By As`ad ABUKHALIL

The monarchical-sounding declaration by Kaïs Saïed eight days ago was stunning: the president who was freely elected in 2019 (for only the second time in Tunisian history) was basically proclaiming a coup d’etat by dismissing the prime minister and suspending parliament.

Saïed was elected nine years after the overthrow of President Zine Ben Ali, who in 1987 as the security chief launched a coup against Habib Bourguiba, the founding president of Tunisia.  The 1987 coup was classified in Arab political terminology as a “medical coup”, because Ben Ali stated that Bourguiba was no longer mentally fit to assume the duties of the office.

As is well-known, the protests against the corruption and repression of Ben Ali (a darling of Western governments and lending institutions) sparked the Arab uprisings in December 2010.

Kaïs Saïed arriving as president at Palace of Carthage in October 2019. (Houcemmzoughi, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Surprise Winner

Kaïs Saïed was an unexpected victor in the 2019 presidential election. He was a professor of constitutional law, did not belong to a political party and was not affiliated with any political ideology.

He won support in television debates largely due to his strong command of classical Arabic in a country where French influence remains strong.

Furthermore, Saïed’s campaign was noted for his firm and categorical denunciation of any normalization with Israel.  His answers regarding Palestinian rights and rejection of Israel were a hit on social media, and helped propel him to the top job.

Saïed attracted support among Tunisian youth because he represented a new genre of politicians who have not been tainted by the corrupt system.

The political system that emerged after the end of the Ben Ali rule suffered from many weaknesses; the divide between the secularists and the Islamists only widened, and the regional, political wars between the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey on the other hand, raged inside Tunisia, just as they did in Libya and elsewhere.

UAE Versus Muslim Brotherhood

The UAE regime now leads the battle against the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world, even in Palestine, for instance, where a UAE puppet, Muhammad Dahlan, a former Fatah chief, has championed the agenda of his boss, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Muhammad Ben Zayid.

The Muslim Brotherhood was probably the largest opposition group in several Gulf countries for many years until Sept. 11 convinced Gulf rulers that the elimination of any presence of the Brotherhood was essential for improving relations with the U.S. (and later with Israel).  Saudi interior minister, Prince Nayif (who questioned the U.S. government’s account of Sept. 11), loudly blamed Saudi problems on the Muslim Brotherhood.

When Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul-Nasser banned the Brotherhood after 1954 for trying to kill him, Brotherhood leaders and activists sought refuge in Gulf countries where they were given prominent positions in education, religion and endowment. The UAE even sought the help of a Sudanese Islamist, Hasan Turabi, to draft its constitution.

Essentially, Nasser represented secularism and socialism, while the Gulf regimes represented religious conservatism and obscurantism (naturally, the U.S. and all Western governments were on the side of Gulf regimes — and remain so to this very day).

After the uprising in 2010, Tunisia had a chance to establish a new democratic government. Tunisia became known as the second Arab democracy after Lebanon. (Lebanon remains the freest Arab country in terms of freedom of expression but has a political system marred by horrific corruption and sectarian allocation of government posts.)

In response to the 2010 uprisings, the UAE led the Arab counter revolution — or one side of it, as the Qatari regime and Turkey a led different counter-revolution, which sought to install the Muslim Brotherhood in power in possibly all Arab countries.

The UAE and Saudi regimes (likely with Israeli and U.S. blessings) united their efforts to:

• prevent the establishment of a vibrant democracy anywhere in the Arab world;
• thwart the electoral success of the Brotherhood in any Arab country.

By funneling money and direct intervention through various sectors of the state, Saudi Arbia and the UAE were keen on restoring the ancien regime in Tunisia.  The Gulf alliance (presumably with the West) wanted to prevent a rise of any Islamist government in the region.

Islamists Reassured the West 

April 10, 2015: Antony Blinken, then undersecretary of state in the Obama administration, meeting with Al-Nahda President Rashid al-Ghannushi in Tunis, Tunisia. 

But the Islamists quickly adjusted and reassured the West, especially about their intentions toward Israel. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood suddenly abandoned its previous calls for the elimination of the peace treaty with Israel, and the Tunisian Al-Nahda party sent its leader, Rashid Ghanoushi, to reassure AIPAC (in a talk at WINEP) that Nahda would not support the popular Tunisian demand for criminalization of normalization with Israel.

True to its word, for all the years since 2011, the Brotherhood has lowered its rhetoric on Palestine, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was part of a Syrian opposition coalition which did not harbor much ill-will toward the Israeli occupation.

Yet, no matter how much the Brotherhood has been accommodating to Israeli and Western interests, the Saudi-UAE alliance refused to accept the very existence of Islamist governments. One reason has been because the political clout of the Brotherhood reflected the influence of the Turkish-Qatari alliance, which sponsors and funds the Brotherhood in the region.

June 16, 2012: Street in Cairo during second round of Egypt’s presidential elections, where Muslim Brother’s candidate Mohamed Morsi faced SCAF/Mubarak’s candidate Ahmed Shafik. (Jonathan Rashad, Flickr, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

In Tunisia, the local variant (Nahda) won successive elections and their rule was not in any way characterized by competence or good governance.  But that was not what the UAE cared about; they just wanted to bring the rule of the Brotherhood down, by force (as in Libya) or by electoral interference as in Tunisia.  The UAE and Saudi regimes funded the most reactionary (and ostensibly secular) groups and personalities, and promoted leftovers from the ancien regime of Ben Ali, and even Bourguiba before him.

The victory of Saïed in 2019 dealt a blow to the Nahda. His victory also coincided with an economic crisis that was only accentuated with the onset of the coronavirus.  Gulf regimes withheld financial aid, except to those governments that normalized with Israel like Sudan. (Last month, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced that 60 percent of Sudanese debt to their countries would be forgiven, and that each country would provide $3 billion in aid to Sudan.)

Sudan is ruled by a military junta and the U.S. and Israel ordered Gulf countries to reward those regimes which normalize with Israel.  By contrast, Tunisia is a democratic country and people in all Arab countries (according to all reliable public opinion polls) vehemently reject any normalization with Israel.

Jan. 18. 2011: Protesters run away from tear gas during a demonstration against former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in the center of Tunis. (Nasser Nouri, Flickr, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Tug of War

The tug of war in Tunisia between the Islamist Nahda-controlled parliament and the independent president has been going on for a year.  The coronavirus and the shutdowns have strained the Tunisian economy, which traditionally relied on tourism and foreign aid.  The UAE and the Saudi regime now withhold traditional financial aid except in those cases where regimes (like Egypt) are of service to the Israeli agenda.

President Saïed contacted Saudi and UAE leaders only days before his coup, which he denies is a coup because the article 80 of the Tunisian constitution allows for emergency powers to dissolve parliament and to dismiss the cabinet in the event of a threat to the state and peace.  The president has failed to show evidence of such a threat.

It was not clear at first that this coup enjoyed foreign backing.  But it would have been close to impossible that Saïed would have dared strike at the parliament and government if he did not have the support of the Saudi and UAE regimes (and possibly the U.S.).

Within hours of the announcement of the coup, Saudi and UAE regime media published laudatory coverage and fiercely attacked the Nahda as remnants of the “terrorist Ikhwan (Brotherhood).”

The U.S. Department of State was slow in reacting to the coup and indicated the matter is purely one of political science, and that legal experts were consulted to decide if this was a coup or not.  When it comes to threats to U.S. client regimes, U.S. official experts are quick to denounce and condemn a coup.

This one enjoyed support among some of the secularist forces in Tunisia (including the leftist workers’ unions) but the secular progressives have long been tools of repressive regimes, such as Sisi in Egypt or MbS in Saudi Arabia and MbZ in the UAE.

A youth counsel suddenly emerged in Tunisia to express support for the coup; this immediately drew resonance to the Egyptian youth group, Tamarrud, which was later found to be a tool of the UAE regime to bolster support for the Sisi coup.  The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the U.S. just don’t want democracy in the Arab world.  Repressive regimes are far more convenient for their interests.

consortiumnews.com

Every Friday since February 22, the cities and towns of Algeria have seen massive demonstrations that have brought women, men, children, and old people pouring into the streets, often in high spirits but always voicing pointed political demands. What had provoked the demonstrations was the announcement by the ageing, extremely non-functioning president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, that he would seek a fifth 5-year term in the country’s upcoming elections.

On April 2, Army Chief of Staff Gaid Salah announced that Bouteflika had resigned, effective immediately. But this was not enough to satisfy the demonstrators, who turned out in equal—or greater—numbers for last Friday’s protests.

What has been going on in this large North African country of 42 million people—and what resonance might the events there have for the rest of the Middle East?

I have been to Algeria only three or four times. But I’m lucky to have close (marital) access to William B. Quandt, one of the few Americans who has studied the country deeply over many decades. In 1969, he published a groundbreaking book that studied the leadership of the country’s historic independence movement, the FLN. He followed that work on Algeria with another sole-authored book in 1998, and with contributions to several other books and papers, as well.

So in this week’s column, instead of writing my own, fairly ill-informed thoughts about Algeria, I’m happy to share the following exclusive interview I conducted with Bill Quandt about the exciting developments there:

HC: The Algeria specialist Hugh Roberts recently made some intriguing observations about the mass movement in Algeria. One was that, though Algeria has a long history of mass marches being held in various towns and cities, dating back to the independence struggle in the 1950s, this series of marches has been notable for both its peaceable nature and its gender inclusivity. How would you account for those features?

WBQ: It is true that there have been lots of small protests in recent years, usually focused on specific issues. And there was the nation-wide uprising in October 1988 that was something of a precursor to what is now happening – but it was angrier, more militant, mostly made up of young men, with lots of Islamists joining in. And it ended with a wave of violence when the army intervened.

That uprising did bring about some temporary changes – a new constitution, the end of the one-party system, a relatively free press – but when the elections in 1992 were about to be won by an Islamist party, the military stepped in and cancelled the elections, deposed the president, and soon thereafter Algeria descended into a terrible period of violence known as the “black decade”.

So now Algerians, I believe, are trying to make sure that this time their collective cry for change will be different – hence its peaceful nature, the inclusiveness, and initially just the single demand for Bouteflika to go. That brought literally millions of people into the streets on successive Fridays, and it’s not over yet. And it succeeded in achieving its initial goal. But by the time it did, the demands of the masses had grown, and now the slogan is that the whole “system” should go.

A lot of energy is now going into discussing how to find some balance point between “everything must go”, and the idea that Bouteflika’s departure is the most that can be expected in the near term.

HC: What are the next challenges the movement faces?

WBQ: The movement needs to put forward a credible road map and a group of people who can speak on its behalf during this initial period of the post-Bouteflika era. And they need to figure out how to keep the army from turning against them.

So far the army and police have been quite restrained, but there are a few worrisome signs.  Some protesters stress that the people and the army are brothers; others call for the chief of staff to leave along with all the others who were part of the old order.  The latter demand is a non-starter and will have to be abandoned in favor of working out a transition in which the army plays a part but does not dominate.

For the moment, the military is saying that the constitution should be followed by naming an interim president, which was done today (Tuesday.) Senate President Abdelkader Bensalah was chosen as expected – and he now has 90 days to organize a new presidential election, if the constitution is followed literally. This is totally rejected by most of the demonstrators, who see this as a guarantee that the new order will be “Bouteflikism without Bouteflika” – much as the Egyptian uprising in 2011 finally resulted in “Mubarakism without Mubarak.”

HC: It’s notable that in 2011, when the “Arab Spring” erupted in so many other Arab countries, it did not do so in Algeria—as we both witnessed when we were there in 2012. How do you account for that?

WBQ: I think that Algerians were still getting over the trauma of their “black decade” of the 1990s and were wary of setting off another period of intense confrontation. Also, the government had large reserves of money and they spread it around generously to buy off discontent.  Then, Bouteflika was still a functioning president – he did not suffer his stroke until 2013 – and he still had some credit for having ended the horrific violence of the 1990s. Finally, once the Algerians saw how most of the other Arab Spring uprisings were unfolding, there wasn’t much enthusiasm for following suit.

HC: Can Algeria’s democrats avoid the fate of their counterparts in Egypt, a country that has a similarly deep role of the army in controlling politics, and where the military found ways—with help from Saudi Arabia and the UAE—to beat back the democratic tide of 2011?

WBQ: This will be a big challenge, but so far the vast majority of Algerians seem willing to keep pressing for real change by peaceful means. Like the Egyptian military, the Algerian security services have been central to the choice of presidents from the beginning. But I do not get the impression that the Algerian military has such huge corporate interests as does its Egyptian counterpart. There is also the strong historical narrative of the army and the people fighting side by side for independence, and the idea that the army is a “popular” one.  But this remains the great unknown.

The chief of staff, Gaid Salah, says that the popular will should be respected, but at the same time seems to be pushing ahead with the narrowly defined constitutional procedures that will result in very little real change.

I would be surprised if the Algerian Chief of Staff were to seek the Presidency himself, as Sisi did in Egypt. I think the military will prefer a less visible, behind-the-scenes, role. Half of Algeria’s presidents have been civilians, half have been military men. By contrast, since 1952 Egypt’s presidents have all been from the military with the exception of the brief Morsi interlude in 2012-13.

HC: How can Algeria avoid the fate of Syria, Yemen, or Libya, where the schisms opened up by the “Arab Spring” resulted in horrendous, atrocity-laden civil wars?

WBQ: Several things make me think Algeria will not end up like Syria, Yemen or Libya. First of all, in each of those cases there was massive foreign intervention – sometimes in the form of foreign jihadists coming into the country (Syria), sometimes NATO military forces (Libya), and sometimes neighboring Arab forces (Yemen). In these cases there was also very deep polarization within the societies which was played upon by these foreign interventions.

For the moment, there is really little sign of any foreign intervention in Algeria, and whenever it is suspected it is immediately strongly denounced by the mass of demonstrators. Also, there are so far no ethnic or regional divisions – in fact, the national flag is regularly seen side by side with that of Algeria’s sizeable Berber minority, and slogans are often posted in Arabic, Berber, and French.

Also, the Islamist current in Algeria, which is much weaker than it was in the 1990s, is going along with the peaceful nature of the demonstrations. As in Tunisia, the Algerian uprisings are largely nationalist, secular and united in calling for democracy and freedom. Where the Algerians are less well-endowed than Tunisia is in their lack of relatively autonomous groups like trade unions and professional societies that could begin to organize the demands of the protesters.

HC: Algeria shares a long border with Libya. How does this fact affect both the role of the Algerian military in politics and the prospects for a decent political transition in Algeria?

WBQ:  Algeria is the largest country in Africa in terms of area, so it has real security issues along a very extensive border.  By and large the Algerian military has done pretty well at keeping the chaos in Libya from spilling over into Algeria, and that has given it some legitimacy.  The challenge for the demonstrators is to acknowledge that the army has played, and will play, an important part in Algeria’s future, without letting it set all the rules and choose all the ostensible power holders.

HC: Can the Algerians learn something from their neighbors in Tunisia? Can those two democratic movements be mutually reinforcing.

WBQ: Many Algerians have a tendency to look down a bit on Tunisia, but I think that they have been paying attention to the relative success of the Tunisian transition from autocratic rule to a semi-functioning democracy. In addition, there has been good security cooperation between the two countries in the border area. In recent years, many Algerians have gone to Tunisia on vacation – it is nearby, inexpensive, and culturally familiar, but with touristic accommodations that far outstrip those in Algeria. They come back quite impressed with their neighbor to the east. So yes, the Tunisian example is a plus. But the main difference is that Tunisia never had a very strong or politicized army. Algeria does.

HC: Do you see any outside powers playing any significant role—for good or ill—in affecting the course of Algeria’s move towards democratic accountability and reform?

WBQ: France, the old colonial power, is the one country that always casts a shadow over developments in Algeria. Bouteflika was strongly supported by successive French governments because he brought stability and clamped down on the Islamists. In recent weeks, the French have been careful to say that they will not intervene in Algerian politics, but even little remarks in the French press can set off alarm bells in Algeria.

There is also some suspicion that the rich Gulf Arab states, who hate the idea of a new round of “Arab Spring” uprisings that might produce more demands for freedom and democracy, are eager to subsidize a transition from Bouteflika that results in no real change. Finally, some Algerians look for what the United States might do or say, but so far they are seeing and hearing nothing. Algeria is not on the very small radar screen of the Trump Administration – and that is probably a good thing.

mondoweiss.net

Last month, a U.S. Africa Command spokesperson confirmed in a Task & Purpose report that Marine Corps Raiders were involved in a fierce battle in 2017 in an unnamed North African country, where they fought beside partner forces against militants of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AFRICOM acknowledged that two Marines received citations for valor but withheld certain details, such as the location—undisclosed due to “classification considerations, force protection, and diplomatic sensitivities.” The command also said the Marine Special Operations unit was engaged while on a three-day train, advise and assist operation. However, subsequent research and analysis strongly suggest U.S. involvement runs much deeper. In fact, the dramatic events described in the award citations obtained by Task & Purpose align with those that took place in Tunisia, which has been combatting a low-level insurgency in its western borderlands for the past seven years. Evidence indicates the battle occurred at Mount Semmama, a mountain range in the Kasserine governorate, near the Algerian border. There, the United States sustained its first casualty in action in Tunisia since World War II.

While not of the same magnitude, the events that AFRICOM confirmed took place on Feb. 28, 2017, echo a disastrous ambush less than seven months later in the village of Tongo Tongo, Niger. In that battle, members of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara killed four Army Special Forces soldiers and four Nigerien partners. U.S. partner forces engaged militants of AQIM’s Tunisian branch, the Uqba ibn Nafaa Battalion (KUBN) in a firefight, which resulted in the killing of one militant. The engagement also necessitated a request for air support to rout the militants. The jihadis then attempted to flank the joint U.S.-Tunisian force from the rear, forcing the Marines to return fire. While engaged on the ground, U.S. forces were also part of the air-support component. When a Tunisian soldier manning an M60 machine gun aboard a helicopter sustained wounds after being shot twice by militants returning accurate fire, a U.S. Marine Raider took control of the machine gun to maintain suppressive fire against the militants and simultaneously treated the wounded Tunisian soldier. The Marine Raider unit and their Tunisian partner force each sustained one casualty in the battle, both of whom recovered from their wounds. At the time, local media reported the incident without alluding to any U.S. participation.

Eventually, Tunisian forces secured the site of the battle and seized an Austrian Steyr AUG rifle, ammunition, and other supplies. Two jihadis were killed in action: a Tunisian and an Algerian. The latter was a veteran insurgent who was wounded a decade earlier by a U.S. airstrike while fighting under the banner of Al Qaeda in Iraq, according to a biographical note published by Al Qaeda’s North African affiliate. However, any U.S. involvement in connection to his death was never mentioned.

The United States has maintained a military presence in Tunisia for at least four-and-a-half years, rendering it unlikely that the events of Mount Semmama were an isolated incident limited to a mere advisory role, as the AFRICOM spokesperson claimed. The battle involving U.S. troops occurred amid an intense campaign aimed at dislodging militants from their mountain stronghold. Eleven days before the jointly conducted U.S.-Tunisia operation, another operation had taken place at a nearby location at Mount Semmama, also resulting in the killing of two militants. It is presently unknown whether U.S. troops participated in the preceding operation. It remains an open question as to whether the knowledge of the U.S. encounter in Kasserine would have eventually surfaced had Task & Purpose not filed a Freedom of Information Act request. It was that request which prompted AFRICOM’s release of the partially redacted commendations for valor awarded to two Marine Raiders for their actions at Mount Semmama.

Since its 2010 revolution, Tunisia has carried a burden of expectations as a regional model for democracy, challenged with building political consensus, a staggering economy, a population yearning for progress, and rising security challenges. In this context, the United States has sought to sustain Tunisia’s shaky democratic transition primarily by shoring up its military, which received steadily increasing security assistance from 2014 to 2017. Tunisia now receives more U.S. defense aid than any other country in North Africa and the Sahel region, except for Egypt.

The U.S. military presence has been continuous since February 2014, when the Pentagon deployed a team of several dozen special operations troops to a remote base in western Tunisia. Tunisian soldiers accompanied by U.S. military advisors have on at least one occasion discovered and observed a populated militant camp in Kasserine. In the years since, the Air Force component of AFRICOM has frequently flown intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions across Tunisia from bases in Sigonella and Pantelleria, Italy. In the wake of the March 2015 terrorist attack at the Bardo Museum in Tunis, U.S. forces provided operational assistance to a counterterrorism operation targeting core members of KUBN in the town of Sidi Aich, Gafsa. U.S. staff and drones have also operated out of the Sidi Ahmed Air Base in Bizerte.

The U.S.-Tunisia partnership in the military and security domain is multifaceted. It is composed of defense capacity-building, strengthening border security, and as is so often emphasized, training partner forces in counterterrorism strategies and tactics. However, the questions of U.S. troops and drones operated out of Tunisia have been a source of polemic and its sensitivity should not be underestimated. American foreign policy is generally unpopular and unfavorable attitudes toward the United States are widespread in Tunisian society. For instance, in 2012 protesters outraged by an anti-Islamic short film ransacked the U.S. embassy and set fire to a nearby American school in the capital of Tunis. More recently, the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital triggered a wave of protests across Tunisia. The issue of U.S. military presence has also sparked controversy, being the subject of heated debates at the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, Tunisia’s parliament. On numerous occasions, there has been pressure on President Béji Caid Essebsi and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed on the matter of national sovereignty. Furthermore, the revelation of the clash in Kasserine eighteen months ago testifies to a deeper level U.S. involvement on the ground than AFRICOM is willing to admit. The details of the 2017 battle at Mount Semmama contribute to a slowly growing public understanding of the expansion of covert and overt military action on the African continent, where the United States is secretly at war.

nationalinterest.org

Roughly, 8-11 thousand jihadi fighters come from Maghreb countries. The numbers vary according to different estimates. Some of the militants will lose lives on the battlefield, some will lay down their arms, but a large part will continue the efforts to reach the coveted goal of establishing a caliphate. With the battle experience received in Syria and Iraq, these seasoned fighters will pose a great threat to the stability of their respective homelands.

It has already started. Algeria faces a security challenge. The war against jihadism has turned Algeria into one of Africa’s top military powerhouses. In the past 20 years, Algeria has spent more on its military than all three of its immediate neighbors — Mo­rocco, Libya and Tunisia — com­bined.

Algeria is a country with a 1,200 km coastline. If waves of asylum seekers hit Europe from there, the Old Continent will be in real trouble. Besides, the country is a key supplier of oil and gas to the West. The implications of internal conflict in Algeria could be a real nightmare. Russia helps to prevent it and, thus, save Western Europe.

At least 6 thousand of IS fighters are Tunisians. Some of them hold prominent positions in the IS and the Nusra Front (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) in Syria. Many Tunisian extremists are affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is active in a half-dozen countries across North Africa. Tunisia is at odds over what to do if and when they come home. These fighters would have the capabilities and cultural familiarity to potentially create a formidable and sustained destabilizing force in Tunisia. Meanwhile, Tunisian security forces break up one IS recruiting cell after another.

Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco face threats from the East as well as from the South, where they have to counter the emerging «Sahara-Sahel Front». Islamists from Mali, Niger and Mauritania are regrouping to expand the zone of influence. For instance, Al-Qaeda militants have recently attacked a Malian army post near the border of Burkina Faso.

In North and West Africa, Al Qaeda is on the rise again. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has withstood the chokehold of the Algerian security services, US drones, and the French-led intervention in Mali, to launch a range of attacks in recent years, whether storming a beach resort in Ivory Coast or conducting a low-level insurgency in northern Mali.

A number of terrorist groups operating in Mali and neighboring areas – Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, the Massina Brigades, the Sahara Emirate – united this February into one organization called Nusrat-ul-Islam. The newly formed group pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah, al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the leader of al-Qaida's North African franchise Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are challenged by the IS. In November 2016, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara was formed, led by Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.

The IS militants may regroup in the war-torn Libya. This country is probably the weakest link among Maghreb states. Defense officials have said the hardline Sunni Muslim militants are considering moving their headquarters to that country. A US military intervention is an option. According to Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, head of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, «The instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant near-term threat to U.S. and allies’ interests on the continent». Russia has been asked to intervene by Libyan political and military leaders.

The armed forces of Maghreb countries are getting prepared. The Moroccan military has just held exercises Flintlock-2017 with the US. Weapons systems, like, for instance, Russian Mi-28N Night Hunter attack helicopters, are procured to make the counterterrorist operations more effective. On March 15th, 2016, King Mohamed VI visited Moscow to sign several important agreements, including the agreement on mutual protection of classified information on military and military-technical matters and the declaration on the fight against international terrorism. Morocco is interested in strengthening its military capabilities with Russian weapons.

Last year, Russia provided Algerian and Tunisian authorities with intelligence and military aid to strengthen counterterrorism efforts. The package included Russian high-resolution satellite imagery of key Algerian border crossings with Tunisia, Libya, Chad and Mali. The imagery has enabled Algerian authorities to thwart several attempts by terrorists and insurgents to infiltrate Algerian borders. Algeria has shared this data with Tunisia.

Russia has close military cooperation with the states of the region. A country with a significant Muslim minority, about 10% of its popula­tion, it has been battling jihadists in the Caucasus for a number of years. It understands the problem and has vast experience to share. Unlike the US and other Western powers, Russia does not accompany its aid with lectures about human rights or political demands pushing for «democra­tic reforms». As Rus­sian armaments have proven themselves on the battlefield, it seems likely that Maghreb governments under terrorist threat will increasingly turn towards Moscow.

Today, Islamists of all kinds, especially the IS, are emerging as a very serious threat for the United States, its NATO allies and Russia. Despite the existing differences on Ukraine and a host of other issues where Russia and the West are on opposite side of the barricades, cooperation on fighting the threat is possible and necessary. After all, the enemy is common and its deadly activities go far beyond the scope of a regional threat.

Russia and the West could coordinate activities in Libya. Sharing intelligence and cooperating in joint special operations against key targets could be a start of a broader process. Russia and the US-led West could launch preliminary talks on the wording of a hypothetical UN Security Council resolution to make it approved if an international effort will be required to keep the region from abyss.

North Africa should not become a divisive issue to complicate the relations between Russia and the West. The situation calls for cooperation and dialogue. The IS will soon become a thing of the past if Russia and the West set aside what divides them and concentrate on what brings them together. This approach will benefit all. 

On Sept. 12, the people of Fernana — a small town located in northwestern Tunisia — gathered at the pumping station that supplies water to Tunis and threatened to cut off the supply to the capital, before security forces intervened and prevented them from doing so. This came in response to the death of Wissem Nasri, a cafe owner who set himself on fire outside the municipality building following a dispute with its general secretary because he could not obtain permission to serve shishas to his clients.

Since the beginning of July, repeated water cuts in several regions of Tunisia sparked anger and protests among the local population. Water shortages were reported in towns such as Sousse, Nabeul, Sfax, Kef, Siliana, Beja, Sidi Bouzid, Ben Arous, Medenine and Tataouine. Given the increasing number of protests, the Tunisian citizen’s water observatory, Watchwater, warned against a possible “thirst uprising” in a statement released Aug. 10.

On July 28, then-Minister of Agriculture, Water Resources and Fisheries Saad Seddik — who was replaced by Samir Bettaieb after a change of government at the end of August — said at a press conference that Tunisia had suffered a rainfall deficit of 28% compared to 2015, and that this had negatively impacted the filling of dams in the north of the country. He also said Tunisians were living “below the water poverty line” — as defined by the United Nations — which is 1,000 cubic meters (roughly 264,000 gallons) per person, against 460 cubic meters (roughly 121,500 gallons) per person in Tunisia.

Recalling that the right to water is guaranteed by Article 44 of the new Tunisian Constitution, Watchwater asked in its Aug. 10 statement for the hearing of the minister of agriculture and of SONEDE (National Company of Water Exploitation and Distribution) before parliament, insisting on their responsibilities in the management and distribution of water. “We call on the representatives of the people … to exercise their right to question the company and the ministry concerned,” said the organization. But their request was not accepted.

The observatory has been mapping all water supply-related incidents in Tunisia since March. “Since we launched the platform, we have been collecting 739 alerts,” Ala Marzougui, the coordinator of Watchwater, told Al-Monitor.

Marzougui comes from Redeyef, a phosphate mining area in southwest Tunisia. He said, “In Redeyef, we have been undergoing for long years repeated shortages. The last water cut here was in early September and lasted for four days. But all Tunisian regions suffer from cuts, even in winter. Maybe it has been catching more attention from the media this summer because of thetouristic places being affected.”

For his part, Larbi Bouguerra, a former professor at Tunis University's faculty of science and the author of the essay "Water under Threat," told Al-Monitor, “We all know that rainfall is erratic in the Mediterranean and that there are episodes of five to six years of drought.”

He said, “Nothing has been done to address the problem. It has not been anticipated. On the other hand, water is wasted in Tunisia. We no longer use the traditional techniques that once existed to collect water, like the rainwater tanks."

Bouguerra insisted, “The previous governments under Presidents Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, favored the coast. They drained all the water from the north of Tunisia to the Sahel region and the tourist cities.”

In a series of articles published in 2015 about water and the Arab Spring, Bouguerra wrote, “The Tunisian revolution began in the most disadvantaged areas in terms of access to water.”

Marzougui added, “We can see that the regions most affected by water cuts — such as Gafsa, Jendouba, Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan — also suffer the most marginalization, unemployment, lack of infrastructure and lack of access to health care."

However, on Aug. 12, two weeks after his press conference about drought and the water scarcity most Tunisians experience, Seddik said in a radio interview that the government had decided to “give priority to the tourist areas” for supply of clean water.

According to the World Resources Institute, Tunisia will be one of the most water-stressed countries in 2040. In 2014, the World Bank described “water scarcity” as a “development challenge” for Tunisia, dealing with climate change, urbanization and growing demands from industry and agriculture.

“It is true that there exists overexploitation and water pollution,” said Habib Ayeb, a Tunisian geographer, researcher and associate professor at the University of Paris 8 who focuses his research on marginalization, water and social change.

He told Al-Monitor, “The most important thing is the right to access to water. It is a matter of inequality and injustice. The real problem for me is: Who has the right to access to water and what is the water used for?”

In 2013, at the time when the 2014 constitution was drafted, Ayeb was one of those asking for the right to water to be defined as a legally enforceable right, “which means the possibility for the people who are not connected to the clean water system to take legal action against the state and to obtain financial compensation,” he said. “But the proposal wasn’t adopted. The right to water is enshrined in the constitution but has not been defined.”

While Ayeb insisted he cannot “predict the future,” he also said, “Assuming the revolution was caused by social demands, water could be the reason for a new uprising. The only thing I know is that there is a growing awareness. During the dictatorship, there already were water cuts, but nobody talked about it. And I think that as long as we keep the same water governance model the problem will remain."

al-monitor.com

“Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things,” former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared after the invasion of Iraq. “Stuff happens,” he added.

The untidiness of the revolution against Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia — a ruthless dictator visited by Rumsfeld in 2006 — resulted in the rise of the Salafist brand of Islam and the rise of Ansar Al Sharia, the group responsible for attacking the CIA compound in Libya.

Now we learn that the gunmen who carried out the attack in Tunis were trained in neighboring Libya, another country where stuff happened and the transition to democracy was, to say the least, messy.

In 2011, we reported that Khalifa Hifter, a former Gaddafi military officer, was appointed to lead the rebel army supported by the United Nations, the United States and its cobbled together coalition. Hifter has worked with the CIA since he “defected to the Libyan National Salvation Front (LNSF), the principal anti-Gaddafi group, which had the backing of the American CIA. He organized his own militia,” according to the Le Monde diplomatique published book Manipulations africaines.

In addition, Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi, the Libyan rebel leader, admitted to working for the CIA. “Mr. al-Hasidi,” we wrote in March, 2011, “is reportedly a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), also known as Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya. It is the most powerful radical faction waging Jihad in Libya and was officially designated as an affiliate of al-Qaeda and the Taliban – both CIA creations – by the UN 1267 Committee. LIFG was founded in the fall of 1995 by Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, in short for the CIA and the ISI.”

The order out of chaos effort in Libya continues today as al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya and other Salafist groups — undoubtedly the same folks who allegedly trained the gunmen in Tunis — are funded by the Gulf Emirates and the CIA, partners since the successful CIA effort to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

The attack signals the ascension of the Salafist jihad in northern Africa. “The consolidation of a jihadist Caliphate in eastern Libya accelerated starting early 2014 because of the need to support the Egyptian Islamist jihadists against the growing power and popularity of President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi,” writes theWorld Tribune.

The failure of “democracy” in Tunisia — formerly held out as the shining star of the Arab Spring — and corporate media warnings that such freedom allows the Salafist revolution to grow serves as yet another signal that the war on terror is an ever-expanding enterprise.

In addition to growing the national security state in the United States, Canada and Europe and feeding associated industries in militarism and surveillance, the continuing expansion of the Islamic State, most recently in Libya and soon in Tunisian and across the Arab Maghreb, will extend the expiry date on the so-called war on terror, possibly for a generation or longer.

infowars.com

Boubaker al-Hakim is a member of the extremist Islamic State (IS) group who last month claimed responsibility for assassinating two secular politicians, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, in Tunisia in 2013.

He was previously part of the "Butte-Chaumont network" in Paris — alongside Kouachi — that helped send fighters to join Al Qaeda in Iraq in the mid-2000s.

Kouachi is wanted along with his brother Said for the deadly attack on satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on Wednesday that left 12 people dead.

Hakim "represents the link between the Kouachi brothers and (IS)," said researcher Jean-Pierre Filiu, a leading expert on radical Islam at Paris's Sciences Po University.

"It is impossible that an operation on the scale of the one that led to the massacre at Charlie Hebdo was not sponsored by Daesh," he claimed, using an alternative name for IS.

No group has yet claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack, "but it is certain that (IS) is closely following it and waiting to see how it ends," said Filiu.

"I am sure that the video claiming responsibility is already prepared."

He added that Hakim is not a very senior figure in IS, but gained respect within the movement after killing Belaid and Brahmi.

Hakim claimed responsibility for the murders in a video released last month that was filmed in IS territory somewhere in Iraq or Syria.

Born in 1983, he is only around a few months younger than Kouachi and grew up in the same area of Paris — the 19th arrondissement — where the "Butte-Chaumont network" was established.

Both men were arrested and convicted together in Paris in 2008 for their role in the network.

Hakim was sentenced to seven years for running a way station in Damascus for young French Muslims en route to fight US forces in Iraq. Kouachi received three years.

"Hakim, and no doubt Kouachi, rejoined Al Qaeda's Iraqi networks after they were released from prison and accompanied them in their transformation into Daesh," said Filiu.

"The combat experience they acquired was useful in the cold-blooded assassinations they have carried out since."

middle-east-online.com

The fairytale appeared to become reality in the year 2006 when the Persian Gulf emirate of Qatar set up the English-language news broadcaster, Al Jazeera. Qatar’s ruler Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, one of the richest men in the world owing to his tiny country’s immense natural gas wealth, put up the money to found the corporation… To go head-to-head with well-established global media giants was no mean feat, requiring a multi-billion-dollar investment. Pretty soon, however, Al Jazeera proved to be media heavyweight and appeared to offer news consumers a fresh perspective from the Western-centred corporations, especially when it came to Middle East affairs. 

When Al Jazeera English entered the global scene, the American-led military occupation of Iraq was at full throttle with disturbing evidence of rampant NATO violations against civilians, such as the mass murder of families in Haditha by a platoon of US marines, and the full-scale onslaught on the city of Fallujah involving use of banned weapons like White Phosphorus. Al Jazeera provided critical coverage of these events in a manner that often outshone likes of the BBC, CNN, Reuters and Sky. 

On events in the occupied territories of Palestine and Afghanistan, the Qatar-based network seemed to offer ground-breaking independent reportage. Al Jazeera was judged by many viewers, including Western audiences, to be more independent than the Western media outlets who were often considered “too soft” on Israeli violations and too deferential to foreign policy of their respective governments. In the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq, which was viewed as an illegal war based on criminal deception over spurious claims about 9/11 and non-existent weapons of mass destruction, the credibility of the major Western media corporations had slumped in the public eye. These outlets were seen as compromised, having uncritically indulged the fabrications and lies that emanated from Washington and London with regard to the Saddam Hussein regime and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Al Jazeera was not encumbered with this propaganda baggage and was therefore viewed as a more reliable source of international news.

There were, of course, skeptical voices about Al Jazeera even at its inception. How could a news broadcaster owned by an unelected absolute ruler be independent? After all, the Persian Gulf Arab oil sheikhdoms are a byword for repression and benighted medieval obscurantism, with Saudi Arabia’s House of Al Saud taking the laurels for that unenviable reputation. Qatar’s House of Al Thani was not far behind in the oppression stakes. Emir Hamad came to power in 1998 after he led a coup against his own father. 

However, the Qatari ruler had a vision of promoting his kingdom as a global media hub. In some ways it was a radical initiative, setting the emirate apart from its Arab neighbours and bestowing global kudos on a mini-state of less than four million population. Al Jazeera English was central to realizing that vision. International celebrity journalists, such as Britain’s Sir David Frost, were recruited to give the corporation star appeal and household brand recognition. Qatar’s capital, Doha, became an international forum for high-profile media debates on weighty matters of the day. Glamorous news presenters, such as the BBC’s Zainab Badawi, were called up to host the Doha Debates on such issues as global poverty and ecological sustainability. 

American and European prestigious universities, such as Cornell and the Paris Sorbonne, have been partnered with Qatari oil and gas money to boost the newfound international reputation of Qatar as an intelligence hub and seat of learning. 

But cracks in Qatar’s carefully crafted façade began to appear with the advent of the Arab Spring. Qatar’s rulers, along with the House of Saud, have nailed their political colours to the American and Western mast in relation to the region’s momentous upheavals. Qatar has emerged as a strident Arab voice backing the Western geopolitical agenda of shoring up the conservative Muslim Brotherhood parties in Egypt and Tunisia that have served to blunt the revolutions on Western government terms. Whereas in Libya and Syria, Qatar has joined the Western fray in demanding regime change. 

The increasingly interventionist role of Qatar in promoting the Western geopolitical agenda towards the Arab Spring has been accompanied by an increasingly overt propaganda role of Al Jazeera in covering these events. The broadcaster’s erstwhile reputation as an independent, critical news media outlet has rapidly dissipated to reveal an information service that is more propagandist than objective, serving the political ambitions of its royal owner, rather than functioning as a reliable journalistic source. 

Al Jazeera has come under scrutiny for dumbing down on the popular uprising against the Western-backed Khalifa regime in neighbouring Bahrain, while at the same time giving saturated coverage to the Western-fomented insurgency in Syria. As with Western mainstream news media, Al Jazeera has given scant coverage to the brutal repression against civilians in Bahrain – where there is an undoubted genuine popular revolt – but, in contrast, the Western and Qatari/Saudi-backed covert, criminal campaign of subversion in Syria is distorted to appear as a noble struggle for democracy against the government of Bashar Al Assad. On more than one occasion, the Doha-based broadcaster has been caught red-handed peddling disinformation about the Damascus government with unfounded allegations of human rights abuses, while covering up rampant atrocities committed by the Western-backed and Qatari-armed so-called Free Syrian Army.

The Arab Spring has shot through the putative reputation of Al Jazeera as an independent news outlet. Several of its journalists and bureau chiefs have resigned in disgust at the nakedly political agenda of Al Jazeera, where the organization has come to be seen as a propaganda tool serving the geopolitical interests and ambitions of its owner, the Qatari monarch.

Perhaps the final nail in the coffin for the emirate’s pretensions of supporting independent journalism and free speech was delivered last week with the fate of a young Qatari poet. University student Mohammed Al Ajami was sentenced to life in prison by a secret court in Doha for the “crime” of writing a poem that was deemed to be critical of the emir. 

Ajami’s poem, entitled Tunisian Jasmine, was inspired by the popular uprisings that sparked off in Tunisia at the end of 2010 with the self-immolation of a young street vendor. The student poet lamented how the people of the region “were all Tunisians now” and he deprecated the region’s autocratic rulers who were deaf to the cries of freedom and democratic rights among the masses. He was first detained by the Qatari rulers in November 2011 after his poem was posted on the internet and he was kept in solitary confinement for 12 months before being sentenced to life imprisonment last week. Ajami’s lawyer told media how he was not allowed to represent his client in court and that the young poet was not even given the chance to defend himself from the charges laid against him in secret by an Al Thani appointed judge. 

Rights group Amnesty International said of the verdict: “It is deplorable that Qatar, which likes to paint itself internationally as a country that promotes freedom of expression, is indulging in what appears to be such a flagrant abuse of that right.”

This was the barbaric fate of a Qatari youth who mildly spoke his mind and expressed a heartfelt desire for human freedom and dignity. The barbarity was perpetrated by a megalomaniac ruler who professes concern for human rights and democratic freedom in Gaza and Syria; the same ruler who owns Al Jazeera English – the self-styled independent global news broadcaster. This fairytale just ended in cruel tears with poetic justice of a very barbarous kind.

Regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt, the demolition of Gadhafi's rule in Libya, and lingering conflicts in Yemen and Syria were the first results of the tide of mass protests that rose in the Arab world in 2011. While in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen the outpourings of popular discontent were prompted by evident socioeconomic ills, corruption, and lack of democracy, the developments in Syria and especially in Libya were mainly attributable to external influences… 

Dissenting young people, in many cases unemployed holders of advanced degrees, who were angered by the decline of living standards, unchecked powers exercised by the administrations, and negative outlooks for their own future, were the muscle behind the Arab Spring. As protests widened, political parties and supporters of politicized Islam joined in, the latter eventually becoming the opposition's biggest strike force. Notably, the popular movements were led by cyber-activists and prolific bloggers who managed to draw thousands of opposition supporters into protest rallies with the help of social media. In Tunisia, the role was taken by Slim Amamou (born in 1977), who was in charge of Internet systems in Alixys, commanded an audience of some 20,000 web users, and later held, albeit briefly, the post of the country's minister for youth and sports. In Egypt, it was Google employee Wael Ghonim (born in 1981), the moderator of Facebook page titled "We are all Khaled Said". The page was created as a tribute to Khaled Said, a blogger with a Twitter following of over 100,000 who was beaten to death while in police custody. Mohamed Nabbous (1983-2011), an information technologist and an opposition activist who founded the Al Hurra TV and was killed in Benghazi in a clash with Gadhafi's loyalists, was a similar figure in Libya. 

In Tunisia, the main challenges to Ben Ali's rule came from the semi-legal Congress for the Republic led by Moncef Marzouki, a human rights veteran who used to be deported from the country, and from the Democratic Progressive Party headed by Maya Jribi and Najib Chebbi. All of them were, nevertheless, outperformed by Rashid Al-Ghannushi's moderately Islamist Ennahda in the first free parliamentary elections held in Tunisia on October 23, 2011, after the fall of the regime of Ben Ali. Born in 1942, Al-Ghannushi is an ideologist of politicized Islam acclaimed as such both in and outside of Tunisia. Under Ben Ali, Ennahda faced coup attempt charges, due to which the party was banned and Al-Ghannushi was forced into over two decades of emigration (Al-Ghannushi lived in Great Britain most of the time). He returned to Tunisia on January 30, 2011 after the displacement of Ben Ali. Al-Ghannushi says that he has no intention to become Tunisia's Khomeini and that his party, which now has 90 seats in the parliament out of 217, is fully committed to the standards of democracy. Supporters of secular parties which lost the race to the parliament to Ennahda do express concerns over its potential agenda and occasionally charge it with ballot rigging. Moncef Marzouki, the leader of the left-democratic Congress for the Republic which gained only 30 seats in the parliament, on the other hand, expressed confidence in the democratic orientation of Ennahda and did not rule out entering a coalition with it. 

In contrast to Tunisia, in Egypt the ouster of Mubarak was followed by the transfer of power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who disbanded the parliament by decree. In early March, Cairo saw another round of demonstrations, now with demands to abolish the political police and to discharge from the police forces the officers guilty of repressions against the opponents of Mubarak. Prime minister Ahmed Shafik, a retired general and former chief of Egypt's air forces, lost his post under the pressure. Former transportation minister and an active participant of the anti-Mubarak protests Essam Sharaf was appointed as Egypt's new premier. A March 19, 2011 national referendum approved constitution amendments abolishing the military court trials of civilians. Electoral legislation was also passed by which 28 November was set as the parliamentary elections date, the presidential elections became due after April, 2012, and all power must be transferred to a civilian administration thereafter. In the meantime, the situation in Egypt remained tense as the political forces discontent at the constitution amendments and the electoral legislation rallied in Cairo. Clashes with fatalities took place between Christian Copts on one side and Muslims and the police on the other in the fall of 2011 (Christians account for some 20% of the Egyptian population which numbers 84 million). In some instances, the clashes were linked to the Copts' demand to allow the construction of churches or by their unauthorized construction in several parts of Egypt. Premier Sharaf and the Copts' Patriarch condemned those who incited the hostilities and blamed the clashes on loyalists of the ousted Mubarak. New players – the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution, "We are all Khaled Said", the April 6 Youth Movement, the Revolutionary Socialists, the National Association for Change – appear to be entering Egypt's political stage and staking the bids for representation in the parliament. The forces of politicized Islam, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood, along with its youth organization and The Freedom and Justice Party – are also hyperactive in Egypt. As a parallel process, the Salafist movement which came into being as a political entirety after the collapse of Mubarak's regime built its own network of parties comprising Al Nour (“Light”), Asala (“Fundamentals”), and Fadila (“Virtue”). It is probably a fair assessment that the Muslim Brotherhood is the best-organized and top-influential group in the post-Mubarak Egypt. Judging by the statements released by the Muslim Brotherhood, it has gone a long way towards integrating democratic values in its worldview, and at the moment the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood seems almost identical to the programs of the majority of democratic parties. The Muslim Brotherhood's new generation leaders are typically intellectuals with backgrounds in science or humanities. Notably, the group even chose to replace its previous logo featuring crossed swords with a one showing hands in a handshake and a green stem. The Egyptian society largely stays cautious about the Muslim Brotherhood, with a part of the country's population, especially the Christians, being concerned that the former fundamentalists' expression of allegiance to democracy are an electoral tactic disguising their essentially unchanged views. Still, it is also clear that the Muslim Brotherhood's reformed self-portrayal is perceived as credible by quite a few in Egypt.

To be continued

Truly speaking, Sarrazin neither attacked Islam as a religion nor criticized all of Germany's Muslims indiscriminately — his invectives target exclusively the part of the Muslim community which avoids getting integrated into the German society and remains unenthusiastic about learning the German language or generally interacting with the German educational system. While Germany's greens responded to attempts to introduce mandatory courses of German for Muslim migrants by screaming about enforced Germanization, the impression is that the majority of Muslim migrants indeed expect that the society will hand them the welfare and leave them alone. As a result, Germanyfinds itself hosting parallel societies with traditions and lifestyles alien to most Germans, and the goodwill of the German society which must be credited with accepting and supporting immigrants is not enough to solve the problem.

Opinion polls showed that 62% of Germans sided with Sarrazin on the immigrants issue, which indirectly proves that his assessment of the situation is adequate. Moreover, 18% of those polled said they would immediately join Sarrazin's party should he establish one. Rebellions in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and Libya broke out in just a couple of months after the survey was conducted. The West is pursuing its own interests in the region where it is installing puppet regimes and securing a grip on the  energy resources, politics, and markets, but for Europe the gains come with a cost as the EU is facing a new tide of immigration.

Lampedusa is an Italian island located some 100 km away from Tunisia's coast. Under public pressure, two years ago the Italian government signed an agreement with Libya's Gadhafi and Tunisia's Ben Ali to immediately deport refugees from the two countries, and the inflow of illegal immigrants dropped sharply thereafter. The statistics supplied by the UN Refugee Agency reflected the arrival of 36,000 refugees to Italy in 2008 but only 9,573 in 2009 and 4,348 — in 2010. Some three months ago the situation remained more or less under control, but the rebellions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya exposed the EU to the risk of an unprecedented immigrant onslaught. Lampedusa was the first to absorb the shock — over the past three months it had to receive thousands of illegal immigrants who evidently cannot be deported under the current circumstances. Lampedusa mayor Bernardino De Rubeis requested assistance from the government citing urgent public security regards, as cases of robbery and vandalism had been reported and some of the «visitors» from Africa whose identities were impossible to verify could be terrorists or other criminals. The police clashed with refugees in Lampedusa, and the island whose capacities are supposed to give shelter to at most 800 people cannot cope with their inflow.

In contrast to the previous waves of immigration which reached  Lampedusa, the one the island is dealing with at the moment consists of people aggressively pressing their demands.They are not asking to be received, but rather act as if they are entitled to being where they are. Mayor De Rubeis was slammed for inciting hate based on race when he explicitly disallowed begging and unauthorized camping in public places. Leader of the French right Marine Le Pen who visited Lampedusa and was joined by De Rubeis at the airport was confronted by activists chanting slogans like «This is a colored world!» and «Marine Le Pen, we don't want you here!». She replied that she also had a heart and was overwhelmed by compassion but it was still impossible to admit everybody. The Italian government attempted to scatter the migrants across several refugee camps and requested assistance from the EU to handle what appears to be Europe's common problem. Italy's foreign minister Franco Frattini said the EU was unprepared to pick up the challenge and did nothing to prevent the crisis. Eventually S. Berlusconi personally headed for Lampedusa to help shift the illegal immigrants around. The European countries rejected the idea to distribute the migrants over the EU to give a break to Lampedusa where at the moment natives are outnumbered by immigrants. Germany's minister of the interior Thomas de Maiziere bluntly said his country already absorbed enough refugees and was unable to solve the whole world's problems, adding that the situation in Italy was a challenge but still not a shock. It quickly transpired that in 2010 Germany sheltered 48,000 and Sweden — 30,000 refugees, roughly a factor of five more than Italy. German deputy minister of the interior Ole Schröder said that the best thing Europe can do for the people is to assist Africa in stabilizing its socioeconomic settings, while softening the border regulations is not an option.

Italyis asking the European Commission for Euro 100m to fund the first round of measures supposed to improve the immigrants current living conditions. Fortex, Europe's agency responsible for coastline patrol, tightened the regime along the entire Mediterranean coast. The Italian government and the EU law-enforcement agencies are monitoring the developments on Italy's southern frontier and thinking how — upon rendering the first aid — to ping-pong the immigrants back to where they belong. It is nevertheless clear that the efforts will neither tone down the problem of illegal immigration from Africa to the EU nor spare Italy the human rights watchdogs' outcry over alleged violations of the regulations concerning the political asylums. As prescribed by the 1992 Helsinki treaty, protecting the rights of refugees and displaced persons must be on top of the list of CSCE countries' priorities, regardless of the fact that the number of refugees rose tenfold since the agreement was penned.

The surge of illegal immigration makes the EU chose between «the human rights» and social stability. For Europe, the much-cheered change of the «dictatorial regimes» echoes with the advent of mobs of citizens of the «now-democratic» republics who are eager to eat into the European countries' budgets.

Residents of Lampedusa blocked the island's bay inlet to debar more boats carrying immigrants from coming in. Immigrants in Lampedusa do what they can to get food which is already in short supply. Hundreds of them are rallying at the seaport, shouting that they only demand elementary things like beds but are held in intolerable conditions and treated as criminals, which, by the way, they are from the standpoint of the Italian law after illegally entering the country's territory.

This year, over 15,000 of immigrants from North Africa landed in Lampedusa. Italy's premier pledged to get all of them out of the island, but in any case for Italy — and for the rest of Europe – Lampedusa is forever. The African crisis set in motion by France was bred by the policies of the Western countries which build their welfare systems as if they hope to somehow remain unaffected by the developments they provoke in Africa, seemingly far away from their own territories.

The illegal immigrants who — without any sense of gratitude – nab parts of the social pie in the countries they penetrate will always be a headache to the original populations at whose expense the EU is going to offset the drawbacks of its foreign politics escapades. The fighting and clashes with police in Leicester, Great Britain, during the right radicals' recent march against immigration can only be attributed to the protesters' narrow vision. Their problem is not that they have to coexist with Asian or other communities but that their own government worries about the newcomers from South Asia, Africa, India, and China more than about the country's native citizens.

Why do the West's governments serially provoke Lampedusas? The explanation is that the immigrants are the government's failsafe support base, the people who would not mind voting for the current administrations daily. As reported by Hamburger Abendblatt, German Institute for Economic Research director Klaus Zimmermann maintains that Germany needs to bring in 500,000 immigrants a year to keep its economy healthy, or else in some five years workforce shortages await the country where 250,000 people retire annually. I could tell Mr. Zimmermann right away where to get workforce in sufficient numbers for the coming 15 years or so: at the moment 3.01 people in Germany are unemployed. They might need re-training or assistance in relocating, but in any case they are already there, not on the way to Lampedusa. Simply the government would have to recall which nation's interests it nominally espouses.