The foreign minister of Turkmenistan, Rashid Meredov, recently met with the secretary general of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (Turkic Council), Baghdad Amreev, to discuss closer cooperation between the Central Asian nation and the Turkish-dominated bloc.

Turkmenistan is the only Turkic-speaking former Soviet republic in Central Asia that is not currently a member of the Turkic Council. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are members along with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

It has never joined either the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or the Russian- and Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), although the other four Central Asian nations have joined all three.

The above meeting occurred in the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, where the parties deliberated over “the current level and prospects of cooperation between Turkmenistan and the Turkic Council, aimed at promoting constructive partnership between the countries of this format,” to quote an Azerbaijani news source.

Turkmenistan’s relationship with the Turkic Council was praised by the latter; particularly the regular participation of its president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, “in high-level events organized by the Council.”

At a summit of the Turkic Council this March the Turkmen president spoke of a common approach to “resolving urgent tasks of the global and regional agendas.”

The recent meeting also discussed the prospects of Turkmenistan being granted special status in the Turkic Council. Currently Hungary has special status. Ukraine has expressed interest becoming an observer, as has Afghanistan recently. The latter two nations have Turkic-speaking minorities. The Hungarian government’s claim to ethnic kinship with the Turkish people is the subject of another article.

Uzbekistan joined the council in 2018 after leaving the CSTO six years earlier. That trajectory may be replicated with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; and perhaps with the SCO as well as the CSTO. (Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from the CSTO in 1999.)

Russia’s accommodation (the kindest word for its behavior) of Azerbaijani-Turkish aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh last year and against Armenia starting this May sounded the death knell of the CSTO.

Three members of the SCO that are not majority Turkic have Turkic minorities: Russia, China and Tajikistan. So does observer state Afghanistan. On Russia’s initiative Turkey was admitted to the SCO as an observer in 2012.

The Turkic Council was set up in 2009 with Turkey as its prime mover, five years after the nation hosted the NATO summit in Istanbul that recorded the largest-ever expansion of the military bloc. Seven new nations joined – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – including for the first time former republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The summit also launched NATO’s military partnership with nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Its web page says of its founding mission that it was not to be limited to Turkic-speaking-majority nations but had a broader purview. It reads in part that “by promoting deeper relations and solidarity amongst Turkic speaking countries, it aims to serve as a new regional instrument for advancing international cooperation in [the] Eurasian continent, particularly in Central Asia and [the] Caucasus.”

Its mandate is nothing less than the Eurasian continent.

The SCO has no military, hasn’t even a security component. The CSTO is a shrinking paper organization. When NATO member Turkey invaded CSTO member Armenia this May (it still has 1,000 troops there) Armenia appealed to the CSTO. The latter did nothing.

When violent clashes occurred between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (which is non-Turkic) in late April, the CSTO played no effective role in ending the conflict. However the Turkic Council met on the issue and stated, “The Turkic Council will continue to maintain close contact with brotherly Kyrgyzstan, a founding member of the Turkic Council.” Expect to see Kyrgyzstan follow Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan in departing from the CSTO.

Two weeks before the Kyrgyz-Tajik crisis the aforementioned leader of the Turkic Council, Baghdad Amreev, spoke of last year’s war against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and said: “We are very glad that Azerbaijan has liberated its de-occupied territories. We, the Turkic states, express our solidarity with Azerbaijan.”

The moribund CSTO has never occupied itself with anything other than crossborder crime and immigration. It has no real military role. The SCO has not even pretended to be a security much less a military alliance.

An expanding Turkic Council under Turkish domination will assuredly have a military component. One it will not hesitate to employ.

ANTI-BELLUM

Azerbaijan held a presidential election this month. Predictably, incumbent leader Ilham Aliyev won his fourth consecutive term with a Kim dynasty-esque 86% of the votes.

International monitors for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) stressed “widespread disregard for mandatory procedures, numerous instances of serious irregularities and lack of transparency”; the Azeri electoral commission replied that such observations were “unfounded”.

Much has to do with the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, facilitated by the late Zbigniew “Grand Chessboard” Brzezinski during the first Bill Clinton administration to bypass Iran. The BTC de facto unleashed the energy chapter of the New Great Game that I have called Pipelineistan.

Now, Baku is harboring great hopes for its new port at the desert wasteland of Alat (“Your hub in Eurasia!”), simultaneously connected to the West (Turkey and the European Union), the South (Iran and India) and the North (Russia).

Alat is also designed as a top logistics/manufacturing/connectivity hub of the New Silk Roads, aka Belt and Road Initiative. Its top strategic location straddles the BRI’s central connectivity corridor; links to the newly opened Baku-Tblisi-Kars railway, connecting the Caucasus with Central Asia; and also links with the International North-South Transport Corridor that connects Russia to India via Iran.

Transportation corridors are all the rage. For Azerbaijan, oil and gas may only last up to 2050. So the priority from now on is to engineer the transition toward becoming a logistics hub; actually, the premier Caspian Sea hub.

Do (Caspian) opposites attract?

Baku’s drive revisits and propels to the forefront the role of Pipelineistan and connectivity corridors in Eurasia integration. The overall picture may finally point to a “third way,” Europe-bound, for Caspian energy exports, for the moment mostly concentrated on Russia and China.

Turkmenistan is actively promoting itself this year as “the heart of the Great Silk Road.” Yet that’s centered more on reviving Ancient Silk Road sites than on digital connectivity.

Still, Ashgabat did anticipate the BRI when the 1,800-kilometer Central Asia-China gas pipeline, from Turkmenistan to Xinjiang via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, carrying 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year, was inaugurated in 2009.

Ashgabat and Moscow have had a tortuous spat that eventually led to Gazprom completely ceasing imports of Turkmen gas into Russia more than two years ago.

And that’s how Beijing, and not Moscow, ended up being configured as Central Asia’s top energy customer – and trading partner.

Because of its idiosyncratic practices, Turkmenistan in the end never managed to diversify its export markets. It operated the switch from Russia to China but could not land the lucrative European market.

It has been a mantra in Brussels for ages now that the EU needs energy diversification away from Gazprom – even as member nations are incapable of agreeing on the mere lineaments of a common energy policy.

European companies at best are developing major oilfields in Kazakhstan. But on the “blue gold” Pipelineistan front, so far no gas from Central Asia is flowing to Europe.

The traumatic experiences of the past are epitomized by the Nabucco soap opera – a pipeline from Turkmenistan via the Caspian to Turkey and beyond that in the end will never be built.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are actually stiff competitors on opposite shores of the Caspian. Baku was delighted with Nabucco’s failure because that boosted the prospects of its own gas from the sprawling Shah Deniz field hitting Europe. The key Nabucco problem was the mystery surrounding Turkmenistan’s real gas-production capability, considering that most of its gas is now directed toward China.

A complicating factor is that any pipeline that crosses the still legally undefined Caspian (is it a sea or is it a lake?) is also not exactly welcomed by either Russia or Iran.

Gazprom has its own plans to increase its share of the European market via Nord Stream and Turk Stream. Iran would aim finally to crack European markets via a possible pipeline from the massive South Pars field in cooperation with Qatar, a revamped version of the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline that was one of the key reasons for the war in Syria.

TAP meets TANAP

So in the end the only realistic Pipelineistan gambit in terms of Caspian gas connections to European markets is bound to be the small, €4,5 billion (US$5.55 billion) Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), carrying 10bcm of gas a year from Baku.

TAP, only 878km long (northern Greece 550km; Albania 215km; Adriatic Sea 105km; southern Italy 8km), is supposed to come online by March 2020.

TAP will be a sort of extension of the way more ambitious, $8 billion Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which will ship gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz 2 to western Turkey, as configured by the so-called Southern Gas Corridor. TAP and TANAP will connect at the Greek-Turkish border.

It’s enlightening to compare how Azerbaijan is betting on Europe while Turkmenistan bets on China.

And then there’s Kazakhstan – which deploys its own, branded, “multi-vector” foreign policy involving Russia, China, the US and the EU.

At the same time that Astana is a key node of the BRI, a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it welcomes investment from EU majors and US oil giants.

Going forward, the trend is Beijing enjoying a strategic advantage as the top trading partner of every Central Asian “stan” except Kazakhstan, while Moscow maintains its multiple roles as security provider, trading partner, source of foreign investment, employer to millions of Central Asian expats, and Soft Power Central (Russian is the lingua franca in Central Asia, and Russian TV and culture are ubiquitous).

And this will all play within the framework of interpolation between BRI and the EEU.

But what about Iran and Turkey in the Big Picture?

Azerbaijan, as a Caspian nation, maintains deep ethnic and linguistic links with Turkey. Yet Baku prizes secularism in an Ataturk vein – which sets it at odds with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamic-tinged neo-Ottomanism.

The major complicating factor is that Ankara and Moscow are collaborating on Turk Stream – in essence a Pipelineistan move from Siberia to Europe under the Black Sea directly competing with Azerbaijan’s own gas exports.

Iran for its part deploys ample cultural and linguistic influence all across Central Asia. In fact Persia, historically, has been the top organizing entity across Central Asia. Iran is as much a Central Asian power as Southwest Asian (what the west calls the Middle East).

But in a BRI environment shaped by the building of roads, railways, bridges, tunnels, pipelines, and fiber-optic networks, the real game-changing player in Central Asia will continue to be China – allegedly more than Turkey, Iran and Russia.

Chinese companies already own roughly 25% of Kazakhstan’s oil production and practically all of Turkmenistan’s gas exports. And they have their sights on Baku as a major BRI node.

Call it a sort of digital revival of the Tang dynasty, when Chinese imperial influence extended across Central Asia all the way to northeastern Iran. Any bets on the Caspian soon becoming a Chinese lake?

atimes.com

A meeting of GUAM (the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development) held in Brussels got together the foreign chiefs of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The chairmanship of the organization was transferred from Ukraine to Azerbaijan. Collective security and gas pipelines, as well as other transport routes going around Russia, topped the agenda. 

The project to expand the South Caucasian gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) constitutes the backbone of growing cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan. The plans include the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) going through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – a pipeline project to transport natural gas from the Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan) starting from Greece via Albania and the Adriatic Sea to Italy, and further to Western Europe. The plans are supported by the European Union. Turkmenistan wants to join the Southern Gas Corridor, an initiative of the European Commission for the gas supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern regions to Europe. The talks are on the way between Brussels and Ashgabat. The Southern Gas Corridor is planned to become operational in 2018-2019. 

Turkey is behind these vigorous diplomatic activities. Turkey’s trade turnover with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan had grown over 50 percent. Turkish investments into these countries have increased by one third. Turkey is the main importer of oil and gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The Southern Gas Corridor is destined to diminish the dependence of Turkey and Europe on Russian gas. 

The Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway is a regional rail link project to directly connect Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The project is aiming to create a rail transportation route for energy resources mainly supplied by Azerbaijan. The construction of a highway along the same route is also in the cards together with the plans to build ferry routes going through Georgia to Moldova and Ukraine and through Turkey to the Balkans. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route aimed to invigorate foreign trade and cargo transportation between China and Europe, via Central Asia and the South Caucasus region became operational last year. In early August the first container block train from China arrived at the Port of Baku in Azerbaijan.

Before the talks in Ashgabat, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoglu visited Baku to discuss the possibility of expediting the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, part of the Southern Gas Pipeline to connect Azerbaijan and Georgia with the eastern part of Turkey. It could become operational in 2017. Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, an expert on South Caucasus and vice-president of the Turkish Strategic Outlook Institution which is one of the most effective English based research portals on international relations in Turkey, believes the project will make Azerbaijan the key country in the implementation of the plans to expand transport links between the southern part of the former Soviet Union, Turkey and Europe. 

In Ashgabat Georgian President Giorgi Margevlashvili told Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that the cooperation between Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the European Union should be expanded. In his turn, Erdogan expressed support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He condemned the treaties between Russia and Abkhazia, Russia and South Ossetia. The Turkish President also confirmed Turkey’s support for Georgia’s integration with NATO.    

During the talks in Ashgabat, Erdogan said that Turkey has always been paying special attention on the relationship with Turkmenistan since it became an independent state. According to him, Turkmenistan is the original homeland of Turkish people. Since its independence, we have especially valued our relations with Turkmenistan, the land of our ancestors. Our deep-rooted history and shared values constitute the solid base of our relations with Turkmenistan. I believe our relations, we built on this base, will continue to grow stronger

Central Asian states: plans and scenarios

Some experts argue states such as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan would be unable to contain a hypothetical breakout of fighting in Afghanistan's fractious northern provinces without significant outside help.

There is ground to believe the militants long-term plans may include invasion of Turkmenistan. «Galkynysh» or Southern Yoloten-Osman, Minara fields eastern part of the country, as well as gas deposits in the adjacent areas making one giant oil field – the second largest in the world. Another lucrative objective is obviously the Amu Darya River with the Bagtyyarlyk gas deposit on its left shore. 

The Turkmenistan border guards can see with their own eyes the fighting raging on the Afghan side of the border. Until now the Taliban has held its positions making the TAPI construction impossible. The ANSF attacks prevent militants from invading Turkmenistan, but they use the tactics of raids to scare foreign investors away and make them withdraw from gas projects, like TAPI, the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan – China (TUKC) pipeline and the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. Local extremists are likely to join the fray as it starts. The use of armed jeeps (the tactics tried in Libya) may be successful in case it’s not countered by helicopters that hardly anyone else but Russia could provide in needed numbers. 

The other weak point to make Turkmenistan vulnerable is water security. The militants control the district of Hamyab, Jowzjan province, bordering Turkmenistan. Actually, the radicals are just four-eight kilometers away from the Karakum Canal which is crucial for the country’s water supplies. The canal goes straight to the Caspian Sea. Creating obstacles on the way of riverine traffic is a great threat. Snipers are already at work. The Amu Darya and Turkmen border guards are the only obstacle on the way of moving to Turkmenistan.

Now to another country facing an invasion threat. There are the following scenarios of potential invasion of Tajikistan: attacking the city of Khorog in the West-central Gorno-Badakhshan mountainous region, launching an offensive to seize Kurghan Tube and Sambuli military range, the Khatlon province, or clandestinely moving forces from Takhar province in Afghanistan to Tajik cities of Tavildara and Gharm along the border with mountainous Badakhshan to finally enter Kyrgyzstan. Badakhshan is the weakest point – the area is flooded with criminal gangs ready to join the forces opposing the government in Dushanbe. 

Prospects for outside support

True, the US aid can lend a helping hand. As the Iraq and Afghanistan experience shows, there is each and every ground to believe it won’t be effective. By and large, it will all boil down to consultations, providing limited funds, personnel training programs. The supposition that America may be seriously involved in the events sounds more a wishful thinking. Anyway, the US will avoid any decisions till the president – elect will take office on January 20, 2017 – and that’s a long time to go. 

China is mainly concerned over the stability of energy supplies and economic prospects. It could make a significant economic and political contribution, but the situation is not viewed by Beijing as an imminent security threat. 

Russia and CSTO: special role to play

The situation is an imminent threat to Russia with its many centuries-long history of living together with Central Asian nations. Unlike the US or the EU, Central Asia is close to Russian borders, and there is a plethora of common interests to unite Moscow with the states of the region. Unlike the West, Russia never imposed its vision of democracy and human rights protection. Common security concerns have produced the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an organization with teeth serving as an instrument to safeguard peace and stability in Central Asia. 

The organization is an intergovernmental military alliance formed in 1992 with six members at present: Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus, as well as two observer states – Afghanistan and Serbia. Its rapid reaction force was established in 2009 to counter a limited military aggression against CSTO members, as well as to combat terrorism and drug trafficking. This is the only real force to counter the common threat and it is ready to accomplish the mission. 

On April 14, Afghanistan for the first time participated as an observer in a meeting of the Secretaries of the Security Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), that took place in Moscow. Back then Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said «We are ready to provide all-encompassing aid to Afghanistan in order to stabilize the situation in the country which remains complex. We are ready to work closely with you and with other foreign partners in overcoming terrorist and drug threats.» 

The uptick in Afghan fighting has given rise to concern of Russia’s allies in Central Asia and they look towards Moscow for reassurance. For instance, Tajikistan hosts a Russian military base and has called for Moscow to step up its military assistance to the country.

This May Russia deployed hundreds of troops bolstered by soldiers of brotherly nations from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus for drills in Tajikistan to hone skills of conducting joint combined rapid deployment operations. All in all, the exercise involved more than 2,500 troops, 200 units of armaments and military equipment, about 20 combat aircraft and helicopters and 30 military transport aircraft. The move demonstrated the readiness of Russia and CSTO allies to match the words with deeds and guarantee the region's security after US troops leave Afghanistan. 

This statement will hardly smooth worries away especially in view that nothing is done to rectify the situation as events unfold unfavorably for those who oppose the Islamic State. Until recently it had been widely believed that the central authorities in Kabul were fighting the Taliban. Now a third belligerent emerged. Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser, Mohammad Hanif Atmar, has said that the presence of Daesh, or the Islamic State, is growing. According to him, the group plans to seize control of Central Asia and then move to Russia. The efforts to fight the Islamic State in Afghanistan are not enough to counter the threat. True, the Taliban and the Islamic State don’t join forces; to the contrary they fight each other. But it should not give rise to illusions. Many Taliban fighters join the ranks of the Islamic State. It’s hard to say how many of them have already changed sides but it’s evident that the Islamic State recruiting efforts have been a success so far. This January the Islamic State anointed a former Taliban leader, known as Hafiz Saeed Khan, as their new overload in southern Asia and the sub-continent. Saeed, who is also known as Mulla Saeed Orakzai, was appointed the leader of a new group called IS Khorasan, an offshoot of Abu Bakhr al-Baghdadi's militant group which spans Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh, as well as some parts of Central Asia. The installation of Saeed, a former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), automatically makes him one of the most powerful warlords in the Middle East. Other groups have also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, for instance: The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). 

Obviously the Islamic States is trying to spread instability beyond the borders of the Middle East. It targets Central Asia. An outright military intervention may not be that imminent but the incitement of internal tensions in the Central Asian states is something to expect. 

Many citizens of Central Asia go to Iraq and Syria willing to join the Islamic State militants. They will come back. Islamists have already gained experience of armed struggle against the government forces in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They will apply the acquired skills to kill in their respective countries upon return. The social problems have become exacerbated in the Central Asian states. The opposition uses this factor to its advantage. The living standards are low, internal strife is in full swing with corruption and unemployment omnipresent and pervasive. According to Russian Federal Migration Service, around nine million immigrants from Central Asia worked in Russia in 2014. Now the Central Asian states themselves are going to be hit by a wave of immigrants coming from Afghanistan. There still remain circumstances in Afghanistan that could trigger a mass influx of refugees to the Central Asian countries, Mr. Bernard Doyle, UNHCR Regional Representative and Regional Coordinator for Central Asia, told in an interview with AKIpress on May 25. He did not make precise what exactly circumstances he meant. Will Central Asia cope? In 2014 the number of refugees there did not exceed three thousand but the situation has significantly worsened recently in the border areas of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 900 ethnic Turkmen families are asking Turkmenistan for political asylum. They had to leave homes because of combat actions. Until now they haven’t got a reply. The fighting has been raging near the Turkmenistan border for a few weeks already. Militants keep on gaining ground seizing new populated areas. They have many foreigners in their ranks. The leaders of Afghan provinces complain that Kabul ignores their pleas for urgent help. The Taliban says its fighters don’t take part in the hostilities. 

Some surmise that it’s all part of a complicated plot. The situation in the areas adjacent to the Turkmenistan – Afghanistan border is getting tense. Turkmenistan is moving forces closer to the border. It is building fortifications. The government has declared partial mobilization. According to General Lloyd Austin, Commander of US Central Command, Turkmenistan has asked the United States for military aid. 

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completed the mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 (NATO took command of the United Nations-mandated mission in Afghanistan in August 2003). However, support for the continued development of the Afghan security forces and institutions, and wider cooperation with Afghanistan continue. The U.S. handed over responsibility for security to local Afghans in 2014, but Obama has not specified a date for the withdrawal of all American troops from the country. According to the President, the last American troops will leave Afghanistan at the end of 2016. On March 24, Barack Obama announced that the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would be slowed and the remaining 9,800 troops would stay there through the end of 2015. The servicemen keep away from taking part in combat actions. Instead they concentrate on training and auxiliary missions. This development does not change the central issue, which is the Obama administration's withdrawal date of December 2016 for all U.S. forces. 

NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a session in Antalya, Turkey, on May 13-14. It was agreed that NATO will keep some troops in Afghanistan even after its current training mission ends around the end of next year in a signal of support for Afghan security forces struggling to repel a Taliban offensive. "Today we agreed that we will maintain a presence in Afghanistan even after the end of our current mission," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference during the meeting. On May 23, General Campbell said that the leaders of the United States and other NATO nations are intensifying discussions about future support for Afghanistan, probably meaning at least some American troops will remain here well after President Obama leaves office. According to him, NATO military commanders plan to establish a base in Kabul to help distribute aid, facilitate weapons sales and continue efforts to train Afghan security forces. Although Campbell stressed that NATO civilian officials probably will be in charge of the new mission, a contingent of troops also would be needed to secure the base. He added that NATO forces also could be used to help bolster the Afghan air force and intelligence service. Americans don’t plan get involved in hostilities but they intend to maintain control over Afghan authorities and military command. The have exercised the control long enough and here are the results. In some mysterious way Afghan security forces are successfully fighting back the Taliban in the south and east of the country (the Taliban is daily reported to suffer losses in the Ghazni and Gilmend provinces) but fail to gain ground against the relatively small formations of militants in the areas near the border with Central Asia. 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg went to Afghanistan in November 2014. During the visit he visited the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command at Camp Morehead in Kabul, where the chief of North Atlantic Alliance praised the progress of Afghan commando units. «I have seen a highly trained, experienced and professional force," Stoltenberg said. For over a year Afghan soldiers and police have led security operations across the country, and at the end of this year you will take full charge of security. But you will not stand alone. NATO and our partners will continue to support you." These words give rise to a question – why the Afghan military is doing its best to avoid clashes with the armed formations of opposition in the north of the country? Neither Washington, nor Kabul offers a reasonable answer. 

The Taliban attacks have intensified since the spring of 2014 to become even more threatening than before. In January 2015, Ashgabat started mobilization to last till the end of March. The threat is serious enough to make Turkmenistan build additional fortifications at the frontier with Afghan Jowzjan Province to include a 6 meter deep ditch and barbed wire fencing with 2 meter high concrete pillars in between. Shohrat Kadyrov, the leading researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, is critical of the steps taken to counter the threat. According to him, «Turkmenistan boasts the territory equal in size to the Caucasus. It is the weakest link of Eurasian security. For instance, Tajikistan is protected from Afghanistan by range of high mountains. The border is relatively well guarded. In comparison there are no natural obstacles on the Turkmenistan’s border and no Russian troops are involved in border protection. No matter how deep the ditch may be, it won’t offer Turkmenistan, the country where tribalism is very strong, protection from the Taliban and the radicals of Islamic State». 

Talking about the situation at the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border, Yevgeny Satanovsky, President, the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at Russian Academy of Sciences, says «the death toll among civilians is measured in hundreds with dozens of houses burnt. There are cases of mass beheadings, something the region has not seen before. Experts are prone to point a finger at the Islamic State. Turkmen border guards suffer significant losses, some are taken prisoner by radicals. Militants cleanse the areas in the vicinity of border from local population while preparing corridors to be crossed in the spring of 2015».

Among the three neighboring states – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – the Turkmen border is the least protected. Around one million Turkmen reside on the Afghan side of the border – the second largest (after Iran) Turkmen population abroad. 

Around 60% of Turkmen residing in the contemporary Afghanistan are successors of refugees from the Bukhara Emirate and Khiva Khanate and those who left Turkmenistan escaping the Soviet rule in the 1920-1930s. 

The main threat comes from the Taliban. «To justify their appearance in lands alien to them, the Taliban claims that all land belongs to the Almighty one,» Afghan parliament member Nazari Turkmen said. «Taliban fighters don’t recognize any borders and pop up anywhere they choose, to start killing those unwilling to succumb to their rule». Pashtun tribes are the main source of recruitment for Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. The growing numbers of Turkmen Taliban militants have appeared recently in the north-western provinces of Afghanistan. Alexander Knyazev, a historian and an Oriental studies expert, says people use different ways to get to Afghanistan from Turkmenistan. Large armed units are being formed. A three thousand strong group is formed in the province of Faryab. Another formation numbering around two thousand warriors is located in the province of Bagdis. Around 30% of fighters come from Turkmenistan. In Afghanistan these formations (not government forces) control about 25% of the border with Turkmenistan. Since November 2104 skirmishes take place almost daily. Wounded border guards are taken to Ashgabad hospitals. 

According to Knyazev, in Afghanistan Turkmen Taliban have taken under their control almost the entire route of the proposed TAPI (the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline also known as Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline) natural gas pipeline. 

There is another factor to complicate things. Turkmen Mujahir, the successors of influential clans that escaped the Soviet Turkmenistan in the 1920-1930s and moved to Afghanistan, have been putting forward land restitution claims for a number of years. The claimed territory is situated near the cluster of gas fields: South Iolotan, Osman, Minara and Yashlar in Mary region (the south-east of the country). These deposits are used for forever increasing supplies to China. According to plans, they will fill with gas the TAPI pipeline under construction at present. The British consultancy Gaffney, Cline and Associates puts the reserves of the Galkynysh (English: Renaissance, the name for the South Yolotan-Osman gas field) in Mary oblast (region) at around 21, 2 trillion cubic meters. It makes it the largest gas field in the world after the South Pars, the world's largest natural gas condensate field located in the Persian Gulf and shared between Iran and Qatar. 

Ever since the days of Saparmurat Niyazov Turkmenistan has been adhering to the policy of neutrality stated in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1995. The document states that the United Nations "recognizes and supports the declared status of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan." Such a unique document was adopted for the first time by the international community of nations. There are signs that the exacerbation of tension provoked by the withdrawal of the international coalition from Afghanistan puts the Turkmenistan’s neutrality in doubt – the country is facing the most serious test in the recent twenty years. As Shohrat Kadyrov puts it, under the conditions «willy-nilly» Russian becomes the main guarantor of neutral Turkmenistan’s security.

So it was all the more surprising to Baku when one these partners, from whom surprises were least expected, began creating problems for Azerbaijan’s gas exports. 

Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız has announced that his country will abandon the «take or pay» principle for gas supplies from Azerbaijan. Ankara has already abandoned such mutual settlements with Russia’s Gazprom, and is planning to do the same with regard to Iran by the end of the year. Turkey wants to complete a review of the «take or pay» scheme with respect to the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) in 2015. 

Turkey has repeatedly voiced its intention to abandon the principle, which it finds unfavourable, where the customer pays regardless of whether it takes the contracted volume of gas or not. SOCAR has so far been trying to avoid the situation since there have been no talks between Turkish and Azerbaijani companies with regard to an abandonment of the «take or pay» principle. However, it turns out that in a bilateral trade scheme, the gas customer (Turkey) merely has to notify the seller (Azerbaijan) of its decision. 

According to Azerbaijani analysts, fears that Turkey’s transformation into a major energy hub will allow the country to dictate its terms to its partners are beginning to be realised. 

At the same time, Ankara is also trying to lower the price of Azerbaijani gas supplied to Turkey. It is completely possible that in the future, Turkey will be able to go back on pre-agreed volumes of gas supplies just as easily. 

Moreover, Turkey’s plans extend far beyond the western shore of the Caspian Sea. With enviable persistence, Ankara is lobbying for a project to transport Turkmenistan’s gas through the Trans-Caspian pipeline to European markets. During Turkish President Recep Erdoğan’s visit to Turkmenistan on 6-7 November, the Turkish leader stressed the important role his country plays in the transportation of natural gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to the West. We attach great significance to deliveries of Central Asian gas to Europe via Turkey, to which end the Trans Anadolu pipeline project was launched, said Erdoğan.

At the conclusion of Erdoğan’s talks in Ashgabat between the state gas company Turkmengaz and the Turkish company Atagaz, a framework purchase contract was signed. Its conditions remain confidential. However, it is possible to reconstruct a general picture of Turkey’s gas policy in the Caspian Sea region without it. The Turkish company BOTAS has increased its share in the TANAP project to 30 per cent. At the same time, Ankara is gently forcing its Azerbaijani partners to abandon the «take or pay» principle, on which Azerbaijan’s gas exports to Turkey have been built in recent years. The culmination of Turkey’s strategy to conquer dominant energy hub positions between Central Asia and Europe will be connecting the TANAP pipeline to a pipeline Turkey wants to lay at the bottom of the Caspian Sea. Ankara is not worried about the lack of real opportunities to get the project off the ground, or the deficiency in Ashgabat’s ‘blue fuel’ surpluses intended for the Chinese market. The most important thing is applying for the role of Europe’s indispensable partner in gas deals. 

President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev

In Baku, meanwhile, they are rather confidently instilling themselves and others with the idea of Azerbaijan’s exceptional role as a gas supplier to the Old World. Following Erdogan’s visit to Ashgabat and the signing of the Turkish-Turkmen gas agreement, Azerbaijan’s leader Ilham Aliyev set off for Hungary. In an interview with Hungarian National Television on 11 November, he said that Azerbaijan could be «a reliable source of gas for European customers for at least 100 years».

In reality, however, Baku is developing an increasingly better understanding of the conditionality of allied relations with Ankara when Turkey’s commercial interests and geopolitical plans are also involved. And they are not only understanding it, but also trying to offset Turkey’s efforts towards Turkmenistan. 

If Ankara continues its game behind Baku’s back, forcing Azerbaijan to make concessions on gas contracts previously entered into, then Azerbaijan has an alternative. 

Two days before Erdogan’s visit to Ashgabat, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan announced the resumption of gas exports to Russia in 2015, which were suspended for technical reasons in August 2013. By strengthening its ties with Moscow, Baku will be able to successfully withstand increasing pressure from Turkey on the issue of gas.

Exactly what the Americans are basing this confidence on remains a mystery. Just a few months ago, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is financing the TAPI project, put a hold on its implementation due to uncertainty associated with the withdrawal of international security forces from Afghanistan in 2014, where the situation is not only not improving, it is showing clear signs of escalating into a civil war. A report by the US intelligence-gathering community entitled «An evaluation of global threats in 2013» acknowledges that attempts to achieve security are particularly fragile in those areas where responsibility is being handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces, which are in need of international help. The Taliban are still capable of challenging the United States. 

Essentially, the Americans are insisting that the gas pipeline be built in the middle of a combat situation. There are areas in Afghanistan where the authority of the central government is rather weak, and local government bodies are known for their corruption and irresponsibility, allowing the Taliban to maintain its leverage on the situation in the south, southeast and east of the country. Armed groups of rebels are still intentionally attacking the road transport network and making use of their significant influence in rural areas. In the process, the size of these armed groups has increased, which became apparent, for example, in the brief capture of the district administrative centre in the south of Badakhshan that took place in the autumn of 2013. In the short term, a loose division of the spheres of influence is most likely. The Taliban’s position will be strengthened, and it is quite possible that the country will destabilise dramatically and there will be a civil war.

Nevertheless, the US government is showing a profound interest in cooperating with Turkmenistan to implement the TAPI project, suggesting an alternative construction location in a desolate, mountainous area. The security of the pipeline, as planned, will be provided from the air, although according to the Americans themselves, the Afghan Air Force does not have the resources for this. Furthermore, in Pakistan the pipeline needs to be laid around tribal areas where the situation is no less combative than in Afghanistan. In such circumstances, finding investors who are willing to finance work on the vast territories of two extremely unstable countries is incredibly difficult; serious government guarantees are needed. A private consortium, headed by the American company Unocal, refused to be involved in the project’s financing, and the main investor is set to be the government agency USAID. American taxpayers, who last year were paying USD 12 million a day for their troops to stay in Afghanistan, are now going to have to put their hands in their pockets again for the TAPI project, the cost of which is estimated to be USD 8 billion. 

The economic inviability of the TAPI project for the Americans has become particularly evident at the present time. China has made this project useless to the Americans, having become the main decision maker regarding Central Asia’s gas resources. The expropriation of Washington’s plans came about as a result of a contract between the state gas company Turkmengaz and the Chinese company CNPC for the sale of 25 billion cubic metres of gas per year… The deal will bring the total volume of Turkmen gas supplied to China to 65 billion cubic metres. At the same time, agreements have been reached on a proposed new direction for the Turkmenistan-China pipeline (direction D) for additional supplies. Gas agreements have also enabled the approval of a Joint Declaration on Establishing a Strategic Partnership between Turkmenistan and China. The declaration was supported by a cooperation agreement for the financing of the second phase of development at the Galkynysh gas field, as well as a contract for the design and construction of a facility at this location for the production of 30 billion cubic metres of marketable gas per year. By gaining control over the source of raw materials, China has virtually appropriated the TAPI pipeline already. The US does not seem to have any objection. So where does America’s interest lie?

Firstly, following 11 September 2001, Afghanistan became the primary target of America’s global war on terror, while Washington declared that the countries of Central Asia were «frontline states». America’s inability to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan, which is occupied by American troops, and before that in Iraq, raises natural doubts regarding the adequacy of the White House’s strategy. On the eve of the troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is a growing probability that the instability will move from there to neighbouring countries. Washington is obviously trying to keep the strategic gains it has made in Central Asia by imposing its partnership on Central Asian countries. To withdraw from Afghanistan and lose its influence in the region would be intolerable for America. This applies to Central Asia, to Pakistan, and to Iran. 

Secondly, Iran is also seeking to supply its gas to Pakistan. In March 2013, the presidents of these two countries officially opened the final construction stage of the Peace pipeline. The construction of the Iranian section of the pipeline, the length of which, according to various estimates, is nearly 1150 kilometres, is almost completed, and work has begun to extend the pipe in Pakistan, which will be approximately 780 kilometres in length; the cost of the future work has been estimated at USD 1.5 billion. It is expected that Pakistan will begin to receive gas from the pipeline by December 2014 (exactly the same was planned for the TAPI pipeline). According to the contract signed for 25 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran will export 7.8 billion cubic metres of natural gas to Pakistan every year through the new Iranian pipeline. Tehran is not hiding its own particular interest in realising this project and is willing to make substantial concessions to Pakistan. And now the Americans are objecting. The US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, has pointed out that the gas pipeline project between Iran and Pakistan could serve as the reason for new sanctions against both Tehran and Islamabad. Nuland observed that Pakistan has chosen the wrong path by entering into an energy agreement with Iran, and that a penalty in the form of sanctions is unavoidable.

Thirdly, America is consistently true to its desire to prevent the growth of Russia’s international influence. America’s strategic interests in the Central Asia region were stated clearly for the first time in April 1997, in a special report sent to Congress by the State Department. The document indicated that America would not abandon its claims in Central Asia, including with regard to extending and diversifying the world’s energy routes. The contours of such a diversification are obvious: to damage Russia, bypass Iran and harm China. You will recall that the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan appeared in 1996 as an alternative to the Russian-Turkish Blue Stream project. This coincided with America declaring that the Black and Caspian Sea areas were a zone of its strategic interests. At present, the main support for the project is coming from the EU, and the US seems to have receded into the background. Nevertheless, it was the US in August 2010 who gave Azerbaijan nearly USD 2 million to prepare a feasibility study for the project in view of Kazakhstan’s possible involvement in it.

America’s invasion of Afghanistan, one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world, contributed absolutely nothing to the fight against terrorism. After overthrowing the Taliban regime, as much as a quarter of Afghanistan remains under their control. America’s activities in the interests of peace and stability in Afghanistan have essentially come to an end, and the Americans no longer need cooperation in this area from neighbouring powers, including from Russia. The American administration continues to treat Central Asia like a field of strategic competition between the US and neighbouring countries; first and foremost Russia, but now China as well. This is the only reason why America is still suggesting the territory of rebellious Afghanistan as a safe corridor for the transit of energy from the Caspian Sea through Central Asia to Pakistan and India… And why it refuses to see that the mutual distrust of Pakistan and India has brought all talks on energy projects they have been involved in to deadlock, and that alone is turning the TAPI project into a gas pipeline that is going to lead nowhere. 

As the autumn set in a number of high-level government teams visited Turkmenistan. On September 3 president of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow met Taner Yıldız, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources. Energy cooperation topped the agenda. President Berdimuhammedow noted his country was rich in oil and gas and paid interest in building new pipelines going to Europe. Taner Yıldız said Turkey was ready to render any support to bring such projects into life. The very same day the President of Turkmenistan held talks with a delegation of the European Union led by the acting director of the General Department of Energy Jean-Arnold Vinois. By and large they discussed the same agenda: creating reliable and solid legal ground for energy cooperation and diversification of gas export routes going from Turkmenistan. Turkey and the EU try to revive the Nabucco project in a different form. The Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline has become a new project to take the Nabucco’s place. The agreement to build it was signed by Turkey and Azerbaijan in Istanbul on June 26. The estimated cost is $7 billion. The pipeline line is to go from Azerbaijan to the Turkish borders with Bulgaria and Greece. The planned capacity would be 16 billion cubic metres (570 billion cubic feet) of natural gas per year: 6 to Turkey and 10 to Europe. If constructed, it would transport gas from the Azeri Shah Deniz-2 gas field. It’s obviously not enough to compete with Gazprom, so, reportedly, the capacity may go up to 60 billion cubic metres in future. It exactly matches the planned capacity of Russia’s South Stream that, unlike Nabucco, faces no difficulties related to funds or resource base. Taner Yıldız said: "With the TANAP project we have created a structure that will allow gas to transit across Azerbaijan and facilitate trade. …” He said gas deliveries from Turkmenistan was the goal.

At present the project is designed for deliveries from the Azeri Shah Deniz Stage 2 gas-condensate field only. The Nabucco’s capacity was to be around 30 cubic metres a year. Azerbaijan had resources enough to provide for the half of it. The other half was to come from Turkmenistan considered to be the second resource base for Nabucco. Russia has bought four times less of Turkmen gas since 2010, so Ashgabat would greet the emergence of one more export route. A pipeline at the bottom of Caspian Sea is a requirement. The construction is hindered by difficulties involved in establishing the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Being a lake it’s not covered by international sea law. The EU recent strategy has been focused on building a pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan ignoring the objections raised by other Caspian states, first of all Russia and Iran. Neither Brussels nor Ashgabat dared to take the first step.

Unlike Nabucco TANAP is more flexible. In case there would be no access to Turkmenian gas, the investors would be satisfied with the gas coming from Azerbaijan and the capacity would stay at 16 cubic metres a year. The Azeri gas supplies could somewhat be increased as time goes by. According to local BP officer estimates, the potential supplies to Europe could go up to 24 cubic metres by 2020. In this case the program minimum would be implemented: the Azeri gas would go to the EU through Turkey (not Russia) and the foreign policy of South Caucasian states would become more pro-Western. If the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline is built, the capacity could be increased. The projected capacity of 60 cubic metres makes one stop and think. Initially Turkmenistan guaranteed to fill the half of Nabucco’s capacity, that is around 15 cubic metres a year. That’s what is unclear in principle: either the export capacities of Ashgabat and Baku are to suddenly substantially increase exceeding what has been declared so far or the TANAP designers count on other gas sources. Isn’t it Iran that is considered to become a resource base as a result of an operation aimed at “changing the regime”?

Today the Iran’s stance is a major hindrance in the way of Trans-Caspian pipeline project. Teheran insists the Caspian should be divided into five equal parts while other states stand for the division into national sectors along the shore lines. Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan divided the sea bottom among themselves according to this principle. The sea bottom is not divided in the southern part of the Caspian because of Iran’s disagreement with the option. That’s what makes the Trans – Caspian pipeline construction problematic: which territory is it going to cross when there are no commonly recognized sea borders in this part of the sea? Getting Iran out of play makes the solution much simpler.

There is one more hitch in the way of Trans-Caspian pipeline – the disagreement between Baku and Ashgabat over the sea border. The Kyapaz (Serdar in Turkmenian) deposit is at the root of dispute. The estimated oil and gas condensate is 150 million barrels. The both states stick to the principle of border line in the middle of the Sea. However, Azerbaijan proposes the equal distance from extreme points of coastal line while Turkmenistan stand for the principle of delimitation based on the middle of geographic latitudes. The latter makes the Kyapaz a part of Turkmenian territory, the Azeri deposit becomes situated on the border line; its development has already been started by Baku. The proposal to develop the Kyapaz together put forward by Azerbaijan was not accepted by Ashgabat. In 2008 the presidents of both countries agreed to make no moves to develop the disputable field. But in June 2012 a diplomatic scandal flared between the two – Azerbaijan launched a protest against starting seismic work by Turkmenian research vessel. Turkey is trying to settle the issue doing its best to narrow the gap between the stances. It’s not known if the efforts applied by Ankara have produced any result.

The stakes are high in the big game around the Caspian hydrocarbons. The main goal of the West is to separate the countries of South Caucasus and Central Asia from Russia, to avoid the integration of post-Soviet states within the framework of common economic space, to make the energy routes bypass the territory of the Russian Federation. Supposedly, as a result, the geopolitical former Soviet Union space would acquire a new shape described in the concepts of New Silk Road and Greater Middle East…
 

The planned throughput of the 1,700-km Trans-Afghanistan pipeline is currently set to 33 bcm annually, the main target markets being India and Pakistan which are to absorb 14 bcm a year each. The remaining 5 bcm should go to Afghanistan. The route is to pass through Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan, Quetta and Multan in Pakistan, and to reach Fazilka in India. The Indian cost estimate for the construction is $12b and the resources will be drawn from Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan which is currently being sold by Ashgabat as the world's largest.

The invention of the project to construct a pipeline linking the Caspian region and Afghanistan dates back to the Soviet era. The theme was reopened by the US after the collapse of the USSR with the aim of reconfiguring the region's transit network so as to pull apart Russia on the one side and the Central Asia plus the Caucasus on the other. In October, 1995, the construction contract was signed by the US-based Unocal, the Saudi Delta Oil and Co, and the government of Turkmenistan. An international consortium came into being in 1997, but the project never took off the ground as the situation became cloudy in Afghanistan. Though the Talibs supported the project, it had to be put on hold with dim prospects as a result of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the Western coalition.

The Trans-Afghanistan pipeline project was reborn in the late 2000ies, when Ashgabat took to diversifying its gas export routes and the US needed to offer India and Pakistan viable alternatives to gas import from Iran. Gazprom, formerly the main buyer of natural gas from Turkmenistan, suspended transactions with the country in April, 2009 amidst an angry exchange with Ashgabat over the blast which destroyed a section of the Central Asia – Center pipeline. The incident highlighted a deepening rift between Russia and Turkmenistan in the energy sphere. As the global crisis downed the gas prices, buying natural gas at the old cost stopped to make sense for Gazprom, but Turkmenistan staunchly brushed off Russia's requests for lower tariffs. Due to the dispute, gas supplies from Turkmenistan to Russia resumed only in January, 2010, and the corresponding volumes dropped roughly by a factor of four – from 42.8 bcm in 2008 to 10.5 bcm in 2010, with no indications so far that Gazprom would ever shop for more. Estimatedly, the contraction of gas supplies to Russia cost Turkmenistan a quarter of its GDP annually.  

Facing the problem, Turkmenistan had to cultivate alternative gas export avenues. The first phase of the transcontinental Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China pipeline having the annual capacity of 40 bcm was inaugurated in December, 2009. It was decided in November, 2011 to add 25 bcm to the throughput, with 10 bcm to be contributed by Uzbekistan and 12-15 bcm – by Kazakhstan. A new pipeline stretching from the Dauletabad gas field via Saraghs to Iran's Hangeran was launched in January, 2010 with the aim of giving a boost to natural gas export to Iran from 8 to 20 bcm. It must be noted that the revenues from gas export to China and Iran do not offset Turkmenistan's losses due to the dip in gas trade with Russia since both Beijing and Tehran currently pay much lower prices than Moscow used to. 

Exporting natural gas north, east, and south, Turkmenistan never ignored the western and south-eastern (Afghan) directions. Over the past several weeks, two heavyweight partners – Hungary's MOL and Germany's RWE – opted out of the Nabucco project intended to feed Natural gas from Turkmenistan to Europe. Both cited the legal complexities surrounding pipeline construction underneath the landlocked Caspian Sea. With the outlook for Nabucco increasingly negative, Turkmenistan has to focus on the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline project. In fact, the first attempts to reanimate it were made before Ashgabat's relations with Moscow soured. In July, 2008, a Turkmen-Afghan intergovernmental commission for economic and technical cooperation convened for the first time in Turkmenistan, and Ashgabat seized the opportunity to reiterate its commitment to the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline project. On the occasion, Afghanistan was offered perks in the forms of discount natural gas and electric power tariffs and of assistance in the exploration and development of the oil and gas reserves found in the proximity of the country's border. 

In September, 2010, chiefs of the pertinent Turkmen, Afghan, Pakistani, and Indian ministries signed a framework agreement on the construction of the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline which, however, neither set any specific deadlines nor listed the project funding sources or the future transit tariffs. A question that inevitably came into the spotlight at the time was whether Russia's Gazprom would join the initiative. In October, Igor Sechin, the energy projects curator in the Russian government, said Gazprom was talking to Turkmengaz about taking a role in the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline project but added that no decision existed as to what the role would be. The relations between Russia and Turkmenistan never quite recovered after the incident on the Central Asia – Center pipeline, and the comment released by the Turkmen foreign ministry essentially read that no deals on the issue had been reached. The possibility that Gazprom would still blend in – by buying a share in the project or acting as a contractor – continued to be discussed ever since (even at the presidential level in Moscow in December, 2011), but so far with nothing practical in sight. 

The negotiations over the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline construction intensified by the end of 2011. In November, Turkmen and Pakistani presidents Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow and Asif Ali Zardari met in Islamabad to ink a declaration reaffirming the plan. On May 17, 2012, India's energy sector grand GAIL, backed by the Indian government, signed the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline deal with Turkmenistan. The US Department of State recurrently expressed support for the project, evidently keeping in mind the objective of rendering impractical the alternative route from Iran to India via Pakistan.

It is clear that the biggest problem down the road for the  Trans-Afghanistan pipeline project is security. Most of the pipeline would traverse the Afghan and Pakistani territories which are barely, if at all, controlled by the respective governments. The range of solutions considered included exotic options like paying rent to local tribal militias for maintaining the security of the infrastructure. It should be taken into account as well that the risks confronting the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline project will further escalate with the completion of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.