By Vijay PRASHAD

Afghanistan and Tajikistan share a 1,400-kilometer border. Recently, a war of words has erupted between Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon and the Taliban government in Kabul.

Rahmon censures the Taliban for the destabilization of Central Asia by the export of militant groups, while the Taliban leadership has accused Tajikistan’s government of interference.

Earlier this summer, Rahmon mobilized 20,000 troops to the border, and held military exercises and discussions with Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Meanwhile, the spokesperson for the Afghan government — Zabihullah Mujahid — tweeted pictures of Afghan troops deployed to Takhar Province on the border of the two countries. The escalation of harsh language continues. Prospects of war between these two countries should not be discounted, but — given the role Russia plays in Tajikistan — it is unlikely.

Russian President Vladimir Putin awarding Tajik President Emomali Rahmon the Order of Alexander Nevsky in February 2017. (Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Panjshir Exiles

On Sept. 3, Afghanistan’s former Vice President Amrullah Saleh tweeted, “The RESISTANCE is continuing and will continue. I am here with my soil, for my soil & defending its dignity.” A few days later, the Taliban took the Panjshir Valley, where Saleh had taken refuge for the past fortnight, and Saleh slipped across the border into Tajikistan. The resistance inside Afghanistan died down.

From 2001, Saleh had worked closely with the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States and then had become the head of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (2004-2010). He had previously worked closely with Ahmad Shah Massoud of the right-wing Jamiat-e Islami and of the Northern Alliance.

Saleh fled by helicopter to Tajikistan with Massoud’s son Ahmad. They were later joined in Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe by Abdul Latif Pedram, leader of the National Congress Party of Afghanistan.

The RESISTANCE is continuing and will continue. I am here with my soil, for my soil & defending its dignity. https://t.co/FaKmUGB1mq

— Amrullah Saleh (@AmrullahSaleh2) September 3, 2021

These men followed the lead of the Northern Alliance, which had taken refuge in Tajikistan’s Kulob region after the Taliban victory in 1996.

The personal ties between Ahmad Shah Massoud and Tajikistan’s President Rahmon go back to the early 1990s.

In March, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Tajikistan Mohammad Zahir Aghbar remembered that in the early 1990s Massoud told a group of Tajik fighters in Kabul, “I do not want the war in Afghanistan to be transferred to Tajikistan under the banner of Islam. It is enough that our country has been fraudulently destroyed. Go and make peace in your country.”

That Massoud had backed the anti-government United Tajik Opposition, led by the Islamic Renaissance Party, is conveniently forgotten.

Map of Afghanistan with Tajikistan to the north. (CIA, University of Texas at Austin, Wikimedia Commons)

After the Taliban took Kabul on Aug. 15, and just before Saleh and Massoud escaped to Dushanbe, on Sept. 2, Rahmon conferred upon the late Ahmad Shah Massoud the highest civilian award of Tajikistan, the Order of Ismoili Somoni.

This protection afforded to the Saleh-led resistance movement, and Tajikistan’s refusal to recognize the Taliban government in Kabul sent a clear signal to the Taliban from Rahmon’s government.

Rahmon says that the main reason is that he is dismayed by the Taliban’s anti-Tajik stance. But this is not entirely the case. One in four Afghans are Tajiks, while half of Kabul claims Tajik ancestry. The economy minister — Qari Din Mohammad Hanif — is not only Tajik, but comes from the Badakhshan province that borders Tajikistan. The real reason is Rahmon’s concerns about regional destabilization.

Tajik Taliban

On Sept. 11, Saidmukarram Abdulqodirzoda, the head of Tajikistan’s Islamic Council of Ulema, condemned the Taliban as being anti-Islamic in its treatment of women and in its promotion of terrorism. Abdulqodirzoda, the lead imam in Tajikistan, has led a decade-long process to purge “extremists” from the ranks of the mosque leaders. Many foreign-trained imams have been replaced (Abdulqodirzoda had been trained in Islamabad, Pakistan), and foreign funding of mosques has been closely monitored.

Abdulqodirzoda frequently talks about the bloody civil war that tore Tajikistan apart between 1992 and 1997.

Between 1990, when the U.S.S.R. began to collapse, and 1992, when the civil war began, a thousand mosques — more than one a day — opened across the country.

Saudi Arabia’s money and influence rushed into the country, as did the influence of the right-wing Afghan leaders Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Rahmon — as chair of the Supreme Assembly of Tajikistan (1992-1994) and then as president, beginning in 1994 — led the fight against the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), which was eventually crushed by 1997.

The ghost of the civil war reappeared in 2010, when Mullah Amriddin Tabarov, a commander in the IRP, founded Jamaat Ansarullah.

Great Mosque in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in 2013. (Soman, CC BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Cocons)

In 1997, Tabarov fled to join the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), one of the fiercest of the extremist groups in that era. The IMU and Tabarov developed close ties with Al Qaeda, fleeing Afghanistan and Uzbekistan after the U.S. invasion of 2001 for Iraq, later Syria. Tabarov was caught by the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani in July 2015 and killed.

As the Taliban began to make gains in Afghanistan late last year, a thousand Ansarullah fighters arrived from their sojourn with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. When Darwaz fell to the Taliban in November 2020, it was these Ansarullah fighters who took the lead.

Tajikistan’s Rahmon has made it clear that he fears a spillover of Ansarullah into his country, dragging it back into the war of the 1990s. The fear of that war has allowed Rahmon to remain in power, using every means to squash any democratic opening in Tajikistan.

In mid-September, Dushanbe hosted the 21st meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of the Heads of State. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan had several talks with Rahmon about the situation in Afghanistan. As the war of words escalated, Khan called Rahmon on Oct. 3 to ask that the tension be reduced. Russia and China have also called for restraint.

It is unlikely that guns will be fired across the border; neither Dushanbe nor Kabul would like to see that outcome. But both sides are using the tension for their own ends — for Rahmon, to ensure that the Taliban will keep Ansarullah in check, and for the Taliban, for Rahmon to recognize their government.

Globetrotter via consortiumnews.com

On September 25, 2021, Afghanistan’s Economy Minister Qari Din Mohammad Hanif said that his government does not want “help and cooperation from the world like the previous government. The old system was supported by the international community for 20 years but still failed.” It is fair to say that Hanif has no experience in running a complex economy, since he has spent most of his career doing political and diplomatic work for the Taliban (both in Afghanistan and in Qatar). However, during the first Taliban government from 1996 to 2001, Hanif was the planning minister and in that position, dealt with economic affairs.

Hanif is right to point out that the governments of Presidents Hamid Karzai (2001-2014) and Ashraf Ghani (2014-2021), despite receiving billions of dollars in economic aid, failed to address the basic needs of the Afghan population. At the end of their rule—and 20 years of U.S. occupation—one in three people are facing hunger, 72 percent of the population lingers below the poverty line and 65 percent of the people have no access to electricity. No amount of bluster from the Western capitals can obscure the plain fact that support from the “international community” resulted in virtually no economic and social development in the country.

Poor North

Hanif, who is the only member of Afghanistan’s new cabinet who is from the country’s Tajik ethnic minority, comes from the northeastern Afghan province of Badakhshan. The northeastern provinces in Afghanistan are Tajik-dominated areas, and Badakhshan was the base from which the Northern Alliance swiftly moved under U.S. air cover to launch an attack against the Taliban in 2001. In early August 2021, the Taliban swept through these districts. “Why would we defend a government in Kabul that did nothing for us?” said a former official in Karzai’s government who lives in Badakhshan capital, Fayzabad.

Between 2009 and 2011, 80 percent of USAID funds that came into Afghanistan went to areas of the south and east, which had been the natural base of the Taliban. Even this money, a U.S. Senate report noted, went toward “short-term stabilization programs instead of longer-term development projects.” In 2014, Haji Abdul Wadood, then governor of the Argo district in Badakhshan, told Reuters, “Nobody has given money to spend on developmental projects. We do not have resources to spend in our district, our province is a remote one and attracts less attention.”

Hanif’s home province of Badakhshan—and its neighboring areas — suffer from great poverty, the rates upwards of 60 percent. When he talks about failure, Hanif has his home province in mind.

For thousands of years, the province of Badakhshan has been home to mines for gemstones such as lapis lazuli. In 2010, a U.S. military report estimated that there was at least $1 trillion worth of precious metals in Afghanistan; later that year, Afghanistan’s then Minister of Mines Wahidullah Shahrani told BBC radio that the actual figure could be three times as much. The impoverished north might not be so poor after all.

Thieves in the North

With opium production contributing a large chunk of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, it is often a focus of global media coverage on the country’s economy and has partly financed the terrible wars that have wracked the country for the past several years. The gems of Badakhshan, meanwhile, provided the financing for Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Jamiat-e Islami faction in the 1980s; after 1992, when Massoud became the defense minister in Kabul, he made an alliance with a Polish company—Intercommerce—to sell the gems for an estimated $200 million per year. When the Taliban ejected Massoud from power, he returned to the Panjshir Valley and used the Badakhshan, Takhar, and Panjshir gems to finance his anti-Taliban resistance.

When the Northern Alliance—which included Massoud’s faction—came to power under U.S. bombardment in 2001, these mines became the property of the Northern Alliance commanders. Men such as Haji Abdul Malek, Zekria Sawda and Zulmai Mujadidi—all Northern Alliance politicians—controlled the mines. Mujadidi’s brother Asadullah Mujadidi was the militia commander of the Mining Protection Force, which protected the mines for these new elites.

In 2012, Afghanistan’s then Mining Minister Wahidullah Shahrani revealed the extent of corruption in the deals, which he had made clear to the U.S. Embassy in 2009. Shahrani’s attempt at transparency, however, was understood inside Afghanistan as a mechanism to delegitimize Afghan mining concerns and push through a new law that would allow international mining companies more freedom of access to the country’s resources. Various international entities—including Centar (United Kingdom) and the Polish billionaire Jan Kulczyk—attempted to access the gold, copper and gemstone mines of the province; Centar formed an alliance with the Afghanistan Gold and Minerals Company, headed by former Urban Development Minister Sadat Naderi. The consortium’s mining equipment has now been seized by the Taliban. Earlier this year, Shahrani was sentenced to 13 months’ jail time by the Afghan Supreme Court for misuse of authority.

What Will the Taliban Do?

Hanif has an impossible agenda. The IMF has suspended funds for Afghanistan, and the U.S. government continues to block access to the nearly $10 billion of Afghan external reserves held in the United States. Some humanitarian aid has now entered the country, but it will not be sufficient. The Taliban’s harsh social policy—particularly against women—will discourage many aid groups from returning to the country.

Officials at the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the country’s central bank, tell me that the options before the government are minimal. Institutional control over the mining wealth has not been established. “What deals were cut profited a few individuals and not the country as a whole,” said one official. One major deal to develop the Mes Aynak copper mine made with the Metallurgical Corporation of China and with Jiangxi Copper has been sitting idle since 2008.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in mid-September, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon spoke about the need to prevent terrorist groups from moving across the Afghan borders to disrupt Central Asia and western China. Rahmon positioned himself as a defender of the Tajik peoples, although poverty of the Tajik communities on both sides of the border should be as much a focus of attention as upholding the rights of the Tajiks as a minority in Afghanistan.

There is no public indication from the SCO that it would prevent not only cross-border terrorism, but also cross-border smuggling. The largest quantities of heroin and opium from northern Afghanistan go to Tajikistan; untold sums of money are made in the illegal movement of minerals, gemstones, and metals out of Afghanistan. Hanif has not raised this point directly, but officials at DAB say that unless Afghanistan better commandeers its own resources, something it has failed to do over the past two decades, the country will not be able to improve the living conditions of its people.

Globetrotter via counterpunch.org

This statement will hardly smooth worries away especially in view that nothing is done to rectify the situation as events unfold unfavorably for those who oppose the Islamic State. Until recently it had been widely believed that the central authorities in Kabul were fighting the Taliban. Now a third belligerent emerged. Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser, Mohammad Hanif Atmar, has said that the presence of Daesh, or the Islamic State, is growing. According to him, the group plans to seize control of Central Asia and then move to Russia. The efforts to fight the Islamic State in Afghanistan are not enough to counter the threat. True, the Taliban and the Islamic State don’t join forces; to the contrary they fight each other. But it should not give rise to illusions. Many Taliban fighters join the ranks of the Islamic State. It’s hard to say how many of them have already changed sides but it’s evident that the Islamic State recruiting efforts have been a success so far. This January the Islamic State anointed a former Taliban leader, known as Hafiz Saeed Khan, as their new overload in southern Asia and the sub-continent. Saeed, who is also known as Mulla Saeed Orakzai, was appointed the leader of a new group called IS Khorasan, an offshoot of Abu Bakhr al-Baghdadi's militant group which spans Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh, as well as some parts of Central Asia. The installation of Saeed, a former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), automatically makes him one of the most powerful warlords in the Middle East. Other groups have also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, for instance: The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). 

Obviously the Islamic States is trying to spread instability beyond the borders of the Middle East. It targets Central Asia. An outright military intervention may not be that imminent but the incitement of internal tensions in the Central Asian states is something to expect. 

Many citizens of Central Asia go to Iraq and Syria willing to join the Islamic State militants. They will come back. Islamists have already gained experience of armed struggle against the government forces in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They will apply the acquired skills to kill in their respective countries upon return. The social problems have become exacerbated in the Central Asian states. The opposition uses this factor to its advantage. The living standards are low, internal strife is in full swing with corruption and unemployment omnipresent and pervasive. According to Russian Federal Migration Service, around nine million immigrants from Central Asia worked in Russia in 2014. Now the Central Asian states themselves are going to be hit by a wave of immigrants coming from Afghanistan. There still remain circumstances in Afghanistan that could trigger a mass influx of refugees to the Central Asian countries, Mr. Bernard Doyle, UNHCR Regional Representative and Regional Coordinator for Central Asia, told in an interview with AKIpress on May 25. He did not make precise what exactly circumstances he meant. Will Central Asia cope? In 2014 the number of refugees there did not exceed three thousand but the situation has significantly worsened recently in the border areas of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 900 ethnic Turkmen families are asking Turkmenistan for political asylum. They had to leave homes because of combat actions. Until now they haven’t got a reply. The fighting has been raging near the Turkmenistan border for a few weeks already. Militants keep on gaining ground seizing new populated areas. They have many foreigners in their ranks. The leaders of Afghan provinces complain that Kabul ignores their pleas for urgent help. The Taliban says its fighters don’t take part in the hostilities. 

Some surmise that it’s all part of a complicated plot. The situation in the areas adjacent to the Turkmenistan – Afghanistan border is getting tense. Turkmenistan is moving forces closer to the border. It is building fortifications. The government has declared partial mobilization. According to General Lloyd Austin, Commander of US Central Command, Turkmenistan has asked the United States for military aid. 

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completed the mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 (NATO took command of the United Nations-mandated mission in Afghanistan in August 2003). However, support for the continued development of the Afghan security forces and institutions, and wider cooperation with Afghanistan continue. The U.S. handed over responsibility for security to local Afghans in 2014, but Obama has not specified a date for the withdrawal of all American troops from the country. According to the President, the last American troops will leave Afghanistan at the end of 2016. On March 24, Barack Obama announced that the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would be slowed and the remaining 9,800 troops would stay there through the end of 2015. The servicemen keep away from taking part in combat actions. Instead they concentrate on training and auxiliary missions. This development does not change the central issue, which is the Obama administration's withdrawal date of December 2016 for all U.S. forces. 

NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a session in Antalya, Turkey, on May 13-14. It was agreed that NATO will keep some troops in Afghanistan even after its current training mission ends around the end of next year in a signal of support for Afghan security forces struggling to repel a Taliban offensive. "Today we agreed that we will maintain a presence in Afghanistan even after the end of our current mission," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference during the meeting. On May 23, General Campbell said that the leaders of the United States and other NATO nations are intensifying discussions about future support for Afghanistan, probably meaning at least some American troops will remain here well after President Obama leaves office. According to him, NATO military commanders plan to establish a base in Kabul to help distribute aid, facilitate weapons sales and continue efforts to train Afghan security forces. Although Campbell stressed that NATO civilian officials probably will be in charge of the new mission, a contingent of troops also would be needed to secure the base. He added that NATO forces also could be used to help bolster the Afghan air force and intelligence service. Americans don’t plan get involved in hostilities but they intend to maintain control over Afghan authorities and military command. The have exercised the control long enough and here are the results. In some mysterious way Afghan security forces are successfully fighting back the Taliban in the south and east of the country (the Taliban is daily reported to suffer losses in the Ghazni and Gilmend provinces) but fail to gain ground against the relatively small formations of militants in the areas near the border with Central Asia. 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg went to Afghanistan in November 2014. During the visit he visited the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command at Camp Morehead in Kabul, where the chief of North Atlantic Alliance praised the progress of Afghan commando units. «I have seen a highly trained, experienced and professional force," Stoltenberg said. For over a year Afghan soldiers and police have led security operations across the country, and at the end of this year you will take full charge of security. But you will not stand alone. NATO and our partners will continue to support you." These words give rise to a question – why the Afghan military is doing its best to avoid clashes with the armed formations of opposition in the north of the country? Neither Washington, nor Kabul offers a reasonable answer. 

More than 2,500 troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states were involved in the military training event along with some 200 weapons systems and 20 combat aircraft. 30 military-transport aviation planes transported the personnel and military equipment to the exercise area and back. CSTO spokesman Vladimir Zainetdinov said at a press-conference held on May 18 that all the Collective Security Treaty Organization forces successfully carried out all the training missions assigned during the drill. It was the first time the Russian troops making up elements of CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force were transported by IL-76 transport aircraft. They used Arbalet-2 special parachutes. 

The forces were initially deployed in Tajikistan on May 13-15 as a reaction to the exacerbation of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The sound of ongoing battle had been heard for the whole week as Afghanistan security forces were fighting Taliban militants. Kabul said the 12 thousand servicemen were involved in the operation. The civil war in Afghanistan has approached the Tajikistan border. The fighting takes place in Imam Sahib District where the Taliban holds its position on the shore of Panj River. 

Combat actions have been going on in Kunduz province for more than two weeks. Combat actions have resumed at least a hundred times as the security forces repelled the attacks of Taliban and the Islamic State. So far, there have been no attempts by militants to cross the border but their numbers keep on growing grow as they are pushed to the border while the fighting goes on. A Kunduz police official, Said Sarwar Hussaini, does not exclude a possibility of a joint operation with Tajikistan against the terrorists hidden in the woodland belt dividing the two states. Mohammad Omar Safi, the governor of Kunduz province, said many militants fighting the government troops come from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and the North Caucasus. According to him, the militants of Pakistani Taliban also operate in the area. They have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Some of the encircled militants belong to the groups Jamaat Ansorullo and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) trying to break through to Central Asia. 

The situation is worsening in Afghanistan. The fighting is moving from south to north. The Taliban forces control about 80% of Badakhshan province located near the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region in eastern Tajikistan. 

Afghanistan Interior Minister Nur ul-Haq Ulumi has said 11 out of 34 Afghan provinces were seriously threatened, while nine on them faced a lesser threat. Evidently all the Washington’s assurances about the stabilization of the situation in the country are groundless. The mission set 14 years ago before the US forces were deployed in Afghanistan has not been accomplished. No matter that, the operation Enduring Freedom has served as justification for bringing US troops near the borders of the Community of Independent States. 

The United States concentrated on military operations ignoring the need to develop the Afghan economy. Afghanistan remains to be the poorest country in the world. Interethnic and interreligious strife has exacerbated. There is no unity within the ranks of political elite. The religious factor has become a driving force behind the armed struggle. In addition to that, Afghanistan has become the world leading poppy grower. According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, in 2014 the country gathered the largest harvest ever. After the US forces came to the country the poppy production has increased 40-fold.

A grim picture emerged on May 12 when William Brownfield, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, released the results of the Afghanistan World Drug Use survey which revealed that one in nine Afghans are drug users. SGI Global led the team that conducted the survey, which spanned rural and urban districts of Afghanistan and was completed in 2014. Based on the survey – which was prepared as a cooperative effort between the Afghan ministries and the U.S. – three million Afghans are using drugs, and of these, 1.4 million are addicted to drugs.

Actually, the United States uses its presence in Afghanistan to exert pressure on other states, especially Russia and the neighboring Central Asia. In 2014 NATO transferred formal responsibility for the nation’s security to Afghan forces. Since then large formations of militants have moved to the border with Tajikistan. The leadership of Badakhshan has already complained about the neglectful attitude of central government towards the security needs of the province. If Kabul fails to take urgent measures the whole province will be under the control of armed opposition. There is a ground to believe that the scenario when the Islamic State captured a large chunk of Iraq’s territory may be repeated.

Dushanbe knows it well. It boosts security in the border areas. Foreigners are banned from visiting the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. The Collective Security Treaty Organization is monitoring the situation ready to respond. Russia has deployed in the area MI-8 transport helicopters, some of them are gunship versions, as well as MI-24 gunship and attack rotary wing aircraft and Forpost unmanned aerial vehicles. The regional security and the situation in Afghanistan will be in focus of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The next meeting of the Committee of Security Secretaries from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will take place in the Tajik northern city of Khujand on May 20.

The anonymous sources don’t make precise which state is going to host the drones, but the specifications make Tajikistan and the southern part of Uzbekistan potential home bases. Based there the vehicles will be located near the targets, the primary unmanned aircraft MQ-1 Predator’s range is 675 mi or 1,100 km. According to US experts, in January Maj. Gen. Michael K. Nagata, commander of U.S. special operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, visited Tajikistan, which abuts Afghanistan's northern border, for talks on «issues of bilateral security cooperation» and «continued military cooperation», according to a US embassy’s statement in Dushanbe, the capital. Analysts believe there is a small chance Tajikistan will agree to allow US presence because it will risk deterioration of relations with its ally – Russia, which is providing large-scale aid aimed at modernization of Tajik Armed Forces.

Washington may have more success with Uzbekistan. Before leaving Khanabad, the US had used the base for drone operations. Today Uzbekistan is the main US ally in the region. Upon withdrawal from Afghanistan the US plans to leave part of its weapons and equipment in this country. In February 2013 US State Department said the US planned to supply Uzbekistan with unmanned aerial vehicles.

Since 2007-2008 the Pentagon started to get MQ-9 Reapers into its inventory. In comparison with Predator, the drone has a more powerful turbo-prop power plant, can carry a variety of weaponry to give it strike capability comparable to that of an Apache helicopter gunship, the extended range is up to 3700 km. It can strike targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan from Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan).

Officially Turkmenistan opposes any plans to use its territory for foreign bases, but it can strike a deal with Washington informally (for instance, it opened its airspace for US Air Force in 2003). Iran, the Ashgabat’s main economic partner, will strongly object. In December 2011 Iranians got hold of US secret stealth drone RQ-170 Sentinel. It was revealed then that Washington actively used unmanned vehicles for gathering intelligence on Iran. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have recently ratified the December 20, 2011 protocol of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which makes it impossible for any individual country in the group to host a foreign military base on its territory without the full consent of all other members of the organization.

It makes Uzbekistan the most likely candidate no matter some mutual distrust remains after the events in Andijan, when public unrest was quelled. The agreement with the United States would negatively affect the Uzbekistan’s international image against the background of growing protests around the world against the use of drones without any legal limitations. According to UK Bureau of Investigative Journalism, only in the period of 2004-2012 at least 880 civilians, including children, were killed in Pakistan as a result of drone strikes. Growing numbers of drones’ victims made the United Nations launch an investigation in 2013.

Drones deployment will inevitably exacerbate the relations with Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan, as well as with neighboring states of Central Asia. For instance, it can make tenser the relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which already express concern over the Uzbekistan’s air superiority and apply efforts to enhance their air defense capability with the help of Russia. Kazakhstan is also concerned; an unidentified drone coming from Uzbekistan violated its air space and flew over two border posts in the vicinity of Beineu.

The US drones will operations will be strictly classified being conducted by the CIA. There will be no national or international control whatsoever.

It’s the CIA, not the Pentagon, who is responsible for drones operations in Pakistan. Islamabad would not give permission for military operations conducted by the Defense Department which require the approval of its government. The drone operations could encompass other states of Central Asia without their governments’ consent. Drones are normally used for intelligence gathering, radiation monitoring and delivering strikes against ground targets, including political leaders fallen out of Washington’s favor or hired killings.

Deploying drones will require extensive infrastructure, including personnel for maintaining aerial vehicles and installment of sophisticated equipment for different missions. It’ll be difficult enough to make precise what the equipment is destined for. Drone operations require personnel on the ground for guidance and the availability of piloted aircraft to provide support in emergencies.

In future the site could expand to become a full-fledged Air Force base. The US is studying the possibility of using drones for transporting troops, getting assault units to the places of destination and refueling in air. New types of unmanned combat air vehicles are in works to use them against air targets. Avenger is a prototype going through testing.

Totally, the number of drones in the US Air Force inventory has grown from 167 in 2002 to 7, 1 thousand in 2012. The expenditure has grown from 284 million dollars in 2000 to 6, 6 billion in 2013. According to Teal Group, the US will spend 11, 4 billion dollars (or 62 percent of global expenditure for the purpose) on unmanned aerial vehicles in 2022.

The implementation of United States plans to deploy drones in Central Asia will expand the US military presence in the region and create conditions for conducting secret operations using unmanned aerial vehicles while negatively affecting the regional balance of forces.

Washington does not exclude that the repetition of Syria scenario caused by NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan may result in strategic advantage to meet its interests. Controlled chaos is a tried and true method. A would-be war in Afghanistan will enable the Americans to control the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, maintain instability in the vicinity of Iranian borders and exacerbate the relations between India and Pakistan. Finally, the United States will maintain a springboard to exert pressure on Central Asia. Since 2014 Afghanistan is to become a major security problem for Russia… 

Along with the allies – the members Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Russia is urgently planning emergency measures that actually should have been taken long before. By the end of September a CSTO summit was held in Sochi ahead of the schedule with Russia becoming the chairman of the organization before time as well. The leaders of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan talked shop with regard to planned practical steps aimed at tackling the major aspects of the security problem. Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war). 

On October 1 the lower chamber of Tajikistan ratified an agreement on the status of the Russian 201st military base. Signed on October 5, 2012 at top level, the Russian military base agreement is to be in force till 2042. Together with the Tajik forces the base will guarantee the security of Tajikistan. Russia has started to deliver a $200 million military aid package to the country. Air force equipment and other war material will be transferred to Tajik armed forces gratuitously. 

According to experts, there are urgent steps to be taken, for instance, the deployment of Russian border guards along the almost 1500 km long Afghan-Tajik border guarded by only 16 thousand Tajik servicemen. No way could the Tajik authorities tackle the problem of refugees and armed gangs alone. Eight years ago Russian border guards left the area leaving behind only a few dozen strong operational group. Since then the situation has turned for the worse. New hot beds appear along the Tajik border, the extremists gain influence, the number of training camps for militants coming from the Collective Security Treaty Organization member-states has grown. 

Addressing the Sochi Collective Security Treaty Organization summit the President of Tajikistan Emomalii Rahmon called for combined efforts to strengthen the Afghan border. Many Russian politicians and military support the idea of getting Russian border guards back to Tajikistan. Still Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, actually opposed the idea. According to him, Tajikistan needs assistance to enhance the professional level of national border forces, including mountain warfare and new equipment deliveries. 

The US-Afghanistan partnership agreement, which is in works now, is expected to leave nine United States military facilities behind maintaining the capability for emergency response and coming to aid the government forces in case the situation gets abruptly worse. The remaining military forces are to stay in Kabul, Mazari Sharif, Jalalabad, Gardez, the Bagram air base and in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Herat. The list is missing the northern city of Kunduz, the capital of Kunduz Province, situated at the Tajik border, no matter it was the first major populated area where security responsibility was transferred to Afghan forces. Some time ago the security transfer ceremony was held with the participation of German defence and foreign chiefs. Kunduz has an important place in the history of German armed forces. During ten years around 20 thousand Bundeswehr servicemen have seen service there. Nowhere else since the days of WWII has the German military suffered comparable death toll than in Kunduz. 

Russian and Kyrgyz parliaments have ratified a status agreement on Russian air-base in Kant. Russian military will stay there for at least 20 years. Russia is going to upgrade the facility transforming it into a real outpost of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Central Asia, the presence to count with. Today the base is home to Su-24 fighter bombers, SU-25 attack planes, SU-27 SM air superiority fighters and an air group of rotary wing aircraft. Air and ground forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan kicked off military exercises the very next day the summit was over on September 24. 

Facing the expected threats from terrorist and extremist activities to intensify in Afghanistan, it is expedient to remember the events of the Uzbekistan’s Fergana valley where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU) conducted subversive activities from the territory of Kyrgyzstan. It should be admitted that Kyrgyz authorities face growing difficulties while exercising control over the south-western part of the country predominantly populated by Uzbeks. Militants are still recruited among local population to fill the IDU ranks. The Afghan drug flows get to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from Tajikistan and mainly from Kyrgyzstan. 

Kazakhstan stands for strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border and boosting military presence in Kyrgyzstan, the government believes the measures taken are vitally important for the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Of course, Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, is situated far from Afghanistan, still there is concern over the possibility of destabilization affecting Central Asia. Kazakhstan supports assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan because it meets its own national security interests. It also stands for collective defense of Central Asian air space, enhancement of Collective Forces capabilities, spurring the fight against drug trafficking. There have been no bloody conflicts on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan while Uzbekistan, which left the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s membership some time ago, has become the prime target for terrorists. The country is a party to a strategic partnership agreement with Astana. But Kazakhstan is a CSTO member, while Uzbekistan applies efforts to boost the relationship with the United States. 

Some time ago the relationship between Uzbekistan and the United States appeared to be worsened for good. The White House condemned the government for quelling the Andijan protests in 2005. The final break up seemed to be inevitable. Now Washington has restored the relationship with Islam Karimov considering an option of leaving on Uzbekistan soil some forces withdrawn from Afghanistan. Much talked about democratic values, human rights and the persecution of dissent in Uzbekistan pale in importance before the Washington’s desire to preserve military presence in Central Asia. 

It’s Uzbekistan the Unites States relies on to maintain a springboard for exerting influence of Afghanistan and stymie the process of Russia and Central Asia integration. In any event Tashkent is to be compensated by US guarantees and Western arms supplies as a reward for keeping away from the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan is under West European and US arms supplies embargo, but it does not confuse its leadership. The Uzbek government has approached NATO with a request to bring in the equipment and weapons used in Afghanistan and leave it in the country. Tashkent hopes the United States will support its desire to enjoy a privileged position in the northern part of Afghanistan where the ethnic Uzbeks are a majority. Uzbekistan has experience of being a «key ally» of the United States in Central Asia; it’s hard to predict how long the friendship will last this time, the same way it is hard to predict if the United States would leave Afghanistan without leaving some presence behind. 

The insinuations about NATO pulling out before the «combat season» in the spring of 2014 is a probe to see the outside reaction, including the response of Russia. The Russian Federation preferred not to wait till the ISAF withdraws; the probing raids from the territory of Afghanistan could be expected in the upcoming months. For instance, Kenya, where militants perpetrated a blood slaughter, is not an isolated incident, it’s a tendency. The United States military intervention under the pretext of «fight against international terrorism» has not resulted in peace; Afghanistan today is one of the most vulnerable states in the world. Over and over again we reap the fruits of US military domination. Under the circumstances, Russia has to take on a global mission and use the southern approaches to counter the US-sponsored scenario which envisions the «transition of the Middle East from the axis of instability to the axis of freedom». 

The popularity of the Taliban is growing because of the huge rate of unemployment, drugs, poverty and corruption. There was an embarrassing revelation made earlier this month that British intelligence agency MI6 regularly provided Karzai’s government with ‘ghost money’ estimated to run in the tens of millions of dollars in order to buy influence through bribes. Karzai’s government is widely seen as corrupt as it is unpopular with many Afghans. There was significant overlap between the corrupt Afghan political establishment and the country’s illegal heroin trade, including the president’s brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, who was assassinated in 2011. A UN report released last month showed that Afghan poppy production was rapidly expanding, and that the country was expected to produce 90 percent of the world’s opium this year.

Russia expresses legitimate concern 

Russia has voiced concern over the security threats increasing following the planned withdrawal of most US-led foreign combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. On May 8 the President of Russia said at the Security Council meeting that U.S. and NATO-led forces «have not yet achieved a breakthrough in the fight against terrorist and radical groups» and that these groups have become more active recently. He noted, «We need to strengthen the security system in the strategic southern area, including its military component», emphasizing the need for close cooperation with fellow members of regional security alliances. The President further pointed out that «international forces have done practically nothing to root out drug production in Afghanistan» and ignored Russian proposals for more efforts to eradicate crops of poppies used to make heroin. As a result «there is every reason to believe that in the near future we may face a worsening of the situation»… He added, «International terrorist and radical groups do not hide their plans to export instability». Vladimir Putin said Russia should step up migration controls on its southern border and «exponentially increase the effectiveness of work to stem drug trafficking». According to him, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) should speed up efforts to better arm and equip a rapid-reaction force that has done little so far. The President also stressed the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia and China as well as the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, should be involved in efforts to improve security.

After a meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in the southern Russian city of Sochi on May 17, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia is counting on the UN to develop proposals regarding the international presence in Afghanistan after 2014. As to him, «We consider it important to start discussing in advance what forms of international presence there will be in Afghanistan after 2014; we will count on the proposals that the UN Secretary General is planning to prepare together with his colleagues».

After the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan the situation in the part of the country near Russia’s southern borders will worsen, Nikolai Bordyuzha, General Secretary of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), warned the same day. He pointed out a zone of instability will emerge in regions bordering Afghanistan, and the influence of extremist groups will grow, as will the penetration of Islamist fundamentalist ideas in neighboring states. «The member countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will offer all possible help to Tajikistan to ensure security at its borders after the withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan» the General told journalists on May 17. According to Bordyuzha, mountainous terrain complicates the mission of ensuring security at the Tajik-Afghan border, which can be «easily trespassed». «We are coordinating our efforts with Tajikistan, offering assistance in logistics and weapons supplies, and personnel training», he stressed.

Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan Andrei Avetisyan said Russia is considering deploying border guards on the Tajik-Afghan border. He noted, «We prefer to tackle this problem on the Afghan border to stop these threats of narcotics and terrorism reaching Russia». As to him, «We used to have a serious presence on the Afghan-Tajik border and, at that time, the situation there was much better, so it would be in the interest of both Russia and Tajikistan and even Afghanistan if Russia is present there.» Avetisyan said such a presence would involve Russian border troops, but he did not give a number. He told Reuters on May 17 that any agreement on border troop deployment would «of course» have to be agreed upon with Tajikistan.

Russia has previously expressed concerns over the presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov said at the third ministerial conference of the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, «We will not accept reformatting the International Security Assistance Force into long-term foreign military presence in Afghanistan under a different cover and without a relevant UN mandate. We are confident that such a step will not bring stability to Afghanistan and will only escalate tension in the region».

The Afghanistan security issue was also part of NATO-Russia Council Chiefs of Defence meeting in Brussels on May 14. 

Steps to enhance security

Russia has already contributed some 12,000 paratroopers to the CSTO; it has an air base in Kyrgyzstan and more than 6,000 soldiers in Tajikistan, its largest deployment abroad. Tajikistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, has not yet ratified an October agreement extending Russia's lease on the base where the troops are stationed beyond the end of this year. Let me note here that General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of the General Staff, announced last month the formation of a Special Operations Command. According to General Gerasimov, the new command will include a Special Forces brigade, a training center, and helicopter and air transportation squadrons. These forces will be used exclusively outside Russian territory, including in U.N.-mandated operations. The CSTO has already announced the decision to establish a combined air force formation of SU-25 fighters and SU-27 attack aircraft located in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. According to Bordyuzha, the mission is to support peacekeeping ground forces fighting terrorists, especially in mountainous terrain. 

Other countries

Other countries with stakes in Afghanistan are also preparing strategies for post-withdrawal Afghanistan as they fear a spillover of violence once the international troops pull out.

The fact that military contingents will remain not only in Afghanistan but also in the region is doubtless and is openly stated by officials. On April 23, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Robert Blake said the fact of the coalition’s presence in Central Asia is unequivocal, adding that it is still not decided on what other transit points and bases will be maintained in the region. The US also plans to leave behind a sufficient number of troops in Afghanistan to help the Afghan National Army deal with terrorists. President Barack Obama is expected to announce a plan in this regard soon, as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has given his consent for the continued presence of the troops. The exact number of troops to stay behind is not known yet, but it could be between 2,500 and 12,000, according to US officials. It still remains unknown what type of military contingent will remain in Afghanistan and Central Asia thereafter and which countries of the region will be selected by the West for this purpose. The stated aim of the plan is that soldiers would continue to train the Afghan army and police, and carry out attacks on Al-Qaeda militants.

China is strictly in favor of stability in the region. From the economic aspect it is clear that China and Central Asia have close economic relations. Regarding the security issue, China is worried about if Afghanistan becomes a base for separatists in West China. Therefore, the interests and the targets of Russia and China primarily coincide. Beijing is taking this approach welcoming Mr. Karzai to Beijing last month for the fourth time, and responding favorably to requests for economic co-operation, technical training and preferential tariffs for Afghan exports.

New Delhi is also actively discussing its role in Afghanistan. President Karzai arrives in India May 20-22, coinciding with the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. This is Karzai's 12th visit to India, where he last came in November 2012. Military aid is high on the agenda. So far India has been training a limited number of Afghan military officers for years at its military institutions, but provided little weapons assistance except for some vehicles. The timing of Mr. Karzai’s India trip is likely related to recent border skirmishes with Pakistan. A politically and economically stable Afghanistan is of a strategic significance to India, but more collaboration is necessary. Despite little support among India’s policy makers for greater military cooperation with Afghanistan, the lingering ambiguity around Afghanistan’s future after 2014 provides a good opportunity for New Delhi to step up its efforts to be a force for stability in the country. Afghanistan and India signed a comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in October 2011. The SPA serves as the foundation of the two nations expanding bilateral relationship in multiple sectors, including security and defence cooperation, as well as cultural and people-to people cooperation.

Neither China, nor India will expand their efforts in co-operation with NATO. Instead, they are expected to act in their independent national interests to contain militancy and drug trafficking, while also moving to protect significant investments of time, capital and expertise in the country. China has pledged US$3.5 billion to develop the Aynak copper mine 60km south of Kabul, and has built a state-of-the-art hospital in the city. India has committed $1.2bn on a broad program of assistance; including power transmission lines from Uzbekistan that now supply Kabul with reliable electricity, as well as a major hydroelectric dam in Herat. India has also invested hundreds of millions of dollars in small, community-based projects that have brought roads, water, schools and health care to hundreds of impoverished Afghan villages. US plans to drawdown troops may threaten those projects, particularly in the rural hinterland. 

* * *

The risk that Taliban-inspired militancy will spread into Tajikistan and other parts of Central Asia is now a critical concern for regional powers. With NATO gone, the chances of Taliban control of large portions of the country and a civil war are the most probable scenario. The US has actually lost the war and failed to win peace. But the country cannot be left alone. The SCO and the CSTO have an important role to play gradually involving Afghanistan into the cooperation process. Afghanistan now needs huge economic programs implemented with the help of the international community and under its control. The CSTO and NATO joining together in economic projects would be a logical step for everybody’s benefit. Still NATO rejects the very idea of dealing with the CSTO, be it security or economy. No matter, the time is ripe for the countries involved to get united and address the regional security agenda, there is not much time left. Russia and its SCO-CSTO allies are doing just that.

A spark that ignites the fire

Like in the case of the Persian Gulf oligarchies, economic power and wealth in Central Asia is concentrated in the hands of members of the presidential families and their cronies. These privileged elites run monopolies, mostly through state-connected structures or front companies, involving not only key sectors of the economy like oil, natural gas, cotton, and aluminum, but also a wide variety of activities such as import and export of consumer goods, media, banking, agro-industry, transport and telecom, real estate, hotels, restaurants, and holiday resorts. The nadir was reached when the companies run by these elites virtually ventured into «war profiteering» – the highly lucrative business of providing transit rights and the practical facilitation of transporting supplies over their territory for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan. 

Generally speaking, outside of these elites, there is virtually no scope in the Central Asian countries today for economic counter-points to function in the prevailing climate of crony capitalism and oligarchical economic monopolization. 

Despite the official window-dressing, do the local populations have any awareness of what has been going on in the name of free market policies? Surely they do have. The point is, in many ways, these aberrations translate also as facets of everyday life for the populations, and even if they are not being voiced through protest march or demonstrations, they talked about audibly enough, and the anger and frustrations do get commonly talked about in the street and most certainly at home in private conversations, including with foreigners. 

There is indeed a significant amount of resentment that has piled up over time over the suppression and obstruction of economic activities pursued by those who do not come within the charmed circle of the elites, which further fuels the anger that is already there that the predatory neo-liberalist policies by the regime have resulted in a squandering away of the immense heritage of the Soviet era in terms of social achievements and human capital. 

What strikes an outside observer increasingly is that the Central Asian societies are no longer hermetically closed or are completely isolated from the outside world or that the social impact of globalization has bypassed them. Their youth travel abroad for education or commercial activities; people go on religious pilgrimage; intellectuals participate in conferences and discourses abroad; most important, the active populations migrate abroad in large numbers in search of work. And in the process, they get exposed to other ways of life and alternative sources of information and opinions that contradict the official local discourse. Mobile phones and satellite dishes have become far more relevant in everyday life, which cancels out the restrictions placed by the state security on the Internet and other social media. 

Indeed, this also has another side to it. The psychological ties that bind the Central Asian societies to Moscow remain by far the strongest still. In other words, there is no Al-Jazeera to churn up revolt. On the other hand, the regimes also go the extra league to cultivate negative perceptions regarding the Arab Spring. In any case, the so-called «color revolutions» in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) have not exactly created a positive impression about the «change».

The enigma of uprisings

Having said that, we need to revert to the contrarian trend that the grassroots are nonetheless quite aware of what is happening. Information is accruing thanks to satellite dishes, the Russian media and the information conveyed by the migrant labor. And the populations are fascinated by the tantalizing possibility that some day, somehow such things could also happen to their own «Gaddafis» and «Mubaraks». 

Clearly, it is not at all the case that the silence of the graveyard prevails in the Central Asian region. For one thing, Central Asians have a long historical consciousness and would know that no regime is eternal. At the end of the day, the current regimes will also cease to be – as a result of a chronic illness and physical incapacitation of the patriarch-president or his outright death or if the existing faultlines in the society breach, finally. 

To say that the populations are culturally attuned to oppression and humiliation and are incapable of raising their voice is to underestimate the heights of social formation this region scaled during the Soviet era and the emancipation of the human mind the ideology and culture of that unique period of eight decades brought about. The Central Asian populations cannot but know that «stability» under authoritarian rule is artificial and is not static. The power elites also would be knowing very well that the popular perceptions are nuanced despite the avalanche of propaganda that is pouring out in the official media. Hence the nervousness manifesting in the form of the intensified security clampdown. 

To be sure, there is an extraordinary degree of consensus amongst the ruling elites in the Central Asian countries. This has so far precluded any power struggles as such erupting. The elites have rallied around the presidents. (In Egypt, there were internal schisms within the establishment, which played out during the upheaval on Tahrir Square.) Given that the allocation of resources is centralized, and taking into account the propensity to keep the officials frequently rotating, there is also little scope for emergence of other power centres. 

However, there is that ultimate unquantifiable mystique haunting the political chessboard in all the Central Asian states – the succession question. Every now and then when the president catches cold or cough or disappears from public view, speculations begin. And they refuse to die down until he reappears. It shows that there is extreme nervousness griping the society about the uncertainties of a political transition if and when it becomes necessary. 

So far succession issue came up in two Central Asian states – Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the happenings in these two countries, which were radically different situations – and of course both predated the Arab Spring. The transition has been quite rocky in Kyrgyzstan so far and it has bred instability while Turkmenistan simply slid into a new leadership that is not fundamentally different from the one it succeeded. The question still remains unanswered as to what could happen if a succession issue comes into play and the elites face difficulties in resolving their differences peacefully. None of the Central Asian presidents has designated a successor in the event of a succession issue suddenly appearing. In two countries, family members of presidents have been projected into public life and have been talked about as possible successors but there is no certainty that these kinsmen (or kinswomen) would gain wider acceptance once the strongman vacates the scene. 

In the short term, the probability of major societal unrest in Central Asia similar to the upheavals in the Middle East may appear to be low. But the stillness in the air could be deceptive and may give way to volatility if and when the countries need to undergo transition processes – and indeed the day of reckoning could be nearing. 

The enigma of uprisings in a surcharged socio-political environment is that all that is needed is an initial spark, which of course is not hard to find in the prevailing atmosphere in Central Asia. If not a sudden illness and death of the patriarch, it could be a price hike, or even the sight of a BMW or Mercedes haughtily speeding away from the scene of the crime after mowing down an innocent commoner attempting to cross the street. 

On January 23-24 in the provincial town of Ismayilli in Azerbaijan, some kilometers north-west of the capital Baku, that was actually what happened, when the driver working for the nephew of the local governor and the son of a Minister insulted the local people following a minor car collision and all hell broke loose in no time with protestors venting their anger toward those in power. But, even more curiously, protestors rallied in support in Baku itself with young activists organizing themselves via social media holding more than one protest in the capital in the recent months. Then, there were demonstrations in the towns of Zaqatala and Imishli. 

Anything can happen

Clearly, a society with glaring inequalities and injustices, is heaving heavily with tensions, deeply resenting a political system in which ministers are oligrachs and various cliques in the ruling hierarchy monopolize the economy, and corruption is widespread. Interestingly, like in Tunisia and Egypt, the new media played a major role in the protests in the recent months in Azerbaijan. 

The prominent expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Thomas de Waal has estimated that the protests in Azerbaijan show that the authorities no longer have the same control over the provinces as they had in the past, and a combustible mix exists with ordinary people harboring deep resentment about corruption and the seamless power and arbitrariness of the authorities. 

He is of the view that conditions exist similar to what sparked the upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa. Again, the former US ambassador to Azerbaijan Richard Kauzlarich has been quoted as saying, «I do not want to draw a direct parallel with the Arab countries, where revolutions took place, but experience shows that similar events outside the capital [Baku] can turn into major upheavals». 

Again, the protests have erupted, ominously, against the backdrop of a presidential election that is due to be held in Azerbaijan – that is to say, a «succession question» of sorts. Something that has not happened before and was considered to be improbable to happen is indeed happening.

Similarly, while the common opinion is that the prospects of spectacular popular uprisings may appear remote on the Central Asian landscape at present, anything can happen. Then, the possibility also exists for hybrid forms of regime change. It could be an internal coup resulting from or exploiting and manipulating a local unrest, or from clan struggle in a looming succession race when interests at the interpersonal, regional or even institutional fault lines collide and in turn trigger an uprising. 

Besides, Central Asian countries are no longer hermit kingdoms. Not only have they globalized but also thanks to the Afghan war and the rise of China, they are «frontline» states in world politics. Interestingly, even as the endgame in Afghanistan is getting under way, Central Asia has got a curious visitor from Washington this week – Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Mike Hammer… 

The state department announcement in Washington regarding Hammer’s tour of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan said that while in Dushanbe he «will engage with journalists, government officials, civil society leaders, and students on public affairs issues and U.S. support for democratic institutions, among other topics, and will underscore the U.S. Government’s commitment to the region… discuss press and internet freedom» and in Tashkent he will «participate in a conference on government transparency and press freedom with a panel of journalists, ministry spokespeople, and representatives from parliament». The announcement concluded that Hammer «will also host a Facebook chat and an on-the-record discussion with independent journalists»,

(To be concluded)

IMU emerged aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its main aim was to establish Sharia based state and society in Uzbekistan and other parts of Central Asia. Its founders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani aimed at establishing a caliphate comprising former Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang region of China. They challenged Islam Karimov regime and played active roles in promoting violence. Namangani was later killed in Afghanistan, while Yuldashev has shifted base to Waziristan area of Pakistan. Central Asian states were averse to its radical ideology, but IMU found a ready acceptance in the circles of Al Qaeda and Taliban. IMU not only got shelter and sustenance in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, but also contributed to proliferation of violent activities of these organizations.

As northern Afghanistan borders Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it has become convenient for IMU to use porous borders and play havoc in Central Asia. Its cousins in Central Asia like Jundullah (soldiers of Allah) have recently been active in countries like Kazakhstan. Like IMU, the Jundullah has its base in border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan… As Afghanistan has populations of ethnic Uzbek and Tajik minorities, it has become convenient for these organizations to mobilize these people. Poverty and unemployment may have contributed to this rise of radicalism, but certainly propagation of extremist ideology plays a major role. Furthermore, the combination of these Central Asian organizations with international organizations like Al Qaeda, and Af-Pak organizations like Taliban and Haqqani network make them further lethal in conducting operations. Besides fermenting terrorist activities in Central Asia and Afghanistan, these Central Asian organizations have been alleged to have bombed Pakistani cities.

The departure of international forces from Afghanistan may help the war torn country to establish its own mechanisms of governance. But, it will be difficult to predict how far the indigenous government will be stable against the onslaught of the radical forces. The international forces have not been able to stem the rise of these forces. Taliban has already declared its plans of governance in its envisioned emirate of Afghanistan. In this venture of radicalization, forces like IMU come handy. Comparatively rich due to involvement in illegal poppy trade, Taliban and Haqqani network have used IMU operatives as surrogates and helpers. Reports suggest that IMU members, besides following the orders of Taliban and Haqqani, have also worked as bodyguards and helpers of top leaders of these organizations. There are also instances when members of these organizations interchange roles and perform activities for each other. If the return of the Taliban becomes an eventuality, the destructive role of IMU and Jundullah will certainly grow in Central Asia and surrounding regions.

International events of extremism and terrorism can not be completely separated. Radicalization of minorities in multiethnic and pluralistic societies is a core motive of Al Qaeda which, despite trumpets of its decimation, has raised its head not only in Afghanistan, but also in other parts of the world – in Libya, Syria, Mali, Myanmar and many other regions. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri was a key motivator of rebel activities in Libya and Syria. The collusion of Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan may emerge a bigger challenge to countries in Eurasia. Afghanistan is situated among many fault lines, and likely resurgence of Taliban will cause more harm than good. The current policy of Taliban is to hedge against the Karzai regime and buy time till international forces depart, so that it can with support of sympathetic powers seize Kabul. In such a scenario, the morale of IMU will not be boosted psychologically, but also materially. A Taliban government will have resources and foster IMU activities in proliferating ideology of radicalism through bombs.

As the IMU commander al-Burmi declared, the fire of extremism will spread like a forest fire if the Taliban returns to power. Afghanistan is surrounded by multiethnic and pluralistic states, which have ethnic based grievances. The ethnic minorities, currently under the regimes of secular democracies, will be easy targets of radical forces. The dreams of Caliphate of Turkestan or Caucasian Caliphate will be vigorously pursued with easy money coming from drug trafficking and charity money from some extremist regimes from different parts of the world.

The prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan and its border areas do not appear bright in present scenario. This brings forth the urgency of international cooperation, which at present does not appear much in sight. Unless the rise of IMU and their patrons in Afghanistan is checkmated in time, the future war against extremism and terrorism will really be long winding for the countries of Eurasia.

The rumblings of a Western campaign are audible that the «international community» should pay greater attention to force the Tajik leadership to urgently undertake «reform». A report by the western think tank International Crisis Group said: «The secular, Soviet-rained leadership that emerged from the civil war now finds itself dealing with a society increasingly drawn to observant Islam. The regime’s response to this is as inept. Officials allege that the main opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, is becoming increasingly radicalized. Clumsy policies may make this a self-fulfilling prophecy». 

The ICG report warns, «President Rakhmon denies that the North African scenario of popular unrest and revolt could happen in Tajikistan. Despite the different circumstances, such confidence is questionable. Tajikistan is so vulnerable that a small, localized problem could quickly spiral into a threat to the regime’s existence». 

This line of argument when taken to its logical conclusion may seem a contrived attempt to build up the case that the unrest in Gorno-Badakhshan is a concern not only for Rakhmon but also for the global security in general. But this is not entirely the stuff of Western propaganda, either. 

Indeed, the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia might get overthrown in a tsunami of people’s anger and frustration. It seems increasingly a matter of time, given the lack of any signs of genuine reform. And if or when that happens, the high probability is that the Islamists will take advantage of the upheaval. The Islamists in Central Asia have organized themselves well over the years and they do enjoy a significant level of popular support at least in three countries – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Ferghana Valley, which has a dismal record of poverty, unemployment and repression, is a veritable breeding ground of Islamist radicals threatening regional stability. 

There are several Islamist movements operating in the Central Asian region at present apart from Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is the most important – Akromiya, Hizb un-Nusrut, Tablighi Jamaat, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Movement, United Opposition of Tajikistan, etc. They all prioritize the overthrow of the current regimes although they may have different programs and different methods. There is bound to be outside influence on these Islamist groups. 

This external dimension is manifestly at work in similar theatres in the «Greater Middle East» such as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. Thus, the ongoing discourse between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the United States is of profound interest to the future politics of Central Asia. Equally, a distinction needs to be drawn between the US and its Persian Gulf allies – Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular. 

The Saudis have never been comfortable with the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas the US has committed resources on the movement and believes that it will be the dominant movement of the future in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is extremely wary of the threat posed by the Brotherhood’s agenda of the «Islamic Caliphate» to the regime. A prominent Saudi editor and establishment commentator, Mshari Al-Zaydi recently wrote, 

«The dream of establishing the Islamic Caliphate is a dream that has been in the blood of the Muslim Brotherhood from the beginning, and it is the ‘sacred spear’, which they raise against their opponents, and via which they attract supporters who are moved by such imperial dream. This is precisely the way that dreams of the Third Reich moved Hitler’s supporters, or the Roman dreams of Il Duce Mussolini moved the public in Italy… We are facing an epic revolutionary trend that is haunted by historical delusions… Thus, let those good people who chant innocently about democracy and civil society, and those who subscribe to the policy of ‘wait and see’, have mercy on us! The issue is far more dangerous and complicated than the fleeting understanding of the situation». 

In the Central Asian context, therefore, the spectre that is haunting the regimes is not so much the Afghan Taliban as the phenomenal rise of the Hizb ut-Tahrir in the recent years. The Hizb e-Tahrir is, roughly speaking, the equivalent of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the political milieu of the Central Asian region. Significantly, the US has so far drawn a careful line of distinction that there is nothing to show Hizb e-Tahrir having links with international terrorism – although the movement is proscribed in over a dozen countries in Europe and Eurasia, Pakistan and the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Interestingly, the movement’s main base happens to be Western Europe, especially Britain. 

This is where geopolitics comes in. At the end of the day, a major expansion of the US influence in Central Asia cannot take place as long as the current regimes remain in power. With the present regimes, the US has to be satisfied with maintaining only transactional relationships, which will fall far short of exercising dominant influence. On the other hand, the experience of Tunisia and Egypt shows the potential for «regime change» through Islamist parties that are open to US influence. 

Considering the absence of any form of democratic opposition in the Central Asian political landscape (with the noble exception of Kyrgyzstan, perhaps), US will view the Islamist groups – Hizb e-Tahrir in particular – as the vehicles of change. The Russian commentators who ponder over the post-2014 scenario for Central Asia will be needlessly tying themselves in knots by focusing on the old paradigm of a civil war erupting in Afghanistan and that country’s ethnic fault lines widening or the of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries such as Tajikistan, Russia, Iran or India preparing to sponsor a proxy war in Afghanistan. 

Right side of history

No regional power will risk a confrontation with the US, which a proxy war in Afghanistan will entail. However, what is likely to unfold in the post-2014 period could be of far greater consequence for the Muslim majority areas all across the Eurasian heartland from Azerbaijan in the west to Xinjiang in the east than a mere spillover from Afghanistan. The real strategic challenge for the major regional powers, therefore, is to position themselves somehow on the «right side of history» or at the every least not to vacate that space and leave it to the US to monopolize. In other words, what is needed is a holistic strategy on the part of Russia, which has special interests to protect and a high responsibility to safeguard regional stability, as well as on the part of China before the genie of democratic reforms escapes from the bottle in Central Asia. Currently, the narrative is that Shanghai Cooperation Organization ensures regional stability in Central Asia. 

To be sure, the US already visualizes the paradigm shift in the post-2014 period. Earlier in the month of July, «one of the largest Congressional delegations ever to Central Asia» set out from Washington. As the US assistant secretary of state Robert Blake put it during a hearing at the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington last week, «Central Asia is an increasingly important region to the United States… The countries of Central Asia are an important part of our vision of a secure and stable Afghanistan integrated into a stable, secure, and prosperous region… 2014 makes our engagement with Central Asia even more critical». With regard to Tajikistan, Blake added, 

«The United States is concerned about Tajikistan’s continuing efforts to limit human rights, including religious freedom and media freedoms. While we recognize the government’s desire to promote security and prevent violent extremism, long-term peace and stability are only possible when accompanied by respect for human rights, the rule of law, the fostering of transparent and democratic governmental and civic institutions, and an open and unrestricted media environment. We continue to encourage Tajikistan to protect religious freedom, and to respect media freedom and refrain from interference in the media sector».

Without doubt, the US has been paying focused attention to the internal situation in Tajikistan, estimating that it is going to be the pivotal country. The US commentators do not buy the thesis that Tajikistan faces an existential threat from Islamist militancy. In a lengthy dispatch recently, New York Times wrote, «Possible militant incursions into Tajikistan have put the government here [in Dushanbe] increasingly on edge… In the past year, Tajik forces have raided the craggy mountain hideouts of suspected militant leaders, arresting or killing several. Yet, the extent of the militant threat is unclear. The authoritarian governments of Central Asia have long used the specter of Islamic radicalism to justify crackdowns on dissent. Despite the fears… movement by Afghan militants into Tajikistan is still rare. Rather, much of the violence that spills across the border is associated with the thriving trade in drugs, mostly heroin».

Actually, there are no serious takers in the western opinion that the current events in Gorno-Badakhshan have much to do with militancy. The common view is that the murdered security official and his alleged killer were more likely to have been competitors in drug smuggling. But then, Ayombekov also happens to be the younger brother of Abdulamon («Lyosha the Hunchback») who is a famous Pamiri warlord with links to Afghan militants. The Ferghana news agency reported that Afghan Ismaili fighters in the Badakhshan region have volunteered to help their co-religionists in the Tajik Pamirs to counter the government forces. There are rumors that Aymbekov himself may have crossed the border and taken refuge in Afghanistan. 

Rakhmon met the Afghan interior minister and intelligence chief last Thursday and he also discussed the situation in Gorno-Badakhshan with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Evidently, the 1300- kilometer long Tajik-Afghan border is today practically open and Tajikistan’s (or Afghanistan’s) border control cannot do much about it. There is great urgency to amicably conclude the negotiations over the future of the Russian military bases in Tajikistan.  

In sum, everything points toward a highly complex security matrix. On the one hand, western experts say Moscow is merely crying «wolf» to frighten Dushanbe, whereas, there is no real militant threat or spillover from Afghanistan. On the other hand, they say, Dushanbe also has learnt from Moscow’s bag of tricks and is raising an Islamist bogey in order to deflect attention from its failings. 

The western experts finger point at the Tajik regime for being repressive and insensitive and responsible for the instability. At the same time, the US has also been hoping to establish military bases or «lily pads» in Tajikistan and to create depots for storing weapons for use in any crisis by secretly bargaining with the very same allegedly decrepit regime. 

In the highly competitive strategic environment, the US has been systematically undercutting Russia’s own attempts at regional integration within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. And all this while tens of thousands of US troops, including combat troops, are preparing for open-ended stay in Afghanistan and the NATO’s shadows are steadily lengthening in the Central Asian steppes. The Gorno-Badakhshan events couldn’t have had a more cataclysmic regional backdrop.