Andrew COCKBURN

The old maxim that “the U.S. government exists to buy arms at home and sell arms abroad” was never truer than today. Our defense budget is soaring to previously undreamed-of heights and overseas weapons deals are setting new records.

Indeed, the arms sales industry has become so multi-faceted that while some American corporations push weapons, other U.S. firms are making money by acting on behalf of the buyers. Thus a Lockheed Martin-Raytheon team recently dispatched to Riyadh to negotiate the finer points of the ongoing $15 billion deal for seven Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries jointly manufactured by the two companies, found themselves facing not Saudis across the table, but a team of executives from the Boston Consulting Group. This behemoth, which has $7.5 billion in global revenues, is just one of the firms servicing Mohammed “Bone Saw” Bin Salman’s vicious and spendthrift consolidation of power in the kingdom.

Among other lucrative revenue streams, BCG enjoys a contract to overhaul the defense ministry’s arms buying practices, a challenging task given the hundreds of billions of dollars worth of weapons MBS has on order.

For arms dealers doing business in the kingdom, the most visible overhaul to date has been the consolidation of control over Saudi weapons purchases, and all branches of the armed forces, in the hands of MBS himself.

Previously, control in this area had been distributed among different factions of the ruling family, thus enabling each to enjoy the financial rewards (read: kickbacks) traditionally attendant to such deals. But MBS has made it his business, in every sense of the word, to cut out potentially rival middlemen by centralizing all Saudi defense business under the umbrella of the General Authority of Military Industries, with management in the trustworthy (he hopes) hands of close relatives and henchmen such as Mutlaq bin Hamad Al Murashid, the Princeton-trained nuclear engineer charged with developing the Saudi nuclear program.

The Boston Group has cultivated a market in advising foreign governments on arms buying, promoting the fostering of their own military-industrial complexes, or, as BCG executives demurely expressed the strategy in a 2018 paper: “Unlike the way business was done in the past, today’s buyers want the defense contractor to invest in their country’s infrastructure, help develop their local defense capabilities, and diversify their economies.”

So-called “offset” agreements have long been a feature of major weapons export deals in which the exporter undertakes to award sub-contracts for the weapon system in the purchasing country, or else offer some other quid quo pro in the form of business or technology transfer. Their massive expansion in recent times, as highlighted in the BCG paper, brings an additional benefit for all parties involved. But it comes at a risk of sending U.S. defense jobs overseas, and opens up security vulnerabilities, since sensitive technology is now being shared with foreign arms manufacturers abroad.

But the promise of a lucrative offset contract to a company in which an influential figure on the buy side has an interest could be a powerful inducement to swing the decision in a favorable direction, an elegant solution to pesky prohibitions against bribery, including the hated 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that was inspired in part by revelations of arms-deals bribes by Lockheed and others. 

As the well-informed Paris-based security news service Intelligence Online delicately puts it: “One of the reasons for [the success of such arrangements] is that they are not totally covered by the transparency criteria governing commission payments [AKA bribes]which were brought into force by OECD convention in 1997.” (Not, of course, to suggest that BCG itself has base motivations in facilitating offset deals today.) 

Of course, if the Riyadh based BCG office (“always buzzing with a motivating and inspiring vibe,” according to the corporate website) had the true interests of Saudi Arabia at heart, they would have thrown the THAAD sales force out on their ears. THAAD is a system distinguished not only by its enormous cost ($1 billion plus per six-launcher battery),  but also by its total uselessness for the Saudis.  Presumably, the Saudis have been sold on the THAAD as a defense against Iranian ballistic missiles like the old Soviet Scud and its various Iranian upgrades.

As its name suggests, the THAAD aims to intercept  incoming short range or medium range ballistic missiles arcing down into the top of the atmosphere 25 to 90 miles up and no further away than 125 miles. The THAAD’s radar must therefore “acquire”–spot– the actual missile warhead, distinguishing it from nearby broken up pieces of its spent booster rocket or from  decoys deliberately launched with it. The radar must then track and predict the future trajectory of the warhead itself, not confusing it with any of the accompanying bits and pieces. Relying on the radar’s predictions, the THAAD missile interceptor,  once launched, must quickly accelerate to MACH 8 speed and guide with absolute precision to hit the target warhead  directly, like a bullet. Near misses won’t do.

After a series of early, disastrous failures, the Pentagon is now touting a fifteen out of fifteen string of successful THAAD launchings. Needless to say, not one of these tests has been against a ballistic missile target accompanied by booster debris or decoys, much less against half a dozen of such missiles fired at once.

This alone should be reason enough for the Saudis to toss the deal, but even if the system could perform as advertised, it would have been entirely irrelevant as a defense against the September 14 Houthi attacks on Abqaiq and Kurais.  The drones and cruise missiles employed clearly came in at low altitude, while THAAD is designed to operate against high altitude targets. The Patriot and Hawk batteries already in place are of course no better suited to confront low altitude threats, which are inevitably masked by ground clutter.

Even if the attackers had been obliging enough to send in ballistic missiles with a high-altitude trajectory, the THAAD would have offered little succor, since its infra-red seeker, as noted, cannot distinguish between actual warheads and decoys. Nor would the Russian S-400 system cheekily offered by Putin in the aftermath of the attack have fared better, and for many of the same reasons.

Such realities have found little place in the outpouring of commentary on the attacks, with little or no attention paid to easily available evidence. For example, published pictures of the damage at Abqaiq clearly show a number of liquified natural gas storage tanks pierced in the same place on their western sides.  As former Pentagon analyst Pierre Sprey pointed out to me, this clearly shows that the attacks came from the west, not the north, as claimed in numerous media reports.

The consistent accuracy demonstrated by these impact holes indicates that the terminal guidance was not GPS, but rather human drone controllers, manually steering the slow flying drones, via the drones’ video cameras, into the target.  For control purposes they would have to have been in line of sight to the drones (the only alternative would be an easily detectable satellite link) so they could have been no further than 36 miles away at most, assuming the drones were flying at a likely 300 feet altitude.

Instead of such cogent analysis, we have been presented with unquestioning reports of Saudi “evidence” that the attacks came directly from Iran in the form of pictures of an alleged wrecked Iranian drone discovered somewhere close to the targeted area.

Motivated and inspired, presumably, by the enormous sums of money to be made, the Boston Consultants and others advising the Saudi regime must have little interest in drawing attention to such tiresome details. There are arms to be bought and sold, and that is the whole point, bringing that old maxim, “the U.S. government exists to buy arms at home and sell arms abroad,” into a sharper, and yet more twisted, focus.

theamericanconservative.com

The NDAA includes $616.9 billion for the base budget and $69 billion for overseas contingency operations. The sum of $21.9 billion for nuclear weapons programs goes to the Energy Department. Section 3111 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to develop low-yield nuclear weapons capable of more tactical use as the Nuclear Posture Report calls for.

Section 1663 seeks to accelerate programs to develop both a ground-based strategic deterrent and long-range standoff weapons. To preserve global footprint the military is working on next-generation aircraft, including and a sixth-generation fighter. The new US Air Force's new long-range stealth B-21 Raider bomber is to be fully funded. New aircraft carriers (the fourth Ford-class flattop) to preserve 10 strike groups, new surface ships (three LCS and three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers), attack (two Virginia-class submarines) and ballistic-missile submarines (a Columbia class boomer) are coming.

Non-MDAP (major defense acquisition programs), including hypervelocity drones, got a large share of the R&D funds to make the military a future-oriented force.

Active duty manpower is to grow by 24,100. The funds allocated for six icebreakers demonstrate the intent to boost military capabilities in the Arctic. The law adds $140 million to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for hypersonic defense capabilities and development of critical directed energy and space sensing projects. Funds are allocated for integrating Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems. The agency is authorized to work on space-based boost phase intercept systems. It means the arms race goes to space. If the technology is mature, live fire intercept capability is expected in FY22. The MDA will continue to work toward putting a laser on a UAV to strike missile at the initial phase of the trajectory. It’s not all. Congress is still to pass a spending bill to fund specific priorities with the military.

According to the NDAA, Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are adversaries to be countered. The National Defense Authorization Act 2019 strengthens the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is responsible for reviewing proposed foreign investments to weigh whether they threaten national security. This measure is obviously targeted at China.

The law delays the delivery of stealth warplanes to Ankara. The Secretary of Defense is directed to study whether Turkey’s planned deployment of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system will risk the security of US-made F-35 fighter jets. 

The NDAA does not authorize the use of military force against Iran but focuses on the policy to destabilize it, including identifying the countries, which cooperate with Tehran. The law does not say it openly but the countries to be affected are Russia, China and, probably, Turkey.

The NDAA pays much attention to strengthening defense and security ties with Taiwan, including military sales, to anger China. Defense assistance to Taiwan is to increase. Chinese investments are blunted as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is to be strengthened.

The document includes tough language on Russia. It says the funding goes to “cyber warfare and influence operations to counter Russian aggression, cyber, and information warfare threats.” The Open Skies Treaty (OST) is actually suspended (Section 1242). The Air Force cannot use certain funds intended to bring the United States into compliance with the OST. The NDAA (Section 3122) specifically prohibits any use of funds to enter into a contract with or provide assistance to Russia relating to atomic energy defense activities. This restriction may be waivered if the secretaries of State, Defense and Energy determine such action would be in the US national security interest. Using funds for any activity that recognizes the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea is forbidden.

The president is required (Section 1243) to provide relevant congressional committees with a determination as to whether Russia is in material breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and, as a result, whether related treaty provisions remain binding on the United States. The law says (Section 1244) Russia’s “violations” of the INF Treaty entitle the United States to suspend its operation. The president is required to inform Congress whether he has implemented certain sanctions and related measures authorized by the 2018 NDAA against individuals and entities who have contributed to Russia’s treaty violations by Nov. 1, 2018. 

The president is to report on whether he raised the issue with Russia on including its new weapon systems (alleged “strategic offensive arms”) into the New START Treaty count and “whether their position impacts the viability of that treaty or requires additional US responses.” Obviously, the systems in question include the Sarmat ICBM, the Burevestnik nuclear powered cruise missile, the Kh-101 air-to surface long range cruise missile, the Poseidon underwater drone and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.

A total of $6.3 billion goes to European Deterrence Initiative to “deter” Russia. The provocative military presence near Russia’s borders will be strengthened.

Georgia is present in the document. The NDAA includes “robust security sector assistance” for Georgia, including defensive lethal assistance, to improve its interoperability with NATO forces. Military assistance, originally provided to Ukraine in the 2016 NDAA, will continue. The $250 million in assistance goes to Kiev, of which $50 million is designated specifically for delivery of lethal weapons.

In a nutshell, the new law restricts presidential foreign policy prerogatives to complicate the negotiation process with Russia. It does not emphasize the importance of maintaining the existing arms control agreements in force and puts into doubt the need to comply with them. The document uses tough language to paint Russia as a hostile state and forbids military-to-military contacts, which are needed so much, especially at a time the relationship is at a low ebb. The military should talk despite the political fluctuations.

The NDAA encourages space militarization and arms race in different domains. The break-up of INF Treaty in combination with boosting the EDI may lead to stationing intermediate range offensive forces in the Baltic States, Poland and Romania dangerously close to Russian borders. This is unacceptable for Russia but it’s hard to negotiate the controversial issues under the NDAA terms and in the environment it creates. This is a defense budget of confrontation giving preference to pressure instead of negotiations and diplomacy.

The two countries don’t see eye-to-eye on a number of issues, including the tariff wars, the Iran deal etc. The news came a day after Washington announced that all other countries, including India, must cut oil imports from Iran to "zero" by November 4 or face sanctions. It made clear there would be no waivers to anyone. This is for the second time that America postponed the 2+2 dialogue which was initially slated for March.

The US position looks very much like blackmail because if India refuses to dump the Russian system, it will come under sanctions according to the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) unless the administration is able to convince the Congress that this country deserves a waiver in case it reduces its defense cooperation with Russia. This is another example of America’s arms-twisting diplomacy.

Is it worth to reject the pressure and stand tall? If America offered a good deal, why not meet it halfway? But will India get what it seeks as a result? It calls for a look at the capabilities of the two systems.

The S-400 multi-layered general purpose air defense system covers the entire spectrum of possible air to space targets, including small and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The THAAD is a single layer defense destined to counter only against intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missile systems at either before or during the early phase of their reentry with the speed of up to 3000 m/s outside of atmosphere. A missile’s velocity is 2,880 m/s allowing to launch another interceptor at the upcoming target in case the first one missed. If there is no kill, the Patriot air defense system will have to step in.

The Triumf can engage targets with higher speed up to 4,800 m/s. It can effectively target incoming aircraft and other targets while transmitting target information to other air defense systems.

The THAAD relies entirely on friendly units for protection against enemy aircraft the Russian system is effective against. The THAAD’s kinetic energy hit minimizes the risk of exploding ballistic missiles’ warheads upon impact, but the Russian system’s fragmentary warhead increases kill probability. The S-400 provides 5 missile types and several different radars for providing intercept from short range / low altitude targets to long-range / high altitude targets. The THAAD has only one.

The THAAD’s has an estimated range of 150-200 km in comparison to Triumf’s 400 km. This is a very important advantage of the Russian weapon. The American system has a greater altitude: 150 km vs S-400’s 30 km. It also boasts a greater detection range: 100 km vs S-400’s 600 km. The THAAD is good against high altitude missiles. But theater defense requires the capability to take down targets at low altitude, not in space.

The S-400’s missiles are fitted with homing devices. Unlike American systems, the Triumf does not need to track the target.

The Triumf routinely scans the airspace in a 360 degree sweep. The THAAD horizontal sweep is 90 degrees, a vertical sweep: 60 degrees.

There is a great difference in prices. One THAAD battery consists of six launchers (eight interceptors per each of them) and costs about $2, 3 billion plus $574 modernized AN/TPY-2 radar. A battery of S-400, including eight launchers with 4 interceptors each, costs about $500 million or six times less.

The THAAD’s identification friend-or-foe system will not allow India to take down US-made and NATO member states – produced aircraft or missiles a potential enemy may have in the inventory. The Russian S-400 will allow countering weapons produced in Western countries.

As one can see, the S-400 has many advantages over the THAAD, including a broad greater range, a lower price, and a wider range of targets to knock down, but it’s not about comparing specifications or costs. Saudi Arabia wants to have both systems in the inventory, India could do it too. What really matters is that Russia attaches no strings to the deal. Unlike the US, it exerts no pressure and makes no threats. It treats India with respect and does not hurt its national pride by trying to impose its weapon systems instead of winning in a fair contest. Moscow does not threaten New Delhi with sanctions and other things if it buys the American THAAD. That’s the main difference between the two deals India has to consider.

China is already operating S-400s, Turkey has concluded a deal. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are engaged in negotiations over the purchase while many more nations are considering such a possibility. India will not make a mistake if it buys the Russian system. With the deal going through, it’ll get a bigger bang for its buck and protect its sovereignty demonstrating the determination to resist pressure. Great nations cannot be dictated the terms of decisions they are going to make. The Indian government knows better what weapon its military needs to defend the country.

“We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97% of the time,” President Donald Trump said in his interview with Fox News on October 11, adding “and if you send two of them, it’s going to get knocked down.” He was talking about the threat coming from North Korea to be repelled by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) in Alaska and California – the $40 billion project administered by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

The US military conducted the first-ever missile defense test involving a simulated attack by an intercontinental ballistic missile in May. The ICBM-type target was fired from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands toward the waters just south of Alaska. The mission was to prepare for countering an intercontinental missile launched by North Korea. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) described the test as an “incredible accomplishment”. According to Vice Admiral Jim Syring, director of the agency, “This system is vitally important to the defense of our homeland, and this test demonstrates that we have a capable, credible deterrent against a very real threat.” The assessment appears to be exaggerated as the test was not conducted in a realistic environment.

The next test of the GMD system is scheduled for late 2018 and, for the first time, will involve firing two interceptors against one ICBM target. It makes unsubstantiated the president’s affirmation that two interceptors are enough to knock out a North Korean missile as no such tests have been conducted so far.

The US currently deploys 36 interceptors – 32 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. By the end of 2017, there will be 44 deployed GBIs. A majority of the interceptors use the CE-I variant of kill vehicle that has scored only two successes in four tests. At least ten interceptors are to be equipped with the CE-II Block I vehicle, which has had two successful intercept tests in three tries.

It is generally believed that it takes at least four-five interceptors to hit the target. It means President Trump is off base saying the hit probability is 97%. Prior to the ICBM test, the GMD system had successfully hit its target in only ten of 18 tests since 1999. A success rate is about 56%, not 97%. But even 56% is almost certainly an overstatement, given the less-than-realistic nature of the tests.

A success rate for four-five interceptors per target may be 97% but the possibility that each successive interceptor’s chance of successful kill might not be independent of the previous one, due to correlated factors such as design shortcomings, leading to a lower overall success rate. Nevertheless, President Trump believes each interceptor has a single-shot probability of kill (SSPK) for a given interceptor of 97% (rather than 56%).

According to the Washington Post, “No single interceptor for ICBMs has demonstrated a 97-percent success rate, and there is no guarantee using two interceptors has a 100-percent success rate. Moreover, the military’s suggestion that it could achieve a 97-percent success rate with four interceptors appears based on faulty assumptions and overenthusiastic math. The odds of success under the most ideal conditions are no better than 50-50, and likely worse, as documented in detailed government assessment.”

Joe Cirincione, the President of Ploughshares Fund and the author of Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late, investigated anti-missile programs for almost 10 years as professional staff on the House Armed Services and Government Operations Committees. He believes that “If people took a close look at just one of these interceptor tests, they would likely conclude, as I did, that the tests bear little resemblance to real-world conditions.”

If North Korea fired an ICBM — or multiple ICBMs — at the United States, the GMD with its Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) is only one system that could take a shot at intercepting and destroying the warhead outside the earth’s atmosphere in midcourse flight. Other missile defense systems such as THAAD and Aegis are in no position to hit ICBMs as they’re designed for other classes of targets.

With only one test against an ICBM, the MDA is not even close to demonstrating that the system works in a real-world setting. The GMD systems have not yet been tested in the range of conditions under which it is expected to operate. No tests have been conducted at night or against complex countermeasures, such as electronic countermeasures and decoys. The tests are always rigged because the intercept team knows the timing and trajectory of the incoming missile. But even the scripted tests have often failed. What has been done so far is insufficient to demonstrate that an operational BMD capability really exists.

The US has not publicly conducted any tests to see whether the missile-defense radars can distinguish a missile from chaff. Even cheap inflatable balloons can make all intercept efforts go down the drain. With no air resistance (or drag) in space, a decoy like a balloon shaped like a nuclear warhead could travel in the same way as the true warhead, making it difficult for a missile to distinguish the real thing from the decoy. Balloons are light enough to enable a sophisticated warhead launch 20 or 30 decoy balloons to obscure the path of the warhead, swamping the defense system with fake signals.

In February and April 2016, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed that the MDA has not “demonstrated through flight testing that it can defend the US homeland against the current missile defense threat,” relying on “a highly optimistic, aggressive schedule” to upgrade the system.

The US abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, which greatly obstructed arms control process. Efficient or not, the US current and potential BMD capability is taken into consideration to influence Russia’s military planning. It provokes Moscow into taking countermeasures to respond to BMD plans and negatively affects the prospects for future Russia-US arms control agreements. With uncertainties raised about the strict balance of arms agreed upon in New START, a chain reaction is triggered leading to arms race.

Philip Giraldi, a highly respected expert and the Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, believes that the American people are being fooled by the administration, which tries to make them think that a nuclear war is thinkable. According to him, “If that is the message being sent by the White House, it would encourage further reckless adventurism on the part of the national security state.” Mr. Giraldi hit the nail right on the head. The GMD effort creates a dangerous illusion that a victory in a nuclear conflict is achievable and no money should be spared to spur the implementation of the MDA plans. In reality, the US defense industry is the only benefactor while the taxpayers throw money into the drain. The result: further erosion of arms control and reduced security.

Over the past week, US President Donald Trump has sharpened his bellicose rhetoric towards North Korea, now declaring that “only one thing works” in regard to the security crisis over the Korean Peninsula. That “one thing”, according to Trump, is evidently the “military option”.

For the past several months, the Trump administration has indeed repeatedly threatened the North Korean state led by Kim Jong-un with military force over the latter’s nuclear weapons program. But the American threats have always been conveyed in the context that other options, including diplomacy, were also being considered, or even preferred.

Now Trump is openly admitting that the apparent option of diplomacy is no longer on the table. It’s a belated admission by Trump that the diplomatic option was only ever a cynical charade, not under genuine consideration.

Washington is instead moving towards war with North Korea.

Adding to the gravity of the moment are reports in the British media that Britain’s military chiefs have drawn up plans for deploying forces along with the US against North Korea.

British military chiefs are quoted as saying that they are ready to dispatch a new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, as well as several destroyers and frigates, to the Korean Peninsula in support of its US ally.

Just last week Britain’s defense secretary Michael Fallon also delivered a belligerent speech to the Conservative Party conference in which he declared readiness to order “warships, aircraft and troops” in support of the US and other allies.

Fallon repeated earlier warnings that his government was fully prepared to order a first-strike nuclear attack against North Korea or any other “enemy state”.

The British minister accused North Korea of threatening Britain’s national security, saying that “Manchester and London are closer to Pyongyang than Los Angeles”.

Fallon’s shrill rhetoric echoed the scaremongering claims once made by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair back in 2003 when he justified the imminent Anglo-American war on Iraq because then Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was allegedly capable of mounting a missile attack on Britain “within 45 minutes”. Blair’s war pretext turned out to be a vile fraud.

Britain’s long-standing readiness to join in American military operations around the world is a convenient political-legal cover that gives the impression of “an international coalition” acting in supposed defense of “the international community”.

But the historical record shows that such Anglo-American militarism is nothing other than illegal aggression carried out by Washington and London, which has led to the ruination of whole nations and the unleashing of sectarian conflicts and terrorism. The British-aided American wars against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 continue to wreak havoc across the Middle East today.

Yet, in spite of these disasters, not to say criminal wars, Britain’s defense secretary “Sir” Michael Fallon arrogantly asserts that “we should not be squeamish” about committing to further military deployments elsewhere, and in particular with regard to North Korea.

This coupling of American and British military power focused on North Korea is an ominous sign that the Anglo-American war machine is cranking up again.

Earlier this month, President Trump issued an extraordinary rebuke to his secretary of state Rex Tillerson over the latter’s public comments about pursuing diplomatic contacts with North Korea. Trump rebuffed Tillerson for “wasting his time” in negotiations with Pyongyang.

Since then Trump has gone on to sharpen the rhetoric to the point now where he is saying the US is considering “only one option” – a military strike on North Korea.

Last week, while hosting US military leaders and their spouses at a dinner in the White House, Trump made the menacing remark that the gathering was the “calm before the storm”. He subsequently refused to clarify what he meant by that cryptic remark.

A couple of days later on October 7, Trump then declared through his usual Twitter feed that diplomacy with North Korea was over. He said the past 25 years of diplomacy under previous administrations had failed, adding, “only one thing will work!”

This is while the US is sending the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier and a full battle group of warships towards the Korean Peninsula to commence joint operations with allied South Korean forces over the coming days.

It also follows this week long-distance practice bombing raids by US strategic B1-B Lancer warplanes over the Korean Peninsula. It was reportedly the first time that these US warplanes were accompanied by both South Korean and Japanese fighter jets in the same maneuver.

When Trump and his officials, including defense secretary James Mattis, have previously warned of using military force against North Korea they have let it be known that the action would be “overwhelming” and “catastrophic”. This can be understood to mean the US using nuclear weapons in any action against Pyongyang.

Trump is now positioning the US on an all-out war footing against North Korea by contriving a situation whereby diplomacy has been forfeited.

This is a heinous travesty. American diplomacy towards North Korea to settle the decades-old conflict on the Peninsula has never been genuinely pursued, not under Trump nor previous administrations.

Trump is accelerating US war plans on North Korea. US Pentagon chief James Mattis this week warned American forces to be ready for action and said military plans were being furnished for Trump. Mattis’ willingness to defer to Trump shows that this is a government policy, not merely the depraved recklessness of a lunatic president.

The fact too that Britain, America’s loyal war accomplice, is concurrently drawing up military contingencies over North Korea is a disturbing indicator of how far the Anglo-American war machine is gearing up.

Both Russia and China have repeatedly urged restraint by all parties. This week, Moscow said the US naval build-up around the Korean Peninsula was a dangerous escalation. Russia also said that the newly deployed US anti-missile THAAD system in South Korea was targeting its territory, as well as that of North Korea and China.

If the US and Britain go ahead with their war plans on North Korea, as seems likely, they will ignite a war that threatens the whole planet.

How quintessentially Anglo-American is the arrogance and criminality.

The mishap at the Moscow airport on Wednesday when the Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz arrived on a historic visit, was a wake-up call that even the most carefully choregraphed enterprises may hold unpleasant surprises.

When Salman exited his plane and stepped out onto the special escalator he travels with, something went wrong. It malfunctioned halfway down, leaving the king standing awkwardly for about 20 seconds before he decided to walk the rest of the way. For ordinary mortals, this wouldn’t have been an uncommon occurrence but divinity ordains when a king is involved.

Salman had hardly departed from Russian soil when the Pentagon issued a statement announcing that the State Department had on Friday approved a possible US$15-billion sale of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to Saudi Arabia. The statement recalled that Saudi Arabia had requested to purchase from America 44 THAAD launchers, 360 missiles, 16 fire control stations and seven radars.

The US officials confirmed that the sale was part of the $110-billion package of defense equipment and services initially announced during US President Donald Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia in May. The Pentagon statement said, “This potential sale will substantially increase Saudi Arabia’s capability to defend itself against the growing ballistic missile threat in the region.”

The timing of the US announcement is highly significant. It comes in the wake of claims by Russian officials that Saudi Arabia had shown interest in buying the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. The Saudis have successfully pressured the Trump administration to approve the sale of the THAAD system. And Washington has signaled that the US will not let Russia make an entry into the Saudi arms bazaar.

Hard-nosed realpolitik

The hard-nosed realpolitik in the Saudi-Russian entente had a dramatic start when the then Saudi intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan visited Russia and held a four-hour meeting with Putin at the latter’s dacha outside Moscow in early August 2013. According to media leaks from Russian sources, the Prince allegedly confronted the Kremlin with a mix of inducements and threats in a bid to break Russia’s support for the Syrian regime, which Riyadh was trying to overthrow.

Bandar’s package was riveted on the alluring proposal of a unified Russian-Saudi strategy to keep oil production quantities at a level that keeps the price stable in global markets via an alliance between the OPEC cartel and Russia. And, in return for throwing the Syrian regime under the bus – thereby leaving Iran to face the brunt of the ISIS threat – Bandar promised that Russia could retain the naval base in Taurus under a successor regime in Damascus and be assured of security from a ‘jihadi’ backlash.

The Kremlin apparently spurned the overture in a huff. At any rate, by the beginning of 2014, symptoms of a new Cold War began appearing in Russia’s relations with the West following the regime change in Ukraine. The year 2015 also saw a ‘transition’ in Saudi Arabia with the death of King Abdullah. Of course, the year ended with Russia’s military intervention in Syria.

However, the seeds left behind by Bandar began sprouting and with the Russian economy feeling the crunch from Western sanctions, the fall in oil prices on the world market assumed an existential overtone for the Kremlin. The challenge of the US oil shale industry also meant that Saudi-Russian cooperation became a practical necessity. The rest is history.

Agreement to cut oil production

Indeed, the hallmark of Salman’s visit to Moscow has been the pledge by the two countries to carry forward their agreement to cut oil production. Putin disclosed that the deal to cut oil output to boost prices could be extended till the end of 2018, instead of expiring in March 2018.

Putin described his talks with the Saudi king as “very substantive, informative and very trusting”. And Russian commentators have hyped up that Saudi Arabia is “leaning toward Moscow in solving the Syrian crisis”. The Russian reports mentioned that Moscow and Riyadh are eyeing cooperation on nuclear energy, space exploration, plus infrastructure and arms deals.

However, Bandar’s proposal on oil production still remains the leitmotif of Saudi-Russian cooperation, as apparent from the rise in oil prices this week – as word came that Saudi Arabia and Russia would limit oil production through next year. (Brent crude was up 70 cents at $56.50 per barrel on Thursday.)

The point is, how do the Saudis view their ties with Russia? Are they aiming at a geopolitical shift in the Middle East? Evidently, Salman’s visit underscores that the Saudi and Russian leaders have decided to shift their focus toward common interests rather than let disagreements crowd the centre stage of relations. But then, the THAAD deal signals that Saudi Arabia also has a ‘big picture’ of itself being a major regional and international player.

Suffice to say, the Saudis are shifting away from their special relations with the West to a balanced foreign policy by opening up with Russia and creating multiple options for pursuing national interests. To be sure, the Saudis hope to diversify their partnerships based on common interests. While disagreements remain with Moscow over Syria – and notwithstanding the close ties between Moscow and Tehran – the Saudis have adopted a realistic policy toward the Kremlin.

Most certainly, the Saudi expectation is that at some point, the prospect of lucrative business opportunities would encourage the Kremlin to balance Russia’s relations with Iran. Basically, Bandar’s overture to Putin remains the bottom line.

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Analysts were concluding that a large part of the continental United States, including Los Angeles and Chicago, is now in the range of North Korean weapons. The Diplomat cites David Wright at the Union of Concerned Scientists, who reported that the Hwasong-14 may now be capable of flying to a range of 10,400 kilometers and potentially 11,000 kilometers. That means it could have reached Los Angeles, Denver or Chicago, depending on variables such as the size and weight of the warhead. Wright notes that if the unknown payload used for testing «was lighter than the actual warhead the missile would carry, the ranges would be shorter than those estimated».

Right after the test, US and South Korean forces conducted live-fire exercises. The event prompted South Korean President Moon Jae-in to ask the US to deploy four additional THAAD interceptor launchers at the military base in Seongju, south of Seoul. South Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo called for the deployment of strategic US military assets. In Tokyo, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said Japan cannot tolerate its repeated provocations.

China has been building up defenses along its border with North Korea amid tensions over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The North Korean-Chinese border stretches 880 miles (1,415 kilometers) across China's Liaoning province, an industrial and mining heartland prone to heavy smog and painfully cold winters. Beijing has established a new border brigade, built bunkers to protect civilians against nuclear blasts, and set up 24-hour surveillance along its frontier. According to a report published last month on the official website of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), a «newly formed border defense brigade» is conducting patrols to gather intelligence.

The preparations for the July 28 launch had been reported before the test took place. The House Armed Services Committee held a classified briefing for all members of the chamber on July 25 to discuss North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile development. The briefing team included Rob Soofer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Air Force Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves, director of the Missile Defense Agency, and representatives from the DIA and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Even those Americans living on the East Coast, places like in Boston, Massachusetts, started to assess damage to be inflicted as a result of North Korea’s potential nuclear strike.

The latest launch put added pressure on US President Donald Trump to sign a bill passed by veto-proof margins in the House and Senate that would tighten sanctions on North Korea, as well as Iran and Russia. President Trump has said he will not allow North Korea to obtain a nuclear-tipped ICBM. According to the president, «a major, major conflict» with North Korea is possible because of its nuclear and missile programs and that all options are on the table.

On July 21, CIA Director Mike Pompeo made it clear the US wants regime change in North Korea. «It would be a great thing to denuclearize the peninsula, to get those weapons off of that, but the thing that is most dangerous about it is the character who holds the control over them today», Pompeo said in a discussion moderated by conservative New York Times columnist Bret Stephens at the Aspen Security Forum. He continued, «So from the administration's perspective, the most important thing we can do is separate those two. Right? Separate capacity and someone who might well have intent and break those two apart».

Last week, the Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly concluded that the North will have a reliable ICBM capable of carrying a nuclear weapon as early as next year, not two-three years as had been estimated before. By the next year, the program will have advanced from prototype to assembly line, according to officials familiar with the document.

According to The National Interest, the Pentagon has just released a new manual that lays out how the United States might destroy North Korea’s nukes. Army Techniques Publication No. 3-90.40, «Combined Arms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction», explains US doctrine for neutralizing WMDs. The guidelines focus on the nuts and bolts of counter-WMD combined-arms operations by brigade combat teams, or BCTs. In other words, how regular Army combat brigades should deal with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Though the manual doesn’t specifically mention North Korea, many of its recommendations would apply should large formations of US ground troops enter the country.

Immediately after the North Korean launch, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford and Adm. Harry Harris, commander of US Pacific Command, discussed nothing else but «military response options» with Gen. Lee Sun-jin, chairman of the Republic of (South) Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No doubt, the US has the first strike capability to knock out the nuclear infrastructure using stealth aircraft and sea-based standoff cruise missiles. In a surprise attack scenario, the primary tools for the task would be stealth aircraft, such as B-2 bombers and F-22 tactical fighters, and naval platforms. The overall number of sea and air-based long range cruise missiles in the first strike could be 600-1,000, with the second strike to follow soon.

At least two Ohio-class cruise missile submarines with more than 300 BGM-109 missiles could be secretly deployed off the coast. The B-2 Spirit bomber can carry a pair of massive 13,600-kilogram GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators to reach the targets located deep underground or 16 900-kilogram GBU-31 JDAMs. The GBU-57 is believed to be capable of penetrating over 60 feet of concrete. A USAF article stated it can penetrate 200 feet before going off. The US Air Force has 2,000 standard BLU-109/B penetrators with approximately 530 pounds of explosive packed inside to break through four to six feet of reinforced concrete. More advanced the BLU-137/B are to come into service beginning in either 2017 or 2018.

The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) is a guidance kit that converts unguided bombs, giving them a published range of up to 15 nautical miles (28 km). There were over 300,000 JDAM guidance kits as of November 2016, with 130 kits produced daily. According to the US Air Force, the system is accurate to within 40 feet (13 meters). When everything goes exactly right, the bombs generally hit within a few feet of their targets. The 21,600-pound (9,797-kg) GBU-43 (Guided Bomb Unit), one of only 15 ever built, was tested this year in Afghanistan. Called «mother of all bombs», it was dropped on the Achin district of Nangarhar, bordering Pakistan, from an MC-130 aircraft in April.

With command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure and nuclear sites destroyed, key defense installations, including transporter erector launchers (TEL), and delivery vehicles will come under attack.

In November, 2015, the US and South Korea worked out a plan for waging an operation against North Korea, including actively detecting and destroying the weapons in an emergency. The parties agreed on pre-emptive strike plans against North Korea’s nuclear capable sites and weapons. The «4D Operational Concept» (detect, disrupt, destroy and defend) calls for more proactive responses in an emergency, letting Washington and Seoul attack missile launch sites or submarine-launched ballistic missiles without waiting for Pyongyang to strike first. Reconnaissance and high altitude drones have a special place in the plans.

In addition to the American arsenal, South Korean surface-to-surface Hyunmoo 2A, 2B and Hyunmoo 3 ballistic missiles, which have ranges of 300 km (185 miles), 500 km (310 miles) and 1,000 km (620 miles), respectively, could be used to strike Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.

The special unit known as the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) is to be mission-ready this year. It is created to decapitate North Korea by physically eliminating its leader Kim Jong Un.

Pyongyang has a 1.1 million-man army, including a mechanized infantry corps, an artillery corps, an armored corps, and several infantry corps. 13,000 artillery pieces deployed along the demilitarized zone, 30 miles from Seoul. It boasts around 1,100 tactical short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, in addition to 100–200 intermediate range weapons (the Musudan).

North Korea has two aces up its sleeve. The South Korean capital is within its artillery range. 700 heavier guns and rocket launchers, plus the newer 300-millimeter MRLS, have the range to strike Seoul. North Korea’s inventory includes around 1,100 tactical short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, in addition to 100–200 intermediate range weapons (the Musudan). North Korea can strike US forces in South Korea, Japan, the Hawaii Islands and the island of Guam. It can try to deliver a missile strike against Alaska.

President Trump is on shaky ground. With Trump’s job approval rating standing at only 40 percent in July, a rapid, victorious military action is the best way to improve the things and unite the nation behind him, while taking attention away from «Russia ties» stories, cadre shuffling and domestic and foreign policy failures. If he does not take action, his opponents will not waste time to accuse him of doing nothing to counter the growing national security threat. With no diplomatic solution in sight, a military conflict appears to be inevitable.

nationalinterest.org

On June 21, a US and Japanese missile test conducted in Hawaii missed its target. The firing involved a sea-based SM-3 Block IIA missile which is built for the Aegis ballistic missile defense system (BMD) destined to shoot down medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This was the missile’s second intercept test. The first, which took place in February, was a success. The event goes to show that the US and its allies continue to apply intensive efforts to create BMD potential in the proximity of Russian borders.

All in all, the US Navy has 22 guided-missile cruisers and 62 guided-missile destroyers equipped with the Aegis system. Japan has six Aegis destroyers with plans for more. South Korea also operates Aegis-equipped destroyers.

The Aegis system operates similar to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) system which has been partially deployed in South Korea. Each THAAD unit consists of six truck-mounted launchers, 49 interceptors, a fire control and communications unit, and AN/TPY-2 radar. The X-band radar can spot missile as far as 2,000 km with forward-based mode and 600 km with terminal mode. It can be changed into the radar with a much longer detectable range.

It should be taken into consideration that the THAAD deployed in South Korea will be added to the THAAD battery deployed on Guam, two AN/TPY-2 radars deployed in Japan (at Shariki and Kyogamisaki), space-based assets, plus a range of ship-borne radars and larger land-based radars in other parts of the Pacific theatre. The deployment in South Korea might not guarantee the interception of ICBMs as they move fast while sophisticated penetration-aids confuse missile interceptors but it will greatly improve early tracking of Russian and Chinese missiles, depending on their launch point.

The first operational deployment of the system was to Hawaii in 2009, followed by Guam in 2013 and there are currently five THAAD batteries worldwide, including in the United Arab Emirates. The THAAD system has been deployed in South Korea on the basis of military-to-military agreement without the knowledge of the president and parliament.

Russia and China see the US BMD systems in the region as destabilizing. Last year, Russia warned that the US deployment of an advanced missile defense system in South Korea would have «irreparable consequences». Speaking at an economic forum in St Petersburg (June 1-3, 2017), Russian President Vladimir Putin said, «What is happening is a very serious and alarming process. In Alaska, and now in South Korea, elements of the anti-missile defense system are emerging. Should we just stand idly by and watch this? Of course not. We are thinking about how to respond to these challenges. This is a challenge for us». «This destroys the strategic balance in the world», he added.

Russia and China have been saying that the deployment is unnecessary and would tip the balance of power in the Pacific towards the United States. Beijing sees THAAD as a serious threat. For example, the US-deployed system would potentially be able to intercept Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Beijing also believes the radar deployed with THAAD is able to see far into its territory. It will give Washington the potential to track China’s military capabilities. The deployment of the AN/TPY-2 radar system lays down the basis for regional BMD upgrade and expansion to counter Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear potentials.

Japan is also considering the option of deploying THAAD. It is reasonable to expect Russia and China to develop technology that would render THAAD useless; thus the beginnings of an arms race. The deployment of THAAD to South Korea could be the catalyst that sets the United States and Russia/China) on a collision course.

In late May, a Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, system located at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California successfully intercepted a mock intercontinental ballistic missile target. In May, a group of senators introduced a bipartisan bill that seeks to bolster homeland missile defense and sharply increase the number of GMD interceptors.

In May, 2016, the Aegis Ashore system in Deveselu, a US naval support facility in southern Romania, was operationally certified. The land-based BMD system is designed to detect, track, engage, and destroy ballistic missiles in flight outside the atmosphere. It is equipped with the same phased-array SPY-1 radars and Aegis Combat Systems as are installed on many of the US Navy’s surface ships. The SM-3 Block IB missile has a range of up to 1,200 km. It has a robust capability against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Deveselu site comprises three batteries (24 missiles) of SM-3 Block IB interceptors. After the system is ramped up, it’s easy to increase the number of missile launchers.

In response, the Russian Ministry of Defense has taken a decision to deploy a squadron of long-range, supersonic bombers Tu-22М3 with variable sweep wing to Crimea with the option of eventually sending an entire regiment to the peninsula in response to Eastern European NATO allies' reinforcement plans.

The ground-based missile defense site is an element of a larger European shield and US global ballistic missile defense effort to be expanded to cover Europe, Turkey, the Middle East, Japan and South Korea. Another Aegis Ashore system based in the missile defense site located at Redzikowo, Poland, near the Baltic Sea is to become operational next year. The European Interceptor Site (EIS) in Poland will consist of 24 SM-3Block IIA middle range missile interceptors.

The missile defense system in Europe also includes a radar in Turkey, a command center in Ramstein, Germany and interceptor ships. An early warning radar station in Malatya, Turkey, has been in service since 2012. The operational center became active the same year. Four missile defense-capable Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers were deployed to Rota, Spain, in 2015 for rotational patrols in the Mediterranean.

The construction of sophisticated new radar system known as Globus 3 in Vardø, Norway, has already been launched. The site is an element of the US-led NATO BMD. The radar located in Svalbard (the Arctic) can also be used by US military for missile defense purposes. The radar is installed in violation of the 1925 treaty which states that Svalbard has a demilitarized status.

The North Korean threat in the Asia Pacific and a threat from Iran for NATO European allies are used as pretexts for efforts aimed at reducing Russia’s capability to respond in case it comes under a nuclear attack. The Iranian program is under international control now, leaving NATO with no explanation for proceeding with its BMD plans.

The Aegis Ashore systems installed in Europe use the naval Mk-41 launching system, which is capable of firing long-range cruise missiles. The Aegis Ashore launchpad is practically identical to a system used aboard Aegis warships that is capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles.This is an outright violation of the INF Treaty, banning land-based cruise and medium-range missiles with a range from 300 to 3,400 miles. This fact has been emphasized by Russia’s officials.

The short flight time of these missiles diminished to mere minutes provides little time to decide whether to launch a second strike, raising the risks of mishaps. Military leaders are prone to believe that if the enemy's intentions are unclear they should be interpreted as aggressive (otherwise, they could be late to respond). That leaves the military alone in a vicious spiral of inevitable decisions. 

Russia has put forward a number of proposals related to cooperation with NATO in the field of missile defense making conditional the right of joint decision over the configuration and parameters of the system, as well as international legal guarantees that the system will not undermine Russia’s nuclear potential, to no avail. It has also come up with the initiative on introduction of sectoral missile defense, in which the Russian armed forces would take responsibility for the defence of NATO’s eastern region. All the proposals have been rejected.

The decision to continue with BMD plans is fraught with very serious consequences. The Aegis Ashore systems pose a threat to Russia’s key infrastructure installations located in the western part of the country. Russia has no choice but to respond in kind. Missile defenses provide a false sense of security, as they invite more tensions with Russia – which has recently placed Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad to target the Polish site. The Russian military has also placed Bastion missile launchers in Kaliningrad, the exclave bordering NATO members Poland and Lithuania. This could threaten the prospective NATO BMD site in Poland. Russia could respond to the BMD plans by increasing its cyber weapons potential to target BMD sites as well spurring its efforts to create space-based anti-missile systems. Russia also could increase the number of fake missiles it has coming down on targets so more interceptors go to the wrong missile. And the tactical aviation is in high readiness to knock out the NATO BMD installations.

The United States abandoned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002 to greatly complicate further arms control talks. The document had been the cornerstone of the strategic weapon limitation process for the previous thirty years. The countries which host BMD sites, such as Romania, Poland, South Korea and, if the plans go through, Japan automatically become targets for Russia’s military.

The BMD shield which the United States has activated in Europe and is activating in Asia is a step to a new arms race. The BMD deployment dashes hopes for achieving progress in nuclear disarmament talks at a time the arms control regime is disintegrating. Russian officials say there is no »political logic and common sense in proposals 'to disarm' in conditions when the current US administration has been making concerted effort to undermine the defense and the military-industrial potential of Russia through its sanctions policy for a long time».

The BMD plans have become a major obstacle on the way of reviving the arms control dialogue between the US and Russia. The administration will have to address Russia’s deep concerns about US missile defense in Europe and elsewhere if it believes the arms control regime to be important enough to get the dialogue out of the present deadlock. According to Steven Pifer from the Brookings Institution, «A future U.S. administration interested in a treaty providing for further cuts in strategic nuclear forces may find that it can go no further if it is not prepared to negotiate a treaty on missile defense».

The US allies who host the systems should realize that such moves greatly reduce their security, turning them into the first strike targets for the Russian military. This BMD is a burning issue to be immediately addressed at the round table. Instead, the United States is stubbornly intensifying efforts to boost its BMD capabilities in an attempt to intimidate Russia. The result could be quite the opposite than expected – the policy would undermine the security of the United States and its allies.

On June 5, South Korean President Moon Jai-in ordered an environmental impact assessment in the area where four additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launchers were to be deployed. THAAD is a mobile system capable of hitting ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere in their final, or terminal, phase.

The unexpected move has caused alarm for policy makers in Washington, DC, who are worried about Beijing’s influence on the newly elected president.

The unexpected delay in fully deploying the THAAD system could result in several scenarios going forward.

First, the delay could give the United States a window of opportunity to completely reassess its strategic posturing on the peninsula. Options to execute a phased withdrawal from the region could unfold, something many experts believe would be a mistake.

Secondly, the delay could embolden the North Korean regime to continue its furious pace of missile testing. North Korea has already fired 16 missiles in 10 tests in 2017. As Beijing and Washington continue to squabble over how to exert pressure on the DPRK, it is no wonder this lack of a coherent strategy will allow continued testing to occur unabated.

Third, its unclear if Moon is signaling that that he is open to a fresh approach toward Chinese and South Korean relations. China’s influence in the region is clearly growing as Washington continues to espouse an incoherent strategy in the region while maintaining an “American first” approach toward its decision-making process. It’s no wonder South Korea is weighing its options carefully with Beijing. Closer ties between the two states would benefit both nations in the long run, particularly on economic and regional security issues.

The United States should consider South Korea’s decision to delay THAAD as an opportunity to withdraw from the peninsula. The cold war is long over, and Washington’s ability to contain the DPRK has failed. Allowing China to take a greater leadership role may not be such a bad thing.

atimes.com