On Aug. 6, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned that Georgia’s NATO membership could trigger a “horrible conflict.” That statement was made in an interview with the Russian daily Kommersant on the eve of the 10-year anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war. Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously warned the alliance about the move, emphasizing that it would lead to unspecified consequences. This brings to mind the events that took place exactly ten years ago.

In the early morning hours of Aug. 8, 2008, heavy fighting erupted in and around Tskhinvali, the capital, which spread to other parts of South Ossetia. Georgia violated a 1992 peace agreement and opened fire on Russian peacekeepers. The attack caused significant destruction and civilian casualties. In response to Georgia’s aggression, Russian forces crossed the border on Aug. 8 to free South Ossetia from the invading force and to rescue its own soldiers.

The ensuing EU investigation confirmed that it was Georgia that started the war. The fact-finding mission led by the Swiss diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, included more than 20 political, military, human-rights, and international-law experts, who produced over 1,000 pages of analysis, documentation, and witness statements indicating that the war was sparked as a result of Georgian troops attacking South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers at the orders of Georgia’s then president, Mikheil Saakashvili.

The report claims that the war started "with a massive Georgian artillery attack." The document states plainly that "there was no ongoing armed attack by Russia before the start of the Georgian operation … Georgian claims of a large-scale presence of Russian armed forces in South Ossetia prior to the Georgian offensive could not be substantiated … It could also not be verified that Russia was on the verge of such a major attack."

The Russian troops did not advance into Tbilisi, although they could have done so easily, as the Georgian army was on the run. The Russian response was proportionally appropriate for Moscow’s goal of preventing a larger war and putting an end to the bloodshed and human suffering. A peacekeeping mission was the only way to do it. The conflict was mediated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and a ceasefire agreement was reached on Aug. 12. Russia recognized Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence from Georgia on Aug. 26.

Nine months of hard work led the EU mission to the conclusion that it was Georgia that started the war. But an information war has been waged since then with the intention of painting Russia as the aggressor or the nation that “provoked the events.”

Shortly after the “brief war,” NATO agreed to the admission of Georgia, which shares a border with Russia. If Georgia joins the alliance, NATO will be involved in the territorial dispute involving the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to NATO’s principles of enlargement, a country with unsettled territorial conflicts cannot join the alliance. The recent summit of the bloc demonstrated its readiness to turn a blind eye to this violation of its own rules. During the July 11-12 summit, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to eventually admitting Georgia. The US strongly supports its bid. Just six days before the event, United States Permanent Representative to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison made a special statement emphasizing the US support for Georgia’s aspirations to join the bloc.

It is generally accepted within NATO that because Georgia holds the status of a privileged partner, it does not even need a membership action plan (MAP) like other aspirants. The proponents of Georgia’s “fast track” accession say the country’s participation in the Annual National Plan and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) is enough to grant membership. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg believes that, "Georgia has all the practical tools to become a member." The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) has reaffirmed its unwavering support for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. After all, the Georgian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were the largest non-NATO contingents, dwarfing those of most NATO members.

The United States sees this nation as a useful ally located in a strategically important region. The US and NATO plan to increase their military presence in Afghanistan. Georgia could play a crucial role in supplying their forces, if shipments were transported by land from the Georgian port of Poti on the Black Sea to Baku, then crossing the Caspian Sea to Aktau, Kazakhstan, before being moved by land again across Uzbekistan into Afghanistan. Georgia is the link between energy fields in the Caspian Sea and markets in Turkey and Europe, thus bypassing Russia. It also provides the shortest transport route between Europe and Asia for exporting gas and oil. A US armed conflict with Iran is a possibility. It takes only few hours to fly to any destination in the Middle East from Georgia.

Tbilisi is mulling over an expedited NATO membership strategy. A fast-track approach has been recently proposed by the Washington-based Heritage Foundation think tank. Its proposal states that Georgia could be granted membership by temporarily excluding the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from NATO's Article 5 security guarantee. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which defines specific territories within a given nation, could be amended to include South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Officially, the membership will be presented as a temporary measure that will last until the “internationally recognized territory is re-established by peaceful and diplomatic means.”

From Moscow’s point of view, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are allied independent states with a Russian military presence on their soil. Russia is committed to their defense in the event of an attack. If a full-fledged member of NATO believes those republics are actually part of its own national territory, a conflict is likely. Holding exercises, building military infrastructure, providing arms, and advocating for Georgia’s NATO membership are all provocative steps that can easily spark such a clash. The Russian government has warned about the consequences. PM Dmitry Medvedev has defined the red line that must not be crossed. He has also declared that Russia is ready to normalize the relationship and revive economic ties. Tbilisi must make its choice.

According to the press-release issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian delegations expressed major concern about Georgia deepening its interaction with NATO. They believe that the resolution of the Alliance’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted in Tbilisi once again demonstrated NATO members’ rigid and one-sided approach to the situation in Transcaucasia.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) session, concluded on May 29 to reaffirm its unwavering support to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. It was proclaimed a special aspirant country. The NATO PA called for the «withdrawal of the Russian troops from Georgia’s occupied regions». The four-day meeting in Tbilisi marked the 5th time in the PA history that it held a session outside of NATO, in a country seeking membership. Four out of the five aspirant countries, that previously hosted the NPA sessions, have already joined the alliance. According to Paolo Alli, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly President, it wasn’t a common thing for the Assembly to hold its session in an aspirant country. «It’s an exception for us… but we are happy to do that and we openly reiterate our support for Georgia», he said as once again it was clearly stated that door remains open to Tbilisi to become a NATO member.

Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia also emphasized that Georgia’s attacks at various international venues have become increasingly confrontational recently. One of the examples is the fact that Georgia submitted a draft resolution on refugees to the UN General Assembly, and initiated the adoption of politicized documents in the UN Council on Human Rights and the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia believe these moves are made for propaganda purposes to assert Georgia’s alleged jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Such unilateral steps make discussions of the refugee issue within the framework of the Geneva discussions meaningless.

The participants failed to agree on issues related to non-use of force and setting in motion the mechanisms of international security in the disputed regions.

Georgia already spends 2% of GDP on defense. 870 Georgian servicemen are taking part in international missions. Montenegro is seen as an expiring example to follow. The alliance’s engagement of Georgia, led by the US, paid off in the form of deployments of Georgian troops to NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and to the US-led coalition in Iraq. The Georgian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were the largest non-NATO contingents to dwarf those of most NATO members. Georgia has contributed to the NATO Response Force. The NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center is located just outside of Tbilisi. It started to function in the beginning of this year. Georgia also hosts NATO-Georgia military exercises.

Georgia is a participant in the Annual National Plan and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), which includes support of 13 different areas of defence and security related sectors. It involves strategic level advice and liaison, defence capacity building and training activities, multi-national exercises and enhanced interoperability opportunities. These programs contain all the necessary measures to prepare the country for eventual membership. A special provision could be introduced to address the problem of territorial integrity with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty applied only to the territory outside of Abkhazia and South Ossetia until the conflict is settled.

Why is NATO extension the coveted goal? If Georgia is really threatened, why cannot it be protected by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe? The country is far from being prosperous. It has unsettled territorial disputes. Its defense potential will hardly make NATO much stronger. The country’s membership will be a headache and a burden for the bloc to shoulder. Georgia’s membership will certainly make Russia take appropriate steps to counter the NATO expansion that can entail the most serious and deepest geopolitical consequences for Europe as a whole. Georgia will always be on the brink of military conflict to never be safe again.

At the same time, Russia is one of the top destinations for Georgian agricultural produce, wine and mineral water. The affiliation with the Moscow-led Eurasian Union could do more to create jobs and put money into the pockets of ordinary people. After all, reopening trade with Russia in 2013 gave Georgian agriculture its greatest boost in years. Today, trade is growing and Russian tourists are flocking to Georgia. NATO membership will certainly spoil the relationship to deprive Georgia of all these benefits.

But on the other hand, NATO has its reasons to support Tbilisi’s aspiration to join the alliance.

Georgia is the only South Caucasian state, which has its foreign and security policy oriented on Euro-Atlantic integration. NATO membership is the natural culmination of this policy. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan appear to have interest in NATO membership but given the proximity of the South Caucasus to Europe, its role as an energy corridor and commercial bridge between Europe and Asia, the region is too important for NATO to ignore.

The South Caucasus borders Turkey, still a NATO member, which is on the way to divorce with the alliance. The German parliament has just taken the decision to withdraw its military from Turkey’s İncirlik air base and the Ankara’s relations with many members of the bloc get deteriorated. There are many serious differences between Turkey and the United States. NATO needs a reliable member to compensate for the possible loss.

As divisions between the West and Turkey exacerbate, Georgia’s role is growing. The countries of Central Asia are important to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, but none of them cooperate with the bloc closely and none are candidates for membership. With its military deployed in the country, Georgia is a participant in the mission.

As the US and NATO announce their plans to increase military presence in Afghanistan, Georgia’s geographic position makes it a potential part of supply routes. In theory, a surface route could move supplies from the Georgian port of Poti on the Black Sea and overland to Baku, where they would cross the Caspian Sea to Aktau, Kazakhstan, and then overland across Uzbekistan into Afghanistan.

The country is an important transportation corridor linking energy fields in Caspian Sea to Turkish and European markets, bypassing Russia. Georgia provides the shortest transport corridor between Europe and Asia through which gas and oil are exported. It is the most pro-Western country in the arc of instability from Ukraine to Yemen. From Georgia, it takes only few hours to fly to any destination in the Middle East.

There is another reason. As Dr Tracey German, a well-known British expert on security issues, put it, «If NATO ultimately rejects any prospect of membership for states in the post-Soviet space, they could be abandoned to Russian influence».

The Pentagon is ready to assist Georgia in implementing its military reform. It was stated in the letter Defense Secretary James Mattis sent to Defense Minister of Georgia Levan Izoria in May. According to the Secretary, «Reforms, of course, are rather complicated, but they are an essential component of the integration with the West. The US Department of Defense is ready to assist Georgia in this ambitious process of military reform».

In a meeting with Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili on May 8, US Vice President Mike Pence reaffirmed US support for Georgia's integration into NATO. The alliance approved the idea of Georgia’s membership at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. The same year the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) was established to serve as a forum for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia achieve the stated goal.

Without much publicity, NATO is encouraging Georgia to apply further efforts to join the alliance. The United States military is leading the process. Indeed, as said above, there are well-substantiated reasons to explain why NATO needs Georgia. From a certain angle of view, expanding NATO deeper into the former Soviet Union makes sense for the alliance, gearing up for possible war with Russia. The question is: does Georgia need NATO? Will «living in a powder keg and giving off sparks» promote its security? Even if finally invited, won’t it be wiser to think twice before jumping into the membership?

The new subcommittee was set up as part of the PACE Monitoring Committee and will, as reported on its official website, cooperate closely with it, in order to explore any «situation in which active armed conflict has been brought to an end, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolves the conflict to the satisfaction of the combatants». Thus it is no surprise that it was the head of the assembly’s Monitoring Committee, an Austrian by the name of Stefan Schennach, who spearheaded the establishment of the subcommittee on conflicts between Council of Europe member states.  The was the same gentleman who took it upon himself to send an observer mission to the Crimea to investigate the humanitarian situation there, as well as any potential violations of human rights.

PACE also particularly emphasizes that the new structure will not become yet another mechanism for resolving conflicts, but will aim to use the elements of parliamentary diplomacy in order to support the existing mechanisms for mediating strife.  

The list of conflicts cited by an anonymous staffer on the freshly minted subcommittee is quite interesting.  Initially those would include Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, northern Cyprus, Transnistria, and Crimea.  In addition the new organization might focus on the conflict in eastern Ukraine – pending developments in that region.

None of this seems particularly striking, especially given how any bureaucratic institution loves to «spawn offspring.»  Of course the work of its «mother» – the PACE Monitoring Committee, which is responsible for verifying the fulfillment of obligations assumed by members of the Council of Europe – is more directly linked to the post-Soviet states.  The issues emanating from the regions in conflict (and those areas are certainly not universally regarded as being «in conflict») regularly assume the form of bitter debates, while the elites of the post-Soviet nations are being subjected to manipulation by foreign actors.  Any pan-European structure such as the OSCE, in some way or other finds itself faced with a vast landscape, from the republics in Novorossia – the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) – to Nagorno-Karabakh, but the OSCE’s work has been the recipient of … how shall we put it … very mixed reviews.  

«Like other international organizations, we will not talk about the larger issues that fall within the context of conflict resolution, but will focus on the more specific aspects of that process,» stated Stefan Schennach.  The idea of inter-parliamentary cooperation, including with representatives from the legislative bodies of unrecognized or semi-recognized states, is becoming more popular in Europe.  Perhaps this will make it possible to offer individual gestures of humanitarian assistance, but it will hardly resolve the conflicts themselves – although it can’t hurt …

Some of the events associated with the emergence of this new entity support this not overly optimistic premise and are also linked to the «initial» list of conflicts that will be the object of its focus.  So, the obvious crisis of the Eastern Partnership project suggests that a legitimate subject of discussion might be a kind of safety mechanism that would enable Europeans to keep abreast of what is happening, including the aforementioned «specific aspects.»  The Armenian political scientist Stepan Safaryan, who is spearheading the subcommittee on frozen conflicts, suggests that PACE wants to create some leverage for itself, adding that Strasbourg does not currently have that capacity.  He stated, «The committees previously created to address this issue drafted reports and offered assessments, which had some impact on the political processes.  Now PACE wants to restore that capacity by creating a specialized structure.» 

This desire is of course entirely understandable, viewed through the lens of geopolitical logic, as well as bureaucratic.  However, it should not be forgotten that for Russia the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts are no longer an issue: that question was put to bed on Aug.  26, 2008, and since then Moscow has been building its relationships with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, recognizing them as independent subjects of her foreign policy.  Also, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali are taking part, as independent entities, in the Geneva format of consultations on security in the Caucasus, and it is not yet clear how the new structure will be able to help there.  According to Irakli Khintba, the head of the Expert Department of the Presidential Administration of Abkhazia, the new structure’s hypothetical recommendations will not apply to Abkhazia.  Abkhazia is not a member of PACE.  In addition, the representative from Abkhazia pointed out that that agency’s actions toward the republic have always been overtly hostile, adding, «We remember how PACE repeatedly demanded that Russia withdraw its recognition of Abkhazia, the bias with which it assessed the Russian-Abkhaz Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership, and the one-sidedness and hostility we saw in their reports on the situation in Abkhazia.» 

In turn, the deputy director of the Caucasus Institute, Sergei Minasyan, expressed doubts about the viability of the idea itself, recalling that at one time the Turkish minister for EU affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, tried to create a similar subcommittee, but it shut down within a few years because the Armenians took no part in its work.  It is possible that the new subcommittee will suffer the same fate.

In a similar vein, when and if PACE discusses «the conflict in Crimea,» it is not clear what there will be to say – that region is a constituent part of the Russian Federation, and any attempts to exert external influence there without Moscow’s consent (which, as we know, is no longer involved in PACE’s work) cannot be seen as anything other than interference in Russia’s internal affairs.  Suffice it to recall the failed attempt by an OSCE mission to force its way into Crimea with obviously dubious objectives, in early March, ten days before the referendum vote on the peninsula.  According to Jean-Claude Mignon, who reported to the Council of Europe about the status of Ukraine’s commitments, the work of the new PACE subcommittee on frozen conflicts should be consistent with OSCE’s experience in this area.  It would be unfortunate if the «inter-parliamentary cooperation» occurring under the aegis of PACE and its new committee knowingly took the low road …

And the additional involvement of any of PACE’s entities in the conflict in the Donbass could have a positive impact only if it adheres to the spirit and the letter of the Minsk agreement, fully taking into account the position of the power structures in the DPR and the LPR.  Should that occur, the instruments of parliamentary diplomacy could help to unify the parties’ positions and encourage Kiev to officially reject militant rhetoric and actions (which, incidentally, seems unlikely at present).  

Finally, given the many problems within the Council of Europe itself (in Belgium, Spain, Great Britain, etc.), such excessive attention to post-Soviet conflicts seems out of proportion, and in addition may have any number of causes and repercussions.  There is a real question as to whether European institutions sincerely wish to pursue a constructive path: otherwise PACE would not have remained indifferent to the blockade of Transnistria, which has lasted for many years and has now become extremely punitive.  At the same time, Russia could incorporate some of Europe’s more innovative practices and strengthen her inter-parliamentary contacts with de facto state entities she does not recognize (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, northern Cyprus, and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics).  Obviously the history and civilization of all of these places, with the exception of northern Cyprus, are inseparably linked to Russia, and none need to be in the safekeeping of PACE.

The event that took place on December 2, 2014 served as a warning of imminent attack against Russia prepared by the so-called international justice. But before we switch over to Russia let me say a few words about…Kenya. This African country provides the most recent example of an attempt by International Criminal Court (ICC) to topple a head of state. The charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, the President of Kenya, were brought as far back as 2011, but the trial has not begun as yet. (1) The prosecutors had no witnesses! On December 5, the case was dismissed by ICC prosecutors. It had been preceded by the Court’s ruling to either launch the judicial proceedings or acknowledge the fact that it lacked evidence to do so and terminate the case. It means that the prosecutor’s office admitted it had absolutely no evidence to go upon in the case of Kenyan leader! It’s all just a game played to deceive common people with no experience in such matters. The judges and prosecutors are all part of one entity – the International Criminal Court – and they all take part in the decision making process. The ICC just put on a show for public. Even as far back as in 2011 it was evident that the charges against the President of Kenya had no relation to law. It was a politically motivated action. But the Court signed the indictment in January 2012. To be exact, it was related to only two out of three defendants. I emphasize that it was done by judges, not the prosecutors. It means the court cannot act as protector of Uhuru Kenyatta’s rights because two years ago it decided that the submitted evidence was not convincing enough. Now it has been revealed that there is no any evidence at all (!!!). The further unfolding of events is nothing but a big scandal. First the indictment was signed against two persons (out of three). Then the case against one of them (Francis Muthaura) was dropped by the prosecutor’s office. It means that the prosecutor’s office admitted that the evidence submitted to the court was not sufficient after the court found it quite conclusive! Obviously all this evidence tampering put the prosecutors and the judges into an awkward situation. 

The International Criminal Court has become a driving force for promoting the repressive laws fully ignoring the rights of the accused. Today any person in any country can be called a criminal without producing any evidence. Even after the case is dismissed there is a chance that new charges will be brought against him (or her). 

There is one more aspect to be mentioned in relation to the case described here. The activities of the International Criminal Court are called «witch hunt targeting Africans» or «race hunting». This definition coined by Uganda’s President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni hits the nail right on the head. All the cases currently open at the ICC are exclusively in Africa (1). The Court’s legitimacy is derived from the consent of countries – parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. African countries represent a large regional group. The International Criminal Court presupposes that all international criminals live in the Dark Continent only. This policy has been questioned since a long time ago. The ongoing crisis in the relations between the International Criminal Court and African states was sparked as a result of bringing a legal action against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. It was absolutely clear in 2011, as the legal proceedings were launched, that there was no proof of the President’s guilt! An African Union’s summit demonstrated the readiness of African states to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The ICC has withdrawn the charges against Kenyatta in an attempt to prevent such a turn of events. It’s clear that without African states being unanimous in their opposition to the arbitrary behavior of the Criminal Court the case would not have been dismissed. 

International tribunals are not juridical legal institutions, but rather political entities taking only politically motivated decisions.

Now about Russia. The Russian Federation is not a party to the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It does not recognize the jurisdiction of this repressive organ of «global governance». But the fact does not prevent the ICC from brazen interference into Russia’s internal affairs. The same thing happened with Libya and Sudan – the states that were not parties to the Statute. The cases of Libya and Sudan were forcibly referred to the International Criminal Court to set a precedent of practicing repressive international law. Actually it requires some stretch of imagination to call it «a law». The existing international legal base is going through changes. The goal is to coercively make the heads of states who have fallen out of favor face the International Criminal Court. The changes are introduced without the participation of those who are supposed to become prisoners of international legal system. 

On December 2, 2014, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, published her annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities. The section devoted to Georgia attracts special attention. As far back as September 2011, Russia asked the International Criminal Court to investigate the crimes perpetrated by Georgian government against Russian peacekeepers and the population of South Ossetia. Individual victims of the crimes committed by Georgia in August 2008 also independently asked the Court to examine the case. A few years had passed and the ICC never reported anything in concrete terms. All of a sudden there was an unexpected turn of events. The recently issued report by International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor says the examination has entered into a new phase and there are serious reasons to surmise that large-scale systematic attacks against civilians did take place in August-October 2008, but not by Georgian military against South Ossetian civilians. The report states quite the opposite! Moreover, the Chief Prosecutor insistently emphasizes the participation of the Russian Federation in the conflict. Paragraph 138 says that the return of Georgian refugees became possible only after Russian forces had been withdrawn! The conclusion strikes an eye – the Chief Prosecutor says «the information available on the alleged attack remains inconclusive» because «Georgian and Russian authorities gave contradicting accounts of the events that happened just before and right after 7 August as well as during the subsequent aerial and ground offensive». (paragraphs 141-144). Here is the news! If all prosecutors followed this logic then not a single case would ever be examined at all. Such a conclusion made by the International Criminal Court’s Chief Prosecutor looks like mocking Russia. 

So the International Criminal Court has used the crimes committed by Georgia against South Ossetian civilians for bringing charges against Russia. The ICC examination is not over as yet, but the message is clear. The Chief Prosecutor said the ruling is to be expected very soon… 

The arrests and kidnappings of state leaders by international tribunals have become a routine matter. But taking somebody under arrest is not the main goal. Trumped up cases presuppose public hearings and there is always a risk of being accused of preparing false witnesses and deceiving international community. In some cases it’s more expedient to accuse or just threaten with lodging charges against someone. For instance, the President of Sudan al-Bashir freely travels around the world and could be easily arrested if need be, no matter the arrest warrant was issued a long time ago. But the «international community» keeps on talking about the need to execute the warrant and does nothing in practical terms. Why? Because the warrant issued to the Sudanese President helped the West to dismember the country. True, the recognition of South Sudan’s independence (the country lost around 20% of its territory with main oil reserves) does not meet the Sudan’s interests. At that Omar al-Bashir agreed to hold a referendum, no matter the result was known in advance. In fact he became the founder of the new state called South Sudan. This behavior explains why no action has been taken in accordance with the arrest warrant issued by ICC. 

The International Criminal Court may not issue a warrant to arrest Russian officials. The very threat to do so is enough. It’s easy to guess what the International Criminal Court expects from the main defendant in the «South Ossetian case». The example of Sudan provides a clue… 

There is also another example – Kenya. It’s time for Russia to make known its position with regard to repressive organs of the so-called international legal system and support the states ready to oppose the arbitrary activities of the International Criminal Court, first of all the states of Africa. Africa should withdraw from the Statute of the International Criminal Court delivering a death blow to this judicial body, especially depriving it of funds. Is it not peculiar that the African states constituting the largest regional group among the International Criminal Court’s member-states provide funds to support their own oppressors? 

____________________

(1) Today the cases of Kenya, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Uganda, Congo, the Central African Republic and Libya are referred to the International Criminal Court.

Some time ago, a statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen appeared on the organisation’s website, that relic from last century’s cold war that has been coveting “global responsibility” in the 21st century, on issues relating to strengthening the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with Georgia. Rasmussen felt himself able to condemn the “building of such fences” as allegedly “contrary to the international obligations of Russia and does not contribute to the peaceful settlement of the conflict”. A “peaceful settlement” as far as Rasmussen is concerned must be Russia’s refusal to recognise the “regions of Georgia – South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states”.

The views of American diplomats do not come across as any less dogmatic. Russia must remove the barriers from South Ossetia’s border with Georgia, US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Mary Harf declared: “We have seen reports on the erection of barriers on the administrative boundary. This borderization is inconsistent with Russia’s international commitments and Georgia’s sovereignty and harms relations between both sides. We would call on the Russian Federation to remove the barriers”.

It is worth pointing out one more time that in accordance with current intergovernmental agreements, the Russian Federation has been delegated certain functions and authority to protect the state boundary of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia. Some sections of the 350-kilometre border between South Ossetia and Georgia are being controlled poorly, and a number of issues in the Gali region of Abkhazia have not been settled. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that measures by South Ossetia to erect border fences are intended to reduce the number of incidents related to innocent border infringements by local residents from both sides and thereby remove the factor causing constant tension in the border zone. Since the fences have started being erected, the number of such incidents has fallen sharply. This has also been confirmed by the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia.

The issue of the territorial demarcation between Georgia and the two Caucasian states recognised by Russia periodically stirs up public opinion in Georgia, especially on the threshold of the country’s presidential elections which are scheduled to take place on 26 October.Information on the border fences in one or another Georgian village is being seized upon by the Georgian media and media in the West, who are accusing Russia of the “creeping annexation of Georgian territories”. French newspaper Le Figaro, without worrying about evidence, is “not ruling out” that should what the West is calling “the creeping annexation” continue, then the 1.6 km Baku-Supsa Pipeline, one of three “western” pipelines, will pass through territory controlled by “separatists who are completely subordinate to Moscow”. A systematic aggravation of the situation is under way.

The biased nature of the coverage of events in the Caucasus is an important factor in the reproduction of Russophobic propaganda clichés.The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as before, is providing constant political and diplomatic assistance to Tbilisi. Furthermore, the current Georgian regime has been promised that units of the Republic’s armed forces will take part in the NATO Response Force in 2015. A statement was made about this on 10 October by the same indefatigable Rasmussen. In turn, the Prime Minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose current position in terms of running the country is not completely clear, continues to declare that Georgia is moving towards Euro-Atlantic integration and will do everything it can to become a full member of the European Union and NATO. For the time being, however, nobody is even thinking about officially inviting Georgia to become a member of the alliance, but this is not stopping those involved from continuing to strengthen ties.

The two centres of Euro-Atlantism – NATO and the European Union, with its urgently resuscitated “Eastern Partnership” – are striving for territorial and political expansion outwards with all their might.With the international legal norms and the status of NATO as a regional military alliance of European and North American countries (Georgia, of course, is not geographically situated in either), it is a poor fit.

Since the mid-1990s, the interest of the US and their NATO allies in the Caucasus has been growing continuously. The current situation surrounding South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a result of America’s adventurist policy, which strenuously pushed the outgoing Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili into attacking Tskhinvali. The damaging consequences of this adventurism have long been apparent, especially for Georgia itself. And it is by no means just the loss of territory. The war in 2008, which coincided with the global economic crisis, turned into a nightmare for Georgia, notes the Ronald Reagan House in Lithuania, for example: It “swept away the much needed foreign direct investment and drastically reduced consumer confidence. In 2009 the Georgian GDP fell by 3.9 percent. Foreign direct investment was replaced by foreign loans. Georgia received USD 1 billion from the United States and USD 4.5 billion was handed out by the Donor Conference in Brussels. This expanded the economy by roughly 4 percent”. But the loans have to be paid back sooner or later and the West is not going to take everything Georgia has, which is why patriotic rhetoric designed to move attention away from a society living in despair to its insidious “Northern neighbour” is being exploited so desperately.

The permanent conflict between Russia and Georgia is beneficial to outside forces. Bearing this in mind, a way out of the political and diplomatic impasse should be found wherever possible, just not within the context of the statements made by Rasmussen or Harf.

At present, there are practical actions by both sides aimed at resolving specific issues, including those related to the regular supply of water to border villages. According to the chair of the commission for the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, Gia Volski, “negotiations are under way, including… with Russia on the intervention of international organisations, at the level of non-governmental organisations and independent experts”. A possible relaxation of the border regime with South Ossetia and Abkhazia is probably attainable, but outside of an equal dialogue with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, achieving any kind of progress on this or any other issues will be impossible. In addition, the expansion of political contacts between Tbilisi and Moscow is incompatible with the increased military presence of extra-regional forces on Georgian soil…As a consequence, the provocative campaign being organised by certain circles in Tbilisi in connection with strengthening the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia is a cause for regret.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed hope that the special envoys of the European Union and observers from the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia “will keep the authorities in Tbilisi from taking any irresponsible steps in border regions”. The new head of the EU Observation Mission (with an office in Zugdidi on the border of Abkhazia), Toivo Klaar, has set about familiarising himself with the situation in the conflict zone. According to Klaar, the mission is observing the situation “on the occupation line” and monitoring the movement of the local population, and the information gathered will be sent to Brussels in the near future.

The consequences of the monitoring activities of European observers may turn out to be fairly ambiguous. Brussels is not just the “capital” of the European Union but of NATO as well, the Secretary General of which, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ought to be encouraged to be more correct in his statements regardless. It is possible that he is being pressured by certain member states of the organisation he heads, but this in no way justifies his attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of independent states.

At that, some reinvigoration of Russia-Georgia economic contacts and links between non-government organizations does not mean Russia is intent to deviate from its fundamental policy decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The statements made by Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement, on the South Ossetia-Georgia demarcation process started by Russian border guards are off target. It entailed a response on the part of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscoring that finger-pointing at Russia has no legal ground since South Ossetia is an independent state, which has a right to mark border demarcation lines and install border infrastructure anyway it chooses. It’s worth to note the border control maintained by Russian guards is rather iffy. Sergey Kolbin, head of the region's border guard service, which is part of the Republic’s state security structure, said those, who cross the border from South Ossetia taking advantage of eased crossing regime, move freely across the whole Georgian territory and the number of violations is on the rise. (3)

It’s already evident that the West is set to use the «border issue» for racketing up tensions in and around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian-Georgian situation merits close international attention, said Ariel Cohen, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC. «Borders are only as good as both sides decide to recognize them», the expert noted. «If … one of the sides decided to push a border, and the international community does not react … not only does it put in danger the weaker power, it threatens international order in Europe and in the world».

It’s clear that the issue of guaranteeing the security of South Ossetia will be gaining significance for Russia with the 2014 Olympic Winter Games in Sochi drawing closer. South Ossetian special services provide Russia with important information related to the event, said Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, after the ceremony of signing a memorandum on cooperation between the two security councils. (5)

The Moscow – Tskhinval security interaction will be no less important after 2014. South Ossetians watch with anxiety the Georgia’s ongoing military build-up, the armed forces capabilities being enhanced according to NATO standards. The Georgian military still have a mission to «restore the country’s territorial integrity».

The military modernization is implemented under the close scrutiny of the USA and NATO. The specific feature of the process is getting close with the military of neighboring Turkey and Azerbaijan.

The US and Georgia plan to hold a combined military exercise. Perhaps the training event will totally involve four participants. The Georgian Navy and Air Force are getting back on track. It evokes concern in Abkhazia, the country tied to Russia by bilateral accords, including security arrangements. A US-funded naval command and control infrastructure is being built in West Georgia. According to official information provided by US embassy in Tbilisi, the Supsa facility’s formal mission is to contribute into international and interagency effort to counter the trans-border criminal activities. In practice it means the Georgian Navy is back after having suffered great losses in 2008. It would be propitious to draw lessons from the Middle East events as the naval infrastructure of US close allies’ is being used against Syria.

On July 10, 2013 the Georgian border guards once again seized a ship in the international waters of the Black Sea. This time it was the Turkish vessel Pasha en route from Abkhazia (the port of Sukhum) to Turkey. There have been three illegal seizures of Turkish ships by the border forces of Georgia over the past six months. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia made a related statement to condemn the resumption of piracy by Georgia in neutral waters of the Black Sea. These aggressive actions, pursuing the purpose to exert political and economic pressure on Abkhazia, are aimed at destabilizing the situation in the region.

Georgia boosts its Air Force capability. Some aspects of air activities propaganda coverage are mentioned in the recently published US State Department report partly devoted to Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In response the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the Comment of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia as regards the publication of the report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non-proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (07.19.13) saying «It is appropriate to remind that the reality is that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are sovereign states. The lack of wish to take this into account will negatively affect CACE prospects, as well as the functioning of the acting instrument of building military security and trust in Europe – Treaty on Open Skies (OST). The Russian Federation adheres and will adhere to the principal position that any flights in open skies mode closer than 10 kilometres from borders of the states not parties to the OST (Abkhazia and South Ossetia are such countries) would be in violation of Article VI of this Treaty».

The Secretary General of NATO has recently called on Russia to refrain from using force against Georgia. In response Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin called on Tbilisi to take steps aimed at normalization of relationship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Looks like it’s a hope against hope. The meddling in by Tbilisi’s Western allies is likely to remain the main hindrance on the way of establishing a dialogue between Tbilisi, Sukhum and Tskhinval on the one hand, and between Tbilisi and Moscow on the other hand. They may interfere in different ways.

Georgian special operations forces are going through training instructed by US private military contractors. The US conducts biological activities along the Russian border. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs comment points out that «there is no documentary evidence that all the site under United States’ jurisdiction or control, which earlier participated in military biological programmes, have been destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes pursuant to BTWC Article II. We are also seriously concerned with biological activities of the U.S. Department of Defence near Russian borders». It’s an open secret what kind of activities the National Public Health Reference Laboratory in Tbilisi, Georgia, is involved in. South Ossetia has reported that Georgia works on animal as well as human hostile viruses. (8) The last time serous meningitis came from the southern part of Russia. Gennady Onishenko, Russian chief health physician, said in this connection that a microbiology laboratory of the U.S. Navy continues to work in Georgia. Russian Rospotrebnadzor (the service for the oversight of consumer protection and welfare), believes the laboratory’s activities cause African swine fever which hits the bordering parts of Russia’s territory annually since 2007. This year the virus has struck 13 Russian regions, including those of Krasnodar, Rostov, Volgograd, Smolensk, Belgorod, as well as the vicinities of Moscow. According to Onishenko, the US has spent $350 million to create the naval research facility. Russia takes corresponding steps to counter the threat, including the acquisition of special equipment for South Ossetia and Abkhazia to monitor the environment and respond to emerging threats.

All these factors do not create preconditions to warm up the Russia – Georgia relationship. Even partial normalization hits the snags: mines are laid and blockages are erected. Of course it’s not like it was in the August of 2008, the obstructions may not be that evident, but they are no less perilous. In a speech at a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg in April, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili said openly that the fact that there is a dialogue between Tbilisi and Moscow shouldn’t create the impression that the country doesn’t need support from its partners anymore. The Georgian government is vulnerable facing complex problems. In 1992-2011 The United States has allocated $4, 24 billion for Tbilisi to become the largest foreign donor nation and the most influential Western ally. Now Washington can effectively block any, even the most modest, attempt to expand the business ties between Georgian companies with what the US views as «unwanted» partners, like Iran, for instance. The huge sums of money mentioned above are targeted at military programs, communications projects and «working with the elite». It cannot give the Georgian economy a new lease on life. The former ruling party functionaries are squeezed out of their positions, the President to be elected instead of Saakashvili this autumn will have restricted powers. But it doesn’t automatically bring to power those who stand for more balanced foreign policy. At that, the pre-election period and the voting itself will become a serious test for the Georgian powers that be.

It’s time to realize that a constructive dialogue with Russia first of all meets the interests of Georgian people and state. It’s at least unpropitious to pin hopes on the partners, who had supported Saakashvili during the days of his unrestricted rule. The interests of Russia and the «after Saakashvili» Georgia coincide, the both need to normalize bilateral relations free of destructive impact from outside. Perhaps it will not happen soon. But if Tbilisi will continue to let its territory be a source of problems for Russia and its allies, then any hope for positive dialogue with Moscow, Sukhum or Tskhinval can be forgotten for a long time as a wishful dream.
 

While the Obama administration is cautioning Fiji about recognizing the independence of the two secessionist republics in return for economic aid from Moscow, something Washington calls Taiwan-style “checkbook diplomacy,” it is more than happy to reward other countries with special incentives if they recognize the independence of America’s creation in the Balkans that was severed from Serbia, Kosovo.

The United States has complained, along with its two surrogate “sheriffs” in the Pacific region – Australia and New Zealand – that Russia’s offer of economic perks to Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu, three nations that have never managed to fully break free of Western colonialist dictates, resulted in those nations’ decisions to recognize the independence of Abkhazia. While Vanuatu recognized only Abkhazia during a government crisis in Port-Vila, the Vanuatu capital, Nauru and Tuvalu recognized both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Previously, only Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela recognized the two breakaway nations, with Washington charging that Russia offered military and other deals to Nicaragua and Venezuela in return for their recognition of the two emergent nations.

Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd lived up to the Australian Labor Party’s total subservience to the United States by calling for transparency in Russia’s dealings with the South Pacific states. Yet Australia’s and New Zealand’s policies to the small Pacific nations has often been based on secret intelligence agreements between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, including the signals intelligence alliance between the three nations that makes the diplomatic communications of the South Pacific states and all telecommunications in the South Pacific subject to eavesdropping by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).

Georgia has argued that the cases of Abkhazia/South Ossetia and Kosovo are un-related. However, the United States has cajoled a number of nations into recognizing Kosovo, the latest being Ghana. In return for recognition, Washington has granted countries recognizing the organized crime-imbued regime in Pristina, the Kosovo capital, with the same sort of perks that the United States has accused Russia of providing the South Pacific and Latin American states that have recognized Abkhazia/South Ossetia. While the United States condemns the “checkbook diplomacy” practiced for years by Taiwan and China to gain and swap diplomatic recognition from mostly poor and small nations, it has practiced the same sort of “checkbook diplomacy” with regard to Kosovo.

A State Department cable divulged by WikiLeaks points to the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy and how Washington has pressured countries into not recognizing Abkhazia/South Ossetia by exerting pressure directly or via its allies.

On February 22, 2010, a cable from the U.S. embassy in Quito, Ecuador cited the visit by the Abkhazian Vice Foreign Minister to Quito and referred to U.S. concern that Ecuador’s Multilateral Affairs Under Secretary Arturo Cabrera had met the Abkhazian official in preparation for the announcement of diplomatic relations. The cable states:

“Cabrera said that the MFA too was surprised by the Vice Foreign Minister's visit, and indicated that nothing materialized from it. He gave the impression that he considered it unlikely the GOE would recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia as independent states, although he did not say so directly. Cabrera also informed us that the issue was handled by Bilateral Affairs rather than his office. When the opportunity arises, the Embassy will raise the issue also with the MFA's Bilateral Affairs office.”

Previously, on January 26, 2010, the U.S. embassy in Peru ensured that a Peruvian official would raise Washington’s objections with Ecuador over Abkhazia/South Ossetia at a South American defense meeting:

“Charge raised reftel points regarding the Government of Ecuador's potentially recognizing the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with MFA Under Secretary for the Americas Ambassador Javier Leon January 25. Leon said he planned to travel to Ecuador this week for a UNASUR meeting of Vice Ministers of Defense, and would raise the issue with his GOE [Government of Ecuador]
counterparts at that time.”

The same day, the U.S. embassy in Chile tried to use Chile to pressure Ecuador not to recognize the two secessionist nations but with little success:

“Poloff [Political Officer] delivered reftel demarche to Eduardo Schott, Deputy Director for European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Schott was unaware of Ecuador's potential decision to recognize the independence of the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He will consult with colleagues about the possibility of raising the issue with Ecuador. He said that Chile is comfortable sharing its reasons for not recognizing the regions, but other countries are free to make their own decision.”

Nauru’s decision to recognize Abkhazia/South Ossetia was seen as a “comedy” according to a December 16, 2009, cable from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi:

“Georgian officials downplayed the significance of Nauru's apparent December 14 recognition of Abkhazia's "independence," which Russia reportedly encouraged with an offer of $50 million to the island nation. Although officials are discussing with Australian counterparts whether the recognition is actually final, Reintegration Minister Yakobashvili joked in public about Russia's apparent purchase of the recognition, calling it a "comedy," while Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria told us privately the step was not so important, even if it was true. The relaxed approach represents a welcome shift from Georgia's more manic reaction to previous recognitions by Venezuela and Nicaragua, an approach that we have actively encouraged with our Georgian counterparts. Georgia has also recognized and expressed appreciation for successful U.S. efforts to discourage additional recognitions from Latin American countries . . .”

Perhaps the most draconian use of U.S. pressure regarding recognition of Abkhazia / South Ossetia was the pressure Washington, London, and Paris applied on four poor African states, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali, that signaled a willingness to establish relations with the secessionist states. The information is contained in a September 1, 2009, cable from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi. The relevant sections of the cable are as follows:

“Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze called in the U.S. and UK ambassadors August 31 to request urgent assistance on two matters. First, the Georgians learned that four African countries — Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali — are seriously considering recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Georgians want help dissuading them from doing so . . . Vashadze told the ambassadors that the Georgian Embassy in Paris learned from the Quai d'Orsay that Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, and Mali were seriously considering taking the step of recognition. He considered this information quite reliable. He expressed great concern that such a step would undermine many of Georgia's diplomatic successes over the past year. He was especially concerned that Russia will orchestrate an announcement of these recognitions at the UN General Assembly, saying that such announcement would be an absolute catastrophe, especially if it occurred when President Saakashvili was in New York. ”

The four African nations were pressured into not recognizing Abkhazia/South Ossetia.

Other leaked State Department cables illustrate Washington’s pressure on various nations, including Spain, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Zambia, Guatemala, South Africa, Brunei, Djibouti, and even the tiny Maldives through the same sort of financial incentives and diplomatic “sweeteners” Washington accused Russia applying on the South Pacific states in return for recognition of Abkhazia/South Ossetia.

When it comes to hypocrisy, there is no greater world center for it than the U.S. Department of State. However, thanks to the leaks of State Department cables, the hypocrisy of the State Department and the Obama administration in foreign policy can be read in their own words.

No doubt, the republic has undergone dramatic changes since the autumn of 2008-first of all, in terms of security, to be more exact-quality of security services. The citizens of Tskhinval no longer have to hide to escape shells fired from the Georgian villages (and this is what had been taking place at least 1-2 times a week long before the Georgian invasion two years ago). However, a threat of a new attack remains: some observers think it might be a series of provocations which yet can be ignored (by the official Moscow as well) if take place simultaneously with other attacks in Southern Caucasus and the Middle East.

Russia remains the young republic's protector- in war and in politics, and South Ossetia expects overwhelming assistance from Moscow, not only financial. The republic needs a distinct ideology. Meanwhile, South Ossetia`s achievements in its most promising spheres: agriculture, production of building materials and some minerals, tourism- leave much to be desired. The leader of the Yedinstvo (Unity) party, Z. Kokoyev, said: “…We have practically no livestock industry, no fruit and vegetable growing…we lack water…All vital products, even fruit and vegetables, are being imported from Russia…”

There is a growing divide in the society as Russian specialists invited to work in South Ossetia earn a few times more than the locals (those who are lucky to be employed). Prices in market places in Moscow and Tskhinval are almost equal! Despite the fact that some roads were repaired (for example, the one from Tskhinval to Dmenis), communication between the districts of the republic (with the Leningorsk area 100 km outside Tskhinval and 30 km from Tbilisi) is still poor. In view of this, the republic fails to become a truly independent state having all its territories under control. Religion is another thorny issue there as the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church refuses to recognize the eparchy to which South Ossetia belongs.

All debates which are currently going on in the republic focus on future. Those who urge for reunion with North Ossetia are quite right when they say that the continuing instability evokes pessimistic sentiments in people, who sooner or later decide to leave the republic. Those who have an alternative point of view say that since accession to Russia is not a task of the next few months, it is necessary to work hard to develop statehood on its own. The government, led by Vladimir Brovtsev of the Chelyabinsk region, is criticized for some of its policies, and since the media covers only negative moments, there is an impression that the situation is only worsening. As a result, more and more people are becoming critical-though unintentionally-of Russia.

However, despite all hardships of everyday life in South Ossetia, there is not a sign of pro-Georgian sentiments. The memories of the 20-year confrontation and economic blockade are too fresh in their minds (1) Still, hypothetically, local experts do not rule out a possibility that Moscow might change its policies in South Ossetia amid criticism. At the same time, Tskhinval officials understand that becoming a part of Russia would be unreal not only due to certain geopolitical reasons but also because of some regional peculiarities: relations between North and South Ossetia remain quite complicated.

New difficulties in the independent South Ossetia give the West the green light to change the existing situation.  A well-known intelligence expert, Paul Goble, said that very soon South Ossetia will be offered an absolutely different scenario, which will in no way meet the interests of Russia in the North Caucasus. To avoid this, Moscow needs to adopt a very thorough ‘second step’ strategy to prove that the events of 2008 were not the result of unexpected changes but a well-conceived policy.    

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(1) Actually, life in Georgia (except outwardly prosperous Tbilisi and some other strategically important districts with developed infrastructure) is far from stable.   

An international conference titled “Two years Later: Lessons, Realia, and the Future. Europeans' perspective on the Five Day War in South Ossetia” convened on the eve of the tragic 08.08.08 anniversary. The discussions at the forum largely revolved around the reflection of the Five Day War in global media and the forecasts for the Caucasian region. Representatives of European NGOs gave intriguing talks and occasionally expressed views quite critical of Georgia, but the easily unveiled truth is that the international politics decision-making behind the facade of the “public democracy” is concentrated in the hands of a handful of individuals.

Two years ago Russia faced massive media and diplomatic pressure over its response to Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia. The pressure is still on and will likely persist, meaning that we are to witness a new series of debates and disagreements in the future.

For the most part, Europe's perception of the August, 2008 war between Georgia and South Ossetia remains unchanged. The EU still supports Georgia and regards Russia's reaction as at least unwarranted. Due to various circumstances, the Georgian theme in Russia's relations with the US and the EU has receded from public discourse but its reanimation can be expected any moment, for example if the US and/or Israel strike Iran and the attack triggers major military provocations in the Caucasus. Europe continues denying South Ossetia the recognition of its independence and treats it as a province of Georgia. The later is a US ally in the Caucasus, and Italian journalist Giulietto Chiesa even believes that – as a result of the recent Gaza crisis – the Israeli aircrafts based in Turkey can be relocated to Georgia.

The August, 2008 developments marked a crucial phase of the collapse of the already inefficient system of the instruments of international law, predictably giving military force an ever greater role in international relations. In fact, commonly accepted legal mechanisms of preventing conflicts between ethnic groups or countries are hardly worth talking about since the passing of the notorious verdict on the Kosovo independence by the International Court of Justice. The resolution of ethnic conflicts has irreversibly drifted from the sphere of law to the sphere of current politics, and the arrangement exposes the international security architecture to fundamental risks.

From the outset, there was no hope that the Russian diplomacy would – on the UN level, for example – convince the international community to condemn Saakashvili's aggression or to impose an embargo on weaponry supplies to his regime. Russia's objections notwithstanding, Europe is eager to integrate Georgia – as well as Ukraine – into NATO. The Russian diplomacy's failure to make the world realize that Saakashvili's regime was responsible for unleashing the war in South Ossetia1 did not come as a surprise – no doubt, double standards will dominate the global politics in the foreseeable future. This is the reason why the Russian administration chose to de jure cement the new status quo in the Caucasian region, regardless of how the step angered Western (British and other) thinktanks. The anger surfaced at the forum in Strasbourg…

Evidently, Tbilisi is seeking to maximally drag the US and the EU into the Caucasian affairs. Notably, the EU with its initiatives like the Eastern Partnership and association agreements is a background player in the Caucasian region compared to the US and Russia.

The immediate parties to the conflict – Georgia on one side and South Ossetia plus Abkhazia on the other – are equally committed to the view that a fair resolution can only be brokered with the help of external forces. Georgia is inviting the US and the EU while Abkhazia and South Ossetia are summoning Russia. The Geneva consultations produced no breakthrough, nor will they as long as their agenda is focused on formulating a legally binding agreement on avoiding the use of force. Georgia rejects the deal out of hand claiming that it can only sign an agreement of the kind directly with Russia. Geopolitical reckoning and vague expectations that the strategic balance in the region will tilt prevail over the intentions to build a common European security architecture.

The current – and, alas, temporary – dip in the intensity of anti-Russian rhetoric may well be a prologue to a new round of pressure on Moscow. Things can get worse if the US adopts a hawkish stance (for example, due to the advent of a new US Administration or the triumph of Republicans in the coming Congress elections). Then we are sure to encounter a full-scale revival of all of the recent critical stereotypes. A “gentle” version of essentially the same evolution will likely materialize in the form of the reset which has already drawn Moscow closer to Washington on Iran and several other issues.

From the perspective of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia as the country interested in maintaining its influence over the region in the long term should extend to them guarantees of their security, which they bought dearly and cast irreversibly in the legal form of an independent statehood. Abkhazia and South Ossetia hope that, led by its own geopolitical interests, Russia will create an alliance with them and will never revert to its defeatist 1990ies policies2. The projection is that Russia's strategic stance in dealing with Georgia will be consequent and will not be affected by minute plans to reach a deal with Georgia at the cost of sacrificing the gains of the Five Day War.

The struggle between Russia and the West over the Caucasus will continue despite the pledged reset. The visits of US Vice President J. Biden to Tbilisi and of US Secretary of State H. Clinton – to Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi (a year later), along with a whole range of other developments, showed clearly that the intensity of the rivalry between Washington, Brussels, and Moscow over the Caucasian region is not going to subside. The US has no intention to leave South Caucasus to Russia, and the EU will not become the champion in the region in the nearest future due to the following reasons:

1) The EU mediation lacks a unified underlying policy.

2) The EU is overly burdened with its own problems.

3) The EU would not risk tilting the balance in the Caucasus at the cost of antagonizing Moscow over relatively minor issues.

4) The EU will likely opt for an auxiliary role in implementing a new US strategy aimed at maximally pushing the Caucasian republics – especially Abkhazia – off Russia's orbit.

5) There is no clarity concerning the future Eurointegration of Georgia and other Caucasian republics3

At the same time, South Ossetia and Abkhazia hope to eventually establish normal relations with the EU and to start moving towards Eurointegration, though the latter task ranks lower on their lists of priorities than cultivating the relations with Russia as the guarantor of their security. Brussel's position will render meaningless any talk about the region's European future as a means of addressing its conflicts given that the EU believes that Georgia should retain its Soviet-era borders. In the mid-term, the situation around South Ossetia is bound to be a zero-sum game in which gains on one side are tantamount to losses on the other.

The interpretations of the events that took place in Abkhazia two years ago and the visions of Georgia's relations with its former autonomous parts will at various levels remain a sphere of ideological strife. A lot depends on the clarity and coherence of the positions of Moscow, South Ossetia, and also of the Ossetian communities which are growing increasingly visible in Europe and other parts of the world. In this context, the rallies which convened early this August instill a measure of optimism.

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(1) A. Kurtov. South Caucasus: Expectations and Reality // Russia-Armenia: Opportunities to Deepen the Strategic Partnership. Moscow, RISI, 2010, p. 56

(2) Tbilisi was the first to resort to military force in dealing with its defiant autonomies, but at the initial phase of the conflict the Soviet — and later the post-Soviet — Georgian leadership met with no response whatsoever from Moscow

(3) E. Ponomareva. Abkazia and South Ossetia: the Future of Their Relations with Georgia. Part III // http://www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2638