air fleet was a top priority for the Rouhani government.

* * *

In 2013 analysts agreed that Iran’s economy would benefit from a new government. However, few believed that it would only take three years to restore normal economic life and return to a scenario of average growth. At that time there was no real basis for talking about a successful end to the nuclear negotiations or Iran’s emergence from the regime of sanctions. However, the Rouhani government’s pragmatism and perseverance in achieving goals has allowed it to overcome the negative momentum of recent years.

The current Iranian leadership is adamant about upholding the values of its Islamic system of governance and reserving its right to conduct an independent foreign policy, while not missing out on the benefits of trade and economic cooperation with the West. «The creation of national wealth and its equitable distribution» is the goal of Iran’s economic policy. It’s easy to see why the Islamic Republic is known as an «island of stability» in the Middle East.