Ted Rall, syndicated writer and the cartoonist for ANewDomain.net, is the author of the book “Snowden,” the biography of the NSA whistleblower

Death is usually a sad event. The passing of a world leader, particularly one who brought stability to a tense part of the Muslim world for several decades, is typically cause for concern.

The death of Uzbekistani president Islam Karimov is not typical.

For the majority of the long-oppressed citizens of Uzbekistan, the end of one of the world’s bloodiest and most corrupt dictators — and, to our eternal shame, an American ally — is cause for joy and gleeful celebration.

The SOB died 82 years too late.

Except for the time Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson called it “a small, insignificant state…Ubeki-beki-beki-beki-stan-stan,” the hell on earth created by Karimov doesn’t get much coverage in the news media. Few Americans could find this backwater on a map to save their lives. Yet Uzbekistan, once known as the underbelly of the USSR, is incredibly important. Which is why the rich and powerful – military generals, energy company executives, Hillary Clinton – know all about it.

Unfortunately for the Uzbeks, these American elites’ interest in their country has made their lives unspeakably miserable. And unless something radically unexpectedly takes place, that’s likely to continue. Which is why, during this presidential election season, American voters ought to ask the candidates most likely to win (Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump) as well as those who should be most likely to win (Jill Stein and Gary Johnson) how they would change American foreign policy in obscure/important places like Uzbekistan.

American policymakers care about Uzbekistan because it is an energy giant: one of the largest producers of natural gas in the world, a significant supplier of oil, and the fourth-largest source of gold in the world. Sitting smack dab in the middle of Central Asia, the nation has undeniable strategic importance. Uzbekistan has the region’s largest population, its most sophisticated infrastructure and its biggest cities: Tashkent, a city of 2.3 million people, even has a subway.  It also has the blockbuster tourist attractions: the Silk Road cities of Khiva, Bukhara and Samarkand should be on any world traveler’s wish list.

Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian republic with common borders with all of the others, as well as with perpetually troubled Afghanistan. Oil and gas pipelines to and from the biggest source of fossil fuels on earth, the Caspian Sea, crisscross this blisteringly hot, dry nation.

Given Uzbekistan’s tremendous oil, gas and mineral wealth and its geographically and geopolitically strategic importance, its citizens ought to enjoy a high standard of living. Instead, the average Uzbek subsists on $3 to $8 per day. Where does all that energy wealth go? Karimov, his family and cronies steal it. Gulnara Karimova, the deceased despot’s flamboyant chanteuse daughter, is accused of breaking in over $1 billion in bribes from telecommunications companies seeking permits to do business. Another daughter, Lola Karimova-Tillyaeva, is linked to shell companies that own gaudy multimillion estates in the U.S.

Cultural and ethnic heirs to Genghis Khan’s Golden Horde, Uzbeks are neither stupid nor lazy. It requires and incredibly brutal and ruthless military and police apparatus to prevent them from rising up and overthrowing their oppressors. So this is exactly what the Karimov regime has delivered since the country became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. (Karimov kept his job as boss of the Uzbek SSR, which he scored from outgoing Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.)

Uzbekistan is routinely awarded the world’s “Worst of the Worst” status for its extreme corruption and violations of fundamental human rights. Phones are tapped and militsia goons shake down motorists at innumerable checkpoints. Print and broadcast media are completely state-controlled. There’s a zero tolerance policy toward political opposition.

In 1999, Karimov said: “I am ready to rip off the heads of 200 people, to sacrifice their lives, for the sake of peace and tranquility in the country.” By which he meant his peace and tranquility.

Four percent of the population are subjected to slavery. At least 10,000 political prisoners are rotting in the nation’s prisons. Torture is standard and endemic; Team Karimov landed a rare spot in the news for boiling dissidents to death. In 2005, President Karimov asked security forces confronting protesters in the southern city of Andijon to wait for his arrival from the capital of Tashkent so he could personally witness and coordinate their massacre. An estimated 700 to 1200 Uzbeks were slaughtered. “People have less freedom here than under Brezhnev,” a U.S. official admitted.

Every now and then, some naïve US State Department official has issued a toothless tisk-tisk report documenting human rights abuses in Uzbekistan. But the Americans who run the show are obsessed with maintaining the country’s role in the Northern Distribution Network, a crucial aerial and ground supply line between the US and its European allies and the endless war against Afghanistan and Pakistan. They’re willing to do pretty much anything to protect the NDN — including funneling weapons to one of the most disgusting regimes on the planet.

In 2012, the Obama administration quietly lifted a post-Andijon ban on weapon sales. One major shipment included a 2015 delivery of 320 armored personnel vehicles to Karimov – exactly the kind of equipment an authoritarian state uses to crush demonstrations. “Perhaps worse than equipping a government so well-known for abuses against its own people and for its defiance of international norms with such powerful military equipment,” said Steve Swerdlow of Human Rights Watch, “is the message that the Obama administration is sending the people of Uzbekistan: that Islam Karimov has gotten away with it.”

American news accounts of Karimov’s death omitted America’s role propping him up.

It would be nice to hope that the flowers of democracy will sprout in the soil of the dictator’s grave. But years of suppression have destroyed the opposition groups that might have been able to step into power as part of a post-Karimov transition. The post-KGB security forces will continue to protect themselves and their kleptocratic bosses. Acting Uzbek president Nigmatulla Yuldashev will no doubt call for another of the country’s sham elections, which a hand-selected member of the ruling elite is predestined to win. And Obama will keep the military aid flowing.

This is the kind of thing that causes Muslims to hate us. It’s why we are a constant target of terrorism. But nothing is going to change there unless something changes at the top here.

This statement will hardly smooth worries away especially in view that nothing is done to rectify the situation as events unfold unfavorably for those who oppose the Islamic State. Until recently it had been widely believed that the central authorities in Kabul were fighting the Taliban. Now a third belligerent emerged. Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser, Mohammad Hanif Atmar, has said that the presence of Daesh, or the Islamic State, is growing. According to him, the group plans to seize control of Central Asia and then move to Russia. The efforts to fight the Islamic State in Afghanistan are not enough to counter the threat. True, the Taliban and the Islamic State don’t join forces; to the contrary they fight each other. But it should not give rise to illusions. Many Taliban fighters join the ranks of the Islamic State. It’s hard to say how many of them have already changed sides but it’s evident that the Islamic State recruiting efforts have been a success so far. This January the Islamic State anointed a former Taliban leader, known as Hafiz Saeed Khan, as their new overload in southern Asia and the sub-continent. Saeed, who is also known as Mulla Saeed Orakzai, was appointed the leader of a new group called IS Khorasan, an offshoot of Abu Bakhr al-Baghdadi's militant group which spans Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh, as well as some parts of Central Asia. The installation of Saeed, a former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), automatically makes him one of the most powerful warlords in the Middle East. Other groups have also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, for instance: The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). 

Obviously the Islamic States is trying to spread instability beyond the borders of the Middle East. It targets Central Asia. An outright military intervention may not be that imminent but the incitement of internal tensions in the Central Asian states is something to expect. 

Many citizens of Central Asia go to Iraq and Syria willing to join the Islamic State militants. They will come back. Islamists have already gained experience of armed struggle against the government forces in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They will apply the acquired skills to kill in their respective countries upon return. The social problems have become exacerbated in the Central Asian states. The opposition uses this factor to its advantage. The living standards are low, internal strife is in full swing with corruption and unemployment omnipresent and pervasive. According to Russian Federal Migration Service, around nine million immigrants from Central Asia worked in Russia in 2014. Now the Central Asian states themselves are going to be hit by a wave of immigrants coming from Afghanistan. There still remain circumstances in Afghanistan that could trigger a mass influx of refugees to the Central Asian countries, Mr. Bernard Doyle, UNHCR Regional Representative and Regional Coordinator for Central Asia, told in an interview with AKIpress on May 25. He did not make precise what exactly circumstances he meant. Will Central Asia cope? In 2014 the number of refugees there did not exceed three thousand but the situation has significantly worsened recently in the border areas of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 900 ethnic Turkmen families are asking Turkmenistan for political asylum. They had to leave homes because of combat actions. Until now they haven’t got a reply. The fighting has been raging near the Turkmenistan border for a few weeks already. Militants keep on gaining ground seizing new populated areas. They have many foreigners in their ranks. The leaders of Afghan provinces complain that Kabul ignores their pleas for urgent help. The Taliban says its fighters don’t take part in the hostilities. 

Some surmise that it’s all part of a complicated plot. The situation in the areas adjacent to the Turkmenistan – Afghanistan border is getting tense. Turkmenistan is moving forces closer to the border. It is building fortifications. The government has declared partial mobilization. According to General Lloyd Austin, Commander of US Central Command, Turkmenistan has asked the United States for military aid. 

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completed the mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 (NATO took command of the United Nations-mandated mission in Afghanistan in August 2003). However, support for the continued development of the Afghan security forces and institutions, and wider cooperation with Afghanistan continue. The U.S. handed over responsibility for security to local Afghans in 2014, but Obama has not specified a date for the withdrawal of all American troops from the country. According to the President, the last American troops will leave Afghanistan at the end of 2016. On March 24, Barack Obama announced that the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would be slowed and the remaining 9,800 troops would stay there through the end of 2015. The servicemen keep away from taking part in combat actions. Instead they concentrate on training and auxiliary missions. This development does not change the central issue, which is the Obama administration's withdrawal date of December 2016 for all U.S. forces. 

NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a session in Antalya, Turkey, on May 13-14. It was agreed that NATO will keep some troops in Afghanistan even after its current training mission ends around the end of next year in a signal of support for Afghan security forces struggling to repel a Taliban offensive. "Today we agreed that we will maintain a presence in Afghanistan even after the end of our current mission," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference during the meeting. On May 23, General Campbell said that the leaders of the United States and other NATO nations are intensifying discussions about future support for Afghanistan, probably meaning at least some American troops will remain here well after President Obama leaves office. According to him, NATO military commanders plan to establish a base in Kabul to help distribute aid, facilitate weapons sales and continue efforts to train Afghan security forces. Although Campbell stressed that NATO civilian officials probably will be in charge of the new mission, a contingent of troops also would be needed to secure the base. He added that NATO forces also could be used to help bolster the Afghan air force and intelligence service. Americans don’t plan get involved in hostilities but they intend to maintain control over Afghan authorities and military command. The have exercised the control long enough and here are the results. In some mysterious way Afghan security forces are successfully fighting back the Taliban in the south and east of the country (the Taliban is daily reported to suffer losses in the Ghazni and Gilmend provinces) but fail to gain ground against the relatively small formations of militants in the areas near the border with Central Asia. 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg went to Afghanistan in November 2014. During the visit he visited the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command at Camp Morehead in Kabul, where the chief of North Atlantic Alliance praised the progress of Afghan commando units. «I have seen a highly trained, experienced and professional force," Stoltenberg said. For over a year Afghan soldiers and police have led security operations across the country, and at the end of this year you will take full charge of security. But you will not stand alone. NATO and our partners will continue to support you." These words give rise to a question – why the Afghan military is doing its best to avoid clashes with the armed formations of opposition in the north of the country? Neither Washington, nor Kabul offers a reasonable answer. 

Washington does not exclude that the repetition of Syria scenario caused by NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan may result in strategic advantage to meet its interests. Controlled chaos is a tried and true method. A would-be war in Afghanistan will enable the Americans to control the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, maintain instability in the vicinity of Iranian borders and exacerbate the relations between India and Pakistan. Finally, the United States will maintain a springboard to exert pressure on Central Asia. Since 2014 Afghanistan is to become a major security problem for Russia… 

Along with the allies – the members Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Russia is urgently planning emergency measures that actually should have been taken long before. By the end of September a CSTO summit was held in Sochi ahead of the schedule with Russia becoming the chairman of the organization before time as well. The leaders of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan talked shop with regard to planned practical steps aimed at tackling the major aspects of the security problem. Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war). 

On October 1 the lower chamber of Tajikistan ratified an agreement on the status of the Russian 201st military base. Signed on October 5, 2012 at top level, the Russian military base agreement is to be in force till 2042. Together with the Tajik forces the base will guarantee the security of Tajikistan. Russia has started to deliver a $200 million military aid package to the country. Air force equipment and other war material will be transferred to Tajik armed forces gratuitously. 

According to experts, there are urgent steps to be taken, for instance, the deployment of Russian border guards along the almost 1500 km long Afghan-Tajik border guarded by only 16 thousand Tajik servicemen. No way could the Tajik authorities tackle the problem of refugees and armed gangs alone. Eight years ago Russian border guards left the area leaving behind only a few dozen strong operational group. Since then the situation has turned for the worse. New hot beds appear along the Tajik border, the extremists gain influence, the number of training camps for militants coming from the Collective Security Treaty Organization member-states has grown. 

Addressing the Sochi Collective Security Treaty Organization summit the President of Tajikistan Emomalii Rahmon called for combined efforts to strengthen the Afghan border. Many Russian politicians and military support the idea of getting Russian border guards back to Tajikistan. Still Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, actually opposed the idea. According to him, Tajikistan needs assistance to enhance the professional level of national border forces, including mountain warfare and new equipment deliveries. 

The US-Afghanistan partnership agreement, which is in works now, is expected to leave nine United States military facilities behind maintaining the capability for emergency response and coming to aid the government forces in case the situation gets abruptly worse. The remaining military forces are to stay in Kabul, Mazari Sharif, Jalalabad, Gardez, the Bagram air base and in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Herat. The list is missing the northern city of Kunduz, the capital of Kunduz Province, situated at the Tajik border, no matter it was the first major populated area where security responsibility was transferred to Afghan forces. Some time ago the security transfer ceremony was held with the participation of German defence and foreign chiefs. Kunduz has an important place in the history of German armed forces. During ten years around 20 thousand Bundeswehr servicemen have seen service there. Nowhere else since the days of WWII has the German military suffered comparable death toll than in Kunduz. 

Russian and Kyrgyz parliaments have ratified a status agreement on Russian air-base in Kant. Russian military will stay there for at least 20 years. Russia is going to upgrade the facility transforming it into a real outpost of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Central Asia, the presence to count with. Today the base is home to Su-24 fighter bombers, SU-25 attack planes, SU-27 SM air superiority fighters and an air group of rotary wing aircraft. Air and ground forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan kicked off military exercises the very next day the summit was over on September 24. 

Facing the expected threats from terrorist and extremist activities to intensify in Afghanistan, it is expedient to remember the events of the Uzbekistan’s Fergana valley where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU) conducted subversive activities from the territory of Kyrgyzstan. It should be admitted that Kyrgyz authorities face growing difficulties while exercising control over the south-western part of the country predominantly populated by Uzbeks. Militants are still recruited among local population to fill the IDU ranks. The Afghan drug flows get to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from Tajikistan and mainly from Kyrgyzstan. 

Kazakhstan stands for strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border and boosting military presence in Kyrgyzstan, the government believes the measures taken are vitally important for the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Of course, Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, is situated far from Afghanistan, still there is concern over the possibility of destabilization affecting Central Asia. Kazakhstan supports assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan because it meets its own national security interests. It also stands for collective defense of Central Asian air space, enhancement of Collective Forces capabilities, spurring the fight against drug trafficking. There have been no bloody conflicts on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan while Uzbekistan, which left the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s membership some time ago, has become the prime target for terrorists. The country is a party to a strategic partnership agreement with Astana. But Kazakhstan is a CSTO member, while Uzbekistan applies efforts to boost the relationship with the United States. 

Some time ago the relationship between Uzbekistan and the United States appeared to be worsened for good. The White House condemned the government for quelling the Andijan protests in 2005. The final break up seemed to be inevitable. Now Washington has restored the relationship with Islam Karimov considering an option of leaving on Uzbekistan soil some forces withdrawn from Afghanistan. Much talked about democratic values, human rights and the persecution of dissent in Uzbekistan pale in importance before the Washington’s desire to preserve military presence in Central Asia. 

It’s Uzbekistan the Unites States relies on to maintain a springboard for exerting influence of Afghanistan and stymie the process of Russia and Central Asia integration. In any event Tashkent is to be compensated by US guarantees and Western arms supplies as a reward for keeping away from the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan is under West European and US arms supplies embargo, but it does not confuse its leadership. The Uzbek government has approached NATO with a request to bring in the equipment and weapons used in Afghanistan and leave it in the country. Tashkent hopes the United States will support its desire to enjoy a privileged position in the northern part of Afghanistan where the ethnic Uzbeks are a majority. Uzbekistan has experience of being a «key ally» of the United States in Central Asia; it’s hard to predict how long the friendship will last this time, the same way it is hard to predict if the United States would leave Afghanistan without leaving some presence behind. 

The insinuations about NATO pulling out before the «combat season» in the spring of 2014 is a probe to see the outside reaction, including the response of Russia. The Russian Federation preferred not to wait till the ISAF withdraws; the probing raids from the territory of Afghanistan could be expected in the upcoming months. For instance, Kenya, where militants perpetrated a blood slaughter, is not an isolated incident, it’s a tendency. The United States military intervention under the pretext of «fight against international terrorism» has not resulted in peace; Afghanistan today is one of the most vulnerable states in the world. Over and over again we reap the fruits of US military domination. Under the circumstances, Russia has to take on a global mission and use the southern approaches to counter the US-sponsored scenario which envisions the «transition of the Middle East from the axis of instability to the axis of freedom». 

The persisting speculations regarding political succession in Uzbekistan, the incipient trends of unrest in Azerbaijan in recent months as the country lurches toward a crucial presidential election, growing volatility of the situation in Afghanistan – what surges to the mind is the great Middle Eastern upheaval known as the «Arab Spring.» Are we nearing a «tipping point» in Central Asia? 

The «Arab Spring» has already become a loaded expression laden with heavy political overtones. Although it is still in its early stages, in the two years since it appeared on the political landscape of the Middle East, it has ceased to be a regional movement. Different patterns of regime change have appeared. The indigenous content is also evaporating fast while external content is being injected to give new dynamics and direction to it. The «Arab Spring» is at times perilously close to being discredited as a geopolitical stunt. 

It had a peaceful run – and probably untethered run – in Tunisia two years ago. It became quite a bit rowdyish and muscular by the time it appeared in Egypt and it wasn’t an entirely «Egyptian» spring, either. Some called it a «revolution’ although the jury is still out an year later. On the other hand, Libya was a contrived regime change forced through brutal western military intervention, where the spontaneity that was associated with «Arab Spring» was almost entirely lacking. Again, Syria closely follows the Libyan model with some added features. 

Could the Arab Spring appear in the Central Asian region? There are indeed similarities between the two regions but, equally, there are striking differences too. The human rights organizations and western governments have been critical of the Central Asian regimes, much as they tick off occasionally their Middle Eastern allies for their nasty habits of running authoritarian oligarchic regimes. The rebuke is comparatively uncharitable when it comes to Central Asia, considering that these are new states whereas authoritarianism has an established history in the Middle East. Again, comparisons can be drawn between the two regions with regard to the socio-economic challenges they face – poverty and inequality, corruption and nepotism, unemployment or scant opportunities for the youth, a lack of freedom of the media, authoritarianism, rigged elections and lack of democratic opposition, and so on. Thus, scholars and experts of the region became inquisitive through the past two-year period whether the uprisings in the Middle East would spread to the Central Asian region. 

However, the ground reality is that there have been no major signs of popular discontent in the Central Asian region during these two years since the Arab Spring appeared. The pundits seem to have reached a wary assessment that the historical circumstances and prevailing conditions in Central Asia and the Middle East could be significantly different and the possibility of revolutionary stirrings appearing in the steppes is very remote. Overall, the prevailing opinion of scholars can be summarized in three or four segments. First, most experts agree that it is unlikely that events similar to the Arab Spring would take place in Central Asia. However, they also add the caveat that nonetheless conditions do exist which could create potential for unrest such as poverty, unemployment, corruption, and authoritarian rule. 

Again, there is a point of view – howsoever contentious it might seem in the light of the fall of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak – that the Central Asian regimes have drawn lessons from the events in the Middle East and have prepared counterstrategies to deal with any protests that may erupt. Put differently, the regimes in the region have put in place the instruments of repression that would swing into violent, coercive action if popular protests erupted. Finally, there is a somewhat optimistic view that the «big powers» are just not interested in promoting unrest in the Central Asian region and are instead focusing on the pursuit of compelling economic interests such as energy, which outweigh human rights concerns.

In the light of the above, it is tempting to conclude that the Central Asian regimes have successfully thwarted the advent of a spring season in their midst. It almost seems that when we compare the Middle East and Central Asia, it becomes a comparison between the apple and an orange. Indeed, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in April last year in a speech at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University in Bishkek that there is no scope «to view the Central Asian region through the prism of [the Arab Spring]». 

The Tahrir Square in Cairo was witnessing the revolution even as Lavrov spoke and it seemed he aimed his words at the West, and, interestingly, he was speaking while on a visit to Bishkek. Lavrov made it clear that Russia would take a dim view of Middle-East style upheavals appearing in the post-Soviet space. He strongly hinted that the Arab Spring was not spontaneous. 

He said: "We very much do not want the Arab Spring events, in which less and less attention is being paid to the rule of international law and the tune is more and more being called by unilateral geopolitical interests, to become a tradition and especially do not want anyone to view the Central Asian region through the prism of these processes." 

Learning the bitter lesson

Lavrov spoke as an experienced statesman. But his remarks are also of analytical relevance. So, let us proceed to examine the empirical reasons why the Arab Spring has not spread to Central Asia. First, the undeniable ground reality is that the Central Asian region has made significant recovery from the chaos of the disbandment of the former Soviet Union unilaterally by Boris Yeltsin. Any outsider who traversed the region would know the colossal disruption of the material supply system and the resultant economic dislocation whereby overnight renowned professors steeped in the fields of scholarship had to step out to eke out living as gate keepers, or geologists turned into gardeners, or doctors switched profession to become taxi drivers. No doubt, compared to that dark period, many people in Central Asia today are better off than they were in the past, and the general standard of living is going up, and, most important, there is even hope that the future could be promising. 

Second, it could also be argued that the Central Asians’ apparent apathy is rooted in the Soviet past. The plain truth is that the more things seemed to change in the Central Asian states, the more they remained the same. Alas, the Central Asian societies – unlike Russia which could make the painful democratic transition – played virtually no role in the formative period in the early 1990s in shaping their future. Rather, their future was decided on their behalf by elements who did not represent them, never bothered to consult them and in whom, in turn, they could never think of reposing trust. Put differently, the transition process itself was simply appropriated by Soviet Central Asia’s political elites, who of course had at their command the powerful intelligence and security apparatus and a command economy that exercised total control over the management of resources. Thus, the essence of their past 20-year history turns out to be that the Central Asian societies simply resigned themselves to their current conditions, bereft of any real choices in the matter. 

Again, apart from the Soviet heritage, the Central Asian countries lack a genuinely free media culture – except, perhaps, in Kyrgyzstan to an extent – or any strong opposition movements. Ironically, Russian media provided their window to the outside world but then, it also was disinterested to play the role of a catalyst of change. Indeed, the media remains controlled in most countries of Central Asia. Social media sites, opposition Web sites, and foreign news outlets have been specially targeted and free Internet access is unavailable. The World Press Freedom Index currently ranks Turkmenistan 177, and Uzbekistan 164 out of 179 countries. To be sure, even the most authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes fare better in comparison. This becomes important, ironically, because the social networks, Internet and television did play a major role in stoking the fires of protest in Egypt. 

Yet another factor is that the international criticism of Central Asian governments has probably diminished in the most recent years. The United States and other western countries have strategic and economic interests in the region and their main priority is that the region remains stable and secure so that cooperation is not impeded. Besides, the searing experience of imposing an embargo on Uzbekistan in 2005 following the Andizhan uprising and the subsequent unceremonious backtracking a few years down the road have taught the western countries the bitter lesson that it does not pay to preach human rights to the Central Asian region and such intrusive approaches could even be counter-productive. 

Above all, the war in Afghanistan necessitated the creation of a Northern Distribution Network as an alternative to the two transit routes via Pakistan for moving supplies in and out of Afghanistan. The deterioration of the US-Pakistan strategic partnership and an year-long closure of the two transit routes via Pakistani territory for the ferrying of supplies for the American troops deployed in Afghanistan compelled the Pentagon to depend heavily on the Central Asian region as an alternative access route. 

Arguably, everything else became of secondary importance in the US’ geo-strategies toward the region to the all-important needs of the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the wheel has come full circle and Uzbekistan, which evicted the US military from the K2 [Karshi-Khanabad] air base as recently as in July 2005, happens to be Washington’s closest partner country today in the Central Asian region – although much ambivalence shrouds that complex and unpredictable relationship. 

(To be continued)

IMU emerged aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its main aim was to establish Sharia based state and society in Uzbekistan and other parts of Central Asia. Its founders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani aimed at establishing a caliphate comprising former Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang region of China. They challenged Islam Karimov regime and played active roles in promoting violence. Namangani was later killed in Afghanistan, while Yuldashev has shifted base to Waziristan area of Pakistan. Central Asian states were averse to its radical ideology, but IMU found a ready acceptance in the circles of Al Qaeda and Taliban. IMU not only got shelter and sustenance in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, but also contributed to proliferation of violent activities of these organizations.

As northern Afghanistan borders Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it has become convenient for IMU to use porous borders and play havoc in Central Asia. Its cousins in Central Asia like Jundullah (soldiers of Allah) have recently been active in countries like Kazakhstan. Like IMU, the Jundullah has its base in border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan… As Afghanistan has populations of ethnic Uzbek and Tajik minorities, it has become convenient for these organizations to mobilize these people. Poverty and unemployment may have contributed to this rise of radicalism, but certainly propagation of extremist ideology plays a major role. Furthermore, the combination of these Central Asian organizations with international organizations like Al Qaeda, and Af-Pak organizations like Taliban and Haqqani network make them further lethal in conducting operations. Besides fermenting terrorist activities in Central Asia and Afghanistan, these Central Asian organizations have been alleged to have bombed Pakistani cities.

The departure of international forces from Afghanistan may help the war torn country to establish its own mechanisms of governance. But, it will be difficult to predict how far the indigenous government will be stable against the onslaught of the radical forces. The international forces have not been able to stem the rise of these forces. Taliban has already declared its plans of governance in its envisioned emirate of Afghanistan. In this venture of radicalization, forces like IMU come handy. Comparatively rich due to involvement in illegal poppy trade, Taliban and Haqqani network have used IMU operatives as surrogates and helpers. Reports suggest that IMU members, besides following the orders of Taliban and Haqqani, have also worked as bodyguards and helpers of top leaders of these organizations. There are also instances when members of these organizations interchange roles and perform activities for each other. If the return of the Taliban becomes an eventuality, the destructive role of IMU and Jundullah will certainly grow in Central Asia and surrounding regions.

International events of extremism and terrorism can not be completely separated. Radicalization of minorities in multiethnic and pluralistic societies is a core motive of Al Qaeda which, despite trumpets of its decimation, has raised its head not only in Afghanistan, but also in other parts of the world – in Libya, Syria, Mali, Myanmar and many other regions. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri was a key motivator of rebel activities in Libya and Syria. The collusion of Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan may emerge a bigger challenge to countries in Eurasia. Afghanistan is situated among many fault lines, and likely resurgence of Taliban will cause more harm than good. The current policy of Taliban is to hedge against the Karzai regime and buy time till international forces depart, so that it can with support of sympathetic powers seize Kabul. In such a scenario, the morale of IMU will not be boosted psychologically, but also materially. A Taliban government will have resources and foster IMU activities in proliferating ideology of radicalism through bombs.

As the IMU commander al-Burmi declared, the fire of extremism will spread like a forest fire if the Taliban returns to power. Afghanistan is surrounded by multiethnic and pluralistic states, which have ethnic based grievances. The ethnic minorities, currently under the regimes of secular democracies, will be easy targets of radical forces. The dreams of Caliphate of Turkestan or Caucasian Caliphate will be vigorously pursued with easy money coming from drug trafficking and charity money from some extremist regimes from different parts of the world.

The prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan and its border areas do not appear bright in present scenario. This brings forth the urgency of international cooperation, which at present does not appear much in sight. Unless the rise of IMU and their patrons in Afghanistan is checkmated in time, the future war against extremism and terrorism will really be long winding for the countries of Eurasia.

The summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization took place in Moscow on December 19. In June, 2012, Uzbekistan sent an official note to CSTO secretariat asking for termination of its activity in the organization. The analysts point out the organization satisfied the appeal going even a bit beyond what the Uzbekistan asked for by terminating its membership. It was not activity, but membership suspension that deprived the country of an opportunity to ignore the organization’s decisions because it had no representation anymore. There was one more new provision introduced in relation to the membership restoration procedure. From now on there will be no more preferential treatment. In case Tashkent decides to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization, it will have to ratify all the agreements concluded in its absence. 

The introduction of this provision is explained by the fact Uzbekistan left the Organization in 1999-2006 to join GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). At that, the Uzbekistan’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization didn’t affect the organization’s activities in a favorable way. The matter is – it constantly opposed the initiatives aimed at enhancing the CSTO’s effectiveness. 

Aside from the decision on the Uzbekistan’s membership termination, the Collective Security Treaty Organization adopted a package of 18 agreements, including the military cooperation plans till 2020, the procedure for forming and using capabilities, the forecast on the situation in Afghanistan: the prospects for its evolution and the measures to counter the potential threats originating from the territory of this country. The command system was changed. From now on the Chief of Combined Staff position will be held for three consecutive years, no combination of positions is allowed, the head of staff is forbidden to wear two hats. Russian Lieutenant-General Alexander Studenikin was confirmed for the appointment. The organization’s activities are affected by the events taking place in the Middle East. According to Russian President Putin the CSTO’s decisions are based on «the inviolability of the regulations of international law and the inadmissibility of interference into the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Ignoring these principles, attempting to impose one’s own approaches on other nations, can lead to very serious consequences. The dramatic developments in the Middle East and North Africa are the most evident proofs to that».

No matter what, Russia is not going to turn its back on Uzbekistan. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had wrapped up two-day visit to the Uzbek capital Tashkent just before the CSTO summit. A number of important statements were made as a result. Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov said it was important to bolster strategic relations between the two countries, especially military ties. Afghanistan is a key factor that necessitates the need for military cooperation, as the Uzbekistan leader noted there was no ground for optimistic vision. Rings true. The occupation of Afghanistan by Americans has been lasting since 2001. During this time the country has become a blazing hotbed of terrorism and the source of global drug trafficking. The Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization shouldn’t and will not hamper the efforts to counter the threats. As Lavrov said, «That is Uzbekistan’s sovereign choice. We regret the decision was made, but it was». The Russia’s top diplomat pointed out that Uzbekistan was still Moscow’s ally as the bilateral strategic partnership agreement, the Russia-Uzbekistan Treaty of Alliance and military cooperation programs – all were still in force. 

Military cooperation is of special importance. This summer the issue of the possible establishment of a so-called Operative Reaction Center in Uzbekistan, which could accommodate warehouses storing weapons and military hardware following the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, came to the fore. The prospect for Uzbekistan’s reorientation to the military cooperation with the United States couldn’t but stoke the most serious concern in Moscow… 

According to Kommersant, Lavrov was told during the visit that Tashkent would not deploy US military facilities on its territory. At the same time, Uzbekistan is concerned over the Moscow’s plans to upgrade the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As Kommersant reported in November, Russia planned to allocate $1, 5 million for the purpose. The both republics displayed great interest in getting the assistance, while the both of them had rather complicated, sometimes even tense, relations with Uzbekistan. 

There are still many unresolved issues affecting the relations between the two countries. No matter what the rumors have said, the Uzdunrobita, the largest mobile phone operator, which is part of Russian MTS network provider, hasn’t started its operations in Uzbekistan as yet. On its part, the Tashkent’s request to cancel the recycling tax imposed on cars transported to Russia, has not received a reply. It affects export prices largely in a negative way and has resulted in sales going down. The details of Russia’s intention to build large hydroelectric power plants in Kirgizia are still murky, Uzbekistan stands firmly against such plans. Moscow has made some concessions to Tashkent, for instance, it has agreed to international expertise before the construction starts; it has invited Uzbekistan to take part in the project, including management of enterprises. On the other hand, it’s hard to predict what will happen in case the expertise results will not satisfy Uzbekistan’s leadership and it will refuse to participate in the implementation of the project. 

The session of interstate Eurasian Economic Community took place at the very same time the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit was held in Moscow. It was devoted to the future of the organization. The «brunt» of economic integration process was carried out by the Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus; it was their Customs Union that served as a base for creating the Common Economic Space this year. So the decision was to cease the Eurasian Economic Community’s activities by 2015. According to Putin, «The Community has fulfilled all the goals it had set for itself: the Customs Union is now in operation, the Common Economic Space between three states has been launched, and their common regulatory body – the Eurasian Economic Commission – has been set. Now, after completing the work that has spanned many years, the EurAsEC is transferring to the Eurasian Economic Commission responsibilities to further deepen integration which is an absolutely natural process. The EurAsEC’s powers and functions are being significantly curtailed, thereby requiring that we reorganize the Community».

As yet Uzbekistan has no plans to join the Customs Union, but it has an opportunity to take part in Eurasian integration process. It can accede to the CIS free trade zone (FTZ) agreement that envisages a more «soft» integration – the agreement will eliminate export and import duties on goods with no uniform rates to follow. Tashkent has already expressed the wish to join the CIS free trade zone.

US Undersecretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs R. Blake toured the region on August 15-17. Initially, his itinerary included stays in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In Astana, he was supposed to be selling the New Silk Road project propped up by the US and clearly aimed to exclude Russia from the Eurasian transit web. In the last-moment adjustment, Blake's priorities tilted towards Tashkent – on August 15, he met with Uzbek president I. Karimov and on August 16 Uzbekistan's foreign ministry hosted a third round of talks with the US coupled to a US-Uzbek business forum. The official account of the negotiations mentioned a wide range of political, economic, and security issues being touched upon, with no specific deals previously unheard of, but, in fact, those have likely been sealed under wraps.

In Blake's visit, the intrigue revolved around the hypothetic US plan, recently cited by Kazakh Liter newspaper, to plant a military base in Uzbekistan. The point set forth in Liter was that the arrangement would fit neatly with Uzbekistan's foreign-policy logic, considering that the republic only briefly flirted with Russia after coming under fiery criticism in the West over the handling of the 2005 Andijan drama. By signaling the green light to a US military base on its territory, Uzbekistan would earn the status of Washington's key regional partner, generous economic and military aid, important guarantees, and a fresh sense of confidence vis-a-vis its neighbors with whom Tashkent occasionally gets locked in bitter resources-related disputes. For the US, the benefit of the partnership would be to have a foothold in Uzbekistan with an eye to muscling Russia and China in and beyond Central Asia. 

By all means, the paper in Liter, an outlet of Kazakhstan's ruling Nur Otan party, saw the light of day for serious reasons. On August 23, Russia's Kommersant business daily quoted sources with connections within the Uzbek foreign ministry as saying that Washington and Tashkent opened talks on the creation of an Operative Reaction Center in Uzbekistan charged with the mission of tight coordination to be launched if trouble starts to spill upon the 2014 US withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to Kommersant, the facility would be the biggest one to be run by the US in Central Asia. That, among other things, explains how and why the US plans to distribute much of the army stuff pulled out of Afghanistan among the central Asian republics: some would be supplied for free to Uzbekistan on a permanent basis to reinforce the Center and some – passed to the republic temporarily.

The US has a record of deploying military infrastructures in Uzbekistan. There used to be one – the Karshi-Khanabad base – in 2001-2005 at the Khanabad military aerodrome sited at a distance of 10 km from Karshi in the Qashqadaryo province. Its status was defined by an accord signed in October, 2001, and the US had to rebuild the facility from scratch to later keep there a fleet comprising a group of S-130 transports, a dozen of Black Hawks, and around 1,500 servicemen. The Karshi-Khanabad base was used to support the US operations in Afghanistan, but the US-Uzbek honeymoon came to an end as, under public pressure, Washington urged a fair probe into the 2005 Andijan unrest. In response, Tashkent stated in July, 2005 that the US forces were to leave Karshi-Khanabad within the term of six months, which they did by November the same year, with the homeless aircrafts relocating to Bagram airfield in Afghanistan or the Manas airbase leased to the US by Kyrgyzstan.

The plan for an Operative Reaction Center described by Kommersant implies a US military presence of more impressive proportions as much of the US power would be shifted to the post-Soviet space. If the US get a go-ahead in Uzbekistan, the new base would be packed with aircrafts, armored vehicles, and support infrastructures like arsenals and food depots, while the US forces on premises would far outnumber those that formerly inhabited Karshi-Khanabad. Washington evidently hopes to engage with Uzbekistan as Central Asia's top-populous republic and second-biggest economy strategically positioned in the region. Uzbekistan shares borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and sits fairly close to Iran and China, all of the countries potentially falling within reach for the US forces to be dispatched to the new base.

Under the circumstances, Moscow simply must take steps to dig into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A two-day negotiating marathon between Kyrgyz leader Almazbek Atambayev and Russia's deputy premier I. Shuvalov took place in Bishkek this month, and at the moment a package of three agreements – on the military, economic, and energy cooperation – wait to be inked next fall. Chances are that the deals on the construction of the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant and the Upper Naryn hydropower cascade – both of key importance to Bishkek – will go through earlier than by September 15. Above all, Kyrgyzstan said OK to a Russian military base on its soil (the lease term making 15 years). Against the background, it does remain unclear whether the US airbase in Manas is there to stay or will be closed in line with Atambayev's campaign pledge.

A question mark also hangs over the role of Tajikistan in the disposition now taking shape. Talks between Moscow and Dushanbe meant to hammer out an agreement on the lease term for Russia's 201th base in the republic are deadlocked, and at the moment unofficial reports indicate that the Tajik administration offers to renew the existing contract till 2016 instead of having it replaced and promises greater flexibility later on. The problem, though, is that Tajikistan is to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013-2014, the incumbent E. Rahmon is being challenged by a cohort of rivals, some of them – US-backed, and, given the prospects for regime change in Tajikistan, Moscow might raise strong objections to the delay.

No doubt, Moscow would be confronted with a situation calling for a  tougher than ever strategy if the Operative Reaction Center – a US military base to stay indefinitely in the post-Soviet space regarding which Russia has serious ambitions – pops up in Uzbekistan. Picking up after several makeshift bases narrowly geared to supply the Western coalition in Afghanistan, the facility would come as a slap in the face to Moscow, a humiliation comparable to what Washington would have experienced seeing Russia install a military base in Mexico, Nicaragua, or Cuba…
 

Rail traffic stoppages resulting in delays of cargo supplies to Tajikistan began in Uzbekistan in November, 2009. In January, 2010, the Uzbek railroad company disallowed under various pretexts the passage of around 150 railcars bound for Tajikistan, and by February the number rose to 400. Tajik premier's conversation with his Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev helped clear the way for 178 of the railcars stuck in Uzbekistan, but the overall situation with the transit between the two Central Asian republics remained essentially the same. According to Tajik officials, around 2,000 railcars carrying freight to Tajikistan were delayed by the Uzbek authorities since June, 2010. No railcars heading for Tajikistan's southern Khatlon province got the greenlight in early March – early May, and the total volume of freight transit via the Tajik railroad dropped by 40% over the first half of 2010. In Tajikistan, the fuel shortages which ensued put in jeopardy the sowing campaign, exposing to a critical risk the republic with a predominantly agrarian economy. 

There is firm belief in Dushanbe that the rail blockade imposed by Tashkent on Tajikistan came as a response to the intensification of construction of the Rogun Dam. In 2009, the Tajik administration conducted a campaign of offering to the population the Rogun hydroelectric project shares and managed to launch the dam rebuilding process. Uzbekistan reacted by delaying freight en route to Tajikistan in an attempt to impede the Rogun construction. At the moment, Uzbekistan seems to regard the Rogun project as the key threat to its national security as the dam has a potential to reduce the availability of water resources downstream the Amu Darya. Considering that 75% of the population of Uzbekistan are rural dwellers and are employed in agriculture or adjacent sectors of the economy, a decrease in water supply for agricultural needs may have an extremely negative impact on the republic. Tajikistan completed the preparatory phase at Rogun in 2010 and announced that technically everything was in place to block the flow of the Vakhsh, a tributary of the Amu Darya. The corresponding decision to be taken by a Tajik governmental commission was put on hold pending the finalization of the World Bank's Rogun assessment study. It is indeed likely that the intensification of the Rogun hydropower plant construction is the explanation behind the new round of tensions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which, even apart from the issue, have been locked in bitter disputes for years.

The conflict between the two republics saw escalation in November, 2011 following a blast at the Galaba-Amu Zang stretch of the Termez-Qurghonteppa railroad in southern Uzbekistan, not far from the Tajik and Afghan borders. The incident was promptly described as a terrorist attack by the Uzbek media and Uzbekistan suspended the Galaba-Amu Zang traffic in its wake, effectively subjecting Tajikistan's southern Khatlon province to a transit blockade. By the end of November, the number of railcars which were bound for Khatlon but got stuck in Uzbekistan reached 270. The Uzbek railroad company suggested redirecting them to Dushanbe, from where they could proceed to Tajikistan's south, but Tajikistan rejected the plan as excessively costly. In the process, Tajik experts actually contested the version by which the blast had been a terrorist act and expressed a view that, citing the incident, Tashkent seized the opportunity to put Dushanbe under pressure. Tajik railroad deputy-chief Vladimir Sobkalov said Uzbekistan's railroad company could easily restore the bridge damaged by the blast within 24 hours and stressed that Uzbekistan brushed off the Tajik offer of help in doing so. 

The round of tensions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan affected the whole Central Asian transit network. With a reference to freight delays in Uzbekistan, the Kazakh railroad company temporarily banned the transit of freight to Afghanistan via Tajikistan and the supply of all types of cargo other than grain to Uzbekistan from November 3 till December 12. Following a request from the Turkmen railroad officials, the loading of all freight with the exception of grain and flour for subsequent delivery to Afghanistan via Serhetabat was suspended for the same period of time. Kazakh railroad CEO K. Almagambetov said as a comment on the step that the ban was due to the Uzbek railroad administration's failure to handle the freight carried via the Saryagash railroad link where 20 trains had been delayed. The developments took place in the season when the majority of Central Asians stockpile food supplies for the coming winter, and the termination of supplies from Kazakhstan immediately told on the adjacent republics' consumer markets. 

Head of the UN's World Food Program (WFP) office in Tajikistan Alzira Ferreira warned on December 13 that Tajikistan's population may face food shortages as a result of the Uzbek blockade. She told that even trains carrying humanitarian aid were unable to make it to Tajikistan, and the number of trains with foodstuffs intercepted by Uzbekistan reached 23. The UN provides food aid to around 500,000 residents of the Khatlon province and to the region's 2,000 schools. According to Ferreira, the delays caused the food prices in Tajikistan to grow and were leaving increasing numbers of people in the republic without subsistence.

On January 18, Tajik railroad deputy-chief Vladimir Sobkalov charged that Uzbekistan's blocking railroad traffic to Khatlon was politically motivated. Tajik railroad official Usmon Kalandarov said the Uzbek authorities indicated that the damaged bridge would be rebuilt only when they are through with the investigation into the blast. He quoted the Uzbek side as saying that the bridge pillars had to be repaired but contended that the pillars were actually intact. By the time 298 railcars with freight for South Tajikistan, including 72 with flour, 26 with wheat, 25 with concrete, 26 with gasoline, 8 with jet fuel, 8 with gas, 3 with diesel fuel, and 56 with other types of cargo – were bogged down at the border between the republics. 

The border situation further overheated due to the November 13 incident involving the death of an Uzbek borderguard. The Tajik story is that the Uzbek borderguards invaded Tajikistan while trailing smugglers who were illicitly carrying a shipment of electronic appliances, but the Uzbek officials maintain that the smugglers were drug traffickers eventually caught with 3.8 kg of heroin. Uzbekistan deployed considerable forces – tanks and artillery – in the proximity of the Tajik border in the aftermath, triggering an outbreak of panic in Tajikistan's border-area Sughd Province. Tashkent unexpectedly shut down 9 of the existing 16 checkpoints on the Uzbek-Tajik border in mid-January on the grounds that the facilities awaited renovation, while deputy head of the Tajik Customs Service Negmat Rakhmatov made it clear that Tajikistan received closure notifications concerning only some of the checkpoints and several went offline unnanouncedly. It is also worth noting in the context that since 2000 travel between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is subject to visa requirements and that the transit between the two republics via expressways or by air is completely missing. 

As of today, the relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are far more unfriendly than those between any other pair of Central Asian republics. It may be an accomplished fact that the visa regime is no longer unusual for the region, but the transit blockade and recurrent fatal border-zone clashes clearly make the Uzbek-Tajik conflict the worst in Central Asia. Curiously, in the meantime Tashkent's and Dushanbe's foreign-policy priorities are fairly similar as both recently took to cultivating ties with Washington and – to counter the Russian influence – increasingly favor the US entrenchment. WikiLeaks revelations showed that Washington sees the current Tajik diplomacy chief and number one pro-Western politician Hamrokhon Zarifi as the future leader of Tajikistan, but there are no reasons to hope that his likely presidency would help defuse the Uzbek-Tajik conflict.