Transnistria – Strategic Culture Foundation https://www.strategic-culture.org Strategic Culture Foundation provides a platform for exclusive analysis, research and policy comment on Eurasian and global affairs. We are covering political, economic, social and security issues worldwide. Sun, 10 Apr 2022 20:53:47 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.16 Moldovan Government Rides Roughshod Over National Laws https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/09/09/moldovan-government-rides-roughshod-over-national-laws/ Sat, 09 Sep 2017 08:45:00 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2017/09/09/moldovan-government-rides-roughshod-over-national-laws/ A total of 57 Moldovan servicemen have arrived in Ukraine to take part in NATO exercise Rapid Trident starting this week. The troops were sent according to a government’s decree, despite the fact that President Igor Dodon, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Force, had vetoed the move. The president has twice prohibited the military to participate in the exercise. He has accused the government of violating the law on state security. The pro-Western government led by Prime Minister Pavel Filip says the participation in the exercise will contribute to the soldiers' better training for the KFOR mission in Kosovo.

Rapid Trident is held on September 8-23 at the International Peacekeeping Security Centre near Yavoriv, Ukraine. It involves approximately 1,800 personnel from 14 nations, including Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Italy, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and the US. The training event coincides with the war games known as «Zapad» (the West) to be held in in Belarus as well as in Russia′s Kaliningrad region and other north-western areas.

The president demands the resignation of Deputy Minister of Defence Gheorghe Galbura. He has ordered an investigation launched into the fact of insubordination. Igor Dodon says that as a neutral state Moldova should not take part in exercises of any bloc. The government’s action defies the country's legislation. The Constitutional Court of Moldova will be asked to pass a decision on the matter.

Actually, the Moldovan servicemen taking part in the exercise are deserters and should face trial. They went AWOL with their weapons. Ukraine welcomed the lawbreakers on its territory and even let them take part in the exercise! Those who defied the president’s order should face justice. It strikes the eye that nobody in the West has condemned the Moldovan government or the Defense Ministry’s officials giving illegal orders in flagrant violation of Moldovan law. Can anybody imagine the servicemen of leading NATO members openly refusing to carry out the orders and doing their own thing?

The conflict between the president and the government comes against the background of rising tensions in Moldova's breakaway region of Transnistria. In open defiance of President Dodon’s position, the government of Moldova has called on the United Nations to discuss the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the breakaway Transnistria region at the upcoming 72nd session of the General Assembly to open on September 12. Russia considers the Moldova’s letter to the United Nations as another hostile action.

In July, Igor Dodon condemned the parliament’s declaration on withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, accusing the pro-Western lawmakers of trying to worsen relations with the Russian Federation. The parliamentary resolution was not approved unanimously. Transnistria’s legislators condemned the declaration. The Moldovan parliament failed to take into account the opinion of the people who live in Transnistria.

According to Moldovan MP Vladimir Tsurkan, the president will go straight to the people to make them rise in protest. The Socialist Party, which is enjoying the highest rating, will address the issue at the September 24 rally. The protests against the government violating  the national law may lead to snap election.

Victor Stepanyuk, the chairman of the National Socialist Party of Moldova, believes the government’s actions are a gross violation of the constitution. The rally organized by the Socialist Party may turn into massive protests. President Dodon has also said he could take people to the streets. He believes that the government wants to make the Moldovan military an informal part of NATO. He does not exclude the possibility of holding a referendum of turning Moldova into a presidential republic.

According to Prosperity Index 2015, Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. The World Bank believes that poverty in Moldova is widespread and endemic. With the observer status in the Eurasian Union (EAEU) granted in April, 2017, there are lucrative prospects for deepening trade and economic cooperation between Moldova and the EAEU within the concept of an «EU-EAEU common economic space». After all, the association agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova in force since 2014 does not exclude the possibility of creating a free trade zone between Moldova and third parties. Article 7 of the Eurasian Economic Union also provides for the possibility of establishing such free trade zones. It does not prevent the member states of the Union to sign other international agreements. Moldova stands to gain much by getting closer to Russia and the EAEU. The Moldovan people realize that. Nothing prevents their country from grabbing the promising opportunities.

According to the study conducted in June, 2017, in case of immediate parliamentary elections, 48, 2% of Moldovans would vote for the Socialists’ Party supporting its former leader Igor Dodon, while 26, 7% would vote for Maia Sandu’s Action and Solidarity Party (PAS). Other parties would get less than the required threshold. 38, 5% of Moldovan citizens trust Igor Dodon the most, followed by Maia Sandu (17, 3%). Other politicians like PM Pavel Filip could not get more than 3, 7% of people’s trust.

49% of Moldovans want a President with bigger power. Only 29% want a clearer separation of powers. In terms of foreign policy, 57% think Moldova should be closer to Russia and only 43% think it should closer to Europe and the West. Asked what they would for in a referendum, 48% of the respondents said they would vote for Moldova to join the Eurasian Economic Union. Only 40% would vote for joining the EU. Some 65% would vote against joining NATO, while 21% would vote for joining the military alliance.

The election victory of Igor Dodon in late 2016 shows the Moldovan people favor the development of good neighborly relations with Russia. The parliamentary elections scheduled in Moldova for autumn 2018 will play a crucial role. The Socialist Party has a good chance to strengthen its position in the parliament, increase its influence in Moldovan politics and turn the tide to improve the deteriorated Russo-Moldovan relations.

 

The West can turn a blind eye on the violation of the constitution in Moldova by its own government. The executive can take further steps to challenge Russia and get closer to NATO. The main thing is that this policy is not supported by the people of the country. The efforts will go down the drain and the provocative actions will not be productive. The only thing the pro-Western government can get is a snap election to make it a thing of the past.

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Moldova Presses Russia over Transnistria: What Next? https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/08/28/moldova-presses-russia-over-transnistria-what-next/ Mon, 28 Aug 2017 07:45:00 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2017/08/28/moldova-presses-russia-over-transnistria-what-next/ The government of Moldova has called on the United Nations to discuss the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the breakaway Transnistria region at the upcoming 72nd session of the General Assembly to open on September 12. A letter from the Permanent Representative of Moldova to the UN, Victor Moraru, was forwarded on August 22, calling the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria «a threat to international peace and security».

The Russian Federation has stationed about 1,200 troops in Transnistria in accordance with the «Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova» signed on July 21, 1992 by the presidents of Russia and Moldova in the presence of Transnistria’s leader. Transnistria, a largely Russian-speaking region, broke away from Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Its relations with Moldova’s central government in Chisinau have been tense ever since. In 1992, a bloody armed conflict sparked, with civilian casualties estimated in hundreds on both sides. The truce ended a war between pro-Russian forces and the Moldovan military.

Besides the peacekeepers, there are also around 800 Russian military personnel who guard ammunition depots near Kolbasna settlement left over from the days of the USSR. Their scrapping and removal started in 2001, but was blocked by Transnistria’s residents in 2004 amid deteriorating relations with Chisinau.

In 2008, NATO's Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution urging Russia to «withdraw its illegal military presence from the Transnistrian region of Moldova in the nearest future». Since 2014, after conflict erupted in Ukraine, Moldova has banned Russian military from crossing its territory and the Russian Aerospace Forces from landing at the airport in Chisinau.

In November 2016, the defense ministers of Moldova and Ukraine concluded an agreement on the organization of a «green corridor» for the withdrawal of Russian troops, together with weapons, from the territory of the Transnistrian Republic. It was perceived by Moscow as a provocative move as neither Russia nor Transnistria had been consulted.

On May 2, the Constitutional Court of Moldova declared unconstitutional the presence of Russian soldiers on the territory of the Transnistrian region of the republic. On July 30, the Government of Moldova called the Russian peacekeepers «a factor in the freezing of the Transnistrian conflict».

In July, Moldova's parliament adopted a declaration, asking Russia to withdraw its troops from Transnistria. The move came a day after the Moldovan Foreign Ministry warned the military aircraft with Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin on board was not allowed to land in Chisinau for a visit to mark the 25th anniversary of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Transnistria. Andrei Neguta, the Moldovan ambassador to Russia, was invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin expressed a firm protest against the Moldovan government’s decision to declare Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin a persona non-grata.

The official emphasized that Russia has been consistently working to develop good relations with Moldova in the past few years. In contrast, Chisinau’s irresponsible steps are aimed at deliberately undermining bilateral relations.

Moldova’s President Igor Dodon condemned the declaration on withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers adopted by the parliament, accusing the pro-Western lawmakers of trying to worsen relations with the Russian Federation. He also claimed that such a decision could only come from «outside Moldova», presumably referring to Romania. Romania's Prime Minister Mihai Tudose and several Romanian ministers were in Chisinau on July 21 – the day the resolution was passed – for a joint government meeting with the Moldovan executive. 

The parliamentary resolution was not approved unanimously. «This is a serious violation of common sense. At least allow us to look at it properly», Socialist MP Vlad Batrancea said in parliament. «We believe this is a geopolitical provocation», he added. The lawmakers from the opposition Socialist Party left the parliament’s meeting in protest.

Transnistria’s legislators condemned the declaration, adopted by the Moldovan parliament. The Transnistrian authorities also strongly oppose the Moldova’s plan to withdraw Russian peacekeepers. During 25 years, the peacekeeping mission has been a success. There have been no clashes. After all, nobody else but Moldova insisted on an international peacekeeping force in 1992.

Russia considers Moldova’s letter to the United Nations requesting the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Transnistria as another hostile action. Russia's ambassador to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya, has objected to the Moldovan government's call for the UN to discuss withdrawing Russian troops at the next month's General Assembly session. He believes the «sudden move» was «not very friendly», especially in view that Moscow had not been warned in advance of this request. The Russian representative to the UN also said that this initiative of Moldova would not contribute to the 5 + 2 talks on Transnistrian settlement.

There is a very important aspect of the problem to be mentioned here. Chisinau puts forward the argument that the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit included the commitment by the Russian Federation to withdraw from Transnistria by December 31, 2002. It fails to mention the fact that the agreement was linked to the provisions of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) that limited NATO and Warsaw force disposition in Europe. The treaty was never fully observed by NATO as it kept on expanding. In 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the treaty, and on 10 March 2015, citing NATO's de facto breach of the CFE, Russia formally announced it was completely halting its participation in it as of the next day. The treaty has become history today, it’s not effective anymore. It’s worth to emphasize that the Istanbul document does not rescind the 1992 truce accord.

There is no doubt that the Moldovan letter is an element of the propaganda war to be used by the West in its effort to paint Russia as an «aggressor». Ukraine will use the opportunity for attacks against Russia.

And now, last but not least. Neither the Moldovan government, excluding the president, nor the parliament has mentioned the need to take into account the opinion of Transnistrian people. After all, they have the right for self-determination. The Moldovan letter to the United Nations includes everything but the right of the Transnistrian people to decide their own fate. Should Russia abandon them?

Is there any guarantee there will be no armed conflict sparked right after the Russian military personnel’s withdrawal? If Russia leaves and innocent people die again, will Moldova take on responsibility? Will it be ready to admit its guilt? Is there any other OSCE member but Russia willing to dispatch peacekeepers to Transnistria and shoulder the expenditure? Is there any progress on finding a solution to the problem through talks? Finally, is Moldova ready to provide answers to all these questions at the United Nations General Assembly’s session in September?

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Moldova to Become Foothold for US Military https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/08/10/moldova-become-foothold-us-military/ Thu, 10 Aug 2017 09:45:00 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2017/08/10/moldova-become-foothold-us-military/ The former Soviet republic of Moldova may actually become yet another foothold for the US military in Europe. The US Naval Facilities Engineering Command Europe Africa Southwest Asia (NAVFAC EURAFSWA) plans to construct eight training facilities for military operations in urban terrain at the Bulboaca training base in Moldova. The fact that the US Navy Department is involved makes believe the facility will host American Marines.

A total of $1.6 million has already been invested in the renovation of the Bulboaca base located near Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria or the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. The largely Russian-speaking region broke away from Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The secession led to an armed conflict that ended in a ceasefire in July 1992. Russian troops were deployed to the conflict zone in accordance with the «Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova», signed in 1992 by the presidents of Russia and Moldova in the presence of Transnistria’s leader.

Today, 450 Russian servicemen are carrying out the peacekeeping mission in accordance with the decisions of the 1999 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) summit. Besides the peacekeepers, Russia holds units of the 1,200-strong Operative Group of the Russian Forces residing in Transnistria. The Transnistrian authorities strongly oppose Moldova’s plan to withdraw Russian peacekeepers, whom they see as guarantors of peace in the region. They point out that the mission has proved to be highly successful. The 25th anniversary since the start of the peacekeeping operation was marked in July.

Since 2005, talks on Transnistrian peace have been held in the so-called «5+2 format», which includes Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine, plus the European Union and the United States in external observers’ roles.

Moldovan President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Igor Dodon stepped in to suspend the implementation of the plans to build a US military facility in Bulboaca, saying the move was not approved by him. The president said he will examine the issue. Meanwhile, the US stopped financing the project.

Anatol Șalaru, acting leader of the Party of National Unity and ex-Defense Minister, said he is going to sue President Dodon for undermining national security as the US suspended the $12, 7 military aid to modernize Moldova’s military through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program.

Moldova closely cooperates with the US and NATO. It joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and the Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2006. A NATO liaison office is to open in Chisinau soon.

Since 2016, Moldova has been included in a US regional program to build «more formidable defense capabilities… against aggressive actions by Russia or from other sources». Areas targeted include «border security and air/maritime domain awareness, as well as building stronger institutional oversight» of defense ministries. Last March, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the commander of US Army Europe, said that military engineers would head to Moldova as the US looks «for ways to do more exercises in the southern flank of NATO». 

In February, the US donated 41 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and trucks to the Moldovan Army. The military vehicles would be used during national and international exercises. In 2014, the US donated some other 39 HMMWV and 10 trailers for the military vehicles.

On July 24 — August 5, the base hosted the Dragoon Pioneer 2017, joint drills of US and Moldovan troops. Army Maj. Gen. John L. Gronski, Deputy Commanding General for Army National Guard, US Army. Europe, visited Moldova to watch the training event.

In late July, the Moldovan parliament passed a declaration demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. The resolution was supported by deputies from the ruling coalition led by the Democratic Party, as well as representatives of Liberals and Liberal Democrats. The lawmakers from the opposition Socialist Party left the meeting in protest. Moldovan President Igor Dodon condemned the parliament’s decision, calling it a provocation.

Moscow expresses concern over the Moldovan policy in Transnistria. Russian military personnel movements are obstructed by Moldavan authorities. In late July, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin was barred by the Moldovan government from flying to Transnistria in a military plane to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Russia's deployment of peacekeepers there. Russia retaliated by halting imports of Moldovan farm produce, depriving Europe's poorest country of a key market for its wine, fruit and vegetables. In early August, Moldovan authorities declared Rogozin persona non grata. Actually, the relations had begun to worsen much earlier after the expulsion of five Russian diplomats in May. President Igor Dodon believes that the government embarked on provocations against Russia in order to complicate relations.

Moscow has accused Moldova of undermining their relations and threatening regional stability. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement reads: «High-ranking Russian representatives and peacekeepers but also ordinary citizens of both countries have recently become targets of provocations. It seems that Chisinau politicians are trying to get to the forefront of the hysterical and hopeless campaign that has been launched against the Russian Federation». It adds that dangerous actions may have a serious destabilising influence on the general situation in the region and Europe as a whole. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moldova’s decision to ban Rogozin was «much worse» than even the new tough US economic sanctions on Russia.

The US military presence is expanding everywhere, including areas in the proximity of Russia’s borders, such as Transnistria. This is a very dangerous development to make US forces and Russian peacekeepers watch each other through gun sights. Moscow and Chisinau may have different views and divisions but it does not make them adversaries.

With Russian peacekeepers gone, the situation would exacerbate and a spark would be enough to restart the hostilities – something that has been prevented since 1992. By hosting US-operated facilities on its territory, Moldova, a neutral state, will become a target for a Russian retaliatory strike. Parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Moldova in November 2018. Hopefully, the voters will make the right choice, electing more responsible people to end incessant provocations and adopt a more reasonable foreign policy. If the hopes come true, Russia and Moldova will become friends and good neighbors again.

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Why PACE has turned its gaze toward post-Soviet conflicts https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/05/30/why-pace-has-turned-its-gaze-toward-post-soviet-conflicts/ Fri, 29 May 2015 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2015/05/30/why-pace-has-turned-its-gaze-toward-post-soviet-conflicts/ As has been reported, last April the Monitoring Committee met during the spring session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.  A special subcommittee was created at that meeting – the Ad hoc Sub-Committee on Conflicts between Member States of the Council of Europe.  This new entity, which will be directly responsible for looking into so-called «frozen conflicts» in the former Soviet Union, should have official status and begin its work in June.  It met for the first time in Paris on May 27.

The new subcommittee was set up as part of the PACE Monitoring Committee and will, as reported on its official website, cooperate closely with it, in order to explore any «situation in which active armed conflict has been brought to an end, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolves the conflict to the satisfaction of the combatants». Thus it is no surprise that it was the head of the assembly’s Monitoring Committee, an Austrian by the name of Stefan Schennach, who spearheaded the establishment of the subcommittee on conflicts between Council of Europe member states.  The was the same gentleman who took it upon himself to send an observer mission to the Crimea to investigate the humanitarian situation there, as well as any potential violations of human rights.

PACE also particularly emphasizes that the new structure will not become yet another mechanism for resolving conflicts, but will aim to use the elements of parliamentary diplomacy in order to support the existing mechanisms for mediating strife.  

The list of conflicts cited by an anonymous staffer on the freshly minted subcommittee is quite interesting.  Initially those would include Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, northern Cyprus, Transnistria, and Crimea.  In addition the new organization might focus on the conflict in eastern Ukraine – pending developments in that region.

None of this seems particularly striking, especially given how any bureaucratic institution loves to «spawn offspring.»  Of course the work of its «mother» – the PACE Monitoring Committee, which is responsible for verifying the fulfillment of obligations assumed by members of the Council of Europe – is more directly linked to the post-Soviet states.  The issues emanating from the regions in conflict (and those areas are certainly not universally regarded as being «in conflict») regularly assume the form of bitter debates, while the elites of the post-Soviet nations are being subjected to manipulation by foreign actors.  Any pan-European structure such as the OSCE, in some way or other finds itself faced with a vast landscape, from the republics in Novorossia – the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) – to Nagorno-Karabakh, but the OSCE’s work has been the recipient of … how shall we put it … very mixed reviews.  

«Like other international organizations, we will not talk about the larger issues that fall within the context of conflict resolution, but will focus on the more specific aspects of that process,» stated Stefan Schennach.  The idea of inter-parliamentary cooperation, including with representatives from the legislative bodies of unrecognized or semi-recognized states, is becoming more popular in Europe.  Perhaps this will make it possible to offer individual gestures of humanitarian assistance, but it will hardly resolve the conflicts themselves – although it can’t hurt …

Some of the events associated with the emergence of this new entity support this not overly optimistic premise and are also linked to the «initial» list of conflicts that will be the object of its focus.  So, the obvious crisis of the Eastern Partnership project suggests that a legitimate subject of discussion might be a kind of safety mechanism that would enable Europeans to keep abreast of what is happening, including the aforementioned «specific aspects.»  The Armenian political scientist Stepan Safaryan, who is spearheading the subcommittee on frozen conflicts, suggests that PACE wants to create some leverage for itself, adding that Strasbourg does not currently have that capacity.  He stated, «The committees previously created to address this issue drafted reports and offered assessments, which had some impact on the political processes.  Now PACE wants to restore that capacity by creating a specialized structure.» 

This desire is of course entirely understandable, viewed through the lens of geopolitical logic, as well as bureaucratic.  However, it should not be forgotten that for Russia the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts are no longer an issue: that question was put to bed on Aug.  26, 2008, and since then Moscow has been building its relationships with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, recognizing them as independent subjects of her foreign policy.  Also, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali are taking part, as independent entities, in the Geneva format of consultations on security in the Caucasus, and it is not yet clear how the new structure will be able to help there.  According to Irakli Khintba, the head of the Expert Department of the Presidential Administration of Abkhazia, the new structure’s hypothetical recommendations will not apply to Abkhazia.  Abkhazia is not a member of PACE.  In addition, the representative from Abkhazia pointed out that that agency’s actions toward the republic have always been overtly hostile, adding, «We remember how PACE repeatedly demanded that Russia withdraw its recognition of Abkhazia, the bias with which it assessed the Russian-Abkhaz Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership, and the one-sidedness and hostility we saw in their reports on the situation in Abkhazia.» 

In turn, the deputy director of the Caucasus Institute, Sergei Minasyan, expressed doubts about the viability of the idea itself, recalling that at one time the Turkish minister for EU affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, tried to create a similar subcommittee, but it shut down within a few years because the Armenians took no part in its work.  It is possible that the new subcommittee will suffer the same fate.

In a similar vein, when and if PACE discusses «the conflict in Crimea,» it is not clear what there will be to say – that region is a constituent part of the Russian Federation, and any attempts to exert external influence there without Moscow’s consent (which, as we know, is no longer involved in PACE’s work) cannot be seen as anything other than interference in Russia’s internal affairs.  Suffice it to recall the failed attempt by an OSCE mission to force its way into Crimea with obviously dubious objectives, in early March, ten days before the referendum vote on the peninsula.  According to Jean-Claude Mignon, who reported to the Council of Europe about the status of Ukraine’s commitments, the work of the new PACE subcommittee on frozen conflicts should be consistent with OSCE’s experience in this area.  It would be unfortunate if the «inter-parliamentary cooperation» occurring under the aegis of PACE and its new committee knowingly took the low road …

And the additional involvement of any of PACE’s entities in the conflict in the Donbass could have a positive impact only if it adheres to the spirit and the letter of the Minsk agreement, fully taking into account the position of the power structures in the DPR and the LPR.  Should that occur, the instruments of parliamentary diplomacy could help to unify the parties’ positions and encourage Kiev to officially reject militant rhetoric and actions (which, incidentally, seems unlikely at present).  

Finally, given the many problems within the Council of Europe itself (in Belgium, Spain, Great Britain, etc.), such excessive attention to post-Soviet conflicts seems out of proportion, and in addition may have any number of causes and repercussions.  There is a real question as to whether European institutions sincerely wish to pursue a constructive path: otherwise PACE would not have remained indifferent to the blockade of Transnistria, which has lasted for many years and has now become extremely punitive.  At the same time, Russia could incorporate some of Europe’s more innovative practices and strengthen her inter-parliamentary contacts with de facto state entities she does not recognize (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, northern Cyprus, and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics).  Obviously the history and civilization of all of these places, with the exception of northern Cyprus, are inseparably linked to Russia, and none need to be in the safekeeping of PACE.

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West Incites Tensions on Dniester Shores https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/05/27/west-incites-tensions-on-dniester-shores/ Tue, 26 May 2015 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2015/05/27/west-incites-tensions-on-dniester-shores/ Bucharest and Chisinau have announced their intention to form a joint military unit. Defence Minister Viorel Cibotaru visited Romania on May 19-20 to meet his counterpart Mircea Duşa. Summing up the results of the talks, Viorel Cibotaru said «Moldova supports the expansion of military cooperation with Romania and regards this country as a strategic partner». The Minister said the both sides took a decision to form a joint battalion. The statement of Moldova’s Defense Ministry states, «The both sides plan to use the vast experienced gained by Romania military during multinational peacekeeping missions and combined exercises». Ukrainian and Polish military are also expected to join the formation. 

So, that’s what we have – a joint (allegedly peacekeeping) battalion to include the military of Romania, Moldova, Poland and Ukraine will be formed to conduct operations on the shores of the Dniester River. The peacekeeping mission has been carried out in the region by Russian peacekeeping forces for more than 20 years. The Ukrainian Parliament on May 21 voted to unilaterally scrap the military cooperation agreements with Russia. In particular, it backed Ukraine’s withdrawal from the accords that regulate military transportation between Ukraine and Russia.

Romania's government plans to increase its defense budget over possible tensions on its eastern borders with Ukraine. Prime Minister Victor Ponta announced plans for defense expenditure, which are to grow from 1.36% of GDP (2014) to reach 1, 7% in 2015 and 2% by 2017. Supported by the United States and the European Union Romania is trying to form an anti-Russia alliance to include Poland, a NATO member, Moldova and Ukraine. 

In 2009 Poland and Romania signed the Strategic Partnership agreement which envisioned rendering support to Ukraine and Moldova in their efforts aimed at European integration.

Poland’s and Romania’s top diplomats Grzegorz Schetyna and Bogdan Aurescu met in Warsaw on April 29. The both officials emphasized they had a common view on the conflict in Ukraine. Mr. Schetyna noted that the parties discussed new prospects for military cooperation with plans to involve Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and some Balkans states into the process. 

Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine announced their intention to form a joint brigade last September. Troops assigned to the formation will be housed at its headquarters in Lublin, Poland. The Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian unit will consist of 4500 troops (3500 thousand men from Poland, 600 from Ukraine and 400 from Lithuania). Plans call for the force to be fully operational by 2017 with preliminary joint drills scheduled for later this year. An anti-Russian military alliance is being formed to stretch from the Black Sea to the Baltics. 

The Russian peacekeeping troops in Transnistria are an obstacle to hinder the implementation of the plans. The territory is a kind of enclave inside the south-eastern part of North Atlantic Alliance’s zone of responsibility. The independent Transnistria is like a bone in the throat of Romanian unionists. The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic Transnistria has three official languages: Russian, Moldovan (in the Cyrillic alphabet) and Ukrainian. Moldova switched to the Latin script in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the republic in 1989-1993. There are differences in the vision of the contemporary situation and the past. Chisinau believes that Marshal Antonescu, a Hitler’s ally, was not a military criminal, but a national hero struggling for reunification of Moldova with Romania. Streets in the cities are called after him. 

The supporters of re-unification (the idea espoused by Antonescu which envisions the accession of Moldova) in the Romanian parliament have formed a 41 strong group called the Friends of the Union. It includes 41 MPs. Meanwhile only between 7.5 to 15 percent of Moldovans favor unity with Romania – a figure which has remained the same for the past decade. For comparison, a union is supported by 76 percent of Romanians, according to an IRES poll in 2013 – and no major candidate in Romania’s presidential elections last year risked ruling it out. But historical precedents become tricky when it comes to which pieces of land could join Romania. The Friends of the Union cherish the plans to also accede Bessarabia – the region which includes areas north and south of today’s Moldova, which are now in Ukraine. They don’t say it out loud for the time being not to scare Ukrainians. The issue of returning Bessarabia is gradually coming to the fore. Meanwhile Romania keeps on assuring Kiev that it will join in fighting Russia and attack the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

The plan to push Russian peacekeepers out from Transnistria is being implemented. An information war has been unleashed against Tiraspol. The government of Transnistria is accused of violating democratic freedoms and pursuing independent non-government organizations on the territory of the republic. Some of the NGOs operate in Moldova getting funds from Romania. They maintain close ties with Romanian special services. Western media outlets have a list of issues to make come to the fore: the persecution of non-government organizations in Transnistria, the presence of Russian peacekeepers there, the economic failure of Transnistria and the «influence of the Kremlin». The Chisinau regime is painted as a force able to rectify the situation and restore democracy. Dozens of NGOs have already approached Chisinau asking to step in and use diplomatic pressure. 

In pursuit of its geopolitical aspirations the West uses to its advantage the conflict still smothering in Ukraine. The cease-fire agreement is far from bringing enduring peace. The attempts are undertaken to increased pressure on Moscow and incite tensions in Transnistria. The decision to form a Moldova-Romania «peacekeeping» battalion is another step on the way to reach the goal. 

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NATO Eyes Transnistria https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/09/14/nato-eyes-transnistria/ Sat, 13 Sep 2014 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2014/09/14/nato-eyes-transnistria/ This is an election year in the United States. There will be new faces in the House of Representatives and Senate in November. Elections in the United States are being held throughout 2014, with the general elections scheduled for Tuesday, November 4, 2014. During this midterm election year   all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 33 of the 100 seats in the United States Senate will be contested; along with 38 state and territorial governorships, 46  state legislatures (except Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and Virginia) four territorial legislatures and numerous state and local races. An important event to influence US domestic affairs and foreign policy. 

The US «war party» eyes Moldova and Ukraine to be used as staging areas for offensive actions the same way Georgia was in August 2008 before the presidential election. Bellicose rhetoric was heard in March 2014 as the Congress was involved in heated debates over the next fiscal year’s budget. The war party wants to avoid the sequester, especially the army cuts, boost the military presence in the Baltic and Black Sea and have boots on the ground in Ukraine. It also wants Europeans to shoulder higher military expenditure losing billions of dollars as they from suspended contracts with Russia (Mistral-class amphibious assault ship deal suspended by France and Germany suspending the contract for equipping the Russian training center in the town of Mulino in the Volga region). The hawks would like Sweden and Finland to speed up their NATO entrance while the West broadens and toughens sanctions against Russia.  

US military experts have been reported to appear in Moldova and Ukraine. Headed by General Major Key Randy Allen, the Director, Strategy and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany, the 180 strong team came to Ukraine by the end of July and was involved in the operations against Donetsk and Lugansk self-defence forces. All servicemen are reported to be seasoned warriors with Latin American and other experiences behind. Many of them are reported to come through an expedited Ukrainian language training course. The $70 million United States military aid offers rations, radios, concertina wire, first-aid kits and limited supplies of body armor. Formally the package does not include arms. But much of the assistance is still in the pipeline, including such important items as night-vision goggles. The United States has also promised to train 700 members of Ukraine’s National Guard. This program is scheduled to get underway in 2015. Administration officials say they are considering a number of options, such as providing the Ukrainians with reconnaissance drones, counterbattery radar to pinpoint the source of enemy artillery fire, and Javelin antitank weapons. The State Department has been careful not to rule out expanding at least some types of assistance. In July The U.S. Congress passed a bill, whereby Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia can obtain the status of allies of the U.S. without a NATO membership. The bill is proposed by Robert Corker, the ranking Republican on the Senate foreign relations committee. If it passes into law, Senator Corker’s bill – the «Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014 – could precipitate a distinctive, new US approach toward Russia and the wider post-Soviet space.   The bill proposes «Major Non-NATO Ally» (MNNA) status for Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, and closer interaction by US Armed Forces with these three countries plus Azerbaijan. Specifically, it calls for increasing military exercises and training efforts as well as bolstering security assistance from both the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). MNNA status would benefit Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova by providing access to US defense sales and military advantages on a similar level to that currently enjoyed by NATO-member countries. On July 24, nine members of the House of Representatives – including members of both parties – introduced the Ukraine Security Assistance Act of 2014 to provide MNNA status to Ukraine and to commission a report by Secretary of Defense Hagel assessing Ukraine’s military capabilities, with the intent of providing up to $100 million for weapons and training. Procedurally and legally, the realization of MNNA status is relatively straightforward in comparison to full membership, which requires a two-thirds Senate majority. The bill fails to give details on how the US will encourage and help aspirant countries – especially Georgia – with further NATO integration. The existing law merely requires Washington to «encourage» NATO to create a European Partners Security Fund to support the provision of expanded Alliance trainings, as well as provide assistance for the armed forces of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and other key non-NATO countries. 

About the time the US military instructors arrived in Ukraine Kiev launched a mobilization and demanded the Russian peacekeepers out of Transnistria. American instructors are also reported to be present in Moldova. According to the sources from the Socialist Democratic Party, Americans started to train the country’s national armed forces for combat actions conducted by the Republic of Moldova 

Ukrainian expert Dmitry Tymchuk wrote on July 31, «We must clearly make up our mind regarding Transnistria. For a long time, Ukraine has actively participated in resolving the «Transnistrian issue.» Kyiv has always considered, and continues to view Transnistria as a territory of Moldova… This is the Kremlin’s springboard for acting against our state. In the future, Ukraine must make every effort to restore Moldova’s control over this territory. Without this control, Transnistria is like a Russian landmine near Ukraine, biding its time until it blows».

On August 4, 2014 the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying, «Coordinated actions by Moldova and Ukraine to implement the economic and transport blockade of Transnistria in the attempt to force it to climb down in the negotiation process, refuse from foreign policy priorities will cost the escalation of the situation around this region.

In parallel, at summit level Kishinev makes appeals for the removal of Russian troops, another splash of discussions regarding the need to change the status of the peace-keeping operation on the Dniester, to transform it into some civil mission is observed. Against this backdrop, the degree of discussion within the framework of the Joint Control Commission is raised artificially. Under the pretext of Ukrainian events, they create obstacles for communication with the left bank of Dniester through the Ukrainian territory. There are threats of denunciation of respective Russian-Ukrainian agreements. Throws of disinformation into the mass media regarding alleged supplies of weapons from Transnistria to the conflict area in the South-East of Ukraine continue. The works to build an excavated anticrossing ditch in the Transnistrian section of the Moldavian-Ukrainian border, which Kiev started «for security purposes», provokes escalation of tensions.

As we warned our partners in the negotiation process – Ukrainian, OSCE representatives, as well as OSCE and European Union observers – today all the mentioned trust-destroying actions can become a deadlock in the negotiation process. Kishinev and Kiev should be aware about their direct responsibility for the potential negative consequences of the step they make to spin the situation. As to Russian peacekeepers, they ensure security in the area of their responsibility on an international legal basis and a respective mandate. They fulfil their mission in good faith and unselfishly. They are strong not because of their number, but because of the trust they have earned among the population. Any non-constructive actions aimed at destabilisation of the situation in the region, any attempts to squeeze Russian forces, which are part of Joint Peacekeeping Forces, from Transnistria, will be perceived as unfriendly actions against Russia, which disrupt the foundations of the peace-keeping operation on Dniester and are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Agreement on friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova». 

Late August-early September the tensions were rising high over the Transnistria issue. On September 11 Ukraine’s deputy Internal Affairs Minister Sergey Chobotar said that the soldiers of machardie (National Guard) armed formations and the volunteer company of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine will be stationed in the Odessa region. He explained that this resolution is approved subject to «possible armed risks from Transnistria.» Military preparations are on the way in Romania. On September 5 Romanian edition Click! offered a video clip with armor unites advancing to the Ukrainian border. (2,3). Click! reported that a train with armor medical vehicles and army trucks came to Ploesti at the distance of 180 km from Romania-Ukraine border. The edition asked a question, «Are we preparing for a war with Ukraine?» There is no definite answer as yet. 

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«Eurointegration Is a Myth»… https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/05/01/eurointegration-myth/ Wed, 30 Apr 2014 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2014/05/01/eurointegration-myth/ The rapid unfreezing of old conflicts at the initiative of the West and the accelerated creation of new ones in the Balkan-Black Sea-Caucasus region require the closest of attention. Hopes that the Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and other nations can rid themselves of the dangers that threaten them by making concessions to Washington and Brussels are becoming an illusion. The next signal of this type could come from Transnistria.

In recent days Bucharest has taken a course toward aggravating the situation in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. Romanian President Traian Basescu attacked Russian President Vladimir Putin for his words that Transnistrians «should be allowed to decide their own fate»… Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta, for his part, has promised the Moldovan government all possible assistance in resolving the Transnistrian problem.

This harsher rhetoric from the Romanian leaders comes on the backdrop of internal political scandal. Prime Minister Ponta has stated that the telephones in his own office have been wiretapped, and he hinted transparently at the possible involvement of his main political opponent, President Basescu. The cause of the scandal was the appearance of the transcript of a telephone conversation on corrupt dealings on the Internet. The conversation allegedly took place in the Prime Minister's office. In response Ponta stated that he is moving his residence to the building of the Defense Ministry and expressed his confidence that such a step would foil any similar «attempts by Traian Basescu».

In November there are to be parliamentary elections in Romania, and the intensity of the confrontation is growing by the hour, especially on the backdrop of the economic crisis in the country. Therefore, a hard line on the problem of Transnistria could become the hobbyhorse on which each of the Romanian politicians will try to ride into parliament, and at the same time «wash away» the scandals in which they are involved.

Not satisfied with striking a public blow against Traian Basescu, the Romanian prime minister addressed the Moldovan government, essentially giving it carte blanche in its actions with regard to Tiraspol. «We unwaveringly support the legitimate government position of the Republic of Moldova,» he promised, once again emphasizing the firmness of Romania's «European path».

The Romanian prime minister made this statement having observed the large-scale military exercises in the central part of the country. Incidentally, his opponent Traian Basescu is no less active in «pouring oil on the fire» of the Transnistria conflict, preferring, however, to speak in terms of international law. In Basescu's opinion, the position of Russia and the Russian president in particular on the situation in Transnistria violate the «principles of international law and the fundamentals of the security system in Europe». He did not mention, however, that the modern Moldovan state itself arose as a result of the unilateral actions of Chisinau after the adoption of a declaration of sovereignty in June 1990 and a document on state independence in August 1991. 

A catalyst for the pumping up of nationalist hysteria in Romania is the precipitous collapse of statehood in neighboring Ukraine, which raises the question of the fate of the Romanians living on the territory of Ukrainian Bukovina… Meanwhile, sober analysis tells us that the problem of Transnistria must be resolved first of all based on respect for the will and desires of the residents of the region and in the interests of their safety. In the early 1990s, Transnistrians experienced firsthand the «European values» which the Greater Romanian nationalists are forcing on them. Hope in «united Europe» is even more naive today, when Brussels is patronizing the very same nationalists who have seized power in Kiev and who have become the main threat to the Ruthenians, Hungarians, Romanians and other peoples living in Ukraine.

The following was written in the newspaper Panorama, which comes out in Moldova: «So-called Eurointegration is a myth, as no one is going to accept either Ukraine or Moldova into the European Union. Brainwashed politicians from the ruling coalitions in Kiev and Chisinau can stand in front of the mirror and practice autosuggestion all they want: 'We are Europeans… We are Europeans… We will be offered the prospect of membership… We will be offered the prospect of membership… We will be accepted into the EU… We will be accepted into the EU…'; however, no one plans to accept these countries into the European Union. But Ukraine, Moldova, Russia and Europe will all have to pay a real price for this myth. Everyone can blame one another for what is happening and look for scapegoats, but for some reason Eurointegration, which people said would bring with it only the best and make the Ukrainians and Moldovans happy, is accompanied by great misfortunes for enormous territories and for the tens of millions of people living there»… 

There is a date in the Moldovan political calendar, as in the Romanian calendar, which could become a catalyst for the «unfreezing» of the Transnistrian conflict: November 30, 2014. This is the day when parliamentary elections are to be held in Moldova. The ruling pro-Western coalition needs to show voters something which can distract them from the raging socioeconomic crisis, the thievery of politicians and the absence of any prospects of Moldova being accepted into the EU.

In the mid-2000s the World Bank officially declared Moldova the poorest country in Europe according to gross domestic product per capita. The current government is in no condition to change this. In such a situation, a «small, victorious war» with the support of NATO member Romania could very well capture the imagination of Moldovan radical nationalists. However, aggression against Transnistria will be a fatal move for Moldova: in this case it will turn into the same kind of failed state as Ukraine looks like today in the eyes of the entire world.

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Transnistria Libre! https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/04/01/transnistria-libre/ Tue, 01 Apr 2014 04:06:05 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2014/04/01/transnistria-libre/ The good news is that Secretary of State John Kerry is meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Paris – the bad news is that the negotiations will come to naught if the US insists on upholding its black-and-white narrative, which depicts Russia as the "aggressor" and Ukraine as the blameless helpless victim.
 
What’s interesting about the diplomatic encounter is the nature of Russia’s proposals: a federal system for Ukraine, which allows for greater autonomy for eastern and southern Ukraine, recognition of Russian as one of the official languages, and – especially baffling for Western observers – guarantees for Transnistria’s Russian-speaking population.
 
Transnistria?
 
Those who wish to research the burning Transnistrian Question are handicapped from the very beginning because, among other unresolved issues surrounding this weird little strip of land bordering Moldova and ethnically Russian southern Ukraine is what to call it: there are at least three or four different names for this curious string of territory that snakes along the eastern bank of the Dniester river. The region declared independence in 1992, the immediate impetus being the Soviet collapse, which coincided with a drive within Moldova for union with Romania.
 
Filling the vacuum once occupied by the Romanian Communists, a pan-Romanian movement, motivated by virulent nationalism, was rapidly gaining influence. The pan-Romanists demanded a single official language – Romanian – and the end of political autonomy for geographically concentrated minority ethnic groups. From now on, declared the central Moldovan government, all official business – including instruction in state-supported schools – would be conducted in the sole official language, i.e. the Roman alphabet. That action reversed the old Soviet laws, which had banned the Roman alphabet and decreed all official texts must be in Cyrillic. This ethno-linguistic tug-of-war pretty much encapsulates the post-Soviet history of the entire region.
 
The Moldovan language edict was the initial impetus for the Transnistrian revolt, but the real issue was a fear Moldova would soon merge with Romania in order to realize the ancient dream of Romanian ultra-nationalists: the creation of "Greater Romania." Transnistria, unlike the rest of Moldova, had never been part of Romania, and the Russian and Ukrainian majority – some 60 percent – had no desire to be a part of the "Greater Romania" project. Fighting broke out, and, with the support of the Russians, Transnistria held a 1990 referendum in which 96 percent voted for independence – as in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and now Crimea. Igor Smirnov was elected President.
 
The Moldovan response was to launch attacks on the rebellious republic, which were quickly repulsed: however, the Moldovans kidnapped Smirnov and other separatist leaders on Ukrainian territory and jailed them in the Moldovan capital. Smirnov and the others were released only when Transnistria blockaded the rail line bringing in vital supplies from the east.
 
Boris Yeltsin intervened, at this point, signing an agreement with the Romanians that granted autonomy to Transnistria and also granted it the right to self-determination if and when Moldova decided to merge with Romania. The merger project, however, receded into the background as the "Greater Romania" ultra-nationalists began to lose influence in Moldova – and also Romania – due to the rapidly worsening economic situation in the region. The grandiose plans of the Greater Romanians faded as Moldova careened into utter privation, and the prospect of joining up with dirt-poor Romania seemed less attractive: a referendum overwhelmingly rejected union with Romania.
 
This did nothing to reassure the Transnistrians, however, who suspected Yeltsin and the Russians might sell them out for the right price. Transnistria contains most of what had formerly been Moldova’s light industrial and energy facilities, which the central government was eager to get its hands on. In spite of guarantees of "special" autonomy in the Moldovan constitution under the new administration, the Transnistrians insisted on dealing with the Moldovans in state-to-state terms. To heck with the Moldovan constitution, they averred – which could be changed if the right-wing nationalists came back into power – they wanted a treaty. This the Moldovans steadfastly refused – and the conflict has been "frozen" in place ever since.
 
As in virtually all such post-Soviet "frozen conflicts," history, ethnicity, language, and economics combine in a mosaic of extreme complexity – one not given to cold war era dichotomous thinking. Does anybody really have an easy and just solution to the Transnistrian Question, mired as it is in a tumultuous history of bloody wars, pogroms, and feuds that started in the 14th century? In all of these conflicts – from Crimea to Abkhazia – the clear-cut roles of aggressor and defender blend into one another and all efforts to construct a narrative that puts Russian-speakers in the wrong and Moldovans (or Ukrainians, Poles, etc.) in the right run aground on the rocky shoals of history and moral ambiguity.
 
Yet there is John Kerry, sitting in Paris with Lavrov even as I write, presuming to decide, among other things, the fate of Transnistria. As if we could ever know enough about that impossibly complicated part of the world to make even a qualified judgment.
 
Lavrov is now insisting on a "federal," i.e. highly decentralized system granting a great degree of autonomy to southern and eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is also demanding an end to efforts to make Ukrainian the sole official language, as well as calling for the coup leaders to rein in the right-wing militias, which have taken the place of the police in Kiev.
 
Neither Washington nor Moscow has any business determining Ukraine’s internal political arrangements. Yet it is Washington, in its deployment of "soft power" against the democratically elected government of Viktor Yanukovich, that bears the onus of having provoked this kind of interference by Moscow. The Kiev coup was bought and paid for by the West, which poured money and who-knows-what-else into the Ukrainian opposition – unleashing ultra-nationalist forces like Svoboda and Right Sector and their violent provocations. The Ukrainian "crisis" is entirely the creation of Washington and its "democracy promotion" strategy of pursuing regime-change in the states of the former Soviet Union.
 
What’s more, the Russian proposals are clearly in line with libertarian principles – and yes, this is truly shocking to those who still think a nation’s domestic political character determines and defines its foreign policy. Yet the undeniable truth of the matter is that the decentralized federal system advanced by Lavrov maximizes the liberty of local communities and minimizes the power of oligarch-run authorities in Kiev to plunder the provinces. Conservatives in the US who invoke states rights as a bulwark against an overweening federal government need to think twice before denouncing the Lavrov proposal.
 
As we have seen in the case of Transnistria, the language question is a major problem in southeastern Europe, and the libertarian solution – guarantee linguistic liberty to ethnic minorities – is specified in the Russian proposals. In America, ballots and other official documents are in multiple languages: why is this multicultural approach suddenly abandoned whenever the issue involves Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union?
 
Support for these two important principles – decentralism and multi-lingualism – are what distinguishes genuine libertarians of Ukrainian extraction from Ukrainian nationalists who share with Svoboda and Right Sector a pathological hatred of all things Russian. Don’t be fooled by the latter.
 
This doesn’t mean, however, that the US government should impose these principles, together with Russia, on the peoples of the region. Let the Ukrainians negotiate with the Crimeans, and if they want to involve the Russians that’s their business. We, on the other hand, have no business interfering in this squabble.
 
Why oh why should the long-suffering people of Transnistria – who have lived under the Romanians, the Nazis, the Soviets, and the Moldovans – be forced to read, write, and speak Moldovan? Why must they use the Roman alphabet rather than Cyrillic letters? Does the United States really have a vital interest in deciding this burning question? Is it worth risking the start of a new cold war with nuclear-armed Russia?
 
These are the high weeds we wade into whenever we interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, and they don’t get much higher than in places like Transnistria, Ukraine, and Russia’s "near abroad." The danger here is we lose our way in this wilderness of competing ethnicities and catch ourselves on a tripwire that leads to a wider conflict for which we – and the world – are unprepared. The only rational course for the US to take is to turn back – before it’s too late.
 
NOTES IN THE MARGIN
 
You can check out my Twitter feed by going here. But please note that my tweets are sometimes deliberately provocative, often made in jest, and largely consist of me thinking out loud.
 
I’ve written a couple of books, which you might want to peruse. Here is the link for buying the second edition of my 1993 book, Reclaiming the American Right: The Lost Legacy of the Conservative Movement, with an Introduction by Prof. George W. Carey, a Foreword by Patrick J. Buchanan, and critical essays by Scott Richert and David Gordon (ISI Books, 2008).
 
Justin Raimondo, original.antiwar.com
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Transnistria: Accidental Sparks May Flare Smouldering Conflicts https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/07/21/transnistria-accidental-sparks-may-flare-smouldering-conflicts/ Sat, 20 Jul 2013 20:00:03 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2013/07/21/transnistria-accidental-sparks-may-flare-smouldering-conflicts/ On July 17 Romanian President Traian Basescu paid an official visit to Chisinau to discuss Moldova’s EU integration and stronger bilateral cooperation. Ahead of departure he told reporters, «Our priority is to ensure Moldova’s EU integration with the upcoming 10-12 years». He added, «This will contribute to the two countries’ unification». According to him, the main obstacle for Moldova’s EU integration is the Dniester region conflict that remains unsettled. Mr. Basescu admitted that Romania and Russia have different approaches to the Dniester conflict settlement. «Moscow sees Moldova as a federal state, while we as unitary, but finally only Chisinau can define the level of autonomy for the Dniester region», he explained.

Trayan Basesku received a warm welcome by government officials and organizations like the Union Council, which was created to «gather all unionists» in order to «promote the idea of Romanian national unity». The organization had prepared a list of initiatives aimed at achieving the proclaimed goal. However, not all share the jubilation. The street protests in Chisinau and other cities also added to the picture. On the eve of the event, the leader of Moldova’s Communist Party, the largest political force in the country, Vladimir Voronin, accused Romania of pursuing aggressive policy. «Basescu does not recognize Moldova’s sovereignty and evades the signing of agreements on friendship and cooperation with us as well as on border», he said. Leaders of other parties and non-governmental movements also opposed the Romanian President’s visit. Arthur Reshetnikov, former security minister and a member of Communist party said Basesku doesn’t recognize Moldova as an independent state. He planned to question the legality of the military cooperation treaty concluded last year between the countries in the Constitutional Court. The Russian Youth League and the Patriots of Moldova oppose the military cooperation agreement too.

Military aspect

Indeed, just before the Romanian President’s visit a group of Moldavian MPs made known they planned to appeal to the national Constitutional Court the treaty on defense cooperation between Moldova and Romania. In April 2012 Romania and Moldova signed the intergovernmental agreement on military cooperation. Back then Romanian Minister of National Defence Gabriel Oprea said», Concluding this agreement on military cooperation will contribute to the development of the special relations between our armies, relations that are founded on a partnership having a European vocation». He emphasized the fact that Romania would go on supporting the European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Republic of Moldova and would provide the necessary expertise. Romania's Ministry of National Defence will also continue to train and prepare the military staff of the Republic of Moldova (and indoctrinate the officers as these things go hand in hand, that’s what NATO schools are for after all). Moldovan Defense Minister Vitalie Marinuta then pointed out that the treaty was a continuation of the military accord signed by the two states in 1992 as he said, «updated as required by the new circumstances in the past 20 years, Romania joining the NATO and the EU included».

The treaty includes such fields as defence planning, the management of human resources, joint drills, coordination of command structures activities and military intelligence. At first glance there is nothing hostile in team exchanges and joint training events, except that in practice it means Romanian aircraft could fly over the area of the Russian military contingent’s positions. Actually the document opens the way for Romania to deploy troops on Moldova’s territory. NATO will have boots on the ground in the area bordering Transnistria – a NATO beachhead in the area controlled by Russian military, an OSCE peacekeeping component. At present. A three-party (Russia, Moldova, Transnistria) Joint Control Commission supervises the security arrangements in the demilitarized zone, comprising twenty localities on both sides of the river. To my mind, the military treaty between Romania and Moldova has a serious provocative element. In 2008 the Georgian aggression against Russian peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia did not bring up the possibility of involving NATO. Now with Romanian troops in the area an incident may become a spark to start a fire, a casus belli nobody wants. Romania is a full-fledged NATO member openly stating its intentions to gobble up Moldova, a sovereign state, and, perhaps go further. By no stretch of imagination it could be considered as an impartial party in the Transnistrian conflict.

In October 2012 Russia’s popular Nezavissimaya Gazeta reported the Chisinau authorities were planning to deploy a NATO military base in the Moldovan territory with reference to Vladislav Finagin, chief of the Transnistrian committee for state security (KGB). (1) He said that the Bulboaca military training center (near Chisinau) is being prepared for unfolding a NATO base there, «According to the information available with us, Moldova’s governing Alliance for European Integration is seeking to introduce an amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova that would permit deploying foreign military bases in the Moldovan territory».

Vladislav Finagin explained that «the authors of the said constitutional amendment mean NATO. The Bulboaca exercise ground is being appropriately equipped, and its territory is being prepared for accommodating a NATO base», and that «last half a year, Chisinau has been actively strengthening its military component with the help of the United States and Romania». Back then the paper remarked that it was exactly in response to this trend that Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador-at-Large Sergei Gubarev stated in Tiraspol on October 13 that «in case the Republic of Moldova loses its sovereignty or neutrality, the Russian Federation shall return to the question of realization by Transnistria of its right to self-determination». Finagin also said that in the near future Moldovan laws would be amended to invite NATO. «According to our information, the ruling alliance in Moldova is trying to introduce changes in the Constitution, which allow deploying foreign bases in the republic. The range ground in Bulboaca is being equipped appropriately, the area is being prepared for a NATO base», the chairman of the KGB said in an interview with the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper. «During the last six months, Chisinau has been strengthening the military constituent with the help of the United States and Romania. Specialists of these countries prepare special units of the Interior Ministry and Information and Security Service of Moldova», said Finagin. Let me note the Moldova’s state officials never these affirmations.

Tensions running high

The escalation of tensions between Moldova and the break-away Transnistria region has been causing concern in neighbouring Romania, as well as the EU and NATO. It started already on March 2013 in particular; the Republic of Moldova unilaterally decided to establish migration control of citizens in the six checkpoints without proper coordination at the bilateral or multilateral international level and within the framework of the Joint Control Commission. The decision imposes limitations on the citizens of Russia, living in Transnistria (about 150 thousand people) and forming one-fourth of Transnistria’s population. The Moldovan authorities said they did it in order to establish order on the future eastern border of the European Union, which Moldovan plans to join.

Tensions increased during the night of April 26-27 in the security zone of the Republic of Moldova. In their turn the Transnistrian authorities installed two checkpoints between the village of Varnita (a commune that remains controlled by the Moldovan government) and the city of Bender (controlled by the separatist authorities of Transnistria). The action led to clashes between Moldovan civilians, who tried to remove the checkpoints, and the Transnistrian militia, who intervened to stop them. The conflict was brought to an end by the Unified Control Commission.

* * *

Moldova’s constitution states that it cannot join an international military alliance. During the Romanian President’s visit the voices were raised again calling for amending the clause. The idea started to float since February 2011, when Moldovan Defense Minister Valeriu Marinuta declared that joining NATO is crucial to gaining European Union membership, demonstrating that discussing a membership in the Atlantic alliance is no longer a taboo subject in his country. The very same year, the Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) published a provocative analysis in 2009 written by the Chisinau-based Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) precisely entitled: «In NATO we Trust: Why Moldova should join NATO». Every now and then incumbent Moldovan president Nicolae Timofti has declared his interest in increasing ties with NATO. It may not be an entry right now, but gradual integration by getting closer with Romania militarily. For the past several years, Moldova has sought the replacement of the present peacekeeping operation in the region, in which Russia participates, for a civil mission of observers. There is a chance that this policy is likely to sooner or later usher in political stand-off and willy-nilly move the situation to the brink of military conflict nobody wants, it can be sparked by incident.

A recent opinion poll from Moldova (April 2013) uncovers 81 percent of the surveyed population believe that the country is not governed by the will of the people and 84 percent affirm that the country is heading into the wrong direction; 82 percent of the respondents are also not happy with how the country's ruling administration is dealing with the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. No foreign policy can lead to success without the support of grassroots. I hope the Moldovan leaders realize this simple and evident fact. There is one more thing to ponder. The Transnistrian conflict can be resolved if Moldova joins the Eurasian Economic Union (EurAsEC) where the nation now has an observer status. (2)

Endnotes and remarks:

1. The Russian original text of the article – http://www.ng.ru/cis/2012-10-16/1_pridnestrovie.html. In English the issue was covered extensively by Pravda.ru media outlet – http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/19-10-2012/122512-moldova_transdniestria-0/
2. The opinion expressed in the piece is strictly persona and does not represent any other position but the author’s.

Fotо: www.rferl.org
 

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Romania: Shale Gas and Geopolitics https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/04/19/romania-shale-gas-and-geopolitics/ Thu, 18 Apr 2013 20:00:01 +0000 https://strategic-culture.lo/news/2013/04/19/romania-shale-gas-and-geopolitics/ Twenty Romanian cities have been hit by the protests against the government’s decision to start shale gas extraction. The method used is hydraulic fracturing, which means the propagation of fractures in a rock layer by a pressurized fluid. It’s not safe for environment. The manifestations have spread to the neighboring Bulgaria. Those who sympathize with the Romanian demonstrators went to the streets of Dobrich, the ninth most populated city in Bulgaria, the administrative centre of Dobrich Province and the capital of the region of Southern Dobrudzha. If shale extraction starts in Romania, the city and its hydro resources will be affected… 

It’s a long time since the shale gas development is an issue on the radar screen of East European media. It hits the agenda in Sofia, Warsaw. Vilnius and Kiev, making the gas controversy be openly tainted with anti-Russian tones. 

Victor Ponta, the Prime-Minister of Romania, thinks the Russia-supplied gas is overcharged and shale gas extraction is the only way to guarantee energy security for the country. The energy security is declared to be the key priority of the government’s agenda for 2013. The authorities have decided not to extend the shale gas development moratorium and have started cooperation with Chevron, the second-largest integrated energy company in the United States. The Romanian protests have taken place under the «Chevron, go home!» slogans. 

The West does its best to strengthen its influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The US insists the East European allies switch over to shale gas extraction instead of Russian pipeline supplies. It promises technical support and expertise sharing. The US Energy Information Administration estimates that Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary have combined technically recoverable shale gas deposits of 538 billion cubic metres. Ukraine granted shale gas exploration rights to US Exxon Mobil and British Shell in 2010. 

Chevron has a concession covering 600,000 hectares in the eastern Barlad region. The company also has three concessions in the Dobroudja region, near the Bulgarian border. Tom Holst, Chevron Romania country manager, does his best to gain a foothold in the East European market. According to him, only shale gas development could achieve energy independence for the Romanians. Lithuania is in talks with Chevron too. 

Bucharest thinks the main obstacle on the way of becoming «Greater Romania» is Russia and the presence of its peacekeepers in the Trans-Dniester Region. The Romanian unionists are quite successful in their efforts in a number of areas: they promote the idea of the national unity along the both coasts of the Prut River, conduct activities to discredit Tiraspol, build Romanian churches on the territory of Ukraine, and call upon Moldavians to recognize national unity with Romanians. But they hit snags while tackling energy issues. In reality, Romania needs Russian gas, but this need is presented as a threat coming from Russia. 

In Moldavia Romanian funds spur information war against those who support the idea of Moldavians being a separate nation and the fact of Russian military presence in the Trans-Dniester conflict zone. While holding talks on the Trans-Dniester problem, Bucharest fluctuates between Washington and Brussels on the one hand, and taking independent stand acting through Moldavia and Ukraine on the other. With the plans of the Trans-Dnieper annexation to Moldavia failed, the Romanian special services incite discontent with Chisinau among the Trans-Dnieper population, hoping to finally thwart any effort to make the Trans-Dnieper join Moldavia. This will to large extent ease the unification of Moldavia with Romania. 2013 is the year of Ukraine’s chairmanship in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It has made known its intent to give a new lease on life to the management of the Trans-Dnieper frozen conflict. Last year Kiev launched the demarcation of the Trans-Dnieper – Ukrainian border. The action threatens to convert the Trans-Dnieper into an economic reservation. Romania’s Foreign Minister Titus Corlгюean said the integration of Ukraine into the European Union will depend on its stance on the Trans-Dnieper issue. 

It should be noted, Ukraine has no political, economic or cultural potential to substitute Russia in the conflict area. Pushing Kiev to act against Moscow and Tiraspol, Bucharest shifts part of the burden to Ukraine. The advocates of Romania becoming a great power need a weak and pliable Ukraine unable to resist. 

Today, Kiev and Bucharest are getting closer, especially in the field of energy cooperation. Ukraine has increased its gas import from Europe through Poland to five million cubic meters per day starting April 1, 2013, reports Ukrtransgas, the Ukrainian gas transit state monopoly. This is 2.5 times the previous average amount of two million cubic meters per day.

The United States and the European Union try to create an East European bloc at the borders of former Soviet Union, which would be totally dependent of its own resources and the supplies from the Western partners. The former parts of the Soviet Union: Ukraine, Moldavia and the Baltic States are to join the ‘shale union», an association of states to be created. 

Ukrainian and Moldavian explorers have already announced they have discovered significant deposits of shale gas in Moldavia right in the vicinity of Ukrainian border. Will the Romanian government listen to the voices of those involved in civil protests? Or will it ignore the fact that a number of countries have already banned fracturing? Time will show. At present, Chevron is involved in advertisement campaign and is calling on Romanians to launch an open discussion on the issue, hoping people will see how they benefit in case shale gas extraction starts. 

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