Perhaps no trade deal has been agreed to more times than the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has, firstly in 2005 taking the form of the Trans-Pacific Strategic and Economic Partnership, and then in 2016 as the enlarged U.S.-led TPP-12, and (hopefully) finally in November 2017 with the renamed “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” (CPTPP). The CPTPP, once a legal text is fully worked out, will take effect when six of the eleven remaining countries ratify it.

Staring at some still-born, historical arrangements like the Asian Monetary Fund, the Free Trade Area of the Americas and Transatlantic Free Trade Area, one would marvel at the pertinacity of the deal itself and the perseverance of policy makers this time to press on with trade integration despite growing sentiments in many participating economies that call on government to “protect” rather than to “liberalize.”

Economic success in today’s competitive environment requires countries to proactively reduce trade barriers and win over mobile international capital that flows to freer and more secure markets. But the interlocking nature of modern economic relations and domestic oppositions to unilateral trade disarmament often render that national interests are best served through coordinated and reciprocal regional efforts. The CPTPP is such a mega-scale free trade agreement (FTA) that aims to leverage the collective economic potential of more than eleven countries around the Pacific Rim, whose trade totaled about $350 billion in 2016.

Our updated simulations using the multiregion, multisector GTAP model suggest that a deal without the United States in it would raise the combined real gross domestic product (GDP) of the eleven countries by about 0.7 percent in the long run. More importantly, as a “natural trading bloc” with intra-FTA trade share exceeding the groupings total share of the world’s GDP, the CPTPP’s trade diverting effects are not as alarming as some have feared. The net global welfare amounts to approximately $57 billion according to our analysis.

With respect to content, suspension of some twenty provisions inserted only at the demand of the United States (e.g. extended protection for biologics) and addition of revised articles on withdrawal, accession and review procedures notwithstanding, the reworked CPTPP preserves all the core elements of the TPP-12. It remains a high standard regional trade liberalization blueprint that set regionally acceptable standards and write enforceable trade rules in emerging policy areas, such as digital economy, public procurement, competition and regulatory coherence, in a forward-looking manner.

Country-specific benefits of the CPTPP, too, are worth highlighting. For instance, the value of the deal as an insurance policy against any potential breakdown of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) renegotiation are increasingly picked up on by Canadian and Mexican leaderships. Japanese and Vietnamese liberal reformers would stay relieved that the prize of locking in difficult domestic structural reforms, whether it is in agriculture or state-owned enterprises, is still within grasp. Above all, the withdrawal of the United States seems to have made the CPTPP a more equitable grouping wherein partners, instead of dictating the terms, show more sensitivity to each other’s concerns and interests.

Indo-Pacific Doctrine

Denouncing the TPP as a job killer, Donald Trump pulled his country out of the deal three days into his administration, invoking economic reasons. Trump’s newly announced Asia strategy enshrining a “free and open Indo-Pacific region,” however, makes the scrapping of the TPP more emblematic of his firm departure from the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia,” that defined Asia more narrowly as “Asia-Pacific.”

Ostensibly, the catchphrase is a political shorthand to reflect India’s rising role in Asian and global affairs and tightening U.S.-India bilateral ties since Narendra Modi took office in 2014. Rhetoric aside, it is clear that the new strategy, in so many aspects, shares the pivot’s fundamental goal of dealing with the swelling influence of China. Through outlining a single geoeconomic and geopolitical space bookended by the United States and India, Washington stretches the boundary of the region, and therefore economic center of gravity, westwards. In effect, this dilutes China’s overwhelming economic dominance.

Trump wants to promote trade and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific theater and this will require multilateral infrastructure financing for roads and ports. After all, it is no coincidence that key players in Trump’s Indo-Pacific vision—Japan, Australia, India, and to a lesser extent South Korea and Thailand—are those who are either sidelined by or unsympathetic to China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative.

Withering APEC?

Apart from the TPP, the twenty-one-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is certainly another institution that does not fit well with Trump’s “Indo-Pacific Dream.” The most noticeable difference between Asia-Pacific, a community from which APEC draws strength, and Indo-Pacific is that India is excluded from the former but not from the latter. Although nonincorporation of Asia’s third largest economy in APEC was famously compared to “enacting Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark,” New Delhi’s twenty-year quest for APEC membership still bears no fruit. Even when the extended moratorium on APEC membership expired in 2010, India’s bid was met with fierce oppositions from a host of prominent personnel, including APEC’s intellectual architect Fred Bergsten, who argued against recognizing India as a Pacific nation.

While Trump’s recast of the region as “Indo-Pacific” seemingly solves India’s identity dilemma and paves the way for its long-awaited accession, it could paradoxically reduce the incentive for India to join the APEC grouping. If, for instance, New Delhi is emboldened by Trump’s new strategic thinking, it could “plot” to replace the fading Asia-Pacific organization with an Indo-Pacific equivalent where India and America take the center stage.

That being said, perhaps it is Trump’s “allergy” to multiparty trade cooperation and affection for bilateralism with “many strings attached” that could strike a heavy blow to the institution that is already hollowed out by its inability to push through voluntary and nondiscriminatory trade liberalization. So long as Trump continues to double down on APEC as a loose assemblage and not as a communal forum to advance common purposes and orderly economic integration, the chances for APEC to live up to its mission of building “a dynamic and harmonious Asia-Pacific community” are extremely slim.

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But then the process of creating the partnership began to stall. Obama never managed to get Congress to quickly ratify the TPP. Donald Trump was part of the obstacle – as a presidential candidate a year ago, he was already loudly insisting that the TPP did not serve American interests and that he would withdraw from that partnership if elected. And on January 23, three days after Trump’s inauguration, the new US president signed an executive order to pull out of the TPP.

Japan has the most to lose from a US exit from TPP, as its cars and electronics might lose their competitive edge in the enormous US market. Only six countries (Mexico, Japan, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore) have stated that they are ready to move forward with TPP, regardless of whether the US is involved. I think that in time the partnership’s circle of solid supporters will shrink even further.

But after Washington lost interest in the TPP, the remaining signatories came up with the idea of inviting China to join. Australia in particular hopes to make up for its losses from the US pullout by stepping up its economic relationship with China. But now it’s possible that everything will turn out differently, meaning that China can invite the remaining members of the TPP to join its own «club», without the US. Beijing’s initiative has kicked off the furious process of creating a new international trade organization, namely: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

The core members of RCEP are the ten members of ASEAN (Brunei, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines), plus six countries with which ASEAN has already signed free-trade agreements (Australia, India, China, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan). RCEP includes four economically developed states and 12 developing countries. RCEP could potentially be comparable to TPP: the members of the first partnership are responsible for approximately 30% of global GDP and approximately 50% of the earth’s population. Thirty percent of the countries in the world are currently involved in the RCEP negotiations over global exports. The leading exporters are China, Japan, and South Korea. The members of the new organization are also blessed with significant investment potential. In 2014, 28.5% of the world’s total foreign investment outlays went to the economies of the RCEP nations, and the outflow of investments was equal to 23.6%

In 2014, trade within the group of countries we call RCEP totaled $4.4 trillion. By comparison, trade between the countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – specifically the US, Canada, and Mexico – did not hit the $1 trillion mark until the beginning of this decade.

China is the undisputed leader within the group of RCEP countries, responsible for 28% of intra-group trade in 2014, followed by Japan (15%) and South Korea (11%). These three countries account for more than half of all trade within RCEP.

It is interesting to see the importance of a common market within that regional partnership for individual RCEP member countries. First let’s look at China. In 2014, 26% of China’s exports went to RCEP countries and 34% of China’s imports came from those same nations. This means that the RCEP market is extremely significant for China. And although it’s true that, for China, America is just as significant a trading partner as all of the RCEP countries put together, given Trump’s protectionist threats, China’s outlook for trade with the US could change dramatically. Therefore, Beijing is rushing to promote the RCEP project, which could at least partially offset China’s losses when it comes to the US.

The country leading the RCEP negotiations and boasting the second greatest trade potential is Japan. The RCEP market is even more significant for Tokyo than for Beijing. In 2014, 45% of Japan’s exports went to RCEP countries and 48% of its imports came from those same nations. Although Japan is the only country to have ratified the TPP agreement, it might prove to be second only to China as a driving force behind the partnership.

This means that the RCEP market would be even more significant for the other potential members of the partnership. Here is a list of countries that send over 50% of their exports to the RCEP market: Brunei (94); Myanmar (93); Laos (83); Australia (76); Malaysia (64); Indonesia (62); Singapore (59); New Zealand (58); the Philippines (57); and Thailand (56). 

And this is a list of countries that are greatly dependent on the RCEP market for their imports (%): Laos (95); Myanmar (94); Cambodia (84); Brunei (81); Vietnam (74); Indonesia (68); Malaysia (61); Thailand (58); the Philippines (58); New Zealand (57); and Australia (55).

The launch of the RCEP negotiations commenced on Nov. 20, 2012 at the ASEAN summit in Cambodia. As long as there was progress on the TPP project, the global media paid almost no attention to the RCEP project, believing that it was ill-considered and could not compete with the TPP. RCEP’s ratings have soared in the last month.

Just a few days before the US presidential election, the ministers of the RCEP member nations made an announcement at their meeting in Manila stressing the urgency of reaching a new agreement, due to the rise of protectionist sentiments around the world. There is a looming prospect that China will use Trump’s refusal to support TPP as a pretext to seize the initiative and create the biggest trade and economic association in the world.

Some of the countries that are currently taking part in the RCEP negotiations – or planning to do so – believe that they will be able to have their cake and eat it too, by being active in both partnerships. At the recent APEC summit, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Commerce and Tourism, Eduardo Ferreyros Küppers even said, «China is our friend, the United States is our friend, and everyone else is our friend.» 

Experts note that the RCEP project differs in some fundamental ways from the TPP project. For example, the first has an open membership policy (in contrast to the TPP, which has closed its doors to China and Russia). Second, the first partnership does not make undue requirements of its members. Specifically, unlike the TPP, there are no rigid rules or provisions that regulate environmental issues, the social setting of the workplace, government purchases, investment disputes, etc. RCEP is primarily a commercial partnership. Its conceptual foundation does not make provision for requirements that would significantly exceed the scope of any obligations under the WTO. The main idea behind the new partnership is to liberalize trade regimes, taking into account the particulars of each nation and the differences in the levels of development of the participating economies.

Due to these distinctions, RCEP may eventually expand from a regional to a global partnership.

Of course, there are serious obstacles on the path to signing the RCEP agreement. First of all, it is impossible to ignore the glaring differences in the economic development of the countries that are currently involved in the negotiations. On one hand, there are countries that are highly developed economically, including Australia, Brunei, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan. On the other hand are countries that are less economically developed. These differences make it difficult to reach a consensus over tariffs, access to the services market, customs procedures, and much more. In addition, some of the more developed countries (particularly Australia and New Zealand) tried at one time to include in the RCEP format issues pertaining to patent law, judicial rulings on investment disputes, and environmental and social standards (all of which are important elements of the TPP), but then, however agreed not to overload the negotiations at this stage and elected not to include these issues in the agreement.

Political in addition to economical obstacles may emerge. In particular, territorial disputes between the two biggest economic powers in RCEP – China and Japan – may result in Tokyo being jettisoned from the new partnership.

Although this new partnership is an open one, it is hard to imagine the United States signing up. As for the Russian Federation, it has not yet issued any statements in this regard.

China has unexpectedly emerged as the leader of the process of economic globalization. Speaking in Davos on January 17, Chinese President Xi Jinping made it clear to the participants in the International Economic Forum that Beijing is ready to seize the reins of globalization from Washington. On January 26, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang once again reaffirmed China’s commitment to the principles of multilateral trade liberalism. 

China’s leaders well remember the words of Barack Obama, who stated last May 14 that the TPP’s basic premise «allows America – and not countries like China» to shape the rules of international trade. Now China has the opportunity to make a retaliatory move, by claiming that it has become the arbiter of international trade.

Beijing plans to complete the RCEP negotiations by the end of the year so that a multilateral agreement can be signed in early 2018.

Perhaps, Trump himself is the lone voice of his Administration, while all others are, to borrow the words of William Shakespeare’s Macbeth, mere walking shadows – «poor players who strut and fret their hour upon the stage and then is heard no more».

Mattis’ choice of Seoul and Tokyo for his first business trip abroad prompted interpretations. Some said the Trump administration stated its commitment to the ‘pivot to Asia’. Such a laboured point can be made, perhaps, since the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is moribund and the ‘pivot’ strategy is floundering. Optimists hope that the ‘pivot’ will remain an American foreign policy priority for a foreseeable future.

A columnist wrote this week in Straits Times that the US’ «abandonment of the TPP is more likely to be a signal that the US will seek better trade deals, than a ‘lights out’ for its involvement in Asia. The US will stay here, but is likely to ask for a higher appearance fee». It sounds plausible. After all, the US needs to generate synergy to create jobs and stimulate economic growth through trade and investment ties, while Asia can be a pillar to consolidate America’s leadership in global governance.

In the event, Mattis’ visit left an impression that the US intended to continue with the Barack Obama administration’s policies in the region, which clashed with the more muscular approach towards China that State Secretary Rex Tillerson – or Trump himself – have advocated. In particular, Mattis’ remark that solution to the South China Sea problem must be found on the diplomatic path and that there was no need for any «dramatic military moves» by the US takes a leaf out of the Obama rule book.

It puts him at odds with Tillerson who would have liked the Pentagon to block China from accessing the artificial islands it built, even risking a potential showdown. Tillerson is on record as saying, «We’re going to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed». Tillerson’s views were also echoed by the White House spokesman Sean Spicer.

Therefore, the big question is: Who has Trump’s ear – Mattis, or, Tillerson and Spicer? This becomes important because Mattis also forcefully articulated Washington’s commitment to the alliance with Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, what added to the confusion was that just on the eve of Mattis’ trip to the region, Trump himself had a nasty phone conversation with Malcolm Turnbull, prime minister of Australia, a long-standing ally of the US in the Asia-Pacific that has been a permanent participant in the US’ bloody wars in recent history.

Of course, that was no way to treat an ally. Australia is one of America’s staunchest allies, sharing intelligence and shedding Australian blood to support American military interventions – be it in Afghanistan or Iraq. No US president ever hung up on an Australian counterpart, cutting short a planned hour-long phone conversation to just 25 minutes. But Trump did it.

Nonetheless, Mattis insisted, while in Tokyo: «I made clear that our longstanding policy on the Senkaku Islands stands – the US will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands and as such, Article 5 of the US-Japan security treaty applies». No doubt, it was significant that Mattis echoed the Obama administration’s stated stance. But at the end of the day, Tokyo must be wondering whether Mattis’ remark marked a definitive shift in tone from Trump’s own complaint voiced earlier that the security treaty was «one-sided», and his implied threat that the US could withdraw forces from military bases in Japan and South Korea if those countries did not pay more for protection.

A poll conducted last week by Yomuiri Shimbun newspaper showed that 80 percept of respondents worry about Japan’s relations with the US. The Japanese daily Mainichi commented editorially, «We praise Mattis’ visit to Japan and South Korea up to a point, but still have significant worries about future US involvement in the region… it’s certainly possible that Trump will make decisions linking economic and security issues». Again, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, while welcoming Mattis’ statement, hinted that Trump may not necessarily have the same views as his Pentagon chief, and Tokyo would like to hear it afresh from the new administration «on various occasions».

The underlying, unspoken angst is that Trump may prioritize the Asia-Pacific region as a market, investment destination and source of capital and technology, and that might ultimately provide the raison d’etre of any continued strong and active US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Put differently, once the dust of transition settles and Trump administration shifts gear, it may factor in the criticality of pragmatic cooperative relations with China, which might set the tenor of US-China relations and in turn modulate America’s strategies in the Asia-Pacific.

In the final analysis, therefore, Mattis’ visit may have only set the stage for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s meeting with Trump in the weekend. The two plan to play golf, but Abe is carrying with him big Japanese investment plans that promise to create jobs in the US economy. The Japanese media reported that he called in Toyota Motor Corporation president Akio Toyada to discuss the car maker’s plans to build new factories in the US. Abe will be accompanied by his finance minister. Japan is under pressure to pay, as often in its post-World War II history of relations with the US. How Trump, the archetypal American businessman, reciprocates by voicing US’ diplomatic and security support for Japan will be keenly awaited. If Mattis’ statements are any guide, he may not go beyond proforma remarks.

The wild card here is Trump’s North Korea policy. As much as reaffirming US’ alliance with South Korea and Japan, Mattis had the goal of coordinating with the two countries regarding the North Korean nuclear threat. Now, if Trump’s intention is to pursue the North Korean issue through the diplomatic track, it involves intense negotiations and close coordination with China, which must begin sooner than later.

Beijing can be trusted to welcome such engagement – and even proactively want to build on it. Japan may be anticipating such an eventuality. Following the talks with Mattis talks on Sunday, Foreign Minister Inada disclosed that she had specifically conveyed to him that Japan will not involve its forces in the South China Sea.

Unsurprisingly, Chinese comments on Mattis’ visit to the region have been more for record. Trump’s protectionist agenda; his ‘neo-mercantalistic’ outlook; his preference for bilateral trade deals and the abandonment of the TPP – all this deals a practical blow to the US’ pivot to Asia. Simply put, the containment strategy becomes unsustainable without the underpinning that TPP would have given.

Time works in favour of China. China can be expected to accelerate its goal of an early conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that brings together 16 Asian participating economies, and on a parallel track advance its agenda of boosting integration in the Asia-Pacific region. China may have already secured an opening to tilt the geopolitical balance in Asia in its favour. 

«For America’s friends and partners, ratifying [the trade pact] is a litmus test for your credibility and seriousness of purpose», said Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong speaking in the name of Pacific Rim signatories to the TPP. The president’s decision leaves the door open for Beijing to lead the integration process in the region. China has sought to expand its trade ties with its neighbors and begun an ambitious infrastructure project designed to reinvigorate ancient trading routes to the Middle East and Europe. In a speech last week to the World Economic Forum at Davos, President Xi Jinping likened protectionism to «locking oneself in a dark room».

The Beijing-led 16-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which notably excludes the United States, may the world’s biggest free trade agreement (FTA) to encompass 46% of global population, with a combined GDP of $17 trillion, and 40% of world trade. It will initially comprise several Southeast Asia countries, plus Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India. Some leaders from TPP nations signaled after Trump’s election they’d shift their attention to the RCEP, with the next round of talks due to be held as soon as next month in Japan.

It is a more traditional trade agreement, involving cutting tariffs rather than opening up economies and setting labor and environmental standards as TPP would. That deal doesn’t currently include the US and contains fewer measures to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade. The TPP is contentious in part because it addressed issues like environmental and labor protections.

The RCEP was in the focus of attention at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held in Peru last November. If RCEP succeeds, China would be in a stronger position to lead a bigger free trade area in the future. Already in Asia, some countries, like the Philippines, are aligning themselves with China. Chinese officials are also welcoming Latin American nations to RCEP. China also advocates the idea of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), with the RCEP becoming its fulcrum.

The other parties to the TPP could decide to renegotiate it into an agreement just among themselves, but some may feel they have no choice but to join the RCEP. Japan and Australia expressed their commitment to the TPP on Jan. 24. They have already started discussions with Singapore. The TPP can't be in force without the US. It requires the ratification of at least six countries accounting for 85 percent of the combined gross domestic product of the member nations. Other members of the deal would have to work around the US withdrawal.

Australian Trade Minister Steven Ciobo said his country could push ahead with the TPP without the United States by amending the agreement and possibly adding new members. «We could look at, for example, if China or Indonesia or another country wanted to join, saying, 'Yes, we open the door for them signing up to the agreement as well». But, alternatively, some may feel they have no choice but to join the RCEP. Malaysia has already shifted its attention to the China-honchoed agreement.

The EU may benefit from the US withdrawal. German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel said that the decision of US President Donald Trump to withdraw the country from TPP free trade agreement will open new opportunities for the German economy. The president has said he would try to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which governs trade with Mexico and Canada. After some time, the US may event raise the issue of changing WTO rules.

The US withdrawal from the TPP opens new prospects for Russia and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The EAEU already has free trade agreements with Vietnam and Singapore. New Zealand refused to talk about it in 2014 but now it may become more pliant as well as South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Chile. There have been talks about setting up FTAs between the EAEU and specific ASEAN countries, such as Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia. The Russia’s trade turnover with these states is not very impressive but they are good springboards for expansion.

Last June, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to create a more extensive Eurasian partnership on the basis of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) that would involve China, India, Pakistan, Iran and a number of Community of Independent States (CIS) countries among others willing to join. The Union has an integrated single market of 183 million people and a gross domestic product of over 4 trillion US dollars. The EAEU introduces the free movement of goods, capital, services and people and provides for common transport, agriculture and energy policies, with provisions for a single currency and more extensive integration.

Last June, the EAEU signed a joint declaration on transition to the negotiation stage for development of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union (the EAEU) and the People’s Republic of China. Recently the EAEU has received around 40 proposals for free trade agreements (FTA). The idea of forming an EAEU-ASEAN free trade area has already been floated.

The Pacific integration process may result in the formation of a major Euro-Asian political and economic arc to become the backbone of the world order in the 21st century to cover a major part of the Eurasian space and most Asian countries with the US excluded for the process. The US withdrawal from the TPP is a reflection of the global trend with the world moving toward multipolarity in the global economy.

A whirlwind flashback of the fractious relationship between Obama and «existential threats» Russia and China would include everything from the Washington-sponsored Maidan in Kiev to Obama’s «Assad must go» in Syria, with special mentions to the oil price war, sanctions, the raid on the ruble, extreme demonization of Putin and all things Russian, provocations in the South China Sea – all down to a finishing flourish; the death of the much vaunted Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) treaty, which was reconfirmed at APEC right after the election of Donald Trump.

It was almost too painful to watch Obama defending his not exactly spectacular legacy at his final international press conference – with, ironically, the backdrop of the South American Pacific coast – just as Chinese President Xi Jinping all but basked in his reiterated geopolitical glow, which he already shares with Putin. As for Trump, though invisible in Lima, he was everywhere.

The ritual burial, in Peru’s Pacific waters, of the «NATO on trade» arm of the pivot to Asia (first announced in October 2011 by Hillary Clinton) thus offered Xi the perfect platform to plug the merits of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), amply supported by China.

RCEP is an ambitious idea aiming at becoming the world’s biggest free trade agreement; 46% of global population, with a combined GDP of $17 trillion, and 40% of world trade. RCEP includes the 10 ASEAN nations plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.

The RCEP idea was born four years ago at an ASEAN summit in Cambodia – and has been through nine rounds of negotiations so far. Curiously, the initial idea came from Japan – as a mechanism to combine the plethora of bilateral deals ASEAN has struck with its partners. But now China is in the lead.

RCEP is also the fulcrum of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) – a concept that was introduced at an APEC meeting in Beijing by, who else, China, with the aim of seducing nations whose top trade partner is China away from entertaining TPP notions.

RCEP – and even FTAAP – are not about a new set of ultra-comprehensive trade rules (concocted by US multinationals), but the extension of existing deals to ASEAN and key nations in Northeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania.

It didn’t take experienced weathermen to see which way the Pacific winds are now blowing. Peru and Chile are now on board to join RCEP. And Japan – which was negotiating TPP until the very last breath – has now steered the drive towards RCEP.

The Sultan gets into the action

Meanwhile, Putin and Xi met once again – with Putin revealing he’s going to China next spring to deepen Russian involvement in the New Silk Roads, a.k.a. One Belt, One Road (OBOR). The ultimate objective is to merge the Chinese-led OBOR with the development of the Russia-led Eurasia Economic Union (EEU).

That’s the spirit behind 25 intergovernmental agreements in economy, investment and nuclear industry signed by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in St. Petersburg in early November, as well as the set up of a joint Russia-China Venture Fund.

In parallel, almost out of blue, and with a single stroke, Turkey President Tayyip Erdogan, on the way back from a visit to Pakistan and Uzbekistan, confirmed what had been all but evident for the past few months; «Why shouldn't Turkey be in the Shanghai Five? I said this to Mr. Putin, to (Kazakh President) Nazarbayev, to those who are in the Shanghai Five now… I think if Turkey were to join the Shanghai Five, it will enable it to act with much greater ease».

This bombshell of course refers to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which started in 2001 as the Shanghai Five – China, Russia and three Central Asia nations, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Uzbekistan joined later) – as a security bloc to fight Salafi-jhadism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

Over the years, the SCO has evolved much further – into an Asia integration/cooperation mechanism. India, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Mongolia are observers, with India and Pakistan to be admitted as full members arguably by 2017, followed by Iran. Turkey (since 2013) and Belarus are SCO «dialogue partners».

Wily Erdogan made his SCO opening in conjunction to stressing Turkey did not need to join the EU «at all costs». That’s been more than evident since Erdogan survived the July coup and unleashed a hardcore crackdown that’s been met with horror by Brussels – where the 11-year (so far) negotiations for Turkish accession are all but stalled. And France, the number two EU power after Germany, will inevitably block it further on down the road, whoever is elected President next year.

Turkey joining the SCO, in the long run, alongside Iran, India and Pakistan, would represent yet another key node of Eurasia integration, as the SCO is progressively interlocked with OBOR, EEU, China’s Silk Road Fund, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and even the BRICS’s New Development Bank (NDB), which will start financing projects for group members and then expand to other nations in the Global South. Moscow and Beijing would welcome Ankara with open arms.

Whatever the contours of Trump’s China/Asia foreign policy, Eurasian integration will proceed unabated. China is advancing its own simultaneously internal and external pivot, involving the tweaking of financial, fiscal and tax policies to drive consumption in retail, health, travel and sports in parallel to the OBOR drive all across Eurasia, all the way to solidifying an economic superpower.

TPP – or NATO on trade, the Asian version – is just a scalp in a long and winding road. And on the South China Sea, dialogue is slowly edging out the confrontation fomented throughout the Obama administration.

At APEC, Xi also met with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte – and called for China and the Philippines to go for maritime cooperation. A practical result is that Philippine fishermen will continue to have access to Scarborough Shoal, the fertile fishing ground inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that has been under Chinese control since 2012. Beijing also pledged assistance to Philippine fishermen in alternative industries – such as aquaculture.

Call it the Trans-South China Sea Partnership.

According to the president, Russia and the United States should «break out of this vicious circle» and proceed to a new level of relations. He asked the US to abstain from provoking Russia into taking an active stand to defend its national interests. Mr. Putin would welcome reaching agreements with the US on various issues of common interest. The Russian president has dismissed as 'improper' the behavior of the US politicians, who put the blame on Russia for whatever goes wrong in the world, including Syria.

Indeed, with Barack Obama's second presidential term approaching an end, the inability to successfully deal with Russia is one of foreign policy failures to wreck his legacy. Washington’s efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis jointly with Moscow are a complete debacle. From Russia’s point of view the US is an unreliable partner.

On October 27, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the document called «Comparative Analysis of Russia-US Agreements Implementation» on Syria.

The paper will be circulated as a United Nations document. It lists all the US violations of the agreements reached with Russia on Syria.

From the very start, the administration was divided over the deal with Russia on cessation of hostilities. There was a wide gap between the positions of US Department of State and the Defense Department. The US military did not want to work with their Russian partners. The US has been mulling abandoning all the agreements in favor of military options.

Washington has many times blamed Russia for striking civilians in Syria. Over 60 civilians were killed and at least 200 injured during first three days of the Mosul offensive launched by the US-led coalition. Nobody apologized. It’s not even in the media spotlight!

There are many other areas where the bilateral relationship is almost on the rocks.

Despite Assistant State Secretary Victoria Nuland activities, Ukraine has remained a divisive issue with no progress achieved.

The arms control disintegration continues. Nothing has been done to change the tide during Obama’s tenure.

The 2010 New START (the Prague Treaty) expires in 2020 without any prospects for a new agreement coming into force. The future of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is in doubt.

The Treaty is threatened by ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment with the use of naval Mk-41 launchers capable of firing long-range cruise missile. It constitutes a violation of the treaty. The US has blatantly breached the bilateral Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PDMA).

The current administration has launched the program of upgrading B61-12 nuclear warheads to be installed on tactical aircraft of NATO countries in Europe.

The upgrade is a violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons from NWS (nuclear weapons states) to other states.

It’s just part of the picture as the US has provoked arms control erosion on global scale. President Obama has done nothing to have the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified 20 years after it was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996. The 2016 Washington Nuclear Summit ended without producing any tangible results. The non-proliferation regime is eroding and nothing is done to turn the tide. Under the administration, no effort has been applied to ratify the UN 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The US political clout in the world is waning.

In Europe, the US faces major setback as Europeans revolt against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Germany and France have already said disagreements have killed off prospects for reaching a deal.

The United States’ policy of pivot to Asia has failed to bring positive results. The prospects for ratification of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) are dim.

The failure to ratify this fundamental agreement will be a great setback undermining the US credibility in the region.

The US Middle East policy is in doldrums.

Iraq has been ravaged by sectarianism, spread of Islamic State (IS) extremist movement, a refugee crisis and economic woes.

The meddling into Libya has resulted in devastation, suffering and chaos with Russia asked for help.

The administration was blindsided by the emergence of the Houthi rebellion in Yemen. The wisdom of US meddling into the conflict is doubted with many questions raised about the violations of human rights.

The relationship between the United States and Egypt has deteriorated with Cairo looking for other partners.

President Obama’s efforts to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians have gone down the drain with new Israeli settlements built, moderate Palestinians discredited and Hamas growing stronger.

The situation in the Middle East has become worse than it was when then US president took office. Under President Obama’s watch, IS has made significant gains in the heart of Middle East. Nothing like a US strategy to fight it exists. The president’s policy in the region has resulted in additional chaos alienating US allies and multiplying enemies. As a result, the Middle East faces its worst turmoil in many decades.

The US has failed to carry out its mission in Afghanistan.

Today, the Taliban fighters control more territory than at any time since 2001. The fighting continues with no end in sight.

Nowhere in Africa has the US achieved any success. Terrorist movements are on the rise, the continent is threatened by instability. North Africa and the Saharan and sub-Saharan zones have seen increased terrorism as a result of the regime change policy in Libya. The situation has deteriorated to make America start war preparations.

One debacle is followed by another. It’s not entirely the responsibility of the president and his team. Mr. Obama was guided by the foreign policy elites – the same people Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton is associated with and Republican candidate Donald Trump is criticized by, especially for his readiness to normalize the relations with Russia.

That is the legacy President Obama cedes to his successor, including diplomatic minefield in its relations with Moscow. As the example of Iran nuclear deal shows, normalizing relations with Russia could make possible achievements the Obama administration has failed to reach. Syria’s crisis management could be one if a new administration changes the attitude, reigns in the military and abides by the provisions of deals concluded.

It would be right if the US and Russia cooperated in Iraq and Libya. Looks like they will have to. With all the wrongdoings the US has done in recent years, the Russian president stretched a hand in his Valdai speech. It’s up to the US to decide if further confrontation is better than fruitful cooperation. One thing is clear – a new administration will have to work really hard to rectify the situation with its credibility shattered across the globe. Normalizing the relationship with Russia could be a very tangible achievement. With one thing leading to another, joining together with Moscow could result in other foreign policy successes. It may be a tall order but it’s possible. The new US president will have a chance.

The agreement will enter into force after ratification by all signatories, if this occurs within two years. If not ratified by all before 4 February 2018, it will come into effect after ratification by at least 6 states which together represent at least 85% of the total GDP of the original 12.

The deal, which is opposed by most Democrats and lacks the support of key Republican lawmakers, is coming under harsh criticism from Donald Trump and, increasingly, from Hillary Clinton. Both major presidential candidates have attacked it. The Democratic presidential candidate has recently even toughened up her position to repudiate the proposed agreement.

In his turn, Donald Trump has called for an overarching isolationist foreign policy and abolishing NAFTA.

The present administration has failed to do a good job of selling the idea to the people. The TPP deal is hitting snags on the way having become too politicized – too much about foreign policy and not enough about economic issues. There is a widespread concern with declining employment opportunities in the national economy. The middle class and workers believe that too many American jobs have been lost to countries with lower costs of doing business, especially wages. Many people hold the opinion that the rejection of the pact would protect American workers from an inflow of detrimental imports or an outflow of good-paying jobs. The criticism of controversial TPP has become widespread in US politics to make its passage far from certain.

On August 12, President Obama signaled his commitment to getting the deal done by effectively notifying lawmakers he would submit the trade bill later this year, probably after the November 8 election.

But lame-duck sessions last typically no more than 30 days, and often less. That’s a very compressed timetable for getting any legislation through.

The administration’s push is expected to reoccur at Capitol Hill in September, when lawmakers return from their summer break.

Meanwhile, administration officials, including Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, are holding events with business and agriculture executives in a bid to bring the message home and drum up support for the deal.

The failure to push the deal through Congress will be a great setback undermining the US credibility in the region, where Washington loaded the accord with strategic significance as a counterweight to the rise of China. China, not part of the Trans-Pacific deal, is negotiating a separate Asia pact – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement comparable to the TPP, but led by Beijing. China is also pledging more regional loans through a new bank and a $40 billion Silk Road fund. Without the TPP, the US could be left out. Pacific nations seeking foreign trade and investment will look east, to Beijing.

The administration believes the deal is central to a shift of American military and other resources to the region.

«For America’s friends and partners, ratifying [the trade pact] is a litmus test for your credibility and seriousness of purpose», Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said during his recent visit to Washington, speaking in the name of Pacific Rim signatories.

The 12-nation TTP covers about 40 percent of the global economy and one-third of world trade bringing together Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The Singaporean Prime Minister’s comments carry additional weight as he was in effect talking on behalf of all of the TPP’s Asian partners. Regional leaders who spent political capital to support the pact will be less likely to do so again if it fizzles. In particular, the Prime Minister of Singapore spoke for Japan, saying «Relations between the United States and Japan will suffer if US President Barack Obama fails to win Congress approval of a Pacific free trade agreement before leaving office in January». According to him, the failure to ratify the agreement would hurt Prime Minister Shinzo Abe domestically and affect Washington’s security agreement with Tokyo.

The TTP is not the only alternative the Pacific Rim nations have. Besides the above mentioned talks on the agreement with China, there are other developments to be mentioned. In late July, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) ratified its first-ever free trade agreement with a country outside of the Union – Vietnam.

This is a start of a journey. Recently the EAEU has received around 40 proposals for free trade agreements (FTA). Many of them come from Asia-Pacific countries. This year the Union has signed memoranda of cooperation with Cambodia and Singapore. With regard to Singapore, the EAEU intends to launch a joint feasibility study group before the end of this year in order to identify potential benefits for both sides. The fact that the EAEU market is not yet as deeply integrated into global economy as many others makes it specifically attractive. During the Russian President’s visit to China in June, the EAEU signed a joint declaration on transition to the negotiation stage for development of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union (the EAEU) and the People’s Republic of China. If an economic cooperation deal with China is reached, it’ll be a huge step forward.

Russia is interested in drawing all Asia Pacific countries, not only China, into projects to develop Siberia and Russia’s Far East. For those unwilling to make a definitive choice between the US and China, Russia and the EAEU would become a truly independent center of power. In 2016, the process of rebalancing Russia’s Asian policy got underway with a sequence of milestone summits: the Russia-Japan Summit on May 6 and the ASEAN-Russia Summit on May 19-20. No breakthroughs reached, but the events produced tangible results. As ASEAN member states expand their economies, the demand for traditional Russian exports (energy, raw materials and energy infrastructure), as well as agricultural products increases. The idea of ASEAN and EAEU forming a free trade area was broached for the first time at the summit, while the talks about setting up FTAs between the EAEU and specific ASEAN countries, such as Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia, and are already underway. The ASEAN-Russia Summit declaration mentions the need to explore ways for Russia to join RCEP. In a broader sense, the idea to bring together the EAEU, ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Silk Road Economic Belt has great prospects.

Russia’s intention to expand the Greater Eurasian community to encompass its EAEU partners, China, India and Iran, ASEAN countries and the China-led RCEP will create a major Euro-Asian political and economic arc. The mega community will no doubt have every chance of becoming the backbone of the world order in the 21^st century covering a major part of the Eurasian space and most Asian countries to overshadow US-led projects, which now have a slim chance to ever materialize anyway. 

The next day the EUobserver in Brussels reported that the EU does not have a unified stance on whether to grant China market economy status. The United Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and Germany are all in favor. The strongest opposition to granting China the status of a market economy is found in Italy. 

But meanwhile Beijing is intently watching as two transoceanic partnerships – one in the Pacific and another in the Atlantic – are being created. The Americans are spearheading the formation of these two giant integrative blocs, and they are doing so on one hand in order to strengthen their own global trade position, and on the other – to prevent China, Russia, and other large, non-Western countries from bolstering their situations in a similar manner.

The Americans are especially worried about a stronger China. By creating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Washington hopes to shut China out of markets in the neighboring countries where Beijing does much of its trade (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines).

How is Europe a more important trading partner for China than America?

With the help of the Transatlantic Partnership (TTIP), Washington wants to wrest the European Union (an alliance of 28 countries) away from China. Yet for China the EU is just as important a trading partner as the US. Although the European Union and the US share first and second place in terms of their overall volume of trade with China, Europe is a much more significant import partner for China than America.

When it comes to the European Union’s foreign trade, China also takes top honors (it is the biggest source of imports and second biggest destination for exports). In terms of their total trade with the EU, China and the US are pretty evenly matched.

Europeans are good at math and understand that the creation of the TTIP will provide them with only ephemeral benefits. The increase in exports headed for the US, the creation of additional jobs, the improvement in the trade balance of a unified Europe – these are the empty dreams upon which Washington is basing its propaganda. But the loss of China as a trading partner, plus the resulting unavoidable, direct economic toll, is something quite real. In particular, China surpasses all other EU partners in purchases of machinery and equipment.

China supports Europe’s leadership in the production of many kinds of advanced technical products and keeps European machine-building companies busy. Although officials in Brussels are doing all they can to prepare a draft agreement to establish the TTIP in 2016 and then get it signed, there is powerful opposition to this partnership in many European countries. The European business community is retaining its tight grip on China.

What lurks behind the academic dispute about the «market» or «non-market» nature of China’s economy?

The EU currently has 68 anti-dumping measures in effect, 51 of which are levied against Chinese goods. These duties can exceed 65% and are imposed on a wide range of products, ranging from steel to solar panels.

The rationale for these anti-dumping duties is that Beijing is violating the principle of «fair competition» by providing state support to its exporters. Government officials claim that this is a «non-market» economy, which gives them an excuse to levy higher import duties on Chinese goods.

On Jan. 13 of this year, the authorized representatives of the EU countries discussed whether to grant China market economy status, a move they seemed inclined to support. Back on Dec. 11, 2001, when the WTO’s Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China was signed, China was given up to 15 years to restructure and create a «market» economy. Thus Beijing is hoping to win recognition by Dec. 11, 2016 from its leading trading partner – the European Union – of the Chinese economy’s market qualities. And then the practice of imposing anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods will be abandoned.

But this will be a difficult year for China. It is possible that the government will instead have to increase its support of many sectors of the nation’s economy. Beijing will try to couple this with a simultaneous surge of activity on the diplomatic front. The media is also suggesting that China could ramp up the scale of its investments in the European economy, as payment for the decision that China needs.

The outcome of the meeting in Brussels on Jan. 13 has clearly alarmed Washington. It saw Europe’s expected recognition of the market nature of the Chinese economy as a significant risk to the creation of the TTIP. Not to mention the fact that such a decision could deal a blow to US exports to Europe. Back in December, the Financial Times reported that Washington had taken preemptive action – strongly «warning» Brussels not to grant China market economy status.

At the end of the last decade the Americans verbally recognized the market nature of the Chinese economy. However, this was never legally documented, and from time to time, the US has introduced countervailing duties against many Chinese goods. Additional duties have been assessed on many types of products coming from China, including solar panels, wind-powered generators, coated paper, steel sinks, citric acid, various types of pipes including products for the oil industry, aluminum wire and extrusions, etc. Between 2007 and 2012, the US Dept. of Commerce introduced countervailing duties on Chinese goods 17 times. Over $7 billion of the products subjected to additional tariffs are exported each year on average. In 2012 China was forced to appeal to the WTO court to get Washington to revoke the unreasonable trade barriers. In 2014, the WTO court ruled in Beijing’s favor. The WTO decision states that Washington could not legally prove that the Chinese exporters are state agencies. For this reason, the so-called countervailing duties could not be imposed against those companies. In other words, the WTO court essentially recognized that China has a market economy.

This entire story is very reminiscent of the events surrounding the decision to grant the yuan reserve currency status. In early 2015, Washington issued a stern warning that the yuan would not be awarded such status. But on Nov. 30, 2015 the International Monetary Fund decided to include the yuan in its basket of reserve currencies.

For the rest of the year the issue of the status of the Chinese economy (is it «market» or «non-market»?) will dominate the relationships between China and the EU and the US and the EU. If China wins its new status during that period, it will find it easy to challenge the US grip on the European market and then become the EU’s biggest trading partner. However, this will only happen if Washington is unable to foist the transatlantic partnership agreement upon Europe. If China is not awarded the official status of «market economy» by December 2016, this will raise the tricky question of the legal basis for China’s remaining in the WTO. Time will be the decisive factor here.

Events of recent days prove that the trade conflicts between Beijing and the West have become more inflamed. On April 18 the ministers and trade officials of more than 30 countries gathered for a meeting organized by Belgium and the OECD. At the meeting they discussed the problem of overcapacity in the global steel industry, which is triggering a drop in prices for ferrous metals and doing serious damage to steel businesses in Western Europe and the US. China took part in the meeting but was raked over the coals by representatives of the West, who demanded that Beijing reduce its capacity and stop subsidizing its ferrous metal industry. The US delegation was responsible for the loudest accusations at the meeting. It is crystal clear that Washington is trying to scrape together a unified Western front to fight China’s «non-market» trade expansion. So far nothing is working. But as the fateful date of Dec. 11, 2016 nears, the trade conflicts between China and the West will only heat up, and the US will pour oil on that fire trying to undermine trade relations between Europe and China.

UPDATE. It became known that on May 12 the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly against granting China the market economy status. Once again, the non-market status of Chinese economy can be used as a weapon by trade protectionists.

For Obama, whose foreign policy successes look pathetic even compared to those of his predecessor George W Bush, it is vitally important that he finishes his presidency with a bang, especially since, by his own admission, prospects for the future of the TTIP will be extremely uncertain once the White House changes hands.

And it is not even that Donald Trump, who is openly critical of the global ambitions of the current American elite, has a chance of becoming president. There will also be problems should Hillary Clinton become president, even though, like Obama, she represents the interests of transnational corporations and is a great believer in the idea of US global dominance. The election campaign currently underway in the US has already shown that the electorate is willing to place the interests of the US as a nation state above the imperial ambitions of the elite and large corporations. Trump is not the only one to have expressed this trend, there is also Bernie Sanders and even, to some extent, the number two in the Republican race, Ted Cruz. Even if she wins, therefore, Hillary Clinton will be forced to take this point of view into account, particularly as it will only gain her supporters over time.

Europe’s leaders (with the exception of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UK Prime Minister David Cameron, perhaps) are also not full of enthusiasm at the prospect of their countries becoming colonial appendages to a US monopoly, especially as the majority of countries in Europe also have elections coming up. So if Obama actually succeeds in concluding the TTIP, he will be able to feel like a winner. Along with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement signed between the US and 11 countries of the Asia-Pacific region in October 2015, the outgoing US president will be able to take credit for creating a hugely powerful American-centric system that engulfs the whole of Eurasia from the West and the East and subordinates a number of developed or successfully developing national economies to American (or rather multinational) capital, with a view to the strangulation or subsequent subordination of those countries left out of the TTIP and TPP – primarily China, Russia, India and a number of others.

In addition, America’s attempts to create the TPP and TTIP, which are designed to break the balance of interests in Eurasia completely, are taking place amid strengthening integration processes within Eurasia itself. The joint statement issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2015, during the 70th Anniversary of WW II Victory celebrations, on the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt opened up huge possibilities for uniting the economies of all the countries in Greater Eurasia. And the process of India and Pakistan’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as fully-fledged members (with the possibility of Iran also joining the SCO in the near future) that began in July of the same year simply complete these integration processes.

Moreover, the integration initiatives in Eurasia are not limited to the EEU, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the SCO. In this context, the Eurasian initiative of South Korean President Park Geun-hye, Kazakhstan’s ‘Nurly Zhol’ programme and Mongolia’s Steppe Route project are also worth mentioning. The fundamental difference between all of these projects and the TTP and TTIP projects being promoted and financed by the US is as follows. The main objective of the TPP and TTIP (besides subordinating the member countries’ economies) is to impede the economic growth of the leading Eurasian countries, primarily China and Russia, and prevent their integration into the Asia-Pacific Region and Eurasia. Thus the TPP and TTIP initiatives are exclusive, they deliberately exclude America’s main economic and political rivals. In contrast, the EEU, the Silk Road Economic Belt, the SCO and all the other projects and initiatives mentioned above are by definition inclusive. They are not only open to participation by all the countries in the region, but would simply be unrealisable if just one of the countries located in an area where major infrastructure projects were being implemented was unable, for whatever reason, to take part.

And here we see the following picture. In addition to creating certain frameworks that are under the complete domination of the US (and thereby working for the completely hopeless goal of preserving the unipolar world order), forces that have no interest in the realisation of inclusive integration processes in Eurasia are attempting to directly torpedo these initiatives. If we were to compare a map of the hot spots in Eurasia with a map of the Silk Route’s proposed routes, for example, we would see that most of the trouble spots are located along these routes (along with the routes intended for the development of other integration projects), as well as at the junctions and the most crucial points.

These include the territorial disputes (between China and its neighbours in East and Southeast Asia, for example, or between India and Pakistan), ethnic conflicts (in Myanmar, Nepal and the Pakistani province of Balochistan), civil wars (in Syria or Ukraine), and direct foreign military intervention (in Afghanistan and Iraq) that have placed these countries on the brink of collapse, piracy in the Strait of Malacca and the Horn of Africa, and much more. And it can hardly be considered a coincidence that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (which is undoubtedly being orchestrated by forces outside of the country) once again flared up just when the situation surrounding Iran (which, until recently, was one of the main obstacles to Eurasian integration) was beginning to more or less get back to normal. We should also mention here the enormous efforts of foreign (primarily American) NGOs in Central Asia, where a huge number of conflicts and potential conflicts are lying dormant or smouldering. And thus we get a complete picture of how, in addition to engulfing Eurasia in its own projects, the US is seeking to weaken the continent’s unity in favour of the old principle of ‘divide and rule’.